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Several studies have found that microcredit is unsuccessful in increasing rural household’s 
socioeconomic welfare. To improve the effectiveness of credit, researchers suggest that non-credit 
support services should be provided alongside financial support. Despite Thailand agricultural 
cooperatives (ACs) offering such services, Thailand poverty rates remain high, particularly in rural 
areas. Low participation rates may explain why ACs have been largely ineffective in improving rural 
household welfare. This study investigates the reasons behind low AC member participation rates 
to increase their effectiveness, improve rural Thai households’ socioeconomic welfare, and 
ultimately decrease Thailand’s poverty levels.  
We used rural household survey data from the Nakhonratchasima province, in Northeast Thailand. 
Data was collected from AC members and non-members in 2017 using a two-stage stratified 
sampling technique. Our study used the probit model to estimate the probability of AC participation 
and the Heckman selection model to examine determinants influencing AC service participation 
and participation levels. Using the Endogenous Switching Regression and Endogenous Switching 
Probit models, this study evaluated the effects of AC credit and non-credit support services on rural 
Thai households’ socioeconomic welfare. 
Our results reveal that social networks play a significant role in motivating households to join ACs 
credit and support services. Households residing in an AC village are more likely to become AC 
members and participate in AC services due to easy access and low travel costs. ACs assist largely 
middle-class households in accessing credit and markets; poor households still have difficulties 
accessing credit services. Lastly, perceptions of agricultural risks and the expected benefits of 
membership impact on households’ decisions to participate in ACs. Members who believe that ACs 
can help them obtain credit are more likely to join. Households use marketing services because 
they believe ACs provide quality inputs and farm products at reasonable prices. 
 iii 
The ESR and ESP model results reveal that AC service participation plays an important role in 
improving household socioeconomic welfare. AC credit has a significant positive effect on household 
and farm income, and household consumption. In contrast, AC marketing service participation 
increases household and farm income, but not consumption. AC credit and marketing services do not 
improve educational expenditure and school enrolment rates. While AC credit considerably increases 
the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, using AC agricultural extension services 
does not improve farm production. Households’ health affordability and health access improve when 
they borrow money from, or trade with ACs. AC marketing services are more effective than AC credit 
in improving household welfare. 
To improve AC credit and AC support service participation, households must reduce their agricultural 
risks and improve their agricultural production capacities. One practical way is through participating 
in government-run agricultural development projects. To ensure the government farm development 
projects reach their target population, ACs should provide their members with advice about the 
program’s suitability. Moreover, ACs can increase service participation rates through providing 
farmers with specific information about the benefits of joining a cooperative, redesigning their 
service policies, and developing AC networks. ACs should also offer their services to poorer 
households if they meet certain criteria. 
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At the end of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) period in 2015, the World Bank reported 
that the world had made significant progress in its alleviation of poverty (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
The percentage of global poverty has declined continuously from 1,897 million people (35.9% of the 
global population) in 1990 to about 731 million people (9.9% of the global population) in 2015. 
However, the portion of people living on less than $1.901  a day still remains unacceptably high ( 
World Bank, 2016a). The largest group of poor live in rural areas and work in the agricultural sector. 




Figure 1.1 Number of the Poor    Figure 1.2 Proportion of the Poor 
Source: World Bank, 2019 
Rural finance plays a crucial role in well-being of rural people. Agricultural production is a long-term 
investment. In addition, rural households face natural uncertainty (droughts and floods) and market 
volatility in terms of their products and prices. In these conditions, less revenue and/or more 
expenditure negatively impact rural households’ welfare. Rural finance enables individuals to invest 
more in economic activities and ultimately smooth their consumption (Reed, 2011). As a result of 
increased investment, rural people can improve their productivity, asset formation, and generate 
more income. Increasing income enhances the opportunity for the poor to attain food and services. 
Eventually, they can improve their family’s livelihood by obtaining better nutrition, health care, 
 
1 The World Bank (2015) defines poverty as living below US $1.90 a day (the national poverty line). 
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education and potentially escape from poverty. For example, a low-income household in Bangladesh 
can increase their income due to credit provided by the Grameen Bank (Islam, 2008).  
The borrowers spend credit on income generating activities and human capital development, such as 
their children education and family members’ health. As a consequence, their incomes and well-
being increases.  
Unfortunately, a lack of access to traditional financial institutions is still a barrier for many rural 
populations. Mainstream banks ignore the poor in rural areas because of high transaction costs, risky 
activities, a lack of collateral, and poor financial records. The poor only request a small amount of 
credit for their small scale farms or agriculture-related activities. Moreover, there is a high cost of 
serving rural households due to living in low population, low density areas, and poor infrastructure. It 
costs too much for banks to set up the loans and that is why banks are not interested in having them 
as customers. Farmers’ incomes are unstable since their crop yields are seasonal and prices are 
volatile. Moreover, serving the rural credit market is complicated based on the types of crops that 
farmers grow. These factors means that formal financial institutions are reluctant to serve rural 
customers (Charitonenko & Campion, 2003). As a result of a lack of access to formal credit, rural 
people turn to informal agents who charge high interest rates and offer limited financial services. The 
high cost of informal credit impedes production investment, contributing little to income generation. 
Thus low income households become trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty (Charitonenko & Campion, 
2003).  
Agricultural Cooperatives (ACs), one type of microfinance institution (MFI), is a viable option for rural 
households to combat poverty (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012a). ACs 
have more than 800 million members and provide 100 million jobs worldwide, which is 20% greater 
than multinational enterprises (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011). 
A cooperative is defined as a group of people working together to achieve a common purpose for its 
members through sharing ownership and making democratic decisions (Dardak, 2015). A 
Cooperative  works on cooperative principles; they are member-owned, member-run and member-
serving (Dardak, 2015). ACs or farmers’ cooperatives are groups of farmers who work together for 
the common good. ACs aim to maximize members’ benefits. ACs were established because farmers 
were not able to access high quality inputs at reasonable prices. In addition, farmers face many 
obstacles such as having to use middlemen to sell their products, and a lack of transportation and 
infrastructure to reach markets (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012a). In 
addition to credit, ACs provide access to natural resources, access to input and output markets, 
various technologies, information and training. Members gain bargaining power and receive better 
prices. Moreover, ACs increase small farmers’ ability by providing information and knowledge that 
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enables them to apply innovation and technology in their production. This includes adapting to a 
changing market. With the support of these non-credit services, farmers can improve their 
production and market power; as a result, their income increases contributing to improvement in 
their welfare and a reduction in their levels of poverty. For example, the goal of goat ACs in Nepal is 
to develop markets for high quality breeding goats. Under this program, smallholder farmers can 
produce surpluses, gain market access and improve their incomes (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 2011). 
There are two types of ACs; agricultural production cooperatives and agricultural service 
cooperatives (Smith, 2011). Members of agricultural production cooperatives share production 
resources, such as land and machinery. Agricultural service cooperatives, which are the major form 
of AC, provide diverse services to members. The agricultural service cooperatives are divided into 
supply cooperatives which provide members with inputs for farm production (seeds, fertilizers and 
machinery services), and marketing cooperatives, which include transportation, packing, distribution, 
and marketing for agricultural products. 
ACs provide credit and non-credit support services such as purchasing, marketing and agricultural 
extension services to their members. ACs are involved in many activities, however, each AC focuses 
on different activities which are appropriate for their members’ needs and problems. For example, 
coffee cooperatives in EI Salvador and milk cooperatives in India focus on marketing activities in 
order to solve market access and middlemen problems for their members (Ruete, 2014). Coffee 
cooperatives in El Salvador encourage members to sell their coffee through cooperatives because 
they provide economic benefits. Indian milk cooperatives remove the role of middlemen by 
connecting producers directly to consumers. Danish cooperatives and the Organic Producers and 
Processors Association of Zambia (OPPAZ) help small farmers achieve higher product prices by 
improving the quality and volume of products (Ruete, 2014). OPPAZ focuses on agricultural extension 
services and purchasing activities by providing their members with innovative equipment and 
technologies. Using new technologies, members are able to improve the quality and quantity of their 
products leading to higher prices and revenues. These cooperatives also offer non-credit support 
services to improve their effectiveness. 
Funding and member participation are key factors in AC success (Ruete, 2014). Funding scarcity is a 
result of a lack of member participation in ACs. The main sources of funding are internal funds such 
as equity, savings, and profits from members’ businesses. Therefore the amount of funding depends 
on business volume, which members operate through ACs. In order to resolve funding problems, 
some Asian countries such as China, Indonesia and Malaysia, use business partners. In these 
countries, ACs operate in cooperation with the government. ACs are used as a channel to implement 
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the government’s development plan at a community level. In order to fulfil its development plan, the 
government typically subsidises financial and human capital and provides ACs with staff members, 
agricultural funding and marketing. For example, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments  
provide funding to the ACs and in turn, the ACs offers credit and input such as fertilizers to its 
members (Ahmad, 2006; Suradisastra, 2006). In addition, the Indonesian government purchases all 
farming products from the country’s ACs and offers guaranteed prices. Similarly, the Malaysian 
government has established specific government organizations to support agricultural development 
and provide markets for farm products. Thus, the government can control the type and quantity of 
farm production. Due to government support, many farmers choose to participate ACs since these 
support services improve members’ production and opportunities to access markets, which 
ultimately increase their income (Ahmad, 2006; Suradisastra, 2006).  
Another successful example of AC partnership can be found in China. The Chinese government aims 
to improve the quality of farm production and control the quantity of farm products. The Chinese 
government has negotiated a contract with farmers, using ACs as an implementing channel. Using 
farming contracts, the government can control quantity and quality of farm products. The 
government provides credit and controls what farmers produce and how much farm inputs (e.g. 
fertilizers and pesticides) they are able to use through the ACs (Hoken & Su, 2015; Ito, Bao, & Su, 
2012). 
Proper financing is the crucial factor which influences AC success (Williams, 2007). By partnering with 
the government, ACs have sufficient cash flow to function effectively. ACs that operate without a 
partner have to finance themselves by borrowing from banks, providing savings, and issuing shares. 
While they have management independence, their funding is limited and insufficient to support all of 
their members’ needs. For instance, both Thai and Filipino ACs operate without partners and thus 
often face a lack of funding and members’ participation (Araullo, 2006; Thuvachote, 2007). Most of 
the ACs are either too small or still immature. Their main funding sources are equity, borrowing, and 
savings. Thus, they have limited financial resources to support their services, especially in the case of 
supporting all services simultaneously. Funding scarcity impedes AC effectiveness. Due to ACs’ 
inefficiency, farmers are not interested in becoming members or participating in their businesses. 
1.2 Rural Poverty and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand 
Thailand population structure is similar to many other developing countries. The major proportion of 
the total population (about 84%) live in rural areas (Cooperative Promotion Department, 2014). 
More than one third, or 35% of the total rural population, work in the agricultural sector and about 
31% of the total rural households are freelancers or unemployed (Community Development 
Department, 2014). These rural households have limited resources, low levels of education and 
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capital. Therefore, they have low abilities to mitigate risk, manage their resources and cash flow 
when unexpected crises happen. These factors mean that they are likely to remain in poverty. In 
2013, approximately 4.9 million Thais or 66.6% of the poor live in rural areas (Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Council, 2015). Figure 1.3 shows that rural poverty is far higher 
compared to urban poverty.  
ACs assist small farmers who are disadvantaged in the recently commercialized economy. With 
regards to self-sufficient development, ACs have two important roles; providing financial capital and 
production assistance to rural households. ACs deliver credit and non-credit support programs to 
support farmers’ production by connecting them to input and output markets and other farmers. 
Integrating all product support enables farmers to generate income and improve their livelihoods 
which results in poverty reduction (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation, 2012b).  
The first AC, Wat Chan Cooperative Unlimited Liability, was established by the government in 
Phitsanulok, Thailand on the 26th of February 1916 (Cooperative League of Thailand, 2012). This was 
because Thai farmers faced sudden changes in the economy and natural disasters such as droughts 
and floods. When Thailand began to trade with foreign countries in 1914, this led to a change from a 
self-sufficient economy to one based on trade (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). However, the majority of 
farmers were unable to compete in the commercialized economy due to the nature of their farming 
practices (they were small scale farmers) and financial constraints. This change led them to increase 
their debt. Many ultimately lost their land (Cooperative League of Thailand, 2012). The Wat Chan 
Cooperative Unlimited Liability provided farmers with credit. Their primary aim was to reduce small 
farmers’ debts and improve their livelihoods. 
 
Figure 1.3 Rural Versus Urban Poor in Thailand 
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At present, ACs operate under the Cooperative Societies Act, B.E. 2542. Their primary objective is to 
provide support for all areas of agricultural production, including marketing development, and 
ultimately to improve members’ well-being via increased income (Registrar and Law Office, 2016). 
ACs membership consists of common members and ordinary members. Both members live in the 
community, but common members are those who perform agricultural activities while ordinary 
members work in any occupation. Only one member of each household can be an AC member. Most 
ACs members are small and medium farmers, located in rural areas, with restricted access to 
financial and product markets (Thuvachote, 2011). ACs play an important role in improving 
agricultural production and resolving financial capital scarcity and market accessibility for their 
members. 
Thai ACs are unique and different from other ACs worldwide. Thai ACs combine supply cooperatives 
with marketing cooperatives in order to serve the whole supply chain of agricultural production. To 
meet members’ needs, Thai ACs provide six services to members; these are credit, savings and 
deposits, purchasing, marketing, food processing, and agricultural extension services (Thuvachote, 
2007). For financial services, ACs provide credit and saving facilities. ACs provide farmers with loans 
for both production and consumption purposes such as buying seeds, fertilizers, and machinery, 
along with purchasing or improving land. In terms of loan duration, loans are divided into short-term, 
medium-term, and long-term for urgent need, cultivation investment, and asset investment, 
respectively (Thuvachote, 2007). ACs are popular choices for farmers because borrowing from them 
entails several advantages such as low interest rates and flexible repayment schedules compared 
with bank loans. The annual interest rates charged by ACs is around 6% (Ministry of Agriculture 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2005). This rate is slightly higher than the BAAC rate but it is less than 
commercial bank rates (Preedasak & NaRanong, 2001). AC loan terms and conditions are designed to 
match the farmer’s cash flow. In order to reduce members’ vulnerability, ACs encourage members to 
save by offering two types of savings; savings and fixed term deposits (Cooperative Promotion 
Department, 2015). 
Besides credit and savings, Thai ACs also provide non-credit support services which cover the overall 
supply chain. Non-credit support services can reinforce credit effectiveness and enable farming 
households to improve their welfare. For production, AC members are served by purchasing and 
agricultural extension services to develop their productivity and access input markets. Offering 
opportunities for purchasing agricultural goods is an important service for members since it enables 
them to gain access to good quality agricultural machinery and materials at lower prices. ACs sell 
agricultural supplies and consumer goods in order to reduce members’ costs and ensure that 
members can access input at reasonable prices. Agricultural extension services promote farmers’ 
productivity and reduce costs, including land development, irrigation and demonstration farms. The 
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agricultural extension service is funded through sharing expenses among AC members (Cooperative 
Promotion Department, 2015). 
In terms of distribution, ACs also offer marketing and food processing services to enable members 
access to product markets and also add value to their agriculture products. ACs often collect and sell 
members’ products directly to the markets at market prices with fair weights and measurements. 
The marketing service is crucial since ACs are able to bypass the middleman (something which 
individual farmers are not able to do) (Preedasak & NaRanong, 2001). Both practices increase 
farmers’ bargaining power. Moreover, members can earn more income via food processing activities. 
Overall, ACs in Thailand promotes a certain level of business growth. ACs are successful in terms of 
the number of members and business volume. The number of AC members has been steadily 
increasing for the past ten years (see Figure 1.4). Although AC branches have decreased (see Figure 
1.4), they continue to serve rural low-income people throughout the country; in 2014 there were 
4,317 institutions (Cooperative Auditing Department, 2015; Lewis, Tambunlertchai, Suesuwan, Adair, 
& Hickson, 2013). The success of ACs in Thailand is demonstrated by the total volume of business. 
Total business volume has risen gradually since 2005 to 2013, with the exception of 2014. In 2014, 
the growth rate was negative, at -4% (see Table 1.1). This was due to a decline in the business 
volume of AC marketing services. 
 
Figure 1.4 Number of Agricultural Cooperatives and Members in Thailand (2006-2015) 
Source: Cooperative Promotion Department, 2015a 
Thai ACs have been in existence for more than 100 years, but most have been unable to achieve self-
sufficiency. This is because they face problems such as low member participation, ineffective 
operations, and vague development plans (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). Only a few ACs are successful, 
such as the Khao Kitchakood Agricultural Cooperative (KAC), Phan Fisheries Cooperative (PFC), Green 
Net Cooperative (GNC), and Tha-Yang Cooperative Ltd., (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). Their 
achievements are the result of success in product quality improvement, marketing management, and 
high member participation in AC services. They solve excessive supply problems and low prices by 
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improving the quality of members’ products and/or establish markets for high quality products. 
These strategies have been successful; members are willing to join non-credit AC support services 
and learn new techniques to improve their production. As a result, members’ incomes and well-being 
increases. 
While ACs succeed in members and business growth, they are not always able to fulfil their core 
mission (which is to improve rural households’ economic and social welfare). Thai ACs face many 
problems. One of the most serious problems for Thai ACs is low member participation in non-credit 
support services, especially in marketing and food processing. Only 2.40 and 8.35% of AC members 
join marketing and processing programs respectively (see Table 1.2). Limited member participation in 
marketing is a serious problem, as the more members who participate the greater ACs’ bargaining 
power is. Bargaining power enables small farmers to compete with private traders and obtain higher 
prices for their products. Low participation in marketing services means that members lose 
opportunities to increase their income. The AC purchasing program exhibited 34.20% participation in 
2013 (see Table 1.2). The purchasing program provides goods for consumption and production 
materials which meet members’ needs and are essential to agricultural production and consumption 
(Preedasak, 1998). In addition, buying input and goods from ACs provides members with many 
advantages compared to buying from merchants; these include paying fair prices, buying on 
installment plans with low interest rates, good quality products, and saving transaction costs. 
Strong member participation in AC services is a crucial factor which affects the cooperative’s and 
members’ benefits (Ruete, 2014; Williams, 2007). As noted earlier, ACs are operated by members 
and their capital and cash flow depend on members’ transactions. If there is low member 
participation or trade through ACs, they will not have enough capital to survive and to help poor rural 
households. Low member participation in Thai ACs should be analysed in order to ensure that they 




Table 1.1 Business Volumes of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (2005-2014) 
          Unit: Million Baht 




Total Growth Rate 
(%) 
2005 28,717.57  32,026.95   24,754.76  -   -           294.55    85,793.83    
2006 30,554.48  33,423.12  30,061.45   -   -           255.98    94,295.03            9.91  
2007 33,224.46  37,312.66   35,050.57   -     10,879.83           296.62  116,764.14          23.83  
2008 36,580.17  40,369.96  39,814.56   -     10,811.06           294.78  127,870.53            9.51  
2009 43,572.83  45,366.93  50,084.34   45,774.64        1,522.94          311.60  186,633.28          45.95  
2010 50,540.69  51,826.41  44,835.00  55,676.12     12,142.79          332.08  215,353.09          15.39  
2011 57,006.30  58,467.20  48,137.24   73,517.11     18,645.33           380.29  256,153.47          18.95  
2012 63,837.06  67,003.72  55,533.50  85,266.74     18,269.59           439.58  290,350.19          13.35  
2013 71,855.54  77,498.44   64,670.62   74,150.81     18,045.82           450.97  306,672.20            5.62  
2014 68,970.87  81,893.75  68,796.48  58,586.75     15,700.91           431.88  294,380.64  - 4.01  
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department, 2014 
Table 1.2 Performance of Agricultural Cooperatives and Member Participation Numbers, 2013 (By Type of Cooperative) 
 
Type of Business Business Volume  Members' patronage 
Volume 
(Million Baht) 
Percentage  Number Percentage Compared 
with Total Members 
Depositing 69,174.51 20.45  1,291,774 20.19 
Credit 76,936.73 22.74  1,034,780 16.17 
Purchasing 71,413.90 21.11  2,188,324 34.20 
Marketing 92,317.17 27.29  153,288 2.40 
Processing 25,199.55 7.45  534,517 8.35 
Agricultural Extension Service 3,277.72 0.97  130,847 2.05 
Others 0.00 0  26,766 0.42 
Total 338,319.58 100  5,360,296 83.78 
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department, 2014 
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1.3 Research Problems and Questions 
In recent years, household debt in Thailand has skyrocketed. It is approximately 83% of Thailand’s 
gross domestic product (Thailand Development Research Institution, 2015) and about 48.84% of total 
household debt is in the agricultural sector (Bunthong, 2014). One solution suggests that credit 
provisions enable households to improve their economic conditions through investment in income 
generating activities (Islam, 2008; Kondo, Orbeta, Dingcong, & Infantado, 2008; Li, Gan, & Hu, 
2011b). However, the literature shows that only providing credit (without other services) does not 
lead to a reduction in debt and/or poverty (Anuchitworawong, 2007; Poapongsakorn, 2014). Thai 
households remain in debt because they are unable to utilize the loans effectively or to generate 
income (Thailand Development Research Institution, 2015). 
Several studies have found that microcredit alone is insufficient for promoting rural household 
welfare because borrowers do not have the capabilities to invest the loans in productive activities. 
They are more likely to spend it in consumption than invest in activities that will generate income 
(Ashakul & Chandoevlwit, 2007; Boonperm, Haughton, & Khandker, 2013; Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 
2008). Borrowers cannot generate sufficient income to enable them to repay the loans and thus they 
are unable to improve their welfare. Moreover, borrowers often spend most of their loans in interest 
payments and repaying debt to other lenders (Ashakul & Chandoevlwit, 2007; Boonperm et al., 
2013). 
In order to improve the effectiveness of credit, some researchers suggest that non-credit support 
services, such as purchasing, marketing, and agricultural extension services, should be provided 
simultaneously with credit (Chowdhury, 2009; Hulme & Mosley, 1996). These non-credit support 
services are important to enable borrowers to invest in income generating activities. Agricultural 
extension services are necessary to develop borrowers’ abilities and improve their productivity. 
Moreover, producers have more opportunities to access markets due to AC purchasing and 
marketing services. 
Examples of successful financial institutions providing non-financial services are coffee cooperatives 
in Ethiopia and financial institutions in Sri Lanka. In Ethiopia, small farmers have been confronted 
with several problems, such as unstable coffee prices, high risk investments, low returns, and poor 
infrastructure. In order to help them to overcome such obstacles, coffee cooperatives provide credit 
and saving services, coffee marketing, and distributing or selling inputs to members. As a result of 
marketing and distributing services, Ethiopian farmers who participate in coffee cooperatives have 
gained access to markets and received fairer prices for their product. Coffee cooperative members 
earned more income by 26% compared to not being a member and improved the lives of 15 million 
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small farmers in 2010 (Mojo, Fischer, & Degefa, 2015b). Similarly, two financial institutions, TCCSs 
and SEEDS, in Sri Lanka provide both financial and non-financial services. In terms of non-financial 
services, these cooperatives provide skill training, marketing and purchasing services, business 
development, and educational programs. With the support of non-financial services, borrowers learn 
to use loans productively. One study reveals that households that use non-financial services earn 
more than those who do not. The non-financial services increased monthly income by Rs. 1,312 per 
household (Herath, Gunaratne, & Sanderatne, 2013). 
In Thailand, ACs provide non-credit support services. Thai ACs offer non-credit support services to 
support members’ agricultural production and marketing for generating income and improving well-
being. ACs have been promoted by the Thai government as the main financial intermediaries for 
rural people to enhance their access to financial capital (Banking with the Poor Network, & 
Foundation for Development Cooperation, 2010; Lewis et al., 2013). 
Despite Thai ACs providing credit and non-credit support programs to help rural households, the 
number of poor in rural areas have not reduced as forecast (see Figure 1.3). One possible cause 
impeding AC effectiveness in poverty reduction is low participation rates. Only 18.59% of the total 
Thai rural population are AC members (Cooperative Promotion Department, 2014; World Bank, 
2016b). Another possible reason is that AC members do not use integrated services and therefore 
ACs cannot work as effectively to support the whole supply chain of members’ production. Since 
most rural people have a low income and a poor standard of living, smooth consumption is the rural 
poor’s first priority (Chanchengpanich, 2015). Thus, many AC members prefer to borrow and to buy 
inputs at low prices instead of using existing non-credit services such as marketing, processing, and 
agricultural extension services (Chiengkul, 2015).  
There are limited studies which examine how to improve rural household welfare through credit and 
non-credit support services. Previous studies on credit impact evaluation in Thailand have paid 
attention on the impact of credit product provided by other financial institutions such as the VF, 
BAAC, and informal MFIs. For example, Charitonenko and Campion (2003), Coleman (1999, 2006), 
and Vijitsrikamol, Bunyasiri, Sirijinda, and Kitchaicharoen (2013) have all studied the impact of 
microcredit on borrowers’ welfare in Thailand. Moreover, there are many studies which focus on the 
impact of microcredit offered by the Village Fund (Boonperm et al., 2013; Chandoevwit & Ashakul, 
2008; Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). In terms of the impact of ACs, there is only one study which 
describes the role of cooperatives in poverty reduction in Thailand. Thuvachote (2011) uses 
descriptive analysis to investigate the role of ACs on rural poor households. Our study will bridge the 
gap in the literature by focusing on rural household welfare improvement through AC credit and non-
credit support services. The findings of our study will enable practitioners and policymakers to have a 
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clearer understanding of the role of ACs on rural household welfare, rural household needs, and the 
effects of ACs on rural household welfare. As a result, policymakers and practitioners will be able to 
develop better AC credit and non-credit support services to meet rural household needs and work 
more effectively to improve rural household welfare. 
The purpose of our study is firstly to evaluate the effect of AC credit and non-credit support 
programs on rural household welfare and secondly, to examine the determinants of rural 
households’ participation in AC credit and non-credit support programs. Our study is guided by four 
research questions:  
Research Question 1. How can ACs help Thai rural households to improve their economic and 
social welfare? 
Research Question 2. What are the effects of AC credit provisions on Thai rural households’ 
economic and social welfare? 
Research Question 3. What are the effects of AC non-credit support programs on Thai rural 
households’ economic and social welfare? 
Research Question 4. In what ways can ACs improve both credit and non-credit support services in 
order to meet members’ needs? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The main objective of the current study is to examine the effects of ACs’ credit and non-credit 
support programs on Thai rural household’s economic and social welfare. The objectives are: 
1. to investigate the role of ACs in improving Thai rural households’ economic and social welfare; 
2. to investigate the determinants of rural households’ participations in AC credit and non-credit 
support services; 
3. to evaluate the effects of AC credit provisions on Thai rural households’ economic and social 
welfare; 




1.5 Contribution of the Study 
While the Thai government has noted the central role of ACs in improving rural households’ 
economic and social welfare, there are limited studies which focus on how to improve rural 
household welfare through their services and programs. Most prior studies on impact assessment in 
Thailand focus on other MFIs such as informal MFIs and village funds. Our study will bridge the gaps 
in previous studies by focusing on improving rural household welfare via ACs in both credit and non-
credit support services. It will thereby help practitioners and policymakers to better understand the 
effects of ACs on rural household welfare. Moreover, the study will provide significant information 
for practitioners and policymakers regarding the different types of products and services that work 
best for the target customers. Both policymakers and the ACs administrators can apply the findings 
from our study to improve rural household welfare and to increase operational efficiency. 
Moreover, most prior studies tend to examine the impact of AC participation on household economic 
welfare using income, consumption and assets as indicators of poverty alleviation. Our research 
employs social effects such as children’s education levels and access to healthcare services, to 
measure effects of rural households’ participation in ACs’ credit and non-credit support services 
(marketing and agricultural extension services). Using social effects to measure the impact of 
participation in ACs’ credit and non-credit support will provide a different picture of the effect of AC 
participation on rural household welfare. By doing this, our study will contribute to the growing body 
of literature in this field. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the ACs 
currently operating in Thailand. It defines the cooperative concept, outlines agricultural cooperatives 
in Thailand, and explores the role of Thai ACs in poverty reduction. Chapter 3 reviews the literature 
on the demand theory focusing on credit and marketing services and theory of credit rationing. It 
also includes an overview of determinants of households’ decisions to participate in credit and non-
credit support services and the effects of AC participation on households’ economic and social 
welfare. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology and profiles of the sampled households in the 
survey. Chapters 5 and 6 present results and discussion. While Chapter 5 discusses the determinants 
of participation in ACs, AC credit, and non-credit support services, Chapter 6 evaluates the effects of 
participation in AC credit and non-credit support services on household economic and social welfare. 
To mitigate selection bias, two models are applied to assess the effects of AC service participation. 
Finally, Chapter 7, the final chapter, presents the conclusion, policy implications, limitations of study, 
and topics for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand 
This chapter provides an overview of the cooperative concept, ACs in Thailand, and the role of ACs in 
the Thai economy, particularly in relation to poverty reduction. This chapter is divided into four 
sections. Section 2.1 describes key cooperative principles and provides an overview of the different 
types of cooperatives. Section 2.2 focuses on Thai ACs, including their evolution, current status, as 
well as challenges and innovations. Section 2.3 examines the role of ACs in rural finance and the 
agricultural market. Lastly, section 2.4 explains how ACs can assist rural households in poverty 
reduction in general, and concludes by explaining the situation in Thailand. 
2.1 Cooperative Concept  
2.1.1 Cooperative Definition and Principles 
The definition of cooperatives varies greatly. According to the International Cooperative Alliance 
(ICA), a cooperative is “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise” (Zeuli, Cropp, & Schaars, 2004, p.1). The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA, 1987) define cooperatives as, “a user owned, a user controlled 
business that distributes benefits on the base of use” (Zeuli et al., 2004, p.1). In the case of Thailand 
(according to the Cooperative Act, B.E. 2542), a cooperative is “a group of persons who jointly 
conduct affairs for socio-economic interests on the basis of self-help and mutual assistance and are 
required under this Act” (Thuvachote, 2007, p.4). Cooperatives can be defined by two characteristics. 
Firstly, cooperatives are voluntary organizations formed by persons to serve their socio-economic 
needs. Secondly, cooperatives are owned by their users, controlled by their users and the benefits 
should be distributed to those users (Zeuli et al., 2004). 
Cooperatives follows seven basic principles, which are interpreted by ICA as follows ( ICA, 2006, as 
cited in Tamirat, 2015; ICA, 1995, as cited in Tereda, 2011): 
1. Voluntary and open membership. 
Cooperatives are voluntary associations where every person can be member and use their 
services without discrimination, based on gender, social, and religion. 
2. Democratic member control. 
Cooperative members are able to democratically control, govern, and contribute to cooperative 
policies through voting. Every member is equal based on the one member one vote principle.  
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3. Member economic participation. 
Cooperative members can participate in cooperative operations by contributing and controlling 
cooperative capital, engaging in cooperative businesses, and supporting cooperative activities. 
Members contribute to cooperative capital by investing in equity which is a condition of 
membership. Engaging in cooperative business is important to cooperatives’ success (Mensah, 
Karantininis, Adegbidi, & Okello, 2012). 
4. Autonomy and independence. 
Cooperatives are self-governing and self-help organizations which are controlled by their 
members. 
5. Education, training, and information. 
Cooperatives provide knowledge to members, representatives, managers, and employees to 
develop the cooperative. The members, representatives, and employees can engage in education 
and training supported by the cooperative.  
6. Cooperation among cooperatives. 
In order to work efficiently, cooperatives should cooperate with local, national, and international 
cooperatives. 
7. Concern for community. 
Community development is one of the cooperative’s goals. Therefore, the cooperative should be 
designed to ensure community sustainability. 
Based on these principles, cooperatives differ from business organizations. Cooperatives belong to 
users or members. The users are able to make decisions through their votes and via representatives 
on  the board of directors (Zeuli et al., 2004). In addition, members ought to share the benefits and 
costs, as well as the risk of running cooperative businesses (Zeuli et al., 2004). 
2.1.2 Different Types of Cooperatives  
Cooperatives may be classified into different groups, depending on different features: groups served, 
size, areas, functions, types of membership, as well as legal status and financial structures 
(Williamson, 1987). With respect to the groups served, cooperatives are divided into agricultural 
producer and consumer cooperatives. The most important agricultural producer cooperative is the 
AC. ACs are divided into two main types; agricultural production cooperatives and agricultural service 
cooperatives (Bernard, Spielman, Taffesse, & Gabre-madhin, 2010). Agricultural production 
cooperatives are collective production units whose members share capital and utilize resources 
together. Agricultural service cooperatives serve other functions such as marketing, supply, and 
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services. Consumer cooperatives are divided on the basis of products served, such as consumer 
goods, credit, health care, housing cooperatives, and mutual insurance companies (Williamson, 
1987). 
In terms of areas served, there are four types of cooperatives; local, regional, national, and 
international cooperatives. Local cooperatives are trading centre for members who are individuals. 
Regional cooperatives provide wholesaling and manufacturing services. Some special services that 
regional cooperatives cannot provide are served by national cooperatives. International cooperatives 
perform business on an international basis (Williamson, 1987). 
ACs may also be grouped based on their functions, such as marketing, supply, and service 
cooperatives. Marketing cooperatives provide marketing services for members’ farm products. 
Supply cooperatives offer farm materials and equipment, such as seeds, fertilizers, petroleum 
products, farm equipment, as well as food. Service cooperatives provide extension services to 
members at competitive prices, such as credit, electricity, telephone, insurance, and irrigation 
(Williamson, 1987). 
In terms of member type, there are four types of cooperatives; local, federated, centralized, and 
mixed cooperatives. Members of local cooperatives are farmers, while local cooperatives are 
members of the federated cooperatives which control local cooperatives. Centralized cooperatives 
are similar to local cooperatives, except that they operate in large areas or across states. Mixed 
cooperatives serve both individual and local cooperatives (Williamson, 1987). 
In terms of the financial structure criteria, cooperatives are divided into stock and non-stock 
cooperatives. They differ in terms of ownership. Ownership of stock cooperatives is stockholders’ 
equity represented by a share of stock while ownership of non-stock cooperative is membership. 
Another criteria for group cooperatives is legal status; there are both incorporated and 
unincorporated cooperatives (Williamson, 1987). 
2.2 Overview of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand 
2.2.1 The Cooperative Movement in Thailand 
In Thailand, cooperatives have been operating for 100 years. Cooperatives were initially developed to 
solve farmers’ debt and a lack of capital lack for farm production (Pratuckchai & Patichol, 2016). The 
success of the first cooperative led to the establishment of other cooperatives. The cooperative 
evolution in Thailand can be divided into four eras; trial, adjustment, expansion, and improvement 
(Baumrungwong, 2001).  
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Trial Era (1916-1927) 
The first cooperative was established in Thailand to resolve farmers’ debt. Due to economic changes, 
from a subsistence economy to commercialization, demand for agricultural products, particularly 
rice, increased. Farmers needed more capital to expand their production. However, they lacked the 
finance to do so. The only available channel for borrowing was through informal lenders. Due to high 
interest rates and fluctuations in the prices and quantity of agricultural products, farmers could not 
guarantee enough income to meet loan repayments. As a result, they became indebted and often 
had their land confiscated as a result (Pratuckchai & Patichol, 2016).  
In order to assist farmers, the government established village credit cooperatives. Since the 
cooperative concept was a new idea for Thai people, all of the cooperatives used a top-down 
approach. This model differs from those in other countries/regions, such as Europe and the US which 
were established and managed by the people (A bottom-up approach). The village credit 
cooperatives borrowed loans from the Siam Commercial Bank and lent credit to their members 
(Baumrungwong, 2001). 
Adjustment Era (1928-1951) 
This period represents the golden age for Thai cooperatives. Thanks to the success of the first 
cooperative, the government expanded cooperatives, both in terms of quantity and type. They 
established marketing cooperatives, land settlement cooperatives, and consumer cooperatives 
(Baumrungwong, 2001). All types of cooperatives established in this phase were designed to support 
farm production. In order to support their operation, the Thai government established the Bank for 
Cooperatives, with the capital from government in 1943. This was an important source of funds for 
these cooperatives. 
At the provincial level, provincial cooperative banks were formed in the Chiang Mai and Uttaradit 
provinces in 1951 and 1952 (Baumrungwong, 2001). Provincial cooperative banks performed like 
commercial banks. They offered credit and deposit for cooperatives and individuals in the province. 
The provincial cooperative banks served members very well in terms meeting credit needs and 
obtaining surplus funds in deposit (Ratanamalai, 2001). It is almost certain that the provincial 
cooperative banks were the main funding source for cooperatives. They offered rural communities 
access to much needed finance. 
During this period, the number of cooperatives increased dramatically; from 2,998 in 1941 to 10,811 
in 1966. There were 22 different types of cooperative throughout Thailand (Pratuckchai & Patichol, 
2016). However, the number of cooperatives grew too quickly and most of the cooperatives were 
small. The government was not able to support all of these small cooperatives and hence they were 
not able to be as effective as they could have been.  
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Expansion Era (1952-1971)  
During this period, the government attempted to improve the efficiency of cooperatives. There were 
several policies implemented by the government to develop cooperatives. The government 
established the Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT) in 1968. CLT was a national cooperative and 
had 89 cooperatives (as members). CLT focused on activities which would improve ACs’ 
performances (Baumrungwong, 2001). 
During this period, the government introduced many new laws which affected cooperatives. Firstly, 
the government issued the Act of Commercial Bank in 1962 (Baumrungwong, 2001). This Act 
prohibited provincial cooperative banks from serving deposits current accounts. This limited the 
sources of fund for cooperatives. In addition, in 1968, village cooperatives were integrated into 
district cooperatives (Baumrungwong, 2001). However, this merger did not improve the efficiency of 
these cooperatives, since most of the district cooperatives were now made up of small and fragile 
cooperatives. Another act that considerably impacted on cooperatives was the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperative Act of in 1966 (Baumrungwong, 2001). Under this Act, the provincial 
cooperative banks were cancelled. Although they are the main funding source of ACs, the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) also provides loans to individual farmers and thus 
can be seen as a competitor. 
The cooperatives could no longer operate sustainably since developments in this period weakened 
them. The cooperatives had less funding sources and faced increased competition due to larger 
competitors. They were also impacted by forced mergers which weakened them. These effects have 
continued to have a negatively impact on the current cooperatives. 
Improvement Era (1971-Present) 
In this era, cooperative development is focused on external factors such as globalization and 
technology advancement (Pratuckchai & Patichol, 2016). Cooperatives improve their efficiency by 
performing similarly to private companies, for instance, providing business services and applying 
management techniques. They not only provide financial services but also purchasing, marketing and 
food processing, as well as agricultural extension services. 
Cooperative development concentrates on developing the cooperative system. The government 
establishes related organizations to support cooperatives. The government establishes cooperative 
agencies at a provincial and district level (Baumrungwong, 2001). The cooperative development fund 
is formed to provide funding for the cooperatives. The types of cooperatives are reduced from 22 to 
8 and 6 groups in 1968 and 1973, respectively (Baumrungwong, 2001). According to the Cooperative 
Act B.E. 2542, cooperatives in Thailand are classified as ACs, Fisheries Cooperatives, Land-Settlement 
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Cooperatives, Consumer Cooperatives, Thrift and Credit Cooperatives, Service Cooperatives, and 
Credit Union (Cooperative League of Thailand, 2010). 
The evolution of Thai cooperative is shown in Figure 2.1. As this summary has shown, Thai 
cooperatives have faced issues in terms of their operation model (top-down) and a lack of funding 
sources. This is the reason why cooperatives could not meet their members’ needs. In addition, the 
main source of funding for cooperatives is borrowing from BAAC, while the BAAC competes with 
cooperatives. As a result, cooperatives cannot provide competitive credit services. 
2.2.2 Current Status of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand 
During the early stages of establishment, ACs in Thailand were multipurpose cooperatives which 
aimed to provide members with access to credit. After the success of the first cooperative, the Wat 
Chan cooperative, ACs were developed and expanded their services to facilitate members’ 
production and marketing. The ultimate goal of ACs is to increase members’ living standards 
(Cooperative Auditing Department, 2016a). AC objectives are as follows: 
1) to provide loans to members at an affordable interest rate; 
2) to promote member thrift by providing savings and deposits; 
3) to supply the necessary farm and consumer products at reasonable prices; 
4) to supply agricultural equipment to members at minimum cost; 
5) to assist members in reducing production costs and increasing their yields by improving their 
production skills, techniques, and methods; 
6) to help members access product markets at fair measurement and prices; and 
7) to promote members’ education through training 
The structure and function of Thai ACs are explained in the following section. Thai Cooperatives are 
categorized using a three–tier system (see Figure 2.2): primary cooperatives at the district level, 
provincial federations at the provincial level, and national federations at the nation level 
(Thuvachote, 2007). A primary cooperative is a multipurpose cooperative formed by groups of 
individual members. The group of members consists of individuals living in the same village. More 
than five primary cooperatives are combined to form a provincial federation in order to cooperate on 
their targeted activities, such as food processing. The Agricultural Cooperative Federation of 
Thailand, as the national federation, was formed by 76 provincial agricultural cooperative 
federations. Moreover, there are special AC national federations, such as the Sugarcane Growers 
Cooperative Federation of Thailand, The Dairy Cooperative Federation of Thailand, and the Swine 
Raiser Cooperative Federation of Thailand, etc (Ratanamalai, 2001). The national federation provides 
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marketing services and input supplies to primary ACs. All ACs have to be affiliates of the CLT which 
promotes AC development. 
In Thailand, ACs can be divided into eight types: General ACs, Para rubber producers’ cooperatives, 
Land reform area cooperatives, Water users’ cooperatives, Dairy cooperatives, Animal raiser 
cooperatives, BAAC customer cooperatives, and ACs in the assembly of small-scale farmers 
(Cooperative Auditing Department, 2015).  
In terms of AC performance, the total volume of AC business has risen gradually from 85,794 million 
baht in 2005 to 306,672 million baht in 2013, except for 2014 (Cooperative Auditing Department, 
2014). In 2014, the growth rate decreased by 4% from 2013 because of a decline in the marketing 
business. In terms of types of AC, the general agricultural cooperative, the rubber cooperative, and 
the water user cooperative had the highest numbers of ACs and account for 53.74, 18, and 12.60% of 
the total number of ACs, respectively (see Table 2.1). However, in terms of the number of members, 
the BAAC customer cooperatives and the general agricultural cooperatives had more members than 
other cooperatives, about 59.11 and 34.56%, respectively (see Table 2.1).  
With respect to AC functions, small farmers face several constraints such as capital and land 
shortages, a lack of production knowledge, poor infrastructure, and unfairness in marketing. 
Individual farmers cannot solve these problems. Thus ACs assist them by providing five services, 
credit, savings and deposits, purchasing or selling agricultural supplies, marketing and food 
processing, as well as agricultural extension services. The ACs’ services and their roles on members 
are explained as follows: 
1) Credit Service 
Lending is thought to be a necessary activity for AC members since ACs provide not only credit, in 
term of cash, but also agricultural material credit, for example, credit for buying seeds, fertilizers, or 
farm materials (Thongpukdee, 2011). The average annual interest rate for credit is between 9 to 12% 
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Regarding cash credit, AC credit may be grouped based on duration and purpose of credit 
(Thuvachote, 2007). AC credit is divided into short-term, medium-term, and long-term (Thuvachote, 
2007). Short-term loans are for emergency needs or farm expenditure, for purchasing fertilizers, 
seeds, and other farm materials (Bureau of Agricultural Economic Research, 2015). Borrowers have 
to repay short-term loans within two months. Medium-term loans are designed to spend on farm 
investment, for instance, preparing farmland and water sources. The borrowers have to pay back the 
money within 18 months. Finally, long-term loans are for investing in farm assets such as buying 
agricultural equipment, land investment, building or fixing one’s house or warehouse, and debt 
repayment. The duration of long-term loans is five years (Thuvachote, 2007). In terms of credit 
purpose, credits are divided into production and consumption. 
In terms of strategies to motivate members to join credit activities, ACs apply several incentives to 
increase members’ lending. For example, when borrowing from ACs members can use assets or 
guarantors as collateral. ACs return benefits to borrowers in terms of patronage refunds every year 
based on their transactions. Moreover, ACs force members to follow rules, using customer ratings. 
One month after the borrowers accept AC loans, the AC officers check whether the borrowers have 
spent the loan for the intended purpose. ACs rank borrowers’ credit levels and offer rewards such as 
interest rate discounts, raising a borrower’s credit limits, or provide welfare services (Cooperative 
League of Thailand, 2018; Cooperative Promotion Department, 2017).  
Recently, credit plays an important role for AC members. ACs rates of lending have risen 
continuously since 2005 (see Figure 2.3). ACs’ lending rates have increased from 77,498.44 million 
baht in 2013 to 81,893.75 million baht in 2014, which is about 5.67% (Cooperative Auditing 
Department, 2014). About 95% of total AC loans were issued by the general agricultural cooperatives 
and almost 99% of loans were lent to members and the rest to other cooperatives (see Table 2.2). 
Approximately 55% of members’ loan were short term, while 34 and 11% were medium and long 
term, respectively (Cooperative Auditing Department, 2015). 
2) Savings and Deposit Services 
Savings and deposit services are another important feature for both members and ACs. This service 
helps members to reduce their vulnerability and increases smooth consumption. In addition, savings 
and deposits are internal sources of funding for ACs. ACs provide three types of savings and deposits 
for members; Saving Deposit Accounts, Special Saving Deposit Accounts, and Fixed Deposit Accounts 


















Figure 2.2 Agricultural Cooperative Structure in Thailand 
 
Table 2.1 Number of Agricultural Cooperatives and Members, 2014 (by Type) 
 
Type of Agricultural Cooperative Number of ACs Number of Members 
Unit Percentage Unit Percentage 
General Agricultural Cooperatives  2,320 53.74 2,226,819 34.56 
Para Rubber Producers’ Cooperatives 777 18.00 126,281 1.396 
Land Reform Area Cooperatives 171 3.96 77,484 1.21 
Water Users’ Cooperatives 544 12.60 112,967 1.75 
Dairy Cooperatives 115 2.67 19,449 0.30 
Animal Raiser Cooperatives 195 4.52 36,902 0.58 
BAAC Customers’ Cooperatives 77 1.78 3,808,412 59.11 
ACs in the Assembly of Small-scale Farmers 118 2.73 34,226 0.53 
Total 4,317 100.00 6,442,540 100.00 
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Figure 2.3 Business Volumes of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (2005-2014), (By Service) 













ACs have more focused on saving and deposit provisions. Since 2008, the volume of AC savings and 
deposits has continued to increase, however, the volume dropped from 71,855.54 million in 2013 to 
68,970.87 million baht in 2014; equal to 4% (see Figure 2.3). Roughly 75% of the total saving volume 
came from members and about 7 and 18% came from other cooperatives and other sources, 
respectively (Cooperative Auditing Department, 2015). In terms of type of ACs, the amount of savings 
and deposits from general agricultural cooperatives was the highest, with about 95% of total AC 
savings and deposits (see Table 2.2)  
3) Purchasing Services 
Purchasing services provide members with access to agriculture machinery and inputs at lower prices 
for good quality products. ACs sell agricultural inputs and consumer goods such as farm tools, seeds, 
fertilizers, rice, and oil, to members. This service helps members reduce their production costs and 
household expenditure (Cooperative Auditing Department, 2016a).  
The volume of purchasing service has gradually increased since 2005 (see Figure 2.3). In 2014, the 
purchasing volume was 68,796 million baht or 23.37% of the total business volume of ACs (see Table 
2.2). The general agricultural cooperatives provided the greatest volume of purchasing services 
which was 47,734.30 million baht or 69% of the total purchasing volume. In terms of goods type, 
petro products and fertilizers were the highest volume with 47% and 29% in 2014, respectively (see 
Table 2.3). 
4) Marketing Services 
Marketing is an important service for assisting members in reaching markets. This service provides 
members with an advantage in terms of collecting and processing products. Collecting members’ 
products for selling increases members’ bargaining power. As a result, members obtain fair 
measurements and prices. Furthermore, members can gain more income by joining food processing 
services since food processing increases the value of members’ products. Only a few types of ACs use 
marketing services such as the general agricultural cooperative, the rubber cooperative, the BAAC 
customers’ cooperatives, and the dairy cooperatives (see Table 2.2). Similar to marketing, the food 
processing service is mostly offered by rubber cooperatives, dairy cooperatives, and the general 
agricultural cooperatives. 
In terms of marketing performance, crops, rubber, raw milk, and paddy have the highest trade levels 
(Cooperative Auditing Department, 2015). From 2009 to 2012, the volume of marketing business 
gradually increased and was slightly more than the credit business (see Figure 2.3). However, the 
marketing volume dramatically dropped from 85,266.74 million baht in 2012 to 58,586.75 million 
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baht in 2014 (see Figure 2.3). The cause of declines in the marketing volume was the fall in the 
number of economic and energy crops, especially rubber and paddy. Decreased crop yields were due 
to drought and a slump in agricultural prices (Cooperative Auditing Department, 2014). 
With respect to food processing volumes, since this service is only offered by a few ACs, the volume 
of food processing is less than the other services (see Figure 2.3). In 2014, the volume of food 
processing was equal to 15,700.91 million baht or 5.33% of the total AC business volumes (see Table 
2.2). 
5) Agricultural Extension Services 
ACs encourage members to participate in agricultural extension services to solve their production 
problems and promote their products. ACs provide many agricultural extension services such as 
ploughing, land improvement, irrigation, and demonstration farms (Cooperative Auditing 
Department, 2016a). The volume of agricultural extension service is a small portion compared to 
other AC services (see Figure 2.3). In 2014, the volume was 431.88 million baht or 0.15% of ACs total 
business volume (see Table 2.2). 
In summary, in addition to credit services, non-credit support services, particularly purchasing and 
marketing services are important for AC members or farmers. Purchasing products helps members to 
reduce their production costs and consumption expenses. Furthermore, members can attain a more 
competitive price by participating in AC marketing. Both services increase members’ potential to 
compete with other traders. The general agricultural cooperatives have the greatest number of 
participants, which is shown by AC performance in 2014 (see Table 2.2). The business volume of the 
general agricultural cooperatives was the highest compared to other cooperative types. 
2.2.3 Agricultural Cooperative Challenges and Innovations 
Agricultural Cooperative Challenges 
Thai small farmers face excess supply problem. Excess supplies lead to low prices and low bargaining 
power against middlemen. In addition, Thai small farmers have to compete against agribusiness 
enterprises under trade liberalization (Chainuvati & Athipanan, 2001). These constraints mean that 
small farmers have low bargaining power in terms of price and competition. Productivity, 
profitability, and sustainability improvement are all important for reducing poverty (Hazell, Poulton, 
& Wiggins, 2010; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). 
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Table 2.2 Business Volumes of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, 2014 (Type of Cooperatives) 
 
Type of Agricultural Cooperative 
Business (Million baht) 






General Agricultural Cooperatives 65,458.56 77,668.64 47,734.30 18,358.79 2,813.39 298.24 212,331.92 
Para Rubber Producers’ Cooperatives 415.51 382.30 643.58 14,609.29 7,803.43 1.23 23,855.34 
Land Reform Area Cooperatives 1,045.42 1,715.97 1,071.05 3,472.15 495.15 7.44 7,807.18 
Water Users’ Cooperatives 561.76 1,312.48 1,096.34 887.69 0.66 79.97 3,938.90 
Dairy Cooperatives 1,355.93 546.14 4,575.77 7,825.98 4,040.54 27.28 18,371.64 
Animal Raiser Cooperatives 118.2 164.85 703.81 622.99 349.68 5.84 1,965.37 
BAAC Customers’ Cooperatives 10.18 69.21 12,955.37 12,781.54 197.99 11.07 26,025.36 
ACs in the Assembly of Small-scale Farmers 5.31 34.16 16.26 28.32 0.07 0.81 84.93 
Total 68,970.87 81,893.75 68,796.48 58,586.75 15,700.91 431.88 294,380.64 
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department (2015)  
Table 2.3 Volume of Sales of Input and Machinery by Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, 2013-2014   
          Unit: million baht 
 Products 2013 2014 Growth (%) 
Fertilizer  17,652.10   18,737.40  6.15 
Machinery    1,231.67        915.64  -25.66 
Animal Feed    4,800.19     4,773.02  -0.57 
Rice    1,251.58     1,475.91  17.92 
Seed    1,879.52     2,503.12  33.18 
Insecticides/Pesticides       558.51        670.61  20.07 
Petrol  29,138.04   30,331.22  4.09 
Consumption Goods       819.48     1,091.42  33.18 
Other    3,900.65     4,154.14  6.50 
Total  61,231.74   64,652.48  5.59 
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department (2014)
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Most Thai ACs in Thailand are established to solve excess supply problems and increase farmers’ 
access to markets. Small farmers assume greater bargaining power when they are members of ACs. 
They can coordinate with agriculture enterprises in the supply chains; this reduces transaction costs 
and improves their bargaining power (Reardon, Barrett, Berdegue, & Swinnen, 2009; World Bank, 
2007). Furthermore, AC members who are trained in new techniques and forms of knowledge can 
improve their productivity. The improved productivity increases members’ well-being. 
However, ACs confront several challenges in an open market economy, including increasing 
diversification of members, and changes in consumer preferences (Lee, 2006; Thuvachote, 2007). 
Open market economies mean that ACs must compete with private traders who have modern 
technological innovation, large-scale marketing schemes, and more resources. Moreover, the 
changes in international agricultural trade regimes make small farmers face even higher levels of 
competition. Second, ACs meet members’ different needs. Members need different services but ACs 
have limited resources. ACs have to operate efficiently to respond to their members’ needs. 
Furthermore, members want to sell their products as soon as possible and obtain better returns. 
Lastly, ACs have to deliver products that match consumer preferences. Recently, consumer have 
become more aware and concerned about the quality of products, particularly in terms of the use of 
chemicals, and want to buy quality goods at reasonable prices. 
On account of these challenges, there are only a few successful ACs in Thailand. These include the 
KAC, the PFC, the GNC, and the Tha-Yang Cooperative Ltd. (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). The KAC, which 
is a group of fruit farmers in the Chanthaburi province, has used purchasing and marketing services 
as the main tools to solve excess fruit supply (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). As a result, the KAC’ revenue 
was equal to $6.18 million in 2014 with a net profit of $94,000. Approximately 98% of the total 
business volume was accounted for through purchasing and marketing services. In terms of 
members’ benefit, members were able to sell two thousand tons of mangosteens through the KAC in 
2014. Moreover, KAC members receive a dividend of 4.5 % per year. 
The PFC have succeeded in strengthening business networks and providing high member returns 
(Tanrattanaphong, 2015). Members confronted with excess supply and low price offered by 
middleman. PFC also solved excess supply and low price problems by applying marketing services. 
The PFC collects members’ products and sells them directly to consumers. This strategy reduces the 
role of middlemen and enables members to gain a stable price. The PFC’s business volume is 
approximately $3 million dollars per year and about 1.2 thousand tons of members’ products are 
sold annually. As a result of new techniques and production supported by the PFC, members have 
been able to increase their production from 4,000 to 30,000 kilograms per year. The GNC has 
succeeded in developing fair markets for organic farm products (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). The GNC 
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was established to help small farmers access markets and achieve a higher price. In 2014, the GNC 
had a business volume of about $2.5 million and they pay a dividend of 10% per year to members.  
In terms of social benefits, the impact on members is not clear. Not many ACs provide members with 
social welfare benefits. Some, like the KAC, have established a welfare fund to support farmers in the 
case of disaster, to provide new techniques and knowledge, and to encourage young people to work 
in agriculture. 
However, most Thai ACs do not work efficiently enough to promote rural households’ welfare 
(Baumrungwong, 2001; Center for Social Innovation and Participation, 2012; Patrawart, 
Trikethsamphan, Lekudornkorn, Sangpheth, & Ausakulwattana, 2001). They are confronted by low 
levels of member participation, which is a major problem. Without member cooperation, ACs cannot 
develop the members’ products to meet market needs and marketing service are not effective. The 
reason why most of Thai ACs have low member participation is that their services do not meet 
members’ needs. ACs rely on government support, thus their policies and programs are top-down 
policies designed by the government. A few ACs have succeeded in their business and assisting their 
members because they have implemented strategies which satisfy members’ need.  
Agricultural Cooperative Innovations 
Under high levels of market competitiveness, ACs have to create new innovations or strategies to 
ensure business sustainability. New strategies not only contribute to ACs’ performance but also assist 
their members in gaining market competitiveness. AC performance directly affects members’ 
benefits (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). Successful ACs provide high quality services to assist members in 
terms of cost saving, improved production process, and access to fair markets prices. Therefore, 
successful ACs can bring about greater member benefits. New innovations or strategies are discussed 
briefly below:  
1) Collaboration with Private Companies 
Business partnerships are very important for ACs, because they enable them to develop their 
products and provide access to market. ACs should be supported by private companies which have 
expertise in marketing and research and development (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). ACs gain some 
advantages from companies, such as market enhancement and product development. ACs can 
increase market shares by selling products via different market channels provided by private 
companies. For instance, the KAC enhances the market for quality fruits by selling products to big 
supermarkets, both domestic and abroad. Thus KAC members need export knowledge (regulations 
and criteria for exporting fruit). This knowledge is provided by private companies. In addition, ACs 
can enhance market shares by selling their products under the trademark of private companies. An 
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example of successful partnership strategy is cooperation among 12 ACs in the Northeast of Thailand 
with Amway Corporation (Thuvachote, 2007). They produce rice under the brand “Amway Hom Mali 
Rice” for the premium market. Since Amway is a big and famous direct-sale company and consumers 
believe in the product quality, selling rice through the Amway trademark increases AC members’ 
sales and the price they get for their rice. 
Another benefit from collaborating with private companies is product development. The PFC and the 
freezer-storage company have worked together to develop a long life technology; vacuum packed 
fish. Due to this innovation, the FPC can now export their products to international markets.  
2) High-quality Products 
Product quality is necessary to obtain high prices and build one’s market share. Several ACs are 
successful because they improve their product quality. Successful Thai ACs provide knowledge and 
new techniques which improve production processes. The most successful AC in this area is the Tha-
yang Agricultural Cooperative Ltd (Thuvachote, 2007). Tha-Yang encourages its members to produce 
high quality bananas. The AC collects members’ produce and sells them to various markets. Due to 
high quality of organic banana, the AC can export the bananas to Japan where they gain a higher 
price (Thayang Agricultural Co-operative Ltd., 2016). Many ACs, such as the Ban-lat Agricultural 
Cooperative Ltd. and the Thung-Ka-Wat Farmers’ Group have applied Tha-Yang Agricultural 
cooperative’s concept to improve and sell members’ bananas to overseas destinations. KAC and PFC 
have also applied quality improvement strategies (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). The KAC focuses on high 
quality fruits in order to resolve the excess supply of fruit and obtain higher prices. The KAC 
encourages members to improve fruit quality by providing new technologies and quality inputs. 
Similarly, improving product quality is an important strategy for the PFC. The PFC procures fingerlings 
for members in order to obtain high quality of Nile tilapia from PFC members. Due to the high quality 
of Nile tilapia, PFC members have greater bargaining power which enables them to sell their produce 
at a higher price.  
3) Electronic Commerce (E-commerce) 
E-commerce is a new market channel for current commerce. The Cooperative Promotion 
Department (CPD) has encouraged Thai ACs to establish websites to sell their products. E-commerce 
helps ACs to reduce the role of middlemen, since it connects producers to consumers. However, this 
strategy has had limited success, as designing and operating websites need staff who specialize in 
information technology (Thuvachote, 2007). 
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4) Cooperative Women’s Group (CWG) 
The aim of the Cooperative Women’s Group is to promote income, health care, and moral activities 
for households. The CWG plays an important role in non-farm activities and generates more income 
for households (Thuvachote, 2007). At present, there are approximately 1,300 CWG groups 
throughout Thailand. The CWG of ACs generates household income by producing processed food and 
handicraft products. For example, the Panmai cooperative, which is a group of poor women in the 
northeast of Thailand, produces silk textiles (Counting flowers, 2016). The Panmai cooperative trains 
members to weave fabric and provides them with micro-credit. Members’ of Panmai improve their 
household income through selling weaved textiles. Increased income improves the lives on their 
families. 
5) Cooperative Company 
The cooperative company concept is applied in order to support the stability and cost effectiveness 
for AC businesses. The cooperative company is a conglomeration of ACs which work together. The 
cooperative company belongs to, and is controlled by, ACs. For example, the Thai Agri-Business Co., 
Ltd (TABCO) was established by 74 ACs to provide purchasing and marketing services for members 
(Thuvachote, 2007). TABCO buys and distributes materials and farm equipment production. 
Furthermore, TABCO collects and delivers members’ farm products to various markets. The 
cooperative company helps ACs increase their bargaining power and obtain fairer prices.  
6) Associate Members or Open Membership 
An associate member is another strategy ACs apply in order to expand their businesses. ACs allow 
people who are not farmers but who live in the village to be members. The associate members 
cannot vote in AC business management, however, they can participate in AC services, which differ 
from one AC to another AC. For instance, the Ban Lat Agricultural Cooperative, Ltd. have admitted 
4,000 associated members (Thuvachote, 2007). They cannot access credit and marketing services, 
but they are eligible to join saving, purchasing, and agricultural extension services. The inclusion of 
associate members increases ACs’ capital and business scale.  
7) Value-Addition 
A value-added operation refers to the process of adding value to raw farm products; this occurs 
through processing and marketing services, such as grading and packaging (Prakash, 2000). Value-
addition helps ACs gaining competitive advantages since it distinguishes AC products from those of 
competitors. In Thailand, the Kaset-Visai Agricultural Cooperative Ltd, in Roi-Ed province and the Tap-
Pratan farmers’ Group in Ang-Thong province have been successful in adding value to members’ 
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products (Thuvachote, 2007). The Kaset-Visai Agricultural Cooperative created its own brand for 
Hom-Mali rice. The Kaset Visai district is one of the most important areas for jasmine rice production 
in Thailand. Therefore, the trademark, Kaset-Visai Hom-mali, makes consumers believe in the rice 
quality of the Kaset-Visai Agricultural Cooperative Ltd. The Tap-Pratan farmers’ Group added value to 
their rice by changing plain rice to herb-coated rice, to respond high demand. Rice from the Tap-
Pratan Farmers’ Group is different from other rice since it is organic rice.  
8) Marketing Services 
AC marketing services enable members to access various markets. For example, the GNC has been 
successful AC in solving members’ access to different markets. The GNC has succeeded in distributing 
a variety of organic farm products from small farmers to domestic and overseas markets, such as 
rice, coconut milk, herbal teas, and soybeans (Tanrattanaphong, 2015). The GNC is a distribution 
centre which collects farm products from members, provides a logistic system, and distributes 
members’ products to suitable channels. The GNC logistic system is an important service as it assists 
members to access domestic and overseas markets, which would not be possible individually. The 
Maechan Cooperative has helped to decrease the reliance on middlemen, increasing members’ 
accessibility to different markets, and has ultimately resulted in them receiving higher prices. The 
Maechan cooperative has succeeded in inducing members to sell their products through ACs, 
because the cooperative has the market power to negotiate and obtain higher prices for members 
(Autta, 2014). 
9) Member Participation 
Member participation is a crucial factor in product improvement. Members should participate in ACs 
to learn about new production techniques, which leads to product improvements. Abate, 
Francesconi, and Getnet (2014) find that in Ethiopia AC participants’ productivity is greater than non-
participants. Improvements are the result of using production technologies and support services 
provided by ACs, such as training and extension services. Moreover, the ACs’ performance depends 
on the business volume traded by members. The higher the level of members’ participation, the 
more successful the ACs are. For example, KAC’s revenue grew from $1.55 million in 2010 to $6.18 
million in 2014, which is approximately 75%. KAC’s growth was a direct result of member 
participation in purchasing and marketing services, which equals 98% of KAC’s business 




10) Value Network 
Value network development is a recent innovation implemented by Thai ACs to increase their market 
competition. ACs attempt to develop networks between themselves (a horizontal network) and other 
related stakeholders in the supply chain (a vertical network), to deliver farm products to consumers 
(Patrawart & Sriurai, 2010). The horizontal network enables AC members to access their services 
easily and encourages ACs to share their resources leading to reduction in an operation cost and 
improvement in AC efficiency (Intawang & Wingwon, 2014). The network efficiency is determined by 
information, inventory, transportation, and facility management among ACs (Ritthaisong, Akasart, 
Apisitpinyo, Tungprasert, & Jumpasri, 2018). The vertical network is working together with other AC 
members, government officers, and enterprises to improve their supply chain, from upstream to 
downstream enterprises, emphasising fairness and sustainability (Academic Cooperative Institute, 
2015). The network helps AC members solve their problems (such as an excess of supply and the low 
price of farm products) and extend their market to include both domestic and international markets.  
At present, there are six successful networks; The Fruit Value Network, The Thai Co-operative 
Jasmine Rice Value Network, The Rubber Value Network, The Coffee Value Network, The Cassava 
Value Network, and The Moral Rice Value Network (Academic Co-operative Institute, 2015). ACs in 
the value network work closely together in order to develop, extend, and improve their networks. 
For instance, the Fruit Value Network is organized by ACs whose members produce high-quality 
fruits. The network supports ACs to find markets by making contract with buyers, such as wholesalers 
and supermarkets. Another interesting network is the Thai Co-operative Jasmine Rice Value Network 
which consists of 16 ACs in five provinces, Roi-Et, Surin, Buriram, Mahasarakham, and 
Nakhonratchasima. The Thai Co-operative Jasmine Rice Value Network coordinates with ACs and rice 
retailers to develop marketing channel for small farmers. The network links rice producers in the 
supply chain and helps members manage their trade. Members of the rice value network sell rice 
using the network’s trademark, Kerdboon. Finally, the Rubber Value Network in Trang province has 
established production and marketing activities for rubber producers. The rubber network has 
created business partnerships with rubber exporters, Thanumtip farmer group, and a company in 
Malaysia, the Euroma rubber industry. The Thanumtip farmer group and Euroma rubber industry 
help the rubber network access the rubber market in Malaysia. Furthermore, they help the rubber 
network to improve members’ rubber production and develop the rubber network in order to link 
the network with rubber ACs in China. 
Among all of the strategy identified above, the level of member participation is the dominant factor 
in AC success. As Prakash (2000) find that members influence the success of Japanese agricultural 
cooperatives (JAs). In 1995, JAs faced low member participation about 3,642 members per AC, since 
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the JAs did not provide services that could help members to compete in the market (Prakash, 2000). 
Due to low member participation, the non-performing JAs had to cease operations. The number of 
Japanese ACs decreased from 12,000 ACs in 1960 to 1,500 ACs in 1999.  
Prakash (2000) find that members will only join in with business and organizational affairs if ACs can 
response their needs. Members or farmers expect that they can sell their products by obtaining 
timely and sufficient return. Two important innovations that lead to higher returns are value-added 
and marketing. Farmers’ expectations around marketing services include the provision of post-
harvest services, warehousing, grading, packaging, shipment, and market information. 
Besides marketing services, farmers need credit, purchasing or supplies, and extension services 
(Prakash, 2000). Farmers need easy access to credit. Credit for farmers includes credit for the 
purchase of seeds, field maintenance, and investment such as tube wells, and farm cattle. In 
addition, farmers need ACs to supply farm technology and farm inputs such as fertilizers, farm 
chemicals, farm machines and implements. With respect to extension services, farmers need 
assistance and advice on technical production, as well as infrastructure development. 
2.3 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thai Rural Economy 
ACs play an important role in Thai rural households. ACs provide a wide range of support services, 
from production to delivery to customers. Generally, ACs engage in five services; credit, savings, 
purchasing, marketing and food processing, as well as agriculture extension services. AC services can 
be grouped in credit and non-credit support services. Using credit services, members are able to 
access finance. Non-credit support services enhance members’ access to input and output markets. 
The next section explains the roles of ACs in Thai rural financial and agricultural markets. 
2.3.1 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Rural Financial Markets in Thailand 
In the early period, the Thai rural finance market was monopolized by informal lenders such as 
individual moneylenders, relatives, and shop owners selling goods with instalment plans (Siamwalla 
et al., 1990). The government wanted to expand credit options for rural households, with low 
interest rates to rural households in order to reduce their dependence on informal credit. In 1916, 
formal loans were provided to rural households via credit cooperatives (Siamwalla et al., 1990). 
However, cooperatives faced high default rates. To remedy this problem, the government 
established the BAAC in 1966, a specialized financial institution which provided direct credit to farm 
households. In 1975, to increase rural households’ access to credit, the Bank of Thailand asked 
commercial banks to lend to farm households. At present, rural credit is served by formal, semi-
formal, and informal financial institutions. Formal financial institution consists of commercial banks 
and the BAAC. Semi-formal institution includes the ACs, Village Fund, and the Production Credit 
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Group (PCG). Key players in the informal group are neighbours, relatives, moneylenders, store 
owners, input suppliers, landlords, and output purchasers (Townsend, Killian, & Killian, 2016). 
In 2013, household credit use in urban and rural areas decreased from 41.53% in 2010 to 39.50% in 
2013 (Bank of Thailand, 2013). Similarly, Townsend (2016) found that rural households’ borrowing 
decreased from 78% in 2008 to 66% in 2014. The reason for this is too high interest rates and fees. 
Moreover, the loan conditions were complicated and the credit limit was insufficient (Bank of 
Thailand, 2013).  
Regarding sources of credit, rural households’ dependence on loans provided by informal lenders 
decreased from 7.28% in 2008 to 2.18% in 2014 (see Table 2.4). Main credit providers for rural 
households are the Village Fund, BAAC, and ACs, with 53.78, 25.16, and 5.43% of total rural 
households’ credit in 2014, respectively.  
Agricultural credit is necessary for rural households since a major portion of rural population works in 
the agricultural sector. They are small-scale farmers who lack funds needed for production 
investment (Limsombunchai, 2006). Table 2.5 shows that households’ outstanding debt in the 
agricultural sector increased from 204,117.40 million baht in 1999 to 453,339.94 million baht in 
2012, or by around 55%. Moreover, 30% of agricultural households have more debt than income 
(Chatarat, Attavanich, & Sangimnet, 2018). In 2017, the average debt of farm households was 1.3 
times as much as their income and debt per capita was 74,141.60 baht. In terms of the number of 
indebted households, in 2013 the percentage of farm households with debt was equal to 53.11% of 
total households in the agriculture sector (see Figure 2.4). Figure 2.4 shows that most of the indebted 
households (2,681,505 households or 85% of the total indebted households) borrowed money to 
invest in agricultural production.  
BAAC is the main credit providers for farm households. In 2013, almost 53% of total farm households 
were indebted to BAAC (see Table 2.6). The second and third highest providers were the Village Fund 
and Cooperatives with around 33 and 10% of total farm households, respectively. ACs are not the 
main credit providers since they do not have enough funds to meet the high credit demands and 
therefore cannot compete with BAAC. In 2013, about 8.26% of total Thai households were able to 
access loans provided by semi-formal financial institutions (Bank of Thailand, 2013). 
Although ACs are not the major credit providers in Thailand, they still play a significant role in 
assisting low-income people. Table 2.6 shows that most AC members (97,289 members) borrow 
between 10,000 baht to 50,000 baht, while most households borrowing from BAAC, borrow in the 
range of 20,000 baht to 500,000 baht. This data implies that BAAC borrowers are wealthier than AC 
members, since the wealthier households are able to borrow greater amounts. This is supported by 
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Poapongsakorn et al.'s (2015) findings. They find that non-poor farm households borrow twice as 
much as low-income households. 
Table 2.7 shows that AC credit performance has increased since 2005. Approved loans increased by 
approximately 61% from 2005 to 2014. 99% of total AC loans were individual loans (see Table 2.7). In 
2014, about 54% of the total loans or 44,242 million bahts were short-term loans which were used 
for emergency needs and production expenses. About 33% of AC total loans or 27,362.17 million 
were medium-term loans for production expenses during the crop season. 
Table 2.4 Percentage of Rural Household Borrowing, 2008 and 2014 (Type of Credit Provider) 
 
Credit Providers 2008 2014 
Formal Financial Institutions 23.67 25.95 
BAAC 22.91 25.16 
Commercial Bank 0.58 0.79 
Others such as Rice Bank 0.18 - 
Semi-formal Financial Institutions 54.51 61.63 
Agricultural Cooperatives  5.58 5.43 
Village Fund 43.23 53.78 
PCG 5.70 2.42 
Informal Financial Institutions 7.28 2.18 
Neighbours 0.73 0.04 
Relatives 2.35 0.63 
Money Lender 2.01 0.67 
Store Owner 1.37 0.54 
Input Suppliers 0.07 0.17 
Landlords 0.03 - 
Output Purchasers 0.09 0.13 
Others 14.52 10.24 
Source: Townsend et al. (2016)2 
Table 2.5 Outstanding Debt of Farm Households in Thailand (1999-2012) 
 
Year Farm Households’ Debt (Million Baht) Percentage Change 
1999 204,117.40 - 
2002 245,563.14 20.30 
2007 393,839.96 60.38 
2009 319,093.99 -18.98 
2011 351,135.64 10.04 
2012 453,339.94 29.11 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2014) 
  
 
2 Townsend Thai Project Households Annual Resurvey collected data from 6 provinces, Chachoengsao, Lopburi, 




Figure 2.4 Numbers of Indebted Farm Households in Thailand, by purpose (2013) 
Source: National Statistical Office (2013)  
2.3.2 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Thai Agricultural Market  
AC marketing services are believed to assist farmers in reducing transaction costs and increasing 
their bargaining power in the market. However, farmers do not always trade through ACs because 
they often lack efficient management and infrastructure, which links them to the different markets 
(Kainara, 2015). The share of agricultural products traded through the AC channel to total domestic 
agricultural products is less than 20%.  
AC marketing has positively contributed to the national agricultural market. The AC marketing 
transaction ratio for domestic agricultural products had been ranked from 9 to 19% over the last 10 
years (2005-2014) (see Table 2.8). The ratio of AC marketing volume to domestic agricultural 
products has fluctuated. The ratio gradually increased from approximately 10% in 2009 to 19% in 
2012.The ratio rose due to a growth in farm products traded via ACs. It peaked at 125.79 billion baht 
in 2012 (see Table 2.8). After 2012, the AC marketing volume decreased to 89.40 billion baht in 2014. 
As a result, the ratio of agriculture products traded via ACs to domestic agricultural products fell to 










Table 2.6 Number of Debt-Holding Households in the Agricultural Sector in Thailand (Source of Loan, 2013)    
                       
Source of Loan 



















BAAC 4,710 15,574 41,021 108,415 457,815 406,942 503,401 35,660 8,582 1,582,120 
Other Banks 408 1,015 2,686 5,534 13,160 10,136 14,400 3,729 2,916 53,984 
Cooperatives/Farmer’s Group 2,019 7,401 15,557 34,459 97,289 71,248 57,374 3,669 1,226 290,242 
Village Fund 10,793 25,438 135,024 390,443 349,488 62,835 8,621 518 151 983,311 
Other Government Agencies 699 4,086 4,070 2,706 2,546 1,366 1,612 928 930 18,943 
Middleman 254 946 1,264 2,142 4,223 2,556 2,772 564 196 14,917 
Money Lender 363 1,002 2,134 3,949 7,568 4,816 4,259 626 199 24,916 
Relative/Neighbour/Others 1,049 2,762 5,433 7,321 12,614 6,918 5,577 571 188 42,433 
Source: National Statistical Office (2013) 
 
Table 2.7 Credit Outstanding Provided by Agricultural Cooperatives (2005-2014) (Credit Type) 
      Unit: Million Baht 
Year 
Credit for Members  
Credit for other ACs Percentage Total 
Short-term Medium-Term Long-term Total Percentage 
2005 18,895.35  11,857.25  1,066.41  31,819.01  99.35 207.94  0.65 32,026.95  
2006 19,526.65  12,800.83  932.15  33,259.63  99.51 163.49  0.49 33,423.12  
2007 22,170.24  13,497.99  1,432.16  37,100.39  99.43 212.27  0.57 37,312.66  
2008 24,113.51  14,471.43  1,568.36  40,153.30  99.46 216.66  0.54 40,369.96  
2009 27,817.29  15,571.94  1,819.78  45,209.01  99.65 157.92  0.35 45,366.93  
2010 31,250.15  17,741.63  2,486.87  51,478.65  99.33 347.76  0.67 51,826.41  
2011 34,179.79  19,822.86  3,561.97  57,564.62  98.46 902.58  1.54 58,467.20  
2012 38,316.93  22,410.96  5,537.05  66,264.94  98.90 738.78  1.10 67,003.72  
2013 40,657.45  25,529.40  10,521.22  76,708.07  98.98 790.37  1.02 77,498.44  
2014 44,248.62    27,362.17    9,132.54  80,743.33  98.60 1,150.42  1.40 81,893.75  
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department (2014)
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The volume of AC marketing is dominated by three products; para-rubber, raw milk, and paddy. In 
2014, the portion of para-rubber, raw milk, and paddy traded through ACs were about 54, 21, and 
9% of the total volume of AC marketing, respectively (see Table 2.9). The decrease in marketing 
volume of ACs was due to the dramatic decrease in paddy and para-rubber output. The paddy 
volume dropped from 17,279.20 million baht in 2010 to 5,287.54 million baht in 2014, equivalent to 
an approximate 69% fall. The decreased paddy volume occurred due to the reduction in rice planting 
and the lack of a government subsidy from the government (Bank of Thailand, 2015). Para-rubber 
volumes traded via ACs reduced from 55,943.38 million baht in 2012 to 31,741.37 million baht in 
2014 (about 43%). The quantity of para-rubber products increased by 1%, however, the price of para-
rubber declined by 25% compared to the 2013 price (Bank of Thailand, 2015). As a result, the volume 
of para-rubber decreased. 
Table 2.8 Share of Cooperative Marketed Agricultural Products to Domestic Agricultural Product 
Values in Thailand, 2005-2014 
Unit: Billions of Baht 
Year Volume of AC Marketing and 
Processing Businesses (1) 
Domestic Agricultural 
Product (2) 
Ratio of (1) to (2) in 
Percentage 
2009 59.45 603.7 9.85 
2010 76.37 600.9 12.71 
2011 108.95 638.7 17.56 
2012 125.79 656.0 19.18 
2013 110.97 661.3 16.78 
2014 89.40 665.8 13.43 
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department (2016b) and Bank of Thailand (2016) 
 
Table 2.9 Volume of Agricultural Products Traded through Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, 
2007-2014        
          Unit: Million Baht 
Year Paddy Para-rubber Other Crops Raw Milk Animal Total 
2007 6,802.93 18,324.63 4,002.06 4,946.37 490.85 34,566.84 
2008 7,359.42 22,423.43 7,344.77 6,757.55 801.54 44,656.71 
2009 13,814.21 19,948.03 5,673.37 7,730.04 500.48 47,666.13 
2010 17,279.20 22,389.80 6,547.72 8,549.73 634.09 55,400.54 
2011 11,615.66 50,634.35 9,300.32 8,089.64 390.10 80,030.07 
2012 11,151.44 55,943.38 12,523.49 8,549.73 390.10 88,558.14 
2013 7,085.07 45,711.35 12,220.88 8,746.60 386.91 74,150.81 
2014 5,287.54 31,741.37 12,344.07 8,825.59 366.16 58,586.75 
Source: Cooperative Auditing Department (2014) 
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2.4 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Poverty Reduction 
To alleviate Thai rural households’ poverty, ACs should have a good understanding of how credit and 
non-credit support services can improve rural households’ economic and social welfare such as 
income, consumption, and human capital development. In order to understand how ACs help rural 
households in combating poverty, this section reviews the role of ACs in assisting households to 
alleviate poverty in general and more specifically in Thailand. 
2.4.1 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Poverty Reduction 
As ACs provide microfinance services like any other MFIs. Besides credit and savings, ACs also provide 
non-credit support programs. For example, supply cooperatives provide agricultural extension 
services, agricultural inputs in order to assist and improve members’ production. Marketing 
cooperatives provide collection, packing, and distribution for members’ products. AC services usage 
enhances capital accessibility, improves productivity, and employment opportunities for members. 
These contributions lead to increased income and member wellbeing.  
ACs provide members with access to capital, especially credit and human capitals. This finding has 
been confirmed by several global studies (Chagwiza, Muradian, & Ruben, 2016; Tamirat, 2015; 
Wanyama, Develtere, & Pollet, 2008). A lack of capital access is a cause of household poverty, in 
general (World Bank, 2000). Capital is utilized in economic activities to generate income and improve 
household levels of wellbeing. These ultimately lead to poverty reduction (Tamirat, 2015). 
ACs enable members to access credit. Credit access indirectly influences household productivity and 
income through production investment and human capital (Awotide, Abdoulaye, Alene, & Manyong, 
2015; Kannan, 2011; Tamirat, 2015). Awotide et al. (2015) study the relationship between 
agricultural credit and crop production in Nigeria. They find that Nigeria rural households who take 
credit have higher capacity in cassava production than those who do not. The reason is farmers may 
spend credit on production technology improvements and farm investment such as technology use 
and purchasing fertilizers and inputs.  
ACs also help to improve members’ productivity. AC agricultural extension services directly improve 
members’ production capacities, leading to an increase in revenue. Agricultural extension services 
include training, infrastructure and technology provisions, and land maintenance. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (2012b) find that farmers who join Kenya, Uganda, and 
the United Republic of Tanzania ACs, learn new skills and techniques via group participation. As a 
result, the average agricultural income of the three countries increases by 61%. Agricultural 
productivity in Kenya increases by around 80%. Increased productivity is a potential means to 
alleviate rural households’ poverty (Somavia, 2003). Besides, poor people can take advantage of their 
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increased income by further extending income-generating businesses. For instance, farmers in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo improve their cassava production by participating in the Purchase 
for Progress (P4P) cooperative. In 2009, famers were able to plant and harvest more cassava, 
increasing from 0.2 hectares to 1.3 hectares and received USD 220. The farmers also invested in 
other economic activities financed by increased income and established small shops. Finally, the 
famers earned profits equal to USD 1260 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation, 
2012b). The P4P program focuses on developing farm skills and market access. The impact of the 
program not only exists in agricultural production but the participants can also apply knowledge and 
skills to invest further in economic activities. Skill development is central to self-sufficiency. 
Employment creation is related to access to credit. Credit offers members a chance to invest more in 
productive assets and perform economic activities. The expansion of production creates more jobs 
for members and non-members. Entrepreneurs financed by AC credit can start or extend their 
agriculture businesses, which then means that they need to hire more workers. There were 924,000 
Kenya farmers and 900,000 people in Ethiopia who could continue their farm enterprises due to 
receiving income via ACs (Wanyama et al., 2008). Moreover, cooperatives are important 
organizations because they generate a lot more jobs. Global cooperatives created 100 million new 
positions (Chavez Hertig, 2008). Dairy cooperatives in India have created approximately 13 million 
jobs in the agricultural sector. France and Italy cooperatives have generated more than a million 
positions and cooperatives in Wisconsin, the US created 71% of total employment (Chavez Hertig, 
2008). 
2.4.2 Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Poverty Reduction for Thai Rural 
Households  
More than 85% of the poor in Thailand live in rural areas (Lewis et al., 2013) and they are small and 
medium sized farmers (Thuvachote, 2011). They have restricted access to financial and product 
markets. ACs are one of the main sources of credit for Thai farmers since they provide many types of 
loans without credit limits that meet borrowers’ needs. Thai ACs aim to support their members in 
terms of agricultural operation, in terms of production development, marketing, and improve their 
well-being (Registrar and Law Office, 2016). In order to link production activities and distribution, ACs 
have developed non-credit support services to promote efficient credit use. Integrated services are 
more effective rather than credit alone in improving income and well-being. Non-credit support 
services create productivity development and opportunities to access markets. Agricultural extension 
services encourage members to improve their skills and production. These lead to improved farm 
yields. Purchasing and marketing services enable members to obtain fair prices due to AC bargaining 
power, eventually improving their income (Preedasak & NaRanong, 2001). 
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Thai ACs provide member benefits in the same way that other ACs worldwide do, such as improving 
access to capital, income, employment, productivity and social development. As discussed 
previously, ACs improve members’ human and physical capital. Farmers’ and their families’ human 
capital will improve if credit is invested in education, training, and healthcare services. Moreover, the 
supply chain connection built up by ACs increases members’ market accessibility. AC members can 
reduce transaction costs and buy input products and agriculture outputs at reasonable prices 
(Chagwiza et al., 2016). For example, the Phak Hai Agricultural Cooperative has connected with other 
stakeholders in the supply chain link to enhance AC competitiveness (Ratanamaneichat, Rakkarn, 
Suwandee, & Nakrungrueng, 2016). The Phak Hai AC works together with local investors and seed 
suppliers to develop the flooding endurance rice seeds and build a rice mill to control rice quality. 
Moreover, the Phak Hai cooperates with other rice ACs to create their own rice brand and extend 
their markets by setting up a farmer local market and creating a mobile shop such as e-commerce 
marketing channel.  As a result, the members of Phak Hai AC increase over 25%. The AC’s income of 
rice sales increases four times and members earn double income. 
Thai ACs generate income for members through several methods. Firstly, the members receive 
patronage refunds and dividends (Thuvachote, 2011). In 2004, Thai ACs distributed 54.1% of their 
annual net profits to their members, 44.6% for dividends and 9.5% for patronage refunds (Artharee, 
2007, as cited in Thuvachote, 2011). In addition, via purchasing and marketing businesses, ACs are 
able to increase income margins for members since ACs can negotiate better prices and provide fair 
weights and quality for members’ products (Calkins & Ngo, 2010; Wanyama et al., 2008). In Thailand, 
the Thaworn Pattana Karasin Agricultural Cooperative is a successful AC that sells members’ farm 
products. The members received an annual income of 37,879 baht, which is higher than 30,785 baht 
earned by non-members (Juraporn, 2004, as cited in Thuvachote, 2011). Lastly, the food processing 
businesses help members to create value added products. For example, the Tha-Yang cooperative 
which has successfully exported nonchemical bananas to Japan, increased the margin price by 6% 
and earned more than 30,000 baht per year for each household in 2006 (Thuvachote, 2011).  
Thai ACs create employment opportunities in three ways (Wanyama et al., 2008). First, ACs hire 
workers to work in AC businesses. ACs create both temporary and permanent jobs through working 
in the organization and supporting businesses such as purchasing, marketing, and processing 
activities. Thuvachote (2011) reports that Thai ACs provide 7,000 jobs every year. ACs employ around 
55,000 seasonal labourers for marketing and processing businesses. Secondly, the ACs increase self-
employment for members. The increase in self-employment is the result of obtaining more credit. 
Credit offers members a chance to invest more in productive assets and economic activities. 
Increased production creates more jobs. In 2009, Thai ACs generated more than 6 million self-
employed persons and 234,593 employments in the agriculture activities (Thuvachote, 2011). Lastly, 
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non-members are employed through spillover effects. Access to more credit provides jobs, not only 
for members but non-members as well. Companies which work with ACs hire staffs for their business 
operations. For example, in Thailand, the packaging company, which produces containers for dairy 
cooperatives’ products, hires non-members as employees (Thuvachote, 2011)  
ACs also increase well-being. For instance, training programs are offered to improve members’ 
capability to generate more income. Some ACs provide welfare expenses, such as medical, 
educational, and funeral expenditures for members through social funds (Thuvachote, 2011). In 
2005, 98.65% and 59.06% of total Thai ACs spent their net profits on member and non-member 
training and education, respectively (Apichai, 2007, as cited in Thuvachote, 2011). 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations owned and controlled by their users to serve their 
members’ needs. Thai ACs are multipurpose cooperatives which provide members with access to 
credit, markets, and agricultural extension services. Thai ACs provide member benefits in the same 
way that other ACs worldwide do. ACs improve members’ human and physical capital. Farmers’ and 
their families’ human capital will improve if credit is invested in education, training, and healthcare 
services. Moreover, the supply chain connection built up by ACs increases members’ market 
accessibility. AC members can reduce transaction costs, buy input products, and sell agriculture 
outputs at reasonable prices. ACs are able to increase income margins for members since ACs can 
negotiate better prices and provide fair weights and quality for members’ products. Moreover, Thai 
ACs create employment opportunity and provide a social fund to improve members’ well-being. 
ACs play a significant role in providing credit to low-income people. In Thailand, rural credit is served 
by formal, semi-formal, and informal financial institutions. BAAC is the major credit providers for 
agricultural households. The poor cannot access BAAC credit since borrowing from BAAC requires 
collateral. Hence, households without collateral seek an alternative source of credit such as ACs, the 
Village Fund, and informal providers. Amount of AC loans have continuously increased. The major AC 
loans are short-term loans which are used for emergency needs and production expenses. 
Furthermore, ACs assist members to access agricultural product markets. AC marketing services 
assist farmers in reducing transaction costs and increasing their bargaining power in the market. 
However, farmers do not always trade through ACs because they often lack efficient management 
and infrastructure. The share of agricultural products traded through the AC channel to total 
domestic agricultural products is less than 20%. The volume of AC marketing is dominated by three 
products; para-rubber, raw milk, and paddy. 
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Under an open market economy, ACs confront several challenges such as increasing diversification of 
members and changes in consumer preferences. Members need different services but ACs have 
limited resources. Moreover, ACs rely on government support, thus their policies and programs are 
top-down policies designed by the government. Therefore, most of Thai ACs cannot operate 
efficiently to respond to their members’ needs and have low member participation. On account of 
these challenges, there are only a few successful ACs in Thailand such as the KAC, the PFC, the GNC, 
and the Tha-Yang Cooperative Ltd. The successful ACs create new innovations or strategies (e.g. 
collaboration with Private Companies, product quality development, E-commerce, and network 
creation) to ensure business sustainability. New strategies not only contribute to ACs’ performance 
but also assist their members in gaining market competitiveness. 
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Chapter 3 
Review of the Literature 
This chapter reviews the literature on credit and non-credit support services, focusing on the 
determinants for AC participation and the effects of AC participation on rural household welfare. This 
chapter consists of three sections. Section 3.1 reviews relevant theories on credit and non-credit 
support services. The following section reviews the empirical research on households’ decisions to 
participate in credit and non-credit support services. Section 3.2 reviews models and determinants of 
household participation in both credit and non-credit services. Non- credit support services include 
marketing and agricultural extension services. Lastly, Section 3.3 examines the effects of AC 
participation on household welfare. This section includes information about impact evaluation 
methodologies and the effects of agricultural cooperatives at a household level. 
3.1 Theory of Household Demand and Credit Rationing 
This section discusses relevant theories to household participation in credit and marketing services. 
Based on the demand theory, agricultural household demand models have been developed to 
explain household’s decision to participate in credit and marketing services. Household demand 
theory explains household behaviour which is demand side. However, because of credit market 
imperfection, some individuals are constrained to access credit. Credit rationing theory explains 
credit availability in credit market. 
3.1.1 Household Demand for Credit 
The demand theory for credit illustrates the relationship between household participation in AC 
credit and the factors influencing the participation. The household model for credit demand 
presented in this study is applied to analyse the determinants of household participation in AC credit. 
Iqbal (1983, 1986) and Swain (2007) developed the agricultural household model for credit based on 
demand theory. The model can be used to capture farm households’ borrowing behaviour. 
Borrowing helps households to adjust their consumption over time. To capture borrowing, the 
household demand framework applies a multi-period utility function. For convenience, the model is 
assumed to have two periods. Households seek utility maximization by choosing the optimal level of 
products (Ct) and leisure (Lt). Households have an initial endowment (K) for farm production and 
given household characteristics (Z). The household utility function can be shown as:  
     1 2 1 2( , , , ;Z)U f C C L L=     (3.1) 
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The time subscript 1 refers to the current period in which borrowing occurs. The time subscript 2 
refers to the future period, during which the household repays the loan. Income and time constraints 
for each period are shown in equations (3.2) to (3.5). Households produce farm outputs using 
household labour and initial farm endowments (Kt) (Swain, 2007). Households earn income from 
farm product sales (Ptf(Kt,Ht)) with their labour to the market. If the household labour (T) is more 
than the labour needed for their farm production (Ht), the households work on off-farm activities 
(Mt). In this case, the household income includes wages from working on off-farm activities (W1M1). 
The model assumes output price (Pt) and labour wage (Wt) are exogenous. Credit raises household 
income in the current period and is repaid in the future period (t=2). Therefore, the household 
income in the current period includes income from the farm, wages from off-farm work, and the loan 
amount (B) (shown on the left hand side of equation 3.2). They spend their incomes on consumption 
(Ct) and farm investment (I) (shown on the right hand side of equation 3.2). 
( )1 1 1 1 1 1,P f K H W M B C I+ + = +     (3.2) 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2, 1P f K H W M C B r + = + +    (3.3) 
1 1 1M T L H= − −      (3.4) 
2 2 2M T L H= − −      (3.5) 
Where C is consumption expense; L is leisure; I is a farm investment where K2=K1+I; r is a loan 
interest rate; ∝ is a parameter of technical improvement. Investment in farm technology raises 
household income in the subsequent periods because implementing new farm technology increases 
farm productivity (Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985; Singh, Squire, & Strauss, 1986). This effect is 
captured in the model by a parameter of technical improvement ( ) . For the subsequent period, 
the households obtain increased farm incomes ( )( )2 2 2,P f K H  and wages from off-farm activities
( )2 2W M . However, the households need to pay back the loan with interest ( )( )1B r+ . The income 
constraint for this period is shown in equation (3.3). Equations (3.4) and (3.5) present the household 
time constraints in the current and future periods, respectively. 
As a result of farm households’ dual roles, their production and consumption are related. This implies 
that households have to make a decision to allocate their resources for production and consumption 
simultaneously. The optimal consumption, leisure, and loan amount can be derived from the 
household demand model (equations 3.1 to 3.5) using the Lagrangian multiplier approach. The 
Lagrangian equation is given as: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 1 1 4 2 2 2




L U C C L L P f K H W M B C I P f K H W M C B r
M T L H M T L H
  
 
= + + + − − + + − − +
+ − + + + − + +
Solutions for optimal consumption expense (C1 and C2), level of leisure (L1 and L2), and loan amount 
that household need can be identified using the first order condition. After solving these equations, 
we obtain the loan amount which is a function of farm endowments, the difference between input 
price and output price, the interest rate, and household characteristics. The agricultural household 
model for credit demand yields a set of credit demand determinants. The model is employed as a 
benchmark to analyse the determinants of household participation in AC credit in our study. Since 
data used in the analysis is cross-sectional and prices do not vary significantly across districts, input 
and output prices are constant across farm households. Thus these prices are excluded from the 
model (Arthur & van Kooten, 1985). 
3.1.2 Credit Rationing Theory 
Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) theory of credit markets attempts to explain credit rationing in the credit 
markets. The theory explains why some borrowers are able to obtain loans from markets but others 
cannot. Agency problems such as asymmetric information and moral hazard impact on credit 
availability since they are sources of credit risk (Mishkin, 2007). According to Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), market imperfection creates credit rationing and limits credit access for borrowers. 
The credit markets are based on imperfect information. Borrowers have more information than 
lenders about the probability of the success of their projects or whether they will spend their loans 
on the intended projects. Borrowers can be divided into different categories, based on their ability to 
pay back loans; high (good borrowers) and low probability (bad borrowers). Lenders cannot clearly 
identify types of borrowers, since they do not have access to borrowers’ key information, such as a 
borrower’s capacity to repay a loan or the riskiness of projects that the borrower intend to spend the 
loan on. 
Asymmetric information influences lenders’ decisions to approve loans. Lenders use interest rates to 
cover the risk of default (Quach, 2005). However, using interest rates results in two problems; 
adverse selection and the moral hazard problem. Adverse selection arises in the credit market since 
some borrowers are unlikely to repay their loans; credit providers cannot identify good borrowers 
from bad borrowers. Lenders offer the same interest rates to borrowers. Due to asymmetry 
information, lenders increase interest rate to cover credit risk. Higher interest rates means that only 
risker borrowers will apply for loans (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Zeller, 1994). When credit is constrained, 
high risk borrowers are often willing to pay a higher interest rate to accept loans (Feder, Lau, Lin, & 
Luo, 1990). This means that borrowers are more likely to be riskier, which may reduce the lender’s 
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profits (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Moreover, high interest rates encourage borrowers to invest in riskier 
projects (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The interest rate is a cost; thus, it influences borrowers’ behaviour. 
Increased interest rates mean that borrowers are more likely to invest loans in riskier projects, which 
have a lower probability of success but high rates of return (Zeller, 1994).  
Raising the interest rate does not always lead to greater profits for lenders. As explained above, 
higher interest rates tends to lead to more riskier borrowers in the market (Freixas & Rochet, 2008; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Providing loans at a higher interest rate may lower lender’s returns since such 
loans are likely to entail higher risk and increase the riskiness of the average loan. Therefore, lenders 
prefer credit rationing over increasing interest rates (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). However, the signalling 
process can solve information asymmetries and the credit rationing problem (Milde & Riley, 1988; 
Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009). Signalling implementation allows lenders to distinguish low risk 
borrowers from high risk borrowers without withdrawing low risk borrowers from the market (Milde 
& Riley, 1988). Signalling transfers loan applicants’ characteristics to lenders so that they can assess 
borrowers’ quality/types. A multiple-contract is offered by lenders to separate out high and low 
quality borrowers (Milde & Riley, 1988). Lenders exploit various conditions in the contracts to signal 
borrowers’ type, such as different interest rates, loan size, collateral requirements, and loan 
maturities. 
Interest rate is an important variable to identify different types of borrowers (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Lenders use interest rates and collateral as screening devices to separate types of borrowers (Cressy 
& Toivanen, 2001; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Lenders propose different contracts; contract with higher 
interest rates but with low collateral and vice versa. Good borrowers will choose to provide collateral 
and a pay lower interest rate. In contrast, the bad borrowers who know that they have a high 
probability of default will choose a contract with low collateral and pay higher interest rates. Bad 
borrowers do not choose contracts designed for good borrowers since they are afraid that they will 
lose their collateral. 
Lenders offer borrowers different loan sizes and interest rates as a way to solve information 
asymmetries (Milde & Riley, 1988). Project characteristics are important factors which help 
determine loan size. Borrowers’ expected returns are assumed to increase with loan size (Milde & 
Riley, 1988). Lenders are able to screen borrowers’ loan quality by offering various loan sizes, with 
different interest rates. Lenders offer larger loans with higher interest rates. Borrowers signal their 
risk by selecting the size of the loan. The relationship between loan size and borrowers’ loan quality 
can occur in two ways. First, applicants’ loan quality and loan size have a positive correlation. 
Borrowers with higher quality projects tend to select larger loans rather than smaller ones. 
Borrowers’ returns depend on the quality of the projects they invest in. Borrowers with high quality 
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of projects who obtain a larger loan will receive a higher return from their projects. Thus they are 
more willing to borrow a greater amount of money than borrowers who intend to invest in a low 
quality project (Milde & Riley, 1988). To receive a larger loans, applicants with higher quality projects 
(lower risk) are willing to pay a higher interest rate. Selecting a larger loan with a higher interest rate 
implies that they are high quality applicants. However, loan size signalling may have a negative 
relationship with borrowers’ loan quality (Milde & Riley, 1988). If borrowers’ return function does 
not increase with loan size, borrowers with high quality projects will pay a lower interest rate. Thus 
they will accept a smaller loan. In this situation, high quality borrowers signal their status by choosing 
a smaller loan with a lower interest rate. 
Collateral provision can mitigate informational asymmetries and solve credit rationing by screening 
borrowers’ risks (Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009). Collateral has a positive relationship with borrower 
quality. Low risk borrowers are more likely to provide more collateral to signal that they are good 
borrowers (Bester, 1987; Chan & Kanatas, 1985). In contrast, collateral can be negatively associated 
with borrowers’ quality. High-risk borrowers may provide more collateral than low-risk borrowers 
(Mishkin, 2007; Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009). Lenders require high collateral for high-risk 
borrowers to prevent them from changing their behaviour. Loan maturity is applied as a signalling 
instrument to reduce the information asymmetries (Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009). Selecting short-
term loans signals to lenders that borrowers’ projects are good quality. Thus they signal to lenders 
that their projects will earn high returns and therefore they will be able to repay their loans in a short 
amount of time. 
Raising the interest rate is not an effective way for resolving informational asymmetries since it 
increases borrowers’ risks and reduces lenders’ returns. Instead, credit rationing is often the result. 
To resolve information asymmetries and credit rationing, the signalling process is used to distinguish 
types of borrowers. Lenders offer contracts with different condition for each loan application. 
Therefore, loan attributes may influence the size of the loan granted by lenders. Our study thus 
includes loan attributes as one set of factors which influence loan size.  
Model of Credit Rationing 
The presence of credit rationing can be shown by the model of ex-ante asymmetric information. 
Quach (2005) developed a model to capture credit rationing in the credit market. The model consists 
of two agents; borrowers and lenders. Borrowers lack capital meaning they need to borrow money 
for investing in project i. Lenders providing loans to borrowers aim to maximize their profit. 
Under the imperfect information in the credit market, it can be assumed that the expected return of 
every project ( )i  is equal, however, the probability of success ( )i is different (Quach, 2005). The 
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expected return of successful and failed projects are denoted by ,  s fi i   respectively. Lenders can 
identify the expected return of projects but not the probability of the project’s success. With the 
same project expected return, borrowers are offered the same interest rate (r) and loan amount (B). 
The model assumes that the expected return, when the project success is greater than the loan 
repayment, ( ) 1si r B  + . If the return of the failed project is less than the loan repayment then
( ) 1<fi r B + . The expected return to the projects and to the borrowers is given as: 
( )1s fi i i i i    = + −     (3.7) 
( ), (1 )si i ir r B    = − +       (3.8) 
Substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.8), and rearranging, we get: 
( ), (1 )f fi i i i ir r B      = − + − +      (3.9) 
The relationship between the probability of success and the borrower’s expected return is illustrated 
by the first order condition: 
( ) ( ), / 1fi i ir r B     = − +     (3.10) 
Based on the assumption that the expected return of failure is less than the loan repayment, the 
impact of the probability of success on the borrower’s expected return is lower than zero: 
( )1fi r B − + < 0. Therefore, the borrower’s expected return is the decreasing function of the 
probability of success. 
To illustrate the relationship between the probability of success and the interest rate, the implicit 
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     (3.11) 
Since ( ), /  0i ir     , thus ( ), / 0i r r    . Equation (3.11) implies that an increased 
interest rate decreases the probability of success. This means that the higher interest rate leads 
borrowers with lower risk projects to withdraw from the credit market. In short, the remaining 
borrowers tend to invest in riskier projects. 
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In terms of the lenders’ perspective, this assumes that lenders will receive full repayment, if the 
borrower’s project is successful. If the project fails, the borrower will pay back the loan, as much as 
he or she gains from the project. The lender expected return is given as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1  1f fi i i i i iK r r B r B      = + + − = + −    (3.12) 
The relationship between the probability of success and the lender’s return is shown in equation 
(3.13) 
( ) ( ), / 1 fi i iK r r B    = + −     (3.13) 
Since ( )1 fir B +  , the lender expected return is an increasing function of the probability of 
success. The increasing interest rate results in two effects on the lender expected return. First, the 
lender return increases because of the increase in interest income which is the value of the term 
( )1 fir B + − . Second, based on the relationship between the probability of success and the interest 
rate, the increased interest rate decreases the probability of success. This makes the lower risk 
borrowers withdraw from the market, thus the lender expected return decreases (see equation 
3.13). 
The relationship between the lender expected return, the interest rate and the presence of credit 
rationing is shown in Figure 3.1 (Quach, 2005). The lender-optimal interest rate (r*) is the interest 
rate that maximizes the lender expected return. At a certain interest rate (r1) which is lower than the 
lender-optimal interest rate, the credit demand exceeds supply (see Figure 3.1). When r is less than 
(r*), the increase in interest rate raises the expected return of the lender, hence, the lender increases 
the interest rate without leading to a withdrawal of low risk borrowers. However, if the lender keeps 
increasing the interest rate to match the supply and demand, this situation may lead to a decrease in 
the lender expected returns. At higher interest rates, which is higher than the lender-optimal interest 
rate, such as at r2, low risk borrowers withdraw from the credit market. This situation means that 
average loans have a higher risk for the lender. As a result, the expected return of the lender 
decreases. Therefore, the lender prefers to offer interest at r*and ration credit at r*.  
Credit rationing theory is useful to explain why some individuals is constrained to access credit. 
Credit rationing theory suggests that the loan amount granted by lenders depends not only on credit 
applications decisions but also lenders’ decisions (Quach, 2005). Because of the existence of 
excessive credit demand, raising interest rates does not provide lenders a viable solution to cover 
default risks. Increased interest rates tend to increase borrowers’ risks and decrease lenders’ returns 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In times of excessive credit demands, it is better for lenders to ration credit. 
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Since the rural credit markets in our study are characterised by excessive credit demand, the 
empirical model for analysing AC loan amount determinants is based on credit rationing. The 
empirical model includes both household characteristics and credit attributes to analyse loan 
amount. 
 
Figure 3.1 Presence of Credit Rationing 
Source: adapted from Quach, 2005 
3.1.3 Agricultural Household Demand for Marketing Services 
The framework applied to analyse household decisions to participate in the market is based on the 
concept of transaction costs (Key, Sadoulet & Janvry, 2000). Transaction costs are defined as cost 
related to market transactions (Key et al., 2000). Since transaction costs increase prices for 
consumers and decrease producers’ net returns, households’ decisions to trade through markets 
depends on transaction costs (Barrett, 2008; Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000).  
Goetz (1992) in sub-Saharan Africa and Key et al. (2000) in Mexico use the transaction costs 
framework to analyse the relationship between transaction costs and household decisions to 
participate in the agricultural markets. The model assumes that the decision to participate is a two-
step process. In the first stage, households decide whether to trade in the market and which position 
to adopt; as a buyer or a seller. In the second stage, the participants decide the amount of product 
traded through the market. The probability of participation in the market and the level of market 
participation are estimated separately.  
Based on Key et al.’s (2000) model, household utility is a function of goods and services consumed. 
This is given as follows: 
D 
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( ); uU C Z=       (3.14) 
U is the function of household utility, assumed to be monotone; increasing in arguments, strictly 
concave, and possessing continuous second partial derivatives (Ouma, Jagwe, Obare, & Abele, 2010). 
C is the set of goods and service consumed. Zu is the exogenous household characteristics affecting 
household utility. 
Households make decisions about their total outputs (qi). Products are allocated in the following 
manner; for family consumption (Ci), sale through the market (mi), and use as input (xi).  The 
households have two choices to participate in the market as a seller or a buyer. The households 
maximize their utility function and face three constraints; a cash constraint (equation 3.15), farm 
production (equation 3.16), resource balance constraint (equation 3.17), presented below; 




m s s s m b b b s s s b b b
i pi t i i pi t i i fi t i fi t i
i
p t Z p t Z m t Z t Z T   
=
 − + + − − + =
   (3.15) 
( ), x ; 0i i qG q Z =      (3.16) 
0 , 1,2,3,...,i i i i iq x A m C i N− + − − = =    (3.17) 
, , 0i i iC q x        (3.18) 
Where qZ  is the exogenous household characteristics affecting his/her production, including land 
and location factors, such as population density and market access (Ouma, Jagwe, Obare, & Abele, 
2010). iA  is the household’s endowment in good i; G  stands for production technology; ix  is the 
input, including purchased and non-purchased input for the production of good i; iq  is the amount 
of product i produced by the household. 
m
ip  is the market price of good i; im  is the amount of good i 
traded via the market. im  is positive if the household chooses to participate in the market as a seller. 
It is negative when the household is a buyer. ,s bt t   represent a household’s decision to participate in 
the market. 
s
t  equals one, if im is positive and zero otherwise.  
b
t  equals one, if im  is negative and 
zero otherwise. ,s bpi pit t  denote the proportional transaction cost per unit of output i sold or 
purchased via the market, respectively; ,s bfi fit t  is the fixed transaction cost for selling and purchasing 
good i via the market, respectively. 
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Cash constraint (equation 3.15) shows that the households cannot spend money to purchase goods 
beyond their total income. The first term on the left-hand side of the cash constraint equation 
presents the net revenue from trade at the market. The proportion transaction costs (PTCs) influence 
the price received by a household. It decreases the price received by the seller, while it increases the 
price paid by the buyer. PTCs consist of costs for transportation and market access which are 
unobservable. While it is difficult to measure the value of transportation and time spent in the 
market by farmers, PTCs can be observed as a function of exogenous factors affecting PTCs ( ,s bt tZ Z ). 
The second and third terms are the fixed transaction costs (FTCs) for market participation. Although 
FTCs are unobserved, the FTCs are perceived as the function of exogenous characteristics ( ,s bt tZ Z ) 
affecting the FTCs for selling and buying, respectively. When the households are sellers, they pay the 
fixed cost 
s
fit  and pay 
b
fit for the buyers. The last term (T) is transfer payment and includes other 
income. 
In addition to cash budget constraints, the household faces constraint relating to resource balancing. 
This is shown in equation (3.17). The resource balance constraint shows that the summation of 
amount of good i consumed (Ci), used as input (xi), and sold (mi>0) is equal to the summation of an 
endowment for good i (Ai) and the amount of good i produced (qi) and bought from the market 
(mi<0). 
Farm production technologies are included in equation (3.16). They affect input (xi) and output (qi). 
The equation assumes the production technology is an increasing and concave function. A unit 
increase in input generates an increase in output. However, the rate of output decreases with 
increased input. Lastly, the equation assumes that households face a non-negativity constraint, as 
presented in equation (3.18). The amount of good i produced, used as input, or consumed by 
households may be equal to zero in a given production cycle or positive, but not less than zero. 
The households decide whether to participate in the market or not. If they participate in the market, 
they will choose the amount of product traded via the market to maximize their utility, subject to 
cash, resources balance, and production technology constraints. This can be rewritten as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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Where i  is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimal solution can be broken down into two steps. The 
first step involves solving the optimal solution for the decision to participate in the market. The 
second step involves solving amount of good i produced, used as input, and consumed. The optimal 
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solution can be solved by the first order condition with respect to amount of goods for consumption 
(Ci), amount of outputs (qi), amount of inputs (xi); and amount of good for trade in markets (mi). 
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    (3.20) 
When the households participate in the market, price is influenced by PTCs. However, if the 
households do not participate in the market, price is an unobservable internal shadow price ( 𝑝?̃?) (Key 
et al., 2000). 
Based on the transaction costs, the household decisions to participate in the market is a choice 
decision. The households have to decide whether to participate in the market as a seller or buyer or 
not at all (and be self-sufficient). This assumes that the households weigh the expected utility among 
three choices and choose one which provides them with the highest utility. The expected utility of 
the three choices (buyer, seller, self-sufficient) is represented in the function of price decision. The 
utility levels under the three different choices can be rewritten in the form of the indirect utility 
function (see Equation 3.21). ( ), , zi uV p y  is an indirect utility function. ip  is the decision price; 
( )0 iy p  is household income before the occurrence of the FTCs.  
( ) ( )( )
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V V p t y p t t Z if sellers
V V p t y p t t Z if buyers
V V p y p Z if self sufficient households
= − − −
= + + −
= −
  (3.21) 
The FTCs and PTCs influence the household decision to participate in the market. The increased FTCs 
reduce the household income and utility (see equations 3.21). The household’s decision to 
participate in the market depends on the market price (
m
ip ). If the market price is in the range of 
s
i pip t−  and 
s
i pip t+  that is, ( )b m si pi i i pip t p p t−   + , the households decide not to participate in 
the market.  If market prices are less than 
b
i pip t− , the households may choose to participate in the 
market as buyers. In contrast, they will be sellers if the market price is greater than 
s
i pip t+ . 
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Household supply of farm products relies on the market price. The supply function is ( ),mi pq p Z . 
With FTCs and PTCs, supply function can be expressed as equation 3.22). Household supply is not 
influenced by the FTCs, whereas the PTCs affect households who are sellers and buyers in different 
ways. When the PTCs increase, households who are sellers will decrease their supply to market, 
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   (3.22) 
Key et al.’s (2000) market participation model includes transaction costs and their effect on 
households’ market participation in terms of the decision to participate in markets and the quantity 
of products sold in the markets. The households’ decision to participate in the markets are 
determined by household characteristics, which affect their production (Z), the FTCs, and the PTCs. 
While sale amount is influenced by household characteristics and the PTCs. In our study, the 
empirical model to investigate the households’ decisions to participate in AC marketing services are 
based on Key et al.’s (2000) model. Transaction costs included in the model are measured by distance 
to the market, while district dummy variables refer to market accessibility.  
3.2 Participation in Credit and Non-Credit Support Service 
This section reviews empirical studies on participation in credit and non-credit support services. Due 
to the limited studies on AC credit participation, our study borrows ideas from formal and informal 
credit accessibility and applies it to the AC credit. It begins with a review of credit studies about 
models and determinants of credit participation. The models and determinants of participation in 
non-credit support services are reviewed in the next section. Non-credit support services include 
input and output marketing and agricultural extension services. 
3.2.1 Participation in Credit Services 
Credit participation is explained by credit demand theory and the credit rationing. According to Zeller 
(1994), credit participation is a two sequential decision. Credit demand is applied to analyse 
households’ decision to participate in credit programs. Their decision to participate in a credit 
program depends on their demand for credit (Zeller, 1994). In a credit market with asymmetric 
information, both credit demand and credit rationing are needed to explain the loan amounts 
granted. The total loan amount granted requires negotiation between both the lender and borrower. 
Credit providers consider and offer the maximum credit to borrowers (credit limit). The credit limit 
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depends on the household’s likelihood of default (Diagne, Zeller, & Sharma, 2000). The borrowers 
decide how much they want to borrow within a range of credit limits. Therefore, the exact loan 
amount depends on various factors relating to both the lender and the borrower (Diagne et al., 2000; 
Feder, Lau, Lin, & Luo, 1990; Nguyen, 2007; Zeller, 1994).  
Previous studies have noted the existence of credit rationing (Feder et al., 1990; Zeller, 1994). Feder 
et al. (1990) examine the effects of credit on farm production in North-eastern China. They take into 
account the credit liquidity constraint in their model. They find that approximately 37% of farm 
households are constrained by credit limitations. Some applicants obtain loans less than for what 
they had applied, while others had their loans rejected. In short, the total amount of credit requested 
by borrowers is more than the number of loans offered by credit providers. Zeller (1994) examines 
the determinants of credit rationing based on data from Madagascar. Zeller shows that both formal 
and informal credit lenders in Madagascar ration credit. The author’s findings show that 51% of 
formal credit applicants and 23.5% of informal credit applicants do not obtain loan.  
Discrete choice theory is applied to analyse household’s decision to participate in the credit market. 
Empirical studies on the determinants of credit participation can be divided into two main streams. 
First, some studies explore household decisions to participate in credit programs. Since household 
decision to participate in the credit program is a simple yes or no, a binary choice model can be 
applied to estimate the probability of credit participation and the determinants affecting credit 
participation (Tetteh Anang, Sipilainen, Backman, & Kola, 2015). The probit and logit models are 
normally used in this stream of research. For example, Ololade and Olagunju (2013) use a logit model 
to identify the impact of household characteristics and credit conditions on rural farmers’ credit 
accessibility in Nigeria. The authors focus on the effects of credit conditions on credit access, thus 
their model includes household characteristics, credit attributes, such as collateral or guarantee 
availability and interest rates, and other factors such as region dummy variables and access to other 
forms of credit. Fongthong and Suriya (2014) investigate the factors relating to borrowing money 
from The Village Fund in Thailand. The authors use the logit model to analyse household 
socioeconomic data from 2009. The authors’ study analyses whether The Village Fund serves the 
poor, which include the poverty index, poverty gap, and an interaction term to measure poverty in 
the model. Sebopetji and Belete (2009) use the probit model to analyse the influence of household 
characteristics on farmers’ decisions to borrow credit in South Africa. The authors are interested in 
both concerned with individual and household factors but do not include geographical factors. 
Nguyen (2007) and Khoi (2012) utilize a probit model to determine the probability of Vietnamese 
household borrowing. The authors consider the interaction between informal loans and formal credit 
access. Their formal credit accessibility model includes informal loan as an explanatory variable. 
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Ololade and Olagunju (2013), Fongthong and Suriya (2014), and Khoi, Gan, Nartea, and Cohen (2013)  
find that the poor face more credit rationing than other groups and often cannot gain access to 
credit. Collateral is a key factor which restricts low-income households from participating in credit 
programs (Ololade & Olagunju, 2013; Sebopetji & Belete, 2009). Forming a group, such as a 
cooperative, enables low-income households to borrow from formal credit providers. Group lending 
mechanisms can solve the problem of collateral scarcity and creditworthiness since it mitigates 
asymmetric information and the moral hazard problem (Coleman, 1999; Sebopetji & Belete, 2009). It 
overcomes informational asymmetries since members know other members’ information. When 
members borrow money, they self-select members in the group, co-guarantee each other’s loans, 
and monitor each other. Group lending provides lenders’ with low monitoring costs. Moreover, if the 
group dynamics and their ability to sanction each other are strong, members will repay their loans on 
time.  
A number of studies have provided insight into households’ behaviour in borrowing from different 
credit sources (Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Tsukada, Higashikata, & Takahashi, 2010). In the 
credit market, credit providers can be classified as formal and informal lenders. Households have 
different preferences for credit; thus, the different credit sources may serve different borrowers 
(Tsukada et al., 2010). A multinomial choice model is applied to investigate factors affecting the 
choice of lenders when the dependent variable includes more than two choices. A multinomial 
choice model is suitable to explain the likelihood that an individual will choose one program over 
another (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011). For example, Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) explore the 
determinants of households’ decision to participate in different credit providers in Thailand. They 
group the choice of credit providers into seven choices and apply a multinomial logit model using the 
Village Fund as abenchmark. Similarly, Tsukada et al. (2010) investigate factors affecting borrowing 
from six different credit sources in Indonesia using a mixed multinomial logit model. They conclude 
that credit market consists of different types of providers and each serve different borrowers. In 
short, informal credit providers are more attractive to low-income households than formal credit 
providers. In addition, the coexistence of different credit sectors reduces credit constraints. 
Another stream of studies on credit participation focuses on the determinants of loan size. Duong 
and Izumida (2002), Khoi et al. (2013), and Nguyen (2007) attempt to capture credit rationing among 
different credit providers. Due to asymmetric information in the rural credit market, borrowers face 
credit constraints. The credit applicants’ loan may be rejected or granted. If borrowers obtain loans, 
they may get the full or a partial amount of the loan requested. Since there are several credit 
providers, borrowers may choose to borrow from one credit provider or from many lenders at the 
same time (Duong & Izumida, 2002). For example, Duong and Izumida (2002) compare the 
determinants of loan amount between formal and informal credit programs in Vietnam. The authors 
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divide the sample into two groups; formal and informal borrowers. The authors use the Tobit model 
to estimate determinants of formal and informal loan amounts. They consider only factors of 
demand side; individaual and household characteristics and province dummy. Their findings show 
that the formal loan amount is positively influenced by farm size and livestock value, while informal 
loan amount is positively affected by farm size and the dependent ratio at the 1% level. Similarly, 
Nguyen (2007) uses the Tobit model to identify the determinants of rural households’ loan size in 
Vietnam. The author uses Household data from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey (VLSS) 
1997/98. The results show that loan amount has a negative relationship with age, but a positive 
relationsip with the size of the land at the 1% level. The findings of this stream contribute to 
understanding the factors which affect the loan amount under conditions of credit rationing. Loan 
amount is influenced by individual and household characteristics (e.g. age, education, family 
members, landholding) and geographical factors such as region dummy and distance to the nearest 
market.  
Besides capturing the coexistence of different credit providers, some studies argued that selection 
bias may take place in credit participation analysis. As a two sequential decision (Zeller, 1994), 
selection bias may happen in the second step of a credit decision; the process of deciding the total 
loan amount. At the first stage, households decide whether to borrow loans or not. The second stage 
is called the outcome stage; only households who decide to borrow loans will need to decide how 
much to borrow. The second stage of the credit decision may have a selection bias since the loan 
amount estimation considers only data from credit participants. Moreover, credit participation is not 
random. Households self-select; in other words, they decide to borrow money. There may be some 
observable and non-observable characteristics which influence households to participate in credit. 
Therefore, using information from only credit participants to estimate the loan amount may lead to a 
selection bias. A study which ignores selection bias may be biased (Girma & Abebaw, 2015; Tetteh 
Anang et al., 2015). Selection bias can be controlled using the Heckman selection model. 
Zeller (1994) is one of the pioneers who provides a framework to analyse credit rationing by taking 
into account the selection bias. The author investigates the determinants of credit access and credit 
rationing under the coexistence of both formal and informal credit providers. Credit decision is a 
sequentail decision process of borrowers and lenders. First, credit applicants decide to apply for 
credit. In the second step, lenders decide amount of loans granted. Credit rationing is the decision of 
lenders after households apply for credits. The determinants of credit participation and credit 
rationing are estimated separately between credit equations of formal and informal providers, using 
the Heckman two-step model.The credit rationing equation is estimated simultaneously alongside 
the credit participation equation. 
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Zeller (1994) finds that low-income individuals have limited access to formal credit providers. The 
poor cannot borrow formal loans because they are more likely to default on their loans.  However, a 
lack of collateral can be solved by group lending. In Madagascar, poor individuals who have no 
collateral can access to formal credit facilities by borrowing through community-based groups. 
Members in the group have information about their members’ credit worthiness than formal 
lenders. Thus formal lenders use applicants’ information and social networks to mitigate information 
asymmetry (Zeller, 1994). Regarding informal credit access, the author finds that the poor are less 
likely to be able to access formal credit and have to rely heavily on informal sources for consumption 
purposes. The probability of access to informal credit is greatly influenced by an individuals’ social 
network. Having many friends or relatives makes it easier to ask them for loans. This is also true for 
AC credit access. Under collateral-free, having lots of friends who are AC members enables 
households to access AC credits due to co-guarantee. Empirical studies show that the more 
neighbours involve in ACs, the more likely are farmers to participate in ACs (Ito et al., 2012; Ma & 
Abdulai, 2016).  
Khoi et al. (2013) and Duy, D'Haese, Lemba, and D'Haese (2012) both explore the factors influencing 
credit participation. Both studies consider the credit participation decision as a two sequential 
decision and take into account the selection bias. Duy et al. (2012) compares the impact of individual 
lending with group-based lending on households’ formal credit accessibility in the Mekong Delta, in 
Vietnam. The Heckman selection model is applied to control for selection bias. In the first step of the 
Heckman model, the probit model is applied to estimate the probability of credit access. In the 
second step, the loan size equation is estimated. Duy et al. (2012) find that selection bias does not 
affect households’ decisions to borrow money. Household endowments, particularly land, determine 
credit access and loan amount for individual lending. Clearly access to formal credit requires 
collateral. Collateral requirements means that the very poor are not able to access formal credit. In 
contrast, social capital is significant for the group-based lending. Households who have more social 
capital tend to borrow larger loan. Duy’s result shows that group-based lending helps the poor to 
overcome a lack of collateral. Members of group self-select themselves, employ social sanctions, and 
monitor their behaviours, thus group lending can mitigate the risk of default. 
Khoi et al. (2013) attempt to capture the coexistence of formal and informal providers. The authors 
assume that formal credit accessibility is influenced by informal loans which are an endogenous 
variable. Therefore, formal and informal loans are estimated using a system of simultaneous 
equations. Khoi et al. (2013) use the Heckman two-step model to control for the selection bias 
problem. In the first step of the Heckman model, the probability of formal credit access is estimated 
using the probit endogenous model. In the second step, the loan size equation is estimated. Khoi et 
al. reveal the presence of a selection bias in their model. Their results show that the lowest income 
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individuals face greater degrees of credit rationing than other groups and that the poorest of the 
poor cannot reach formal credits in Vietnam. Social capital such as working with a local government, 
membership in  a credit group, and being a poor household influence household access to formal 
credit institutions. Moreover, they find that informal loans positively affect accessibility to formal 
credit. Therefore, ignoring the interaction between informal loans and formal credit accessibility may 
lead to a biased result. 
Our study investigates households’ decision to participate in AC credit, both in terms of the decision 
to participate in AC credit schemes and the loan amount granted. Several studies focus on 
determinants of household decisions to participate in the credit market (Akerele & Akanni, 2014; 
Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Ololade & Olagunju, 2013; Tsukada et 
al., 2010). These studies explain households’ participation in formal and informal credit programs. 
However, it is not enough to explain loan amount granted. Credit rationing occurs due to excessive 
demands for credit and asymmetric information. Under condition of credit rationing, loan amount is 
determined by both the borrowers and lenders. Hence, understanding the factors which influence 
loan amount is important to motivate households to participate more in AC credit schemes. 
Furthermore, there may be a selection bias in the credit decision. Ignoring the selection bias may 
lead to biased results. Our study considers that households’ credit decision is a two sequential 
decision and takes into account the selection bias. We investigate the determinants of credit 
participation using the Heckman selection model to mitigate the selection bias. 
Determinants for Credit Participation   
Previous literature shows that households’ decision to participate in the credit market is derived 
from several factors such as household head and household characteristics and geographic factors 
(Duong & Izumida, 2002; Khoi et al., 2013; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Zeller, 1994). Most of 
the literature on credit participation focuses on factors on the demand side (Coleman, 2006; Duong 
& Izumida, 2002; Duy et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2007). As discussed above, credit participation involves 
negotiation between the borrowers and credit providers; therefore, it covers both demand and 
supply factors. The crucial factors influencing credit participation, in terms of credit participation 
decisions and the loan amount are summarized in Table 3.1. These factors are categorized into four 
factors; household head characteristics, household characteristics, attributes of credit providers, and 
geographic factors. 
Household head characteristics are important factors which explain a borrower’s decision to borrow 
from formal and informal credit providers. Individual characteristics reflect the skill and workability 
of household heads (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Age and education play important roles in credit 
accessibility. However, there is no agreement on the impact of age and education on credit 
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participation (Khoi et al., 2013; Nguyen, 2007; Sebopetji & Belete, 2009; Zeller, 1994). Credit 
providers use age and education levels as criteria to evaluate borrowers’ probability of repaying their 
loans. Age is used to denote work experience, credit management, and responsibility for loan 
repayment (Girma & Abebaw, 2015; Khoi et al., 2013; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Older individuals 
are expected to have more experience and credit management skills. Therefore, they are more likely 
to access formal credit programs. 
Similarly, the more educated an individual is, the more likely he or she is able to access credit. Since 
educated people have more ability to obtain credit information and join extension services, they 
have more opportunities to generate income and hence are more likely to repay their loans (Girma & 
Abebaw, 2015). In contrast, younger individuals, who have lower levels of education are often unable 
to access credit from formal institutions and therefore are more likely to borrow from informal credit 
sources (Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). Young people with low 
levels of education have a lower ability to generate income and are less likely to have collateral 
needed to borrow money from formal lenders. Thus, they are more likely to borrow from informal 
lenders. 
Age and education level may have negative effects on credit participation. Khoi et al. (2013) and 
Nguyen (2007) find that age has a negative relationship with loan amount. The elderly are more likely 
to have less credit demands, since they tend to have more assets and land. They often have enough 
money for farm production. Thus, they often have lower demand for credit (Nguyen, 2007; Sebopetji 
& Belete, 2009). Similarly, Khoi et al., (2013) find that household head’s education negatively 
influences loan amount for both formal and informal loans. The education variable in their study is a 
dichotomous variable which equals 1 when households have no education and 0 otherwise. The 
negative relationship between no education and loan amount indicates that households with no 
education tend to borrow less (participate less in the credit market), compared to those with higher 
levels of education.  
Another determinant driving credit participation is gender. Previous findings on the impact of gender 
on credit participation are different. Women are less constrained by some credit programs. Financial 
institutions (FIs) in some countries, such as Grameen bank in Bangladesh and microfinance bank in 
Nigeria, are more likely to provide credit to women (Anyiro & Oriaku, 2011; Bernasek, 2003). Women 
are important factors to success in social development and poverty alleviation (Bernasek, 2003). 
Women’s income are more effects on household well-being than those of men. Furthermore, they 
are more creditworthy. They also exhibit a higher repayment rate and contribute to agriculture 
production. Therefore, women are key customers of FIs. For example, Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) 
show that gender has a negative and significant relationship to credit access in Northern Ghana. They 
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find that women are more likely to access credit than men. Similarly, Fongthong and Suriya (2014) 
find that Thai women have a higher probability of being able to borrow loans from the Village Funds 
at the 10% level. The Village fund committees believe that women have lower credit risks compared 
to men. The negative result of gender suggests that women are given more opportunities to 
participate in credit programs. In contrast, Sebopetji and Belete (2009) find that male household 
heads have a higher likelihood of participating in credit programs than women. This is because men 
dominate women, control the household resources and make all of the decisions. Similarly, Ololade 
and Olagunju (2013) present that in sub-Sahara Africa women are less likely to access credit (by 
71.3%) compared to men. 
Household characteristics are key determinants which influence credit participation. Household 
characteristics are divided into two groups, factors related to household wealth and farm production. 
Household wealth can be captured in terms of household income and assets such as land size, 
number of livestock, and productive assets. Household wealth is a proxy for household economic 
status and is used by credit providers to measure a household’s creditworthiness (Khoi et al., 2013; 
Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Therefore, households with greater wealth tend to have greater access to 
formal credit programs. In contrast, the poor are more likely to access informal credit programs. 
Similarly, studying credit access of poor household in Thailand, Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011), 
also argue that households with low incomes tend to borrow from village funds or ACs more than the 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) since they have difficulty accessing formal 
credit.  
Assets, such as land and productive assets, influence credit participation in two ways. First, these 
factors affect the demand for loans. Since land size indicates scale of production, households with 
larger farms may need more financial capital to purchase farm inputs for their farm production 
(Duong & Izumida, 2002; Nguyen, 2007; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). As a result, households with 
larger farm capital are more likely to borrow more loans compared to those with smaller areas of 
land. Farm capital refers to capital stock for agricultural production. Farm capital may have a 
negative or positive effect on credit demand (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Large capital endowed 
households may have a lower demand for credit since they do not need money to purchase new 
farm capital. However, farm capital may positively influence loan amount because households with 
large farm capital are more likely to invest in updated farm capital for production improvement. They 
are more likely to borrow greater amounts of money. Besides, land and farm capital can be used as 
loan collateral (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). In terms of lenders, households with little land and farm 
capital are regarded as poor and risky borrowers, thus FIs are less likely to offer them credit. 
However, households with large size of land and productive assets exhibit a higher probability to 
participate in credit than smaller land owners. 
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Table 3.1    Determinants of Credit Participation 
 
Independent Variables Credit Accessibility Loan Amount 
Formal Credit Informal Credit Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Household Head Characteristics 
Age  +/- Khoi et al. (2013), 
Nguyen (2007), 
Sebopetji & Belete (2009),  
Zeller (1994)  
 
+/- Zeller (1994), 
Fongthong & Suriya (2014), 
Khoi et al. (2013), 
Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn (2011) 
+/- Zeller (1994), 
Nguyen (2007) 
+/- Zeller (1994),  
Khoi et al. (2013) 
Age Square +/- Zeller (1994), 
Tetteh Anang et al. (2015), 
Ololade & Olagunju (2013) 
- Zeller (1994)   - Zeller (1994) 
Gender    - Fongthong & Suriya (2014) + Zeller (1994), 
 Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) 
  
Education Level +/- Zeller (1994), 
Sebopetji & Belete (2009) 
- Fongthong & Suriya (2014), 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
+ Zeller (1994), 
Coleman (2006) 
+ Zeller (1994), 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
Marital Status  + Duy et al. (2012), 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
+ Fongthong & Suriya (2014)     
Primary Occupation + Nguyen (2007), 
Khoi et al. (2013), 
Girma and Abebaw (2015) 
+ Fongthong & Suriya (2014) - Khoi et al. (2013)   
Household Characteristics       
Family Size + Nguyen (2007) + Fongthong & Suriya (2014) +/- Duy et al. (2012), 
Nguyen (2007), 
Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) 
  
Dependency Ratio   - Fongthong & Suriya (2014)   + Duong & Izumida (2002) 
Adult Membesr/ Income Earners   + Coleman (2006)   
Landholding Area or Farm 
Land 
+ Nguyen (2007) +/- Fongthong & Suriya (2014), Menkhoff 
& Rungruxsirivorn (2011), Khoi et al. 
(2013) 
+  Duong & Izumida (2002), 
Coleman (2006), 





+ Duong & Izumida (2002), 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
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Table 3.1    Determinants of Credit Participation (Cont.) 
 
Independent Variables Credit Accessibility Loan Amount 
Formal Credit Informal Credit Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Livestock Owned     +/- Duong & Izumida (2002),  
Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) 
  
Productive Assets + Tetteh Anang et al. (2015)   +  Tetteh Anang et al. (2015)   
Household Asset       - Zeller (1994) 
Savings   - Khoi et al. (2013)   - Khoi et al. (2013) 
Household Income + Tetteh Anang et al. (2015),  
Khoi et al. (2013)  
- Fongthong & Suriya (2014), 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
  - Khoi et al. (2013) 
Access to Other Credit + 
- 
Khoi et al. (2013) 
Li et al. (2011) 
+ Fongthong & Suriya (2014)     
Access to Agricultural 
Services 
+ Tetteh Anang et al. (2015)       
Technology Adoption     +  Tetteh Anang et al. (2015)   
Membership of Credit 
Group or Other 
Organization 
+ Khoi et al. (2013)   +  Duy et al. (2012)   
Government Official + Khoi et al. (2013)   + Coleman (2006)   
Poor Household + Khoi et al. (2013)       
Credit Attributes 
Credit Purpose   + Khoi et al. (2013), 
Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn(2011) 
+ Khoi et al. (2013) (+) Khoi et al. (2013) 
Collateral or Guarantor 
Availability  
+ Ololade & Olagunju (2013)       
Loan Duration   + Khoi et al. (2013)   + Khoi et al. (2013) 
Repayment Capacity     + Zeller (1994) + Zeller (1994) 
Geographic Factors 
Location (Region Dummy) + Khoi et al. (2013),  
Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) 
+ Fongthong & Suriya (2014),  
Khoi et al. (2013) 
+ Duong & Izumida (2002),  
Khoi et al. (2013) 
- Khoi et al. (2013) 
Road Access + Khoi et al. (2013)     + Khoi et al. (2013) 
Distance to the Nearest 
Market 
- Duy et al. (2012)   - Nguyen (2007)   
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The findings of household wealth on credit access vary. Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) and Duy et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that land size does not significantly determine credit access and loan size, while, 
farm capital has a significant effect on credit access and loan size at the 10% level. Farm capital 
covers capital stock for agricultural production. Farmers who have large amounts of capital are more 
likely to borrow more to invest in new technologies so that they can expand their production. On the 
other hand, Nguyen ( 2007) and Duong and Izumida (2002) indicate that land size positively 
influences Vietnamese households’ formal credit access and loan size, since borrowing from formal 
lenders requires land as collateral. Therefore, households with greater areas of land are more likely 
to access formal credit. Furthermore, they are wealthier, hence, lenders tend to grant them bigger 
loans compared to households with smaller size of land. Similarly, in their study of formal lenders in 
Vietnam, Duong and Izumida (2002) find a positive relationship between loan amount and farm size. 
Household size is an indirect indicator for household income and consumption expenditure.  Effects 
of household size on credit access should be considered together with the dependency ratio and the 
number of income earners in the family (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 
2011). A large family with several income earners have a higher probability of  accessing credit since 
they can generate more  income. Thus they have the capability to pay back the loans (Nguyen, 2007). 
However, households with a higher number of children, elderly, or disabled members are less likely 
to borrow from formal lenders. They are more likely to spend loans to take care of family members; 
therefore, they are less likely to repay their loans. 
Some agricultural production factors, such as extension services, technology adoption, and credit 
use, determine households’ decision to participate in credit. These factors positively affect credit 
participation. Extension services are important sources of market information, farm production 
knowledge, modern farm material and technology and farm production support. Farmers who have 
access to extension services have more opportunities to improve their farm production skills and 
farm input. As a result, farmers are more likely to obtain loans for production expansion (Girma & 
Abebaw, 2015; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Farmers who want to adopt technology may need money 
to invest in new technology, thus technology adopters are more likely to participate in credit 
programs (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). 
Previous studies have suggested that loans borrowed from other sources influence households’ 
decisions to participate in credit services (Duong & Izumida, 2002; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Khoi et 
al., 2013). Loans from different sources are complementary. Formal and informal credit coexist in the 
credit market. Households may borrow from several credit providers at the same time to obtain 
sufficient capital (Khoi et al., 2013). Credit access from other sources are likely to determine 
participation in credit programs. Credit from other sources may have a positive effect on households’ 
66 
demand for credit. Khoi et al. (2013) show that informal loans positively influence households’ access 
to formal credits at the 1% level, indicating that a 1% increase in informal credit raises the probability 
of formal credit access by 5%. Similarly, Fongthong and Suriya (2014) indicate that accessibility to 
other loans positively influences households’ decisions to borrow credit from Thai Village Fund at the 
5% level. This is because formal credit or semi-formal credit (that is, credit from Thai Village Fund and 
ACs) are cheaper than informal credit schemes. Households borrowing from informal lenders often 
borrow credit from formal lenders to repay informal loans (Khoi et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
accessibility to other loans negatively influences households’ credit access. From lenders’ 
perspectives, formal lenders apply other loans as justification for rationing credit since other loans 
can indicate outstanding debt and repayment ability (Li et al., 2011; Zeller, 1994). Households with 
high loans from other credit sources face a higher probability of being constrained, thus, they are less 
likely to participate in the credit market. Li et al. (2011) reveal that access to other loans has a 
negative effect on the probability of credit access at the 1% level. This means that households’ 
probability of credit access will decrease by 10.02% if the household access to other credits.  
Previous studies did not critically examine the credit provider characteristics, as key determinants of 
credit participation. Credit purpose and collateral requirement directly influence credit accessibility 
(Khoi et al., 2013; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Ololade & Olagunju, 2013; Tsukada et al., 
2010). Credit purpose determines household’s credit access to formal or informal sources of credit 
(Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Tsukada et al., 2010). Different credit sources serve different 
credit purposes. For example, in Thailand, BAAC and ACs provide loans for production purposes in 
the agricultural sector, while loans offered by commercial banks are for production in the non-
agricultural sector. Loans from informal lenders are predominantly for consumption. Households 
who need loans for farm production are more likely to participate in BAAC or AC credit programs 
(Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) compare households’ 
reason behind borrowing credit from Thai Village Fund, the BAAC and, ACs in Thailand. The authors 
show that borrowing loans for farm production purposes from Thai Village Fund and ACs are not 
significantly different. In contrast, household who spend loans for consumption are less likely to 
borrow credit from the BAAC at the 5% level. Further, households borrowing for emergency and 
consumption smoothing, tend to borrow from informal sources because they require the money 
quickly (Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Zeller, 1994). Khoi et al. (2013) reveal that borrowers 
who access informal credit are more likely to borrow informal loans for consumption rather than 
other purposes. 
Collateral is required by lenders in order to assess a borrower’s creditworthiness (Zeller, 1994). 
Collateral or guarantor positively influences formal credit participation (Ololade & Olagunju, 2013; 
Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) and Fongthong and Suriya 
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(2014) find that rural Thai households with small size of land are less likely to borrow from formal 
lenders or BAAC. As a result, small landowners are more likely to receive credit from semi-formal or 
informal lenders. Similarly, Ololade and Olagunju (2013) show that having a guarantor positively 
influences farmers’ access to credit in Nigeria at the 5% level, suggesting that households with 
guarantors have a 50.62% higher probability of credit access. 
The effect of the interest rate on credit accessibility varies. Ololade and Olagunju (2013) show that an 
increase in iterest rates decreases the probability of participation in the Nigerian credit mareket by 
193%. On the other hand, the interest rate positively influence informal credit. Khoi et al. (2013) 
reveal that household demand for informal credit increases by 50% if an informal interest rate is 
raise by 1%. Since there are only few lenders, they can control the credit supply and interest rate. To 
obtain informal loans, borrowers have to accept loans with hight interest rates. Moreover, informal 
loan size is determined by loan duration. The relationship between loan duration and informal loan 
amount is positive (Khoi et al., 2013). Informal credit contracts are flexible. The loan duration of 
informal loans depend on the borrower’s repayment capacity. Households tend to borrow larger 
amounts of money when the loan duration is longer. 
Geographic factors affect choices of credit sources and the loan amount. Geographic factors relate to 
physical environments, economic activities and infrastructures , which affect household borrowing 
(Khoi et al, 2013). Empirically, geographic factors are used to control for differences in location 
(Coleman, 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). Regions, road access, and distance to markets are indicators 
used to measure credit providers’ convenience. These factors have various effects on credit 
participation. Living in a village with easy road access means that individuals are more likely to access 
credit facilities (Khoi et al, 2013). Khoi et al. show that households which have access to a road have a 
23.5% higher probability of microcredit participation at the 1% level. This implies that good 
transportation enables households to access credit providers fairly easily. In contrast, households 
living further away from the market are less likely to participate in credit programs (Duy et al., 2012). 
Duy et al. reveal that households’ probability of credit access decreases as distance to nearest 
market increases.  
Although determinants of credit access analysis from prior literature vary, key factors are household 
head, household characteristics, and geography factors. Age, gender, and education levels influence 
households’ decisions to participate in credit programs. The results are mixed (see Table 3.1). For 
household characteristics, the number of household members, land/farm size, household income, 
and other loan access are important factors which affect credit participation. They have positive 
effects on access to formal credit and mixed effects on informal credit access. The last factor, 
geographical location, refers to the distance to the nearest market and location. Distance to town 
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negatively influences formal credit participation, while road accessibility positively affects formal 
credit participation since these indicators measure the convenience of access to lenders. 
3.2.2 Marketing Service Participation 
Small farmers are often confronted with limited access to farm input and output markets, due to 
high transaction costs (Alene et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ortmann & King, 
2007). Due to living in remote areas, poor infrastructure, and limited access to market information, 
farmers face with limited markets. They can overcome these barriers by accepting cooperative 
marketing services, including input (purchasing services) and output marketing. Agricultural 
cooperatives provide market information and marketing services for members, both in input and 
output. Obtaining market information can help farmers to reduce uncertainty over price and 
demand. Agricultural input marketing services help farmers access good quality inputs at lower 
prices, while output marketing services help them to obtain competitive prices for their farm 
products. These services contribute to greater bargaining power and price for the farmers (Chagwiza 
et al., 2016; Holloway, Nicholson, Delgado, Staal, & Ehui, 2000). Understanding what factors are 
important and who benefits from input and output marketing services is useful for policy 
development. It also encourages households to participate in non-credit support services and 
eventually improve household welfare.  
The empirical literature on participation in AC marketing can be grouped into two groups; research 
which focuses on determinants on marketing participation and which considers the level of trade. 
The first group of the studies on AC marketing services explore the factors influencing a household’s 
decision to participate in the AC market. Generally, empirical studies on market participation apply a 
binary choice model to estimate the probability of participating in marketing services since the 
dependent variable is defined as “to participate or not to participate”. For example, Muthyalu (2013) 
applies a logit model to explore factors influencing cooperative members’ participation in AC input 
and output marketing in Ethiopia. Using survey data from 163 AC members, the author concludes 
that household characteristics such as age, land ownership, and membership of ACs, market access, 
such as distance from AC, and information access influence household’s marketing participation. 
Similarly, Chagwiza et al. (2016) explore the effects of participation in dairy marketing cooperatives 
in Ethiopia. They apply a logit model with the primary data categorized as cooperative and non-
cooperative members. The findings of both studies show that land ownership and distance to ACs 
significantly influence households’ decisions to participate in AC marketing.  
 Fischer and Qaim (2012) use a probit model to analyse the role of banana cooperatives in Kenya to 
promote smallholder farmers’ participation in AC marketing services. Their model captures the 
transaction costs in relation to transportation and information cost. The ACs assist banana growers to 
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increase their market accessibility by reducing their transaction costs. Moreover, the authors take 
into account the endogeneity problem. To solve the endogeneity problem, the size of farm before 
joining the ACs is included in the model.  Fischer and Qaim's (2012) findings have been replicated by  
Muthyalu (2013) and Chagwiza et al. (2016). Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that household 
endowment such as land ownership, productive assets, and credit access, significantly increase the 
probability of cooperative marketing participation. In addition, distance to the road and phone 
ownership, in relation to market information access influence households to join the AC. They 
conclude that the poorest of the poor banana growers and growers with less capacity to obtain 
information are more likely to be excluded from the AC marketing.  
A number of studies have identified factors affecting the choices among different marketing channels 
(Ferto & Szabo, 2002; Zhang et al., 2017). Marketing channels include individual sales, selling via 
wholesalers, and selling via ACs. The multinomial logit model is used to explain which factors affect 
households’ decisions to participate in a particular marketing channel. Ferto and Szabo (2002) 
analyse how transaction costs and household capital influence the choices of market channels for 
fruit and vegetable farmers in Hungary. In Ferto and Szabo’s study, the marketing channels are 
divided into wholesale markets, wholesalers, cooperative marketing, and marketing provided by 
producer organizations. The sample is not random; they target traditional farmers. Their findings 
show that the probability of participating in cooperative marketing is positively influenced by age and 
phone ownership, whereas, it is negatively affected by assets and bargaining power. Similarly, Zhang 
et al. (2017) attempt to compare vegetable farmers’ decisions to trade via different marketing 
channels in China using a multinomial logit model. The choice of vegetable marketing in their study is 
divided into vegetable markets, cooperatives, and wholesalers. Zhang et al.’s (2017) model includes 
household head characteristics, household production and sale characteristics. Their findings on the 
size of farmland and information access contrast with those of Ferto and Szabo (2002). That is 
agricultural land size positively affect AC marketing participation, while information accessibility 
about market price has a negative effect on participation in AC marketing.  
Another group of empirical studies considers AC marketing participation as a two-step decision 
process. The first stage, called the selection process, is when households decide whether to use AC 
marketing services or not. In the second stage, called the outcome process, households who join AC 
marketing in the first stage decide how many input and output products are traded via the markets 
(Alene et al., 2008). 
Determinants of the level of AC marketing participation can be estimated using the Tobit model or 
the Heckman model. However, this depends on the selection bias in the model.  Mensah et al., 
(2012) investigate the determinants influencing the number of cashew nuts sold through AC 
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marketing. A two-limit Tobit model is applied since the proportion of sales via AC is a censored 
variable which falls into the range between 0 and 100 percent (Mensah et al., 2012). Some AC 
members do not sell farm products via AC marketing, whereas, some sell most of their farm products 
to AC. The study attempts to capture unobservable factors in the model. They add some psycho-
sociological factors, such as household perceptions of AC marketing and performance. Their findings 
reveal that not only observed factors affect household marketing participation but also unobserved 
factors as well. The findings show that household perceptions of price benefit and satisfaction with 
AC management have a positive effect on the decision to participate in marketing cooperatives, but 
not significant on the amount of sale via ACs. 
Other authors consider marketing participation as the two-stage processes with selection bias. Alene 
et al. (2008), Fischer and Qaim (2014), Ma (2016), and Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005)  investigate 
factors affecting household participation in input and output marketing provided by ACs by taking 
account of the selection bias. The selection bias may take place in marketing participation because of 
non-random samples. The participating households have decided to participate themselves (Abebaw 
& Haile, 2013; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2015). Households are heterogenous 
(Ma & Abdulai, 2016). Although they have similar observable characteristics, they exhibit some 
different unobserved characteristics, such as farming ability and risk preferences. Such unobservable 
factors may significantly influence households’ decision to participate in AC marketing services. 
Therefore, selection bias should not be ignored. 
To control for the selection bias, the Heckman model is applied to analyse the factors of AC 
marketing participation. For example, Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) and Alene et al. (2008) apply 
the Heckman selection model to estimate factors of market participation and level of trade. Winter-
Nelson and Temu (2005) develop a model to explain the chemical fertilizer use of the Tanzanian 
coffee growers. Alene et al. (2008) follow Winter-Nelson and Temu’s (2005) model to analyse the 
role of farmer group in farmers’ participation in fertilizer and Maize markets in Kenya. Heckman 
selection model is implemented by both studies. In the first stage, the probability of participation in 
the market is estimated using the probit model. The inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) is generated in the first 
stage and applied in the second stage. In the second stage, the Tobit model is applied to estimate 
factors influencing the number of fertilizers purchased and farm outputs sold through AC marketing. 
The authors find that there is selection bias in input market participation. Therefore, input market 
participation analysis should take into account the selection bias to obtain unbiased results. 
With a similar objective in mind, Fischer and Qaim (2014) apply the Heckman selection model to 
estimate factors affecting output market participation and the share of bananas sold through AC 
marketing channels. In the first stage, a logit model is applied to estimate the likelihood of 
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participation in the marketing channel. In the second stage, the Tobit and double-hurdle models are 
applied for the proportion of farm products sold via ACs. Fischer and Qaim (2014) use the Heckman-
selection model to test the selection bias and find that the error term of the participation equation 
(equation of the first stage) and the quantity equation (equation of the second stage) are not related. 
Therefore, they conclude that the decision to participate in marketing and decision on the amount of 
output sold through AC marketing are separate decisions. The studies on this stream contribute to 
the literature on household market participation by developing the model beyond the decision to 
participate in the market. The model helps to explain household marketing participation; not only 
the decision to participate, but also the level of participation. 
Most studies determine marketing participation factors by focusing only observable factors, such as 
individual characteristics, household and geographic factors. However, previous studies shows that 
unobserved characteristics are significant to AC marketing participation (Fischer & Qaim, 2014; 
Mensah et al., 2012). Previous studies capture unobserved factors by concentrating on household 
perceptions of risk and AC performance. In order to understand AC marketing, an investigation of 
factors affecting AC marketing participation should apply factors related to household perceptions of 
risk and AC performance. 
Determinants of Marketing Service Participation 
In the context of agricultural cooperatives, households’ decisions to participate in marketing services 
does not depend solely on the costs and benefits received from the marketing service, but also 
household preferences and perceptions of ACs. The key determinants of marketing participation 
include households’ risk and preferences, their production, and geographic factors. These are 
summarized in Table 3.2. 
Household preferences include individual characteristics. Individual characteristics relate to 
marketing participation in two ways; individual risk preferences and the understanding the benefits 
obtained through AC marketing. Household risk preference is captured using age and education. The 
literature shows that only age is the primary factor affecting participation in AC marketing. The 
effects of age on AC marketing participation vary. Some studies have found that age has a positive 
effect on participation in AC output marketing (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ferto & Szabo, 2002). Older 
farmers prefer less risk and tend to trust ACs rather than selling via wholesalers or wholesale 
markets. However, younger farmers prefer to sell their own products directly to the market in order 
to receive higher prices (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ferto & Szabo, 2002). On the other hand, some 
studies have found that age has a negative effect on participation in AC marketing services (Alene et 
al., 2008; Muthyalu, 2013). The older farmers are not able to produce farm outputs that meet ACs’ 
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standards, and since they are risk averse they are hesitant to adopt new technology (Alene et al., 
2008; Muthyalu, 2013).  
Household perceptions of the benefits of AC participation is one of the main factors influencing their 
decision to use marketing services (Fischer & Qaim, 2012, 2014; Mensah et al., 2012). Before making 
a decision to participate in AC marketing services, individuals will evaluate the benefits that they will 
receive from joining an AC. Mensah et al. (2012) measure benefits in terms of economic benefits, 
such as AC price, patronage refund preference, and trade credit preference. Fischer and Qaim (2014) 
suggest that benefits may be measured in term of access to other services, technology, and 
information provided by ACs. Mensah et al. (2012) and Fischer and Qaim (2014) show that only AC 
prices positively affect AC marketing participation. AC members compare prices offered by ACs to 
prices from alternatives. If ACs provide a higher price than others, they will sell their products via ACs 
(Mensah et al., 2012). 
Mensah et al. (2012) measure AC performance based on AC effectiveness and satisfaction. They find 
that households with high levels of AC performance satisfaction are far more likely to participate in 
AC marketing service. Moreover, exploitation perception of intermediary traders is another factor 
identified as to whether households sell their produce via ACs (Fischer & Qaim, 2014). Exploitation 
perception implies farmers’ trust of traders. If farmers feel that they are exploited by traders, they are 
more likely to sell their products through ACs. 
Factors related to production and transaction costs are significant factors, which influence marketing 
participation since they directly relate to production and cost. These factors can be captured by land 
ownership, household assets, and production and sale characteristics (Ferto & Szabo, 2002; Fischer & 
Qaim, 2012). Land ownership affects household decisions to participate in marketing services since it 
indicates wealth and production capacity. The effects of land ownership on marketing participation 
vary. Mensah et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2017) show the relationship is positive. Zhang et al. 
(2017) find that farmers are more likely to use ACs as marketing channels increase to 40.9% when 
farm size increases by one unit. Fischer and Qaim (2012) provide more comprehensive results in the 
positive effect of farm or land size on market participation. The effects of land holding on joining 
marketing cooperatives is positive and is highest in the middle-class farmers. Fischer and Qaim 
(2012) show that an increase in land by one acre raises the farmer’s probability of using ACs to sell 
bananas by about 47.3%. However, this trend decreases with farmers who have more than 11 acres. 
Fischer and Qaim's (2012) findings are in line with Bernard and Spielman's (2009). This means that 
the impact of squared land ownership on marketing participation is negative. Farmers with very 
small or large landholdings are less likely to join marketing cooperatives (Bernard & Spielman, 2009). 
Farmers with small holding do not have enough produce to sell via groups. However, farmers with 
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larger holdings may make higher profit when selling products to individual trade because it increases 
their bargaining power and transaction expenses are not high. In contrast, Chagwiza et al. (2016) and 
Wollni and Zeller (2007) argue that farm size has a negative impact on AC marketing participation. 
The most likely explanation for this is that larger farmers have a higher bargaining power to 
negotiate with private traders (Wollni & Zeller, 2007) and farmers with small landholdings benefit 
from ACs, rather than larger producers (Chagwiza et al., 2016).  
Transaction costs can be divided into travel and information costs. Travel costs are measured by 
vehicle ownership and information costs are measured by phone, radio, or computer ownership. 
Vehicles imply access to the market (Alene et al., 2008). Communication assets such as phone, radio, 
and computer imply the access to information. Phones, radios, and computers are methods to access 
or exchange information, and allow communication among AC members and staff (Ferto & Szabo, 
2002; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Unlike other issues, there is agreement on the effects of vehicle and 
communication asset ownership on marketing participation. Having a vehicle or phone, radio, or 
mobile phone positively affect input and output marketing. Farmers with vehicle and communication 
assets are easily contactable and have more opportunities to join AC activities because of access to 
information (Alene et al., 2008; Ferto & Szabo, 2002; Fischer & Qaim, 2012, 2014). 
Farmer decisions to join input and output marketing is directly related to production and sale 
characteristics. Input market participation has a positive correlation with factors related to 
househhold production such as irrigation accessibility (Ma & Abdulai, 2016). A study in China (Ma & 
Abdulai, 2016) shows that farmers who have access to irrigation are more likely to be AC members 
and use more fertilizers. As accessibility to irrigation ensures farmers have sufficient water for 
planting, they have a higher possibility of using inputs than farmers who do not have irrigation 
systems. For sale characteristics, product quality may impede farmer to sell via ACs (Ferto & Szabo, 
2002; Zhang et al., 2017) because ACs require good quality farm products. In terms of sale amount, 
the sale volume depends on output price. Farmers compare prices offered by ACs with market price 
to decide the level of sales through ACs (Alene et al., 2008; Ouma et al., 2010). 
Generally, geographical factors are captured using distance to the nearest market or road access. 
Distance to the nearest market or access to a road determines household participation in AC 
marketing (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Households living near markets or roads can gain access to 
markets easily, thus they are more likely to sell their products by themselves rather than using AC 
marketing. In contrast households who live far from the markets or road are more likely to sell via 
ACs. For example, Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that farmers living far from the road have a higher 
probability of selling their products through ACs.  
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There are a few studies that investigate AC attributes that affect AC marketing participation. AC 
attributes in literature include late payments and distance to ACs. Fischer and Qaim (2014) find that 
delayed AC payments have negative effects on output marketing participation. The reason is that 
most farm households, particularly in developing countries, are poor and face liquidity constraints, so 
they prefer cash payment immediately. Similarly, distance to the AC center negatively influences AC 
marketing participation for both input and output markets because of high transaction costs. 
3.2.3 Participation in Agricultural Extension Services  
Agricultural extension services play a vital role in improving farm household production and 
eventually increase household welfare (Egziabher, Mathijs, Maertens, Deckers, & Bauer, 2011; Feder 
et al., 1985). Agricultural extension services directly influence household productivity. Agricultural 
extension services share farm knowledge in terms of technology and farm management with farmers 
(Feder et al., 1985). Individuals participating in agricultural extension services gain technology 
knowledge and improve management skills (Atsan, Isik, Yavuz, & Yurttas, 2009; Purcell & Anderson, 
1997, as cited in Cerdan-Infantes, Maffioli, & Ubfal, 2008). They can adopt new technologies in their 
farming and manage their businesses efficiently. As a result, participating in agricultural extension 
services improves farmers’ farm productivity leading to increase in output and profits (Atsan et al., 
2009). Therefore, it is important to understand which factors influence households’ decision to 
participate in agricultural extension services. Understading of the determinants on extension service 
participation may help to develop better agricultural extension services. 
Most of the empirical studies on agricultural extension services attempts to analyse what factors 
affect households’ decisions to participate in agricultural extension services. Several models have 
been used to determine the determinants of household participation in agricultural extension 
services. First, Atsan et al. (2009) use the probit model to study Turkish farmers, while Egziabher et 
al. (2011) and, Elias, Nohmi, Yasunobu, and Ishida (2013) study Ethiopian households. They find that 
household decisions to participate in agricultural extension services are related to household head 
and household characteristics such as age of household head, education level, and household assets 
(Atsan et al., 2009; Egziabher et al., 2011; Elias et al., 2013). Moreover, Egziabher et al. (2011) and 
Elias et al. (2013) suggest that social capital, such as being members of some organization and 
working as a local government officer, increases the probability of households participating in 
agricultural extension services.   
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Output Marketing Service Input Marketing Service 
Selling Products via ACs  Number of Sales Purchasing Input via ACs Number of Input Use 
Independent Variables Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors 
Household Head Characteristics 
Age of HH Head +/- Chagwiza et al. (2016), 
Ferto & Szabo (2002), 
Alene et al. (2008), 
+ Fischer & Qaim (2014)  - Alene et al. (2008), 
Muthyalu (2013), 
Ma & Abdulai (2016) 
+ Ma & Abdulai (2016) 
Education of HH Head +/- Fischer & Qaim (2014), 
Chagwiza et al (2016), 
Zhang et al. (2017) 
+ Fischer & Qaim (2014) - Ma & Abdulai (2016) 
 
  
Gender   +/- Ouma et al. (2010), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
+  Ouma et al. (2010) - Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005) 
- Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
Member of Another Group + Wollni & Zeller (2007) + Fischer & Qaim (2014), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
+ Muthyalu (2013), 
Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005) 




  + Fischer & Qaim (2014) - Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005) 
- Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005) 
Adult Member  + Alene et al. (2008) + Alene et al. (2008), 
Ouma et al. (2010) 
    







Livestock Ownership   +/-  Alene et al. (2008), 
Ouma et al. (2010) 
- Ma & Abdulai (2016) + Alene et al. (2008) 
HH Owns a Car, Pick-up, or Motorbike  + Fischer & Qaim (2014), 
Alene et al. (2008),  
Ouma et al. (2010) 
 
  + Alene et al. (2008) 
 
  
HH Owns a Mobile Phone + Fischer & Qaim (2012), 
Chagwiza et al. (2016), 














Off-farm Income -  Alene et al. (2008) 
 
  + Alene et al. (2008) + Alene et al. (2008) 
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Table 3.2    Determinants of Marketing Service Participation (cont.) 
 
Dependent Variables Output Marketing Service Input Marketing Service 
Selling Products via ACs  Number of Sales Purchasing Input via ACs Number of Input Use 
Independent Variables Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors 
Farm Income           + Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005) 





Land Owned  +/- Fischer & Qaim (2012), 
Chagwiza et al. (2016), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
 
  +  Muthyalu (2013), - Alene et al. (2008) 
Farm Size +/- Wollni & Zeller (2007), 
Mensah et al. (2012), 
Fischer & Qaim (2012, 
2014) 
+ Fischer & Qaim (2014) + Ma & Abdulai (2016) - Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005) 
 
Zhang et al. (2017),  







Farm Size Squared - Fischer & Qaim (2012, 
2014) 
      
Access to Credit + Fischer & Qaim (2012), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
      




  + Ma & Abdulai (2016) + Ma & Abdulai (2016) 

















Output Price   + Alene et al. (2008), 
Ouma et al. (2010) 
+ Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005),  
Alene et al. (2008)  
+  Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005), 
Alene et al. (2008) 
Household Preference or Attitude towards ACs 
Feel Exploited by Intermediary 
Traders 







Benefit (Price)  + Mensah et al. (2012) + Mensah et al. (2012)   
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Table 3.2    Determinants of Marketing Service Participation (cont.) 
 
Dependent Variables Output Marketing Service Input Marketing Service 
Selling Products via ACs  Number of Sales Purchasing Input via ACs Number of Input Use 
Independent Variables Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors Sign Authors 
AC Marketing Attributes 
Number of Shares in AC     + Muthyalu (2013)   
Late Payment - Fischer & Qaim (2014) - Fischer & Qaim (2014)     
Distance to ACs - Chagwiza et al. (2016),     - Winter-Nelson & Temu 
(2005), 
Alene et al. (2008), 
Muthyalu (2013) 
   
Geographical Factors (Information and Market Access) 
Distance from Farm to a Paved Road 
(km.)/the Nearest Market 
+/- Fischer & Qaim (2012), 
Zhang et al. (2017), 
Ouma et al. (2010) 
- Alene et al. (2008), 
Ouma et al. (2010) 
 
  + Ma & Abdulai (2016) 
Distance of Farm to Paved Road 
Square 
- Fischer & Qaim (2012)       
Access to Market Price +/- Ouma et al. (2010), 
Zhang et al. (2017)  
 
  - Muthyalu (2013) 
 
  






Some studies focus on the role of ACs on agricultural extension participation. Agricultural 
cooperatives are considered important organizations to promote rural household production 
(Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Ma, 2016; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). ACs encourage their members to 
participate in agricultural extension services such as the adoption of fertilizers and pesticide 
technology. In the context of AC, previous literature concentrates on the selection bias. Selection 
bias may take place since household decisions to participate in AC may be affected by observable and 
unobservable factors. Abebaw and Haile (2013) analyse the role of ACs on small farmers’ agricultural 
technology adoption in Ethiopia. They use propensity score matching to control for observed 
characteristics. Their findings show that ACs are significant institutions that encourage small farmers 
to implement improved chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Fertilizer and pesticide adoption rates of 
AC members are significantly higher than non-AC members. 
Similarly, Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014) and Ma (2016) find that the ACs have positive impacts on 
farmers’ agricultural technology adoption in Rwanda and China, respectively. Verhofstadt and 
Maertens’ (2014) study concludes that ACs play an important role in increasing pesticide technology 
for smallholder farmers in Rwanda. They use propensity score matching to control for observable 
characteristics and the willingness to pay as an additional control variable to control for unobserved 
bias. Their model proves the advantage of controlling for the selection bias, which occurs with 
observed and unobserved biases. 
Besides the selection bias problem, Ma (2016) contends that AC participation may suffer from an 
endogeneity problem. The author examines the role of ACs in the implementation of organic 
fertilizer and pest management technology in China. To solve selection biases and endogeneity 
problems, Ma uses recursive binomial probit model and the endogenous switching probit model to 
estimate the probability of farmers’ adopting fertilizers and pest management technology. His 
findings confirm that ACs facilitate greater use of improved organic fertilizers and pest technology 
adoption for improving smallholder farmers’ productivity. This means that AC members are more 
profitable and are more likely to adopt technology than non-AC members.  
With respect to participation in agricultural extension services, individual characteristics, household 
characteristics, and geographic factors play important roles. Most household factors have positive 
effects on participation in agricultural extension services, except for the age of the household head. 
Age refers to an ability to learn. Older farmers often do not want to change the way they farm and 
find it difficult adapting to new techologies. Thus, they are less likely to participate in agricultural 
extension programs (Atsan et al., 2009). Similarly, Egziabher et al. (2011) find that in Ethiopia, age 
increases the probability of participation in agricultural extension services until an individual reaches 
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44 years old. Household heads who are over 44 years old are less likely to participate in agricultural 
extension services. 
Well-educated people have more opportunities to participate in agricultural extension services than 
uneducated people (Atsan et al., 2009; Tiwari, Sitaula, Nyborg, & Paudel, 2008).  Education level 
relates to one’s ability to access information and to understand new technologies. Participating in 
agricultural extension services enhances technology adoption leading to improved productivity. 
Therefore, people with higher education demonstrate a strong willingness to learn and apply 
knowledge from agricultural extension services, and they are more likely to join these services.   
Being a member of a farmer group and working in a local government office positively influences 
agricultural extension service participation (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Egziabher et al., 2011; Elias et al., 
2013). Being a member of groups relates to social factors. The agricultural extension service 
provision in some countries, such as in Ethiopia and Thailand, often works cooperatively with 
development agencies and local governments. Therefore, people involved in farmer groups or local 
government have a higher possibility of accessing information about agricultural extension programs.  
Regarding household factors relating to farm production, land ownership has a positive effect on 
agricultural extension service participation (Atsan et al., 2009; Elias et al., 2013; Tiwari et al., 2008). 
Land directly relates to new technology investment on farm and wealth. Households with larger plots 
of land can take greater risks, particularly in terms of adopting new technologies (Egziabher et al., 
2011; Tiwari et al., 2008). Moreover, land size is correlated with wealth, influencing households’ 
motivation to invest in farm technologies. Therefore, the larger the landholding size, the greater the 
probability of technology adoption and participation in agricultural extension services (Tiwari et al, 
2008). 
Location or geographical characteristics affect agricultural extension service participation since they 
indicate natural resources possessed by farmers, such as soil fertility and water supply (Ma & 
Abdulai, 2016). Households located in remote areas have limited farm resource accessibility, 
therefore, they are more likely to participate in agricultural extension services in order to use their 




3.3 Effects of Cooperatives on Household Welfare 
An impact assessment is a process used to assess changes that are the result of a particular program. 
Impact evaluation contributes to program improvement (Hulme, 2000). ACs evaluate their services to 
identify which mechanisms can help the poor, and at what levels. Understanding ACs’ constraints or 
problems helps ACs to design or extend their services in order to improve the effectiveness of their 
services and better help members.  
The following section discusses impact evaluation method. The section reviews biases, which may 
occur in AC impact evaluations as well as various approaches to solve these biases. The impact of AC 
participation on households’ welfare is also addressed. 
3.3.1 Impact Evaluation Method 
An impact assessment is generally measured in terms of an average impact (Gertler, Martinez, 
Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011). An average treatment effect is a comparison between the 
mean outcome if households receive treatment, a treatment group, and the mean outcome if the 
same households do not receive treatment, commonly referred to as a control group (Mojo et al., 
2015b). The outcome in the absence of treatment is unobserved and is called a counterfactual 
outcome. To estimate an average treatment effect, an appropriate control group is required 
(Chagwiza et al., 2016; Mojo et al., 2015b). The challenge in assessing impact is defining non-
participants in the control group whose outcomes are not bias. As a result of non-random self-
selection in cooperative participation, there are three biases which may result in an AC impact 
evaluation (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). 
A bias from observable characteristics may arise from the difference in observable characteristics 
between agricultural cooperative (AC) participants and non-participants. The observed 
characteristics influence the probability of joining ACs and the outcome of AC participation (Chagwiza 
et al., 2016; Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). 
The self-selection bias on observable factors can be controlled using the matching method (Getnet & 
Anullo, 2012; Mojo et al., 2015b). The matching method will select the participants and non-
participants who have similar observable covariates. Only participants and non-participants who 
have the similar observed characteristics influence program participation and outcomes are involved 
in a treatment effect estimation (Davis & Nkonya, 2008). In short, the matching method provides an 
unbiased treatment effect. 
However, applying matched covariates leads to the problem of dimensionality. To overcome the 
dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using a balanced score (Mojo et al., 
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2015b). One of the balanced scores which is commonly applied to impact evaluation is Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) because it can reduce the dimension of observable covariates and balance the 
observed characteristics between treatment and control groups (Mojo et al., 2015b). The PSM 
method matches participants and non-participants by using a propensity score (PS), a probability of 
participation in treatment. Only participants and non-participants with comparable PS are used to 
estimate treatment effects (Davis & Nkonya, 2008). 
In the context of AC impact, PSM is used to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) of AC membership on household economic welfare. As underlined in several studies, PSM is 
used to evaluate the AC impact on household income, farm production, market performance, or 
technology adoption in Ethiopia (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Bernard, Taffesse, & Gabre-Madhin, 2008; 
Chagwiza et al., 2016; Francesconi & Ruben, 2007; Francesconi & Heerink, 2011; Getnet & Anullo, 
2012; Mojo et al., 2015b). Ahmed and Mesfin (2017) apply PSM to assess the impact of AC 
participation on household consumption in Ethiopia. Ito et al. (2012) and Verhofstadt and Maertens 
(2014) apply PSM to estimate ATT of AC membership on farmer income and commercialization in 
China and Rwanda, respectively. They apply PSM to eliminate selection bias arising from observable 
characteristics. The ATT estimated by PSM is the mean difference of outcome variable on the AC 
participants and non-AC participants (Jena, Chichaibelu, Stellmacher, & Grote, 2012). The PSM 
method evaluates the effect of the treatment factor by controlling for all observed factors except the 
treatment variable. The PSM method requires cross-sectional data to compare outcomes between 
AC members and non-members.  
Even though selection bias on observed characteristics are controlled by PSM, the individuals in 
treatment and control groups may differ in some unobservable characteristics. Unobserved 
characteristics, such as motivation, risk preference, and production skill, may influence their decision 
to participate in ACs and their outcome (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). 
As a result, the estimated AC impact is biased. 
Based on the studies on AC impact, there are three ways to mitigate the selection-bias on 
unobservable characteristics. The first method involves using instrumental variables (IV) as an 
explanatory variable. While instrumental variable should relate to the households’ decision to join 
the ACs, it should not affect the outcome of AC participation (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). For 
example, Francesconi and Ruben (2007) use the military force member as an instrumental variable to 
control for the selection bias with respect to unobservable characteristics, since ACs in the study are 
established by retired military officers. Moreover, Ma (2016) uses a neighbour’s membership as 
instrument variable. Military force membership and neighbour membership are used as IVs since 
they can explain the decision to participate in ACs, but they do not affect household income. 
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Secondly, a proxy variable is used to capture unobserved effects to mitigate the magnitude of 
unobservable bias. Sometime the instrumental variable estimation method cannot be applied 
because no good instrumental variable can be found. A proxy variable approach is appropriate to 
estimate the propensity score or the effects (Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). A proxy variable related 
to unobserved characteristics is included as an explanatory variable in models (Hoken, 2016; Hoken 
& Su, 2015; Ito et al., 2012; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). Hoken (2016), Hoken and Su (2015), Ito 
et al. (2012), and Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014), all note, AC participation is influenced by 
unobservable characteristics such attitude toward agricultural production, attitude toward risk, 
willingness to adopt new technologies, and the impression of people in community on AC 
performance. These authors develop proxy variables to measure these unobserved factors and 
include them in their models.  
The difference in differences (DID) method is suitable for controlling the unobservable bias since it 
can control time-invariant unobservable characteristic such as farmer skill, social network, and risk 
preferences (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Hoken & Su, 2015; Smith & Todd, 2005). The DID 
method calculates the difference in the outcome variable before (t=0) and after (t=1) participation in 
ACs, for members compared with the difference in the outcome variable for non-members over the 
same time period (Hoken & Su, 2015). The DID method requires panel data for impact assessment. 
Lastly, there is bias in the spill-over effect within the sample area (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). ACs 
may have spill-over effects since large ACs may attract agricultural extension services and traders or 
industries (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). These advantages may benefit non-AC members who live in 
the same area as ACs. Therefore, AC impact evaluated by a comparison between AC members and 
non-AC members in the same area is likely to be underestimated. To exclude a spill-over effect, 
Fischer and Qaim (2012) suggest that non-participants should be selected from areas without ACs. 
The authors evaluate farmer group impact in Kenya using PSM. PSM method assesses an income 
effect by comparing income between AC members and non-members. As a result of a comparison 
between AC participants and non-AC particpants in the same area, the income effect is likely to be 
underestimated. They check the robustness for control group by using data from non-members 
located in areas that did not have ACs. Similarly, Francesconi and Heerink (2010) applies PSM to 
evaluate the impact of Ethiopian AC membership on commercialzation.To mitigate a spill-over effect, 
the authors exclude non-participants who have relationships with AC members.  
Our study evaluates the effects of AC service participation on household welfare using the 
Endogenous Switching Model (ESR). The ESR computes an average treatment effect on treated (ATT) 
and average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) separately. ATT is the difference between the 
actual and counterfactual outcomes of AC service participants, while ATU is the comparison between 
83 
the counterfactual and actual outcomes of non-participants. Effects assessed by ESR method does 
not occur from comparing outcomes of AC participants with non-AC participant, thus the spill-over 
effect is not an issue in our study.   
The effects of AC participation may be influenced by observed factors, such as farm production 
characteristics, and unobserved factors, such as farming skill, attitudes toward farm production, and 
attitudes toward risk and experience (Hoken, 2016; Hoken & Su, 2015; Ito et al., 2012; Dagne Mojo et 
al., 2015b). To mitigate both observable and unobservable selection biases, several methods have 
been applied. For example, Hoken (2016) and Ito et al. (2012) assess the impact of Farmers’ 
Professional Cooperatives (FPCs) participation on farmers’ income in China. The authors use the PSM 
method to control observable selection bias, and they also include farmers’ attitudes on new 
technology adoption, risk preferences, and perceptions of ACs in their models.  
Heckman et al. (1997), Smith and Todd (2005), and Takahashi, Higashikata, and Tsukada (2010) 
propose a combination of propensity score matching and difference in difference (PSM-DID) to 
mitigate observable and unobservable biases (Hoken & Su, 2015). As discussed above, the PSM 
method can mitigate selection bias of observable characteristics and DID can control the bias on 
unobservable ones. Therefore, applying a PSM-DID method can eliminate bias from both observable 
and unobservable characteristics. For example, Hoken and Su (2015) estimate the impact of the rice-
producing cooperatives on Chinese rice farmers’ income using the PSM-DID method. Applying the 
PSM-DID method requires the use of panel data. The PSM-DID method requires outcome data prior 
to and after becoming an AC member. Since most of the AC members in our study have participated 
in ACs for a long time, therefore, it is almost impossible to collect outcome data from the previous 
period. Due to the difficulty of obtaining panel data in our study, PSM-DID cannot be applied to 
evaluate the AC impact.  
The Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) is another suitable approach for estimating the effects of AC 
participation on household welfare. This is because it can mitigate both selection biases on 
observable and unobservable factors. ESR is an alternative method which does not use panel data; it 
only requires cross-sectional data. Mojo et al. (2017) and Ma and Abdulai (2016) apply ESR to 
estimate the role of cooperative participation on apple growers’ income and yields in Ethopia and 
China, respectively. They use cross-sectional data surveyed in 2013 and employ the full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) method to analyse determinants of AC participation and the impact of AC 
participation on household income and yield. 
AC impact assessments are prone to three biases: observable, unobservable, and spill-over biases. 
These biases are the results of self-selection, incomplete information, assumptions of assessment 
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methods, and data availability (Smith, 2004, as cited in Khoi, 2012). To obtain consistent estimates, 
specific methods must be applied. 
3.3.2 Effect of Cooperatives on Households Welfare 
Poverty is multi-dimensional. Poverty can be measured via monetary or economic welfare and non-
monetary or social dimensions (Sakonthawat, Iswilanon, & Palarnuluk, 2012; United Nations 
Development Programme, 1997; World Bank, 2000). ACs play a role in reducing household poverty, 
both economic and social poverty.  
Effect of Agricultural Cooperatives on Economic Welfare 
ACs assist households to improve their economic welfare by enhancing access to credit and markets. 
Economic outcomes can be measured using either income or consumption approach. However, most 
studies on the effects of ACs have focused on income effects (Getnet & Anullo, 2012; Hoken, 2016; 
Hoken & Su, 2015; Ito et al., 2012; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). However, the effect of ACs on 
rural household income is not straightforward. It depends on institutional innovations, location, 
socioeconomic status, as well as household characteristics (Hoken & Su, 2015; Verhofstadt & 
Maertens, 2014). The prevailing evidence which concentrates on different types of ACs in various 
countries exhibited positive, negative, and no effects on member incomes. 
ACs enable members to earn more income rather than non-members through their diverse services. 
AC members exhibit higher farm income with agricultural extension services (Calkins & Ngo, 2010; 
Francesconi & Ruben, 2007; Getnet & Anullo, 2012). ACs improve members’ productivity by 
providing improved materials, such as seed and fertilizers, agricultural techniques, and modern farm 
implements. The effect of agricultural extension services on income is documented in Calkins and 
Ngo (2010), Francesconi and Ruben (2007), and Getnet and Anullo (2012). Getnet and Anullo (2012) 
find that ACs extension services support farmers to use improved seeds. The members produce more 
and better yields, leading to more revenue. These findings are in line with Calkins and Ngo’s (2010) 
study. Calkins and Ngo (2010) examine the role of cocoa cooperatives in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana on 
rural households’ production, marketing services, social development, and well-being. In Cote 
d'Ivoire and Ghana, cocoa cooperative members are encouraged to use modern farm implements 
and fertilizers. The members’ yield per hectare is higher than non-members, by about 19%. Likewise, 
dairy cooperatives improve Ethiopian milk producers’ productivity (by 5%) due to high-yielding cross-
breed cows (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007).   
Apart from agricultural extension services, ACs increase members’ income via input and output 
marketing services. These activities increase small farmers’ market access and provide links with 
other upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. AC marketing services influence 
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input use and input costs, transaction costs, farm output prices, and  output amounts through AC 
marketing services (Calkins and Ngo, 2010; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). 
ACs impacts on input marketing service can be illustrated in two ways. Firstly, the AC input marketing 
service assists members with reducing average input costs. AC members purchase inputs at lower 
than market prices (Getnet & Anullo, 2012). Thus, they are able to reduce average input costs and 
increase their profits. Calkins and Ngo (2010) find that the average costs of fertilizers and pesticides 
for AC members growing coffee in Ghana are lower than non-AC members by USD7 and USD10, 
respectively. Because of the low input prices offered by ACs, AC members’ profits are greater. 
Furthermore, due to low input prices, AC members may increase the number of input uses (Fischer & 
Qaim, 2012). For example, Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that banana growers in Ethiopia who are AC 
members apply more fertilizers and pesticides than non-AC members. Thus AC members’ input 
expenses are greater than non-AC members.  
Regarding AC output marketing services, ACs members selling farm output through AC marketing 
service improve their income in two ways; generating high prices and business opportunities (Getnet 
& Anullo, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2015). Bernard et al. (2008) and Ito et al. 
(2012) compare the incomes of AC participants with non-participants in China. They find that AC 
member income is higher than non-AC members. The cause of increased income for AC members is 
higher product price provided by AC marketing (Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). AC 
marketing services of coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica can increase the coffee price for members by 
USD 0.05 per kilogram (Wollni & Zeller, 2007). Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that AC members using 
AC marketing channels obtain greater income than selling individually because of higher prices. The 
authors find that the average banana price received from ACs in Kenya is higher than selling at the 
market by 23%. 
Another advantage of using AC marketing is an improvement in market access. ACs form a bridge 
between farmers and purchasers. Moreover, ACs provide marketing facilities to encourage their 
members to sell through AC marketing. As a result, AC members can sell more products at higher 
prices than non-members (Calkins & Ngo, 2010; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Francesconi & Ruben, 2007). 
Chagwiza et al. (2016) find that the share of sales of dairy cooperative members is 0.36 times as 
much as non-members in Ethiopia. Francesconi and Ruben (2007) come to similar findings as 
Chagwiza et al. (2016). The sale amount of AC members is greater than those of non-members by 
approximately 20%. This is because ACs provide marketing facilities and technology innovations, such 
as transportation and food processing, to members. These facilities and innovation increase 
members’ market accessibility and enable members to sell more products at a competitive price. 
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Some studies show that participation in ACs has a negative effect or no effect on members’ income 
(Chagwiza et al., 2016; Hoken, 2016; Hoken & Su, 2015; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). The reasons that ACs 
cannot improve the AC members’ income vary. The failure of AC marketing services can impede 
member income improvement (Bernard et al., 2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Francesconi & Heerink, 
2011; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). Marketing failures may be due to cost competition. Chagwiza et al. 
(2016) show that dairy cooperatives in Ethiopia does not increase members’ income since the 
cooperative cannot offer members competitive prices. Similarly, Fischer and Qaim (2012) and Wollni 
and Zeller (2007) find that ACs cannot provide higher price margins to their members because the 
increase in price is less than the increase in input costs in Kenya and Costa Rica, respectively. Bernard 
et al. (2008) and Francesconi and Heerink (2011) show that sale amount of AC members in Ethopia 
do not differ from non-members due to the distrust of ACs. AC members worry about AC 
performance in Ethiopia (Bernard et al., 2008). 
Another reason for no increase in income is unobservable factors such as cultivation skill and risk of 
farm production. Hoken and Su (2015), and Hoken (2016) find that ACs do not significantly improve 
farmers’ incomes. They explain that the income difference between AC members and non-members 
is not a result of AC participation. Instead it is a result of cultivation skills, preferences for farm 
production, and social networks. If studies do not control for unobserved factors, the income of AC 
members will be significantly greater than those of non-members. However, the studies use PSM and 
DID to reduce bias from unobserved factors. The findings show that AC members and nonmembers’ 
incomes are the same. 
Studies on AC consumption impact is limited. AC participation increases household consumption 
(Ahmed & Mesfin, 2017; Wossen et al., 2017). Ahmed and Mesfin (2017) evaluate the impact of 
cooperative membership on the farm household consumption in Ethiopia. Consumption effect is 
measured by consumption per adult. The authors’ findings show that ACs have a positive and 
significant impact on household consumption. Annual consumption for AC members is higher than 
non-members by 22.8%. Similarly, Wossen et al. (2017) investigate the impact of AC membership on 
rural household consumption in Nigeria. Household consumption is measured by food expenditure 
per capita. The findings show that AC membership has a significant and positive effect on food 
expense. AC membership raises household food expenditures by 12.5%. 
The economic impacts in our study are measured in terms of income and consumption factors. Both 
income and consumption refer to household welfare. Income implies household earnings from farm 
production, off-farm activities, and money transfers, whereas, consumption refers to final goods and 
services consumed (O’donnell, Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, & Lindelow, 2007). However, for developing 
countries, household income measurement is difficult. Since a large proportion of people work in 
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informal economic activities or are self-employed, they are hesitant to disclose their incomes (Grosh 
& Glewwe, 2000; O’donnell et al., 2007). Furthermore, household income in the agricultural sector 
fluctuates over farm seasons, while, household consumption is more stable (Haughton & Khandker, 
2009). As a result, for developing countries, household consumption is more directly relevant to 
living standards rather than income. In order to obtain accurate living standard levels, our study 
applies household income and consumption indicators. 
Effect of Agricultural Cooperatives on Social Welfare 
Besides economic effects, ACs play an important role in promoting social welfare, particularly the 
education of members (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Ma, 2016; Majee & Hoyt, 2010; Mojo, Fischer, & 
Degefa, 2015a). However, there are a limited studies on the effect of ACs on household education 
and health factors. 
ACs play an important role in informal education improvement of members (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; 
Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). In general, the main ways to build up education are 
participating in formal and informal education (Mojo et al., 2015a). ACs play an important role in 
improving farmers’ informal education. ACs improve members’ informal education by providing 
agricultural extension services. AC members gain new knowledge and technologies through 
agricultural extension services. These services directly improve members’ production skills. 
The informal education effect of AC is usually measured by agricultural technology adoption. Abebaw 
and Haile (2013) confirm that cooperatives in Ethiopia exhibit a positive and statistically significant 
effect on fertilizer adoption. The fertilizer adoption rate for members is higher than non-members by 
about 9-10%. In the same way, Chagwiza et al. (2016) and Fischer and Qaim (2012) provide evidence 
that ACs significantly promote technological innovation. The dairy cooperatives in Ethiopia 
succeeded in supporting farmers to buy different breeds of cows. The authors’ findings show that the 
proportion of members applying improved cow breed is higher than non-members by 22% (Chagwiza 
et al., 2016). Similarly, the mean of using banana tissue culture plantlet adoption for AC members is 
greater than non-member by 0.5 times (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). The similar results are found in 
China and Nigeria. Ma (2016) find that ACs increase the probability of pest management technology 
adoption by 30%. Wossen et al. (2017) show that Nigerian AC members are more likely to apply 
improved cassava varieties than non-AC members by 13%. 
The research evaluating the impact of cooperatives on household health is limited. Prior literature 
measured the impact of AC participation on household health by using access to health care facilities 
(Calkins and Ngo, 2010) and household expenditure on health (Nghiem, Coelli, & Rao, 2007). Results 
of health impact vary due to different indicators. Calkins and Ngo's (2010) study shows that ACs in 
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana do not improve members’ well-being. The reason is that the AC members do 
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not have the potential to invest in facilities offered by ACs. The AC programs are introduced to the 
very poorest who live in remote areas with a lack of infrastructures. The AC members have to share 
costs to construct infrastructure, such as water towers, schools, and village clinics. Since the 
members are very poor, they cannot afford these investments through the ACs. As a result, the ACs 
cannot provide infrastructure to improve members’ well-being. In contrast, Nghiem et al. (2007) find 
that credit participation improves household education and health status in Vietnam. The impacts of 
education and health in Nghiem’s study are measured by expenditures on education and health. The 
author finds that ACs directly improve household income. The increased income encourages 
households to spend more on education and health care. 
Previous studies show that ACs directly influence household income through the effects on farm 
performance such as input costs, input use, output price, sale, as well as productivity (Bernard et al., 
2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014, 2015; Wossen et 
al., 2017). Besides economic effects, ACs indirectly affect the education and health of households. 
However, empirical evidence on the relation between ACs and education and health effects are 
scarce. In terms of  methodology, most of the studies employ PSM to control for the selection bias 
(Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Ahmed & Mesfin, 2017; Bernard et al., 2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; 
Francesconi & Ruben, 2007; Francesconi & Heerink, 2011; Getnet & Anullo, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; 
Mojo et al., 2015a, 2015b; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014).To bridge this gap, our study contributes 
to the literature by investigating the effects of AC credit and non-credit support services on 
household’s economic and social welfare using the ESR method. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
Credit and non-credit support services are important tools to assist farm households to improve their 
productions and incomes. Understanding the determinants of households’ decision to participate in 
credit and non-credit support services helps practitioners improve household participation in these 
services. The demand theory explains factors influencing households’ demand including demand for 
credit and non-credit support services. Regarding credit, household demand is determined by 
interest rates, farm endowments, and household characteristics. However, the rural credit market in 
Thailand tends to have credit rationing due to asymmetric information. Credit rationing and 
signalling theory are able to explain loan amount granted. Asymmetric information influences 
lenders’ decisions to approve loans. When credit demand exceeds supply, lenders rationing credit 
and impose various conditions in the contracts to distinguish types of borrowers such as different 
interest rates, loan size, collateral requirements, and loan maturities. Empirical studies show that 
credit participation involves negotiation between borrowers and credit providers; therefore, it covers 
both demand and supply factors. Household participation in the credit market is determined by 
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individual and household characteristics (e.g. age, education, land ownership, and productive assets), 
credit attributes (e.g. credit purpose, collateral, and loan duration), and geographic factors such as 
distance to the nearest market and region dummy. 
In terms of non-credit support services (i.e. marketing services), demand theory and transaction cost 
concept provide the explanation for household participation in marketing services. Household 
participation in markets are determined by household characteristics affecting their production, fixed 
transaction costs, and proportion transaction costs. The empirical literature on participation in AC 
marketing services confirms that the key determinants of marketing participation include individual 
and household characteristics (e.g. age, education, land size, and household members, irrigation 
access, product quality, agricultural risks), household perception of AC performance and benefits 
(e.g. AC effectiveness, AC satisfaction, access to technologies, and market information accessibility), 
and geographic factors; distance to nearest market and region dummy. Furthermore, level of 
marketing participation is influenced not only factors of household features (household 
characteristics, household perception of AC performance, and geographical factors) but also 
marketing attributes (i.e. distance to ACs, and late payment for output marketing). 
Empirical studies demonstrate that ACs play a considerable role in poverty reduction for rural 
households. Most studies on the effects of ACs have focused on household income through the 
effects on farm performance such as input costs, input use, output price, sale, as well as productivity. 
The empirical evidence indicates that ACs enable members to earn more income through their 
diverse services such as credit, marketing, and agricultural extension services. However, some 
studies show that participation in ACs has a negative effect or no effect on members’ income. Reason 
for various effects of ACs on household welfare is unobservable factors such as cultivation skill and 
risk of farm production. The presence of unobserved factors influencing households’ AC participation 
and their outcome leads to the selection bias. Effects of ACs are subject to the assumption of 
unobserved factors and impact evaluation method. Difference in the assumption of unobservable 
factors results in different methods for impact evaluation. In Thailand, the research on an 
assessment of AC effects on household welfare are limited. It is necessary to evaluate the effect of 








This chapter describes the empirical models applied in our study. This chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 4.1 provides an overview of model specifications and estimation strategies used to examine 
the determinants of participation in AC and their services; credit and non-credit support services. The 
methods used to evaluate the effects of AC service participation on rural Thai households’ welfare 
are presented in Section 4.2. This section includes outcome indicators, the empirical model, and 
information about the impact estimator approach. Data collection is discussed in Section 4.3 which 
covers the questionnaire design and sampling techniques. Profiles of sampled households in the 
survey are discussed in Section 4.4. 
4.1 Determinants of Participation in Agricultural Cooperative  
4.1.1 Model Specification 
In our study, participation in AC services is defined as the decision to participate in AC services. It 
examines the level of participation; for instance, the loan amount, the level of input use, and the 
quantity of farm products sold. The method used to analyse households’ decisions to be AC 
membership and participate in AC services is the probit model. The Heckman selection model is 
applied to analyse levels of participation in AC services; credit and marketing services.  
Choice of Participation in Agricultural Cooperatives 
Since AC service participation in Thailand does not allow for non-member, the decision to participate 
in AC services has two steps. Firstly, Households decide whether or not to participate in ACs. When 
they are AC members, they can choose to use credit and non-credit support services. Therefore, AC 
participation analysis in our study includes households’ decision to be AC members and participate in 
AC services.  
As discussed in section 3.2, the relationship between households’ decisions to participate in AC and 
determinants influencing AC participation are captured by the choice theory. A binary choice model 
is applied to analyse the decision to be AC membership and participate in AC services since the 
dependent variable is a binary outcome (participation or non-participation). The probit and logit 
models are used to estimate the probability of participation. Both models are different in 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term. For the probit model, the error term is 
assumed to be normally distributed, while in the logit model, the error term is logistically distributed. 
Both models provide consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal estimated parameters (Li, Gan, 
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& Hu, 2011a). In addition, the prediction results of both models are similar. However, the probit 
model is better suited for examining the factors behind AC participation because it can be used for 
smaller samples (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015; Wollni & Zeller, 2007).  
According to Abebaw and Haile (2013), Fischer and Qaim (2012), Mojo et al., (2015b), and Wollni and 
Zeller (2007), a household’s decision to participate in AC is based on the idea of utility maximization. 
The actual utility level of each household is unobservable, however, the utility function can be 
expressed as a function of a vector of exogenous variables ( )ijZ . The utility function consists of two 
parts; a vector of explanatory variables ( )ijZ  and the error term ( )ij (Dubin & Rivers, 1989). The 
explanatory variables are observable factors which influence utility. The error term captures the 
unobservable factors affecting the utility, but are not included in the explanatory variables. The 
utility function can be expressed as: 
( )                         0,1ij ij ijZ j  = + =    (4.1) 
Where  ij is the utility level of household i choosing the alternative j; j  is the choice/decision 
(participation in AC =1 and = 0 otherwise); ijZ  is the vector of explanatory variables;   is the 
unknown parameter; and ij  is the error term. 
To capture AC participation, our study assumes that households are risk neutral and consider the 
potential net returns (Ma & Abdulai, 2016). The household decides to participate in AC, if the 
expected net return obtained from participating in AC ( ) ij is higher than not participating ( )0  i . 
*
iD  is defined as the difference between the expected net returns from participating in AC and not 
participating. 
*
1 0i iiD U U= −      (4.2) 
*
iD  is unobserved but is presented as a latent variable model. Substituting equation (4.1) into 
equation (4.2) and defining 1 0i i iZ Z Z= −  and 1 0i i i  = − , yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 0 1 01 0 1 0
*
i i i ii i i i i
i i i
D z z z z
D Z
      
 
= + − + = − + −
= +
  (4.3) 
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Households participate in AC, if *
iD  is larger than zero. It means that the expected net returns 
obtained from participating in AC are greater than not participating. Otherwise, households would 
choose not to participate in ACs.  











     (4.4) 
Our study carries out two estimations for AC participation: AC membership and participation in AC 
services. Firstly, the estimation explores determinants of AC membership. Thus, iD  is a binary 
outcome which equals 1 when household i decides to be AC membership and 0 otherwise. Secondly, 
the study investigates the determinants of AC members’ decision to participate in AC services. 
Hence, the dependent variable equals 1 for participants in AC service and 0 for non-participants. 
iZ  
is a set of explanatory variables.   is a vector of parameters and i  is an error term. The error term 
is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. 
The probability of participating in AC can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*Pr 1 Pr 0 Pr 0
Pr( )
i i i i i i
i i i
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   (4.5) 
Where F is the cumulative distribution function for i . This model assumes that 1 0i iand   have a 













= =   and ( )
2
1 0i iVar  = + .  
To associate AC participation with expected net returns, we assume households are rational and seek 
net return maximization from farm production.  The expected net returns can be shown as follows: 
( ),o iP Q R Z PI = −      (4.6) 
Where Po is a vector of farm product prices and Q is a vector of total farm yields. Pi is a vector of 
input prices and I is a vector of inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and labour. Z is a vector of 
the explanatory variable. Q is a production function which 0Q I    and 2 2 0Q I    (Ma & Abdulai, 
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2016). Net returns can be presented as a function of input and output prices, the choice of 
participation in AC and AC services (D), and observable characteristics is given as: 
( ), , ,o if P P D Z =      (4.7) 
The first order condition of the net return function (equation 4.6) provides a reduced form for output 
supply function: 
( ), , ,o iQ f P P D Z=       (4.8) 
The model can be modified to capture households’ decision to participate in AC marketing services. 
As Key et al. (2000) argue, households’ decision to participate in AC marketing services depends on 
the transaction costs and benefits of participation. Transaction costs are divided into fixed and 
proportional costs. Proportional transaction costs raise farmers’ input prices ( )Pi iP TC+  and reduce 
farmers’ real output prices ( )Po oP TC− (Key et al., 2000; Ouma et al., 2010). Fixed transaction costs for 
input and output markets influence farmers’ decisions to participate in marketing services and 
reduce their net returns. The expected net return is presented as:  
( ) ( )P P F Fo o i i o iP TC Q P TC I TC TC  = − − + − −      (4.9) 
Where   denotes a household’s expected net returns; oP  and iP  are market prices for output and 
input, respectively. P
oTC  and PiTC denote the proportion transactional costs per unit of output and 
input, respectively; F
oTC  and FiTC are the fixed transaction costs for output and input markets, 
respectively. Q  is the number of farm yields and I  is the number of inputs. 
Based on equation (4.9), a reduced form of net returns function is identified by input and output 
prices, proportional transaction costs for input and output markets, and household and farm 
characteristics (Z) (Ma, 2016). It can be represented by equation (4.10)  
( ), , , ,P Pq i q if P P TC TC Z =      (4.10) 
Based on the net return function (equations 4.7 and 4.10), households’ expected net return is 
defined by input and output prices, the choice of participation in AC services, and observable factors. 
Prior empirical studies have shown that the participation in AC and AC services and expected net 
returns are determined by individual characteristics, household factors, and geographical factors 
(Bernard et al., 2008; Fischer & Qaim, 2012, 2014; Francesconi & Heerink, 2011; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; 
Mojo et al., 2017). However, some empirical evidence shows that farm risks and farmers’ attitudes in 
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AC performances directly influence households’ decisions to participate in ACs (Fischer & Qaim, 
2014; Hoken, 2016; Ito et al., 2012; Mensah et al., 2012; Zheng, Wang, & Song, 2011). This allows us 
to have more control over the unobservable factors in the choice of AC participation. Including these 
variables means that the empirical model of our study is different from other empirical studies of AC 
participation. AC participation variables are adapted from previous studies. The variables are 
categorized into four groups; individual characteristics, household factors, household perception 
toward farm risk and AC performance, and geographic factors. 
Heckman Selection Model 
When analysing factors related to level of AC service participation, one needs to take into account 
selection bias. In section 3.2.2, we discussed that participation in AC services may lead to selection 
bias; this is because households choose to participate in ACs (Ma & Abdulai, 2016). Both observable 
and unobservable factors influence households to participate in AC services. Therefore, the sample is 
not random. In addition, the decision to participate in AC services is a sequential process (Abebaw & 
Haile, 2013; Alene et al., 2008; Duy et al., 2012; Fischer & Qaim, 2014; Girma & Abebaw, 2015; Khoi, 
2012; Mensah et al., 2012; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Firstly, households decide whether to 
participate in AC services or not. Secondly, only participating households choose the level of services 
they require, such as the loan amount, the sale quantity, and the input amount traded through ACs. 
The latter process is more likely to lead to a bias because only data from AC participants is 
considered. Data from non-participants is excluded from the sample.  
To address the selection bias, determinants related to the participation level is analysed using the 
Heckman selection model. The Heckman model is one of the most commonly applied approaches 
because it is able to mitigate the selection bias (Duy et al., 2012). For example, Tetteh Anang et al. 
(2015), Khoi (2012), Duy et al. (2012), and Girma and Abebaw (2015) apply the Heckman model to 
investigate factors which encourage households to access credit. Similarly, Alene et al. (2008), 
Fischer and Qaim (2014), and Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) apply the Heckman model to identify 
the factors of household participation in input and output marketing services, the input amount and 
sales traded. 
The Heckman selection model consists of two steps; the participation or selection process and the 
outcome process. In the first step, households choose to participate in AC services. As discussed 
above, this stage is analysed using the probit model. In the second step, households participating in 
AC services choose their levels of participation. Samples in this step only include those households 
who decide to use AC services. Therefore, the outcome equation in the second step is estimated 
using information from households who are AC service users. The sample selection is expressed in 
the following equations 
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i i iy x = +  , Given iD  equals one (4.11) 
*
i i iD z = +  (4.12) 
Where iy  denotes participation level in AC services; ix  denotes the vector of explanatory variables 
influencing participation levels in AC services;   denotes the parameters; and  denotes the error 
term. The Heckman selection model relies on the assumptions below (Wooldridge, 2010):  
1. iD and iz  are observable. Participation levels ( iy ) are only observed when households 
participate in AC services ( 1iD = ). This assumption concentrates on the sample selection problem. 
When a household’s expected net return of AC service participation exceeds non-participation
*(D 0)i  , it will participate in AC services ( 1iD = ). Then participation levels in AC services ( iy ) are 
observable. In contrast, if 
*
iD  is negative, a household decides not to participate in AC services and 
iy  is unobserved.  
2. The error terms ( ),   are normally distributed with zero means and are independent of the set of 
explanatory variables. Their variances are 2
 and 
2
  and covariance ( )( , )Cov    is  . This 
assumption refers to the exogeneity of iz . 
3. The error term of the selection equation is normally distributed with zero means (
( )0,1Normal ). The assumption that the variance of   equals 1( 2 1 = ) does not lead to a loss 
of generality because iD is a binary variable. 
4. If both error terms are correlated, then the expected value of   is conditional on the sample 
selection which is non-zero, denoted by ( )E   =    
Since the level of AC service participation ( iy ) is observable only when a household participates in 
AC services ( 1iD = ), the expected level of AC service participation can be expressed as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , ,i i i i i iE y D E y z E x E z   = = = +    (4.13) 
Since ( )E  =  and ( )i iE x x= , we must rewrite equation 4.13 to obtain 
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( ) ( ), ,i i i iE y z x E z   = +    (4.14) 
According to the assumption that  is an independent set of explanatory variables and
( )E   = , equation (4.14) can be rewritten as: 
( ),i i iE y z x  = +     (4.15) 
If  equals zero, this indicates that the error terms of participation and outcome equations are not 
related, and that the model does not have a sample selection problem. Then   is consistently 
estimated by OLS using the selected sample. However, if   does not equal zero, equation (4.15) can 
be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )1 1i i i iE y D x E D  = = + =     (4.16) 
Households will participate in AC services if the difference between the expected net return from 
participation is higher than not participating ( )* 0iD  . Substituting equation (4.12) when 
*
iD  is more 
than zero into equation (4.16), we get: 
( ) ( )1i i i iE y D x E z    = = +  −    (4.17) 
The value of ( )iE z   − in equation (4.17) presents the omitted variables arising from the 













;    and   are the 
standard normal density function and standard normal cumulative distribution function, respectively. 
( )iz   is IMR. Therefore, equation (4.17) can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )1i i i iE y D x z  = = +     (4.18) 
IMR ( ( )iz  ) captures the unobservable variables in the selected sample (Wooldridge, 2010).   
and  can be obtained by regressing iy on ix and ( )iz  . Although   is unknown, the estimate of 
  can be derived from the probit estimation of the participation equation (equation 4.5). The 
Heckman two-step method can solve the selection bias and provide unbiased and consistent 
estimators based on IMR.  
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Our study focuses on participation level of three AC services: credit, input, and output marketing 
services. Thus, there are three Heckman selection models in our study. The Heckman selection model 
for each AC service consists of participation equation (equation 4.12) and participation level equation 
(equation 4.11). The dependent variable (yi) in the participation level equation for AC credit is loan 
amounts. While the dependent variable for AC input marketing service is input expenses through ACs 
and for output marketing service is farm product quantity sold to ACs.  
The explanatory variables are drawn from existing literature on determinants of loan amount and 
input and output levels traded through marketing services. These factors can be broadly grouped 
into individual, household, and geographic characteristics. These factors reflect loan applicants’ 
characteristics such as human capital, financial capital endowments, transaction costs, and farm 
production ability. In addition to attributes of the demand side, the participation level of AC services 
is directly determined by AC service attributes. 
In section 3.1.2, we discussed the credit rationing theory that explained why some borrowers are 
limited to access credit. Loan amount is determined by both the demand and supply factors (Zeller, 
1994). First, the choice of participation in a credit program is influenced by factors affecting 
household demand for credit, such as individual and household socioeconomic factors. Next, lenders 
decide whether to fully or partially grant the requested amount. To associate credit rationing and the 
demand for credit, our study uses the AC credit model and includes credit program attributes. In this 
study, credit attributes/variables included are chosen from previous literature (Khoi, 2012; Menkhoff 
& Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Ololade & Olagunju, 2013) and include AC share value, type of collateral, 
and loan duration. 
The AC marketing participation model in our study includes marketing channel attributes. Marketing 
channel attributes determine household participation levels in AC marketing service since they affect 
households’ net farm returns (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). For example, output prices offered by 
ACs positively influence the quantity of farm products sold through it, while the price obtained by 
alternative channels have negative effects on participation in AC marketing services (Mensah et al., 
2012; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). Access to AC marketing services, measured by distance to ACs, is 
expected to negatively influence participation levels for AC marketing services (Winter-Nelson & 
Temu, 2005; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). The further the distance is, the greater transportation costs are 
likely to be. This leads to lower household net returns. The explanatory variables for AC marketing 
attributes included in the AC marketing services participation model are drawn from prior empirical 
studies (Fischer & Qaim, 2014; Mensah et al., 2012; Muthyalu, 2013; Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005).  
AC marketing attributes in our study are AC share value, input payment method, output prices 
offered by AC, other output market channel, and distance from residence to AC center. 
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The model has two main advantages in terms of analysing households’ decision to participate in AC 
services. First, the model overcomes the selection bias problem. The model takes into account the 
fact that households choose to participate in ACs. Selection bias might occur since Thai ACs have 
criteria to screen whether to accept individual applicants. For example, applicants have to be farmers 
living in areas covered by specific ACs. Their farms also have to be a certain size to generate enough 
income to repay their loans. Moreover, the model acknowledges that a household’s decision to 
participate in AC services is a two-step process. This is particularly true in terms of credit and 
marketing service participation. Analysing the decision to participate, separate from the level of 
participation, might lead to the endogeneity of unobservable factors. Second, the model attempts to 
provide a better explanation for participation levels in both AC credit and marketing services. Thus, 
the model captures AC attributes. 
4.1.2 Estimation Strategy 
The main variable in this study is the participation level. It is determined by a vector of explanatory 
variables and the error term ( i ). The error term ( i ) is assumed to be normally distributed. The 
participation level in AC services is observed when households participate in AC services ( 1iD = ). 
Since only the choice of participation in AC services is observable, participation in AC services is 
illustrated as a latent equation (equation 4.18-1). The system equation of AC service participation, 
known as the Heckman selection model, is given as: 
*












1i i i iy x Given D = + =  ,  (4.18-2) 
This system of equations can be estimated using the Heckman two-stage approach (Khoi, 2012; 
Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). The steps are: 
Step 1. Estimate the probit model to determine the probability of participation in AC services using 
all observations. This process provides the vectors of consistent coefficient  . Then calculate IMR 
( )( )i iZ    of the probit model. 
Step 2. Add IMR, an explanatory variable, into the outcome equation (equation 4.18-2) and run iy  
on ix , i  to obtain the coefficients   and the coefficient of IMR ( ). These estimators are 
consistent and asymptotically normal. 
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The Heckman two-stage method is able to correct selection bias because of IMR. IMR captures 
omitted unobservable variables (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Selection bias can be determined using a 
standard t-test on  . The null hypothesis means that there is no selection bias, : 0oH  = . If H0 
holds, it means that the error term in participation and outcome equation are not correlated. 
Therefore, there is no selection bias. 
Under the null hypothesis, Var ( ), 1iy z D =  = Var ( )y z  = Var ( ) , homoskedasticity holds 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, when 0 = , the asymptotic variance of   and   is not influenced 
by . In contrast, when 0  , Var ( ), 1iy z D =  is not constant. This means there is heteroskedasticity 
problem. However, heteroskedasticity can be corrected by applying robust standard errors. 
To avoid collinearity among the regressors in an outcome equation regression, explanatory variables 
for the outcome equation (Xi) can overlap explanatory variables for the participation equation (Zi). 
However, at least one variable (a selection instrument variable), affects a household’s decision to 
participate in AC services but does not affect their level of participation (Ma, 2016; Mojo et al., 2017; 
Wossen et al., 2017). To address collinearity among the regressors, our study uses household’s 
expected benefits from AC services as a selection instrument variable in the Heckman selection 
model since it affects a household’s decision to participate in AC services, but does not affect their 
level of participation. 
4.1.3 Addressing Potential Endogeneity 
To obtain consistent estimates, it is important to address endogeneity problems in the participation 
equation. Some explanatory variables may be potentially endogenous explanatory variables (EEVs) in 
AC member participation and AC credit participation (Khoi et al., 2013; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). 
Regarding AC membership, access to credit and agricultural extension services may be jointly 
determined by AC membership (Ma & Abdulai, 2016). A household’s decision to participate in ACs is 
determined by the demand for credit and agricultural extension services. In contrast, ACs assist 
households to obtain credit and agricultural extension services (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Wossen et al., 
2017). Therefore, credit access and agricultural extension service access might be endogenous 
variables in the AC participation equation.  
In terms of participation in credit services, other complementary or substitute loans are also 
considered. Households may borrow additional money from other credit programs (Duong & 
Izumida, 2002; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Khoi et al., 2013). Loan size, or the money granted by 
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other lenders, is an endogenous variable since it is determined by household characteristics (Khoi, 
2012). Our study, thus, includes endogeneity of other loans in AC credit participation.  
If there are endogenous variables in the participation equation, applying the standard probit method 
will provide biased and yield inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). Endogenous variables 
should be treated before using the Heckman selection model. Various estimation methods have been 
used to estimate the probit model with endogenous variables (Rivers & Vuong, 1988). Heckman 
(1978) proposes a two-stage least squares method (2SLS). The 2SLS estimator can be applied by using 
standard probit and regression. The 2SLS method provides only approximate and no appropriate 
distribution results for the estimators (Miranda & Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). Amemiya (1978) proposes a 
generalized two-stage simultaneous probit model (G2SP) to improve the efficiency of the Heckman 
estimator. This method estimates the parameter estimates of structural equations from parameter 
estimates of reduced equations. Rivers and Vuong (1988) suggest a two-stage conditional maximum 
likelihood model (2SCML). 2SCML is easier for computation and more efficient than the Heckman and 
Amemiya estimators (Rivers & Vuong, 1988). Therefore, our study employs Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) 
approach to estimate the probit model with endogenous variables.  
Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) model consists of a structural equation and a reduced form equation. The 
structural equation is the primary interest equation, which is the participation equation in our study. 
A household’s decision to participate in AC and AC services depends on the explanatory variables, 
including exogenous variables ( iZ ) and endogenous variables ( iG ) (see equation 4.19). A reduced 
form equation for the EEVs is a function of all the other explanatory variables ( iZ  ) in the 
participation equation and a set of instruments ( iS  ). The set of equations are presented below: 
*
i i i iD z G  = + +  , if 
* 0iD  , D=1 and 0, otherwise  (4.19) 
i i i iG Z S  = + +    (4.20) 
Where iG  is a vector of observed endogenous variables; iZ  is a vector of explanatory variables 
affecting the decision to participate in AC and AC services; iS  is a vector of instrument variables. ,   
are the parameters; and i  is an error terms. 
Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) model requires at least one explanatory variable as an instrumental 
variable. An instrument variable significantly affects endogenous variables but does not influence the 
choice of participation (Khoi et al., 2013; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). Thus, instrument variables must be 
excluded from the participation equation estimation (equation 4.19). Moreover, it is not correlated 
with the selection instrument variable used in the Heckman selection model. To address these issues, 
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our study uses “a member of other associations” as an instrumental variable for EEVs in the 
participation equation of AC membership and AC credit models. Being a member of other 
associations is expected to significantly identify EEVs (access credit and agricultural extension 
services) but does not influence the decision to participate in AC membership and AC credit.  
Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) approach has two steps. Step 1. Regress 
iG  on iZ  and iS  to get ,  . 
Next, compute the least squares residuals (
iR ) and add the residuals as an explanatory variable in 
the participation equation (equation 4.20). The participation equation can be rewritten as follows: 
*
i i i i iD Z G R   = + + +   (4.21) 
Where 
iR  is a vector of residual terms estimated from equation (4.20). Adding the residuals 
transforms the endogenous variables into appropriate exogenous variables since the residuals 
perform control functions (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Step 2. Run the probit of *
iD  on , ,andi i iZ G R  to find the vectors of consistent coefficients ( , ,   ) 
This approach provides a test for the endogeneity of the endogenous variables by using the t-test for 
the coefficient . If   equals zero, it means i  and i  are not related. Therefore, an endogeneity 
problem does not exist and iG  is an exogenous variable (Wooldridge, 2010).  
4.2 Effect Evaluation of Agricultural Cooperative at the Household Level 
ACs aim to mitigate farmers’ poverty. ACs are designed to support members’ businesses and improve 
their welfare. Participation in AC services provides opportunities for households to improve their 
income and consumption levels, and increase household members’ education, and improve their 
health. This section discusses the outcome indicators used to measure AC effects on household 
welfare. The empirical model for impact evaluation of AC services is presented in the next section. 
4.2.1  Outcome Indicators of Effect Evaluation 
The poor cannot escape from poverty because they often confront multiple issues, including a lack of 
financial capital, high rates of illiteracy, low skills, and bad health due to poor and a lack of access to 
health services (Birchall & Simmons, 2009). Insufficient income is the main cause of all of these 
issues. Lack of capital impedes people from expanding their businesses and farm productions. Due to 
lack of financial capital, the poor must often borrow money. They cannot borrow from formal lenders 
since they do not have assets which they can use as collateral. If they choose to borrow from 
informal lenders, they may become trapped by high interest rates and become poorer as a result or 
permanently indebted. One way to help people escape from this trap is to provide loans with low 
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interest rates so that they can balance their income and interest payments (Birchall & Simmons, 
2009).   
Low income people are often unable to increase their education and remain stuck in low-skilled jobs 
due to their illiteracy. The poor cannot afford to send their children to school; instead, children are 
often required to work to contribute to the family income. Moreover, the poor are often trapped by 
their bad health. Under-nourished individuals cannot work productively, which means that they are 
unlikely to earn a high income (Birchall & Simmons, 2009).  
ACs provide a way to escape from poverty or at least raise a household’s income level (Birchall & 
Simmons, 2009). The various ways that ACs can help households reduce poverty are illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. ACs credit and marketing services directly improve household’s income, while, AC 
agricultural extension services develop household’s farm production skill. ACs provide loans to 
farmers with lower interest rates compared to other money lenders. Because of ACs’ loan provision, 
rural households are able to reduce reliance on traditional/informal loans (Siamwalla et al., 1990). 
Households can use these loans to support their production. However, providing loans to 
uneducated or unskilled members is a risk. Thus, ACs encourage members to participate in 
agricultural extension services to gain knowledge and improve their production skills. AC agricultural 
extension services provide farm knowledge, information about how to improve inputs and use 
modern technology. These services improve farmer productivity. ACs help members combat market 
failure. ACs also help members to purchase inputs and sell outputs. ACs can offer a lower price for 
inputs and a higher price for outputs to its members than private traders. Moreover, members can 
purchase inputs from ACs on credit. AC marketing services increase members’ profits. Eventually, 
credit and non-credit support services facilitated by increasing household income. With increased 



















Figure 4.1 Effect of Agricultural Cooperative Participation 
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In addition to increased income, ACs contribute to household members’ education and health. Some 
ACs are directly involved in educational activities, such as building schools, providing scholarships or 
educational loans, equipment and stationery (Birchall & Simmons, 2009). These activities increase 
children’s educational opportunities and help to break the poverty cycle. Children are not the only 
ones to benefit from these educational opportunities; adults are also able to participate in 
educational programs. ACs improve members’ farm skills and technology knowledge through 
training. In terms of health, some ACs offer low-cost insurance, funeral funds, and health care 
facilities for members, like those in Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In Thailand, some ACs improve 
members’ education and health by contributing to their members’ education and health expenses 
(Thuvachote, 2011). 
According to Figure 4.1, AC credit participation directly impacts household income, consumption, 
farm skill improvement, children’s education access, and health access. For non-credit support 
services, AC marketing services directly influence household income and consumption and eventually 
influence children’s education access and health access. While AC agricultural extension services 
directly affect farm skill improvement. Therefore, to satisfy the objectives of our study in parts of the 
effects of AC services, our study will evaluate the effects of three AC services. Firstly, the study will 
investigate the effects of AC credit participation including household income, consumption, farm skill 
improvement, children’s education access, and health access. Next, the study will evaluate the 
effects of participation in AC marketing and agricultural extension services as the representation for 
non-credit support service. The effects of AC marketing service participation involve household 
income, consumption, children’s education access, and health access, while, the effect of 
participation in AC agricultural extension services include only farm skill improvement. 
Regarding indicators for AC effects, our study considers economic and social indicators related to the 
effects of AC participation on household welfare; income, consumption, education, and health (see 
Figure 4.1). These indicators were chosen from prior literature. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the 
economic and social effect indicators found in the literature. The economic indicators include total 
household income, household farm income, gross farm revenue, and household consumption 
including food and non-food expenses. Our study applies total household income and household 
farm income to capture the income effect. Total household income includes annual farm, off-farm, 
and transfer payments in Thai Baht. The effect on household consumption is measured using 




Table 4.1 Economic and Social Indicators 
 




















Total Income Mojo et al. (2015b, 2017), Getnet & Anullo 
(2012), Jena et al. (2012) 
Income per Capita Jena et al. (2012), Ma (2016), Hoken (2016), 
Calkins & Ngo (2010) 
Farm Income  Chagwiza et al. (2016), Hoken & SU (2015), 
Hoken (2016), Zheng et al. (2011), Getnet & 
Anullo (2012)  
Farm Revenue Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014, 2015) 
Farm Income per Farm Worker  Hoken (2016), Verhofstadt & Maertens 
(2014) 
Farm Income per Ha  Ma (2016), Hoken & SU (2015), Hoken 
(2016) 
Farm Income per Day Ito et al. (2012) 
The ratio of Farm Income to 
HH Income 
Chagwiza et al. (2016), Calkins & Ngo (2010) 
Consumption Per Capita Consumption 
Expense 
Jena et al. (2012), Ahmed & Mesfin (2017) 
Per Capita Food Expense Wossen et al. (2017) 
Yield 
  
Total yield Mojo et al. (2015b) 
Yield/day Chagwiza et al. (2016), Ito et al. (2012) 
Productivity Yield/Ha. Chagwiza et al (2016), Verhofstadt & 
Maertens (2015), Ma (2016), Calkins & Ngo 
(2010), Fischer & Qaim (2012), Francesconi 










Share of Sale Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014), Fischer & 
Qaim (2012,2014), Francesconi & Ruben 
(2007), Francesconi & Heerink (2011) 
Sale Amount Bernard et al. (2008), Fischer & Qaim (2014) 
Price Price/Kg. Chagwiza et al. (2016), Fischer & Qaim 
(2012), Wollni & Zeller (2007) 
 Profit Price Margin (Profit/Kg.) Ito et al. (2012), Calkins & Ngo (2010), 




Total Input Expenses 
(Fertilizers, Pesticides, seeds) 
Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014), Ma (2016), 
Getnet & Anullo (2012) 
Input Expenses per Ha  Calkins & Ngo (2010), Fischer & Qaim (2012), 
Ma (2016) 
 Social Informal 
Education 
Adoption of Technologies or 
Improved Inputs 
Wossen et al. (2017), Verhofstadt & 
Maertens (2014), Calkins & Ngo (2010), 




Expense on Schooling Sinha & Rasmussen (2007), Holvoet (2004), 
Omoro (2013), Duvendack (2011), Doan et 
al. (2014) 
  Education expense per school-
age child 
Doan et al. (2014) 
  Enrolment Rate DFID (1999), Duvendack (2011), Pronyk 
(2007), Sinha & Rasmussen (2007), World 
bank (2000), Ghana Statistical Service (2013) 
 Health Health Access  Omoro (2013), Pronyk (2007) 
  Health Expenses Duvendack (2011) 
  Ability to Affordable Health 
Care Services 




In our study, the social indicators consist of education and health effects, which are measured using 
numerical and self-evaluated variables. Households were asked to compare changes in their 
household welfare (focusing on education and health) over a three year period (2014-2016). The self-
evaluated education and health indicators were measured using a three-point rating scale, ranging 
from 1=no change, 2= moderate improvement, 3= extreme improvement. 
Education effect consists of effects on formal education (children’s education) and informal 
education (adults’ farm knowledge and technology adoption). Children’s education is measured using 
enrolment and expenditure on schooling. Primary and middle education is compulsory for all Thai 
children. Children can access to compulsory education in two ways, attending school and non-formal 
education. Attending non-formal education is an alternative way for poor households to support 
their children access to education. Poor households do not have enough income to send their kids to 
school, in addition, they need children to work in order to obtain more income. Non-formal 
education is suitable for poor children since it is part-time study and tuition fee is low. The effect on 
children education in our study focuses on formal education. School enrolment is used to measure 
children education effect. School enrolment reflects households’ abilities to provide their children 
the basic education. A school enrolment variable in our study is a dichotomous variable which equals 
1 when every school-aged child (6-15 years old) in family attends school and 0 otherwise. 
Besides, the effect on children’s education is measured by schooling expense. There is a difference 
between sending children to private and public schools (Holvoet, 2004). Private schools have high 
tuition fees and often have higher miscellaneous costs. It is cheaper to send children to public 
schools than private schools, or that parents who send their children to private schools are wealthier. 
To capture the difference between private and public school, schooling expense is used to calculate 
the effect of education. Following the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), schooling expenditures in 
our study include direct expenses (tuition fee and other fee charged for educational services) and 
indirect expenses (expenses for food, uniform, stationery, and transportation) (Oseni et al., 2018). 
In this study, informal education is measured using a self-evaluation method. Households were also 
asked whether they apply new technology, modern farm materials, and improved farm knowledge 
(farm production and management) to their farm production. The variable measuring adoption of 
improved farm technologies and practices is a dichotomous variable which equals 1 when 
households apply improved farm technologies and practices in their productions and 0 otherwise. 
The effect of ACs on household health is measured using access to health care facilities and the 
ability to afford health care services. Access to health care facilities is measured using household 
perceptions of improvement in access to health care; this is a self-evaluated variable. An 
improvement in health access is a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if households’ health access 
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is better off and 0 otherwise. Moreover, our study also includes the ability to afford health care 
services, following the Grameen bank’s indicator for poverty assessment (Grameen Bank, 2017). 
Affordability is an important concept because if households spend a lot of money on a particular 
item, such as food or education, they then have to reduce their consumption of other goods and 
services (Niens et al., 2012). This concept is applied to measure the affordability of health care. If 
households have more income they are able to seek health care when they need it. As a result, 
household healthcare is more affordable. Our study defines health affordability in terms of what 
household income remains after paying for food and education.   
4.2.2 Empirical Model Specification 
An average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is used to evaluate the effects of a particular 
program. The treatment effect is the difference between the actual and the counterfactual outcome. 
When individuals participate in treatment, they have two outcomes; actual and unobserved 
outcomes. The unobserved outcome refers to the outcome that would have occurred when the 
individuals do not participate in the treatment. As the counterfactual outcome cannot be observed, 
treatment effect estimation must be done using an average treatment effect, instead of an individual 
treatment effect (Steiner & Cook, 2013, as cited in Mojo et al., 2017). 
ATT is usually used to evaluate the effects of AC memberships. ATT measures the average difference 
in participant and non-participant outcomes. However, ATT estimation may be subject to selection 
biases (Mojo et al, 2017). As noted above, farmers choose to participate in ACs (Ahmed & Mesfin, 
2017; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). The choice of AC participation is influenced by both observable 
characteristics, such as age, gender, and education levels, and time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics, such as households skills, social networks, risks, and leisure preferences (Hoken & Su, 
2015; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). Applying ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate the treatment effect 
with selection biases will yield inconsistent and biased estimates (Ma & Abdulai, 2016) 
The standard approaches for dealing with the selection bias can be divided into different categories 
based on the types of dependent variables. PSM and ESR models are commonly used for models with 
a continuous dependent variable. RBP and ESP models are used with binary dependent variables. The 
PSM method is applied to estimate the treatment effects of AC participation to control for selection 
biases; however, it can only mitigate the observable selection bias. To control for selection biases 
from both observed and unobserved factors, our study applies the ESR model to assess the effects of 
AC service participation. In terms of the binary dependent variables, the ESP has advantages over the 
RPB model (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004; Ma, 2016). Firstly, ESP model, using the FIML technique, 
provides consistent standard errors of the estimates; it thus yields consistent estimates. In contrast, 
RBP requires potential adjustments for deriving consistent standard errors (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). 
108 
Secondly, the ESP approach estimates the determinants of outcome variables separately, for both AC 
and non-AC participants. Although the RBP model can control for both observed and unobserved 
selection biases, it can only estimate the selection equation with one outcome equation (Ma, 2016). 
Therefore, the RBP model cannot separate determinants of AC participant outcomes and those of 
non-participants. Enhancing household welfare through AC services requires understanding of the 
factors that influence AC and non-AC participants’ decisions separately. 
In our study, outcome variables are continuous (such as household and farm income, household 
consumption, educational expenses, health affordability) and binary (such as school enrolment, 
adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, and improvement of health accessibility). 
Therefore our study estimates the effects of AC service participation using the ESR model for 
continuous outcome variables and the ESP models for binary outcome variables. Both of these 
models apply the FIML method to estimate participation and outcome equations simultaneously 
(Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Mojo et al., 2017; Shiferaw, Kassie, Jaleta, & Yirga, 
2014). 
Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
The ESR model applied in our study is based on Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), Ma and Abdulai (2016) and 
Mojo et al.’s (2017) work. The ESR model has two stages, the selection and the outcome stage. In the 
first stage, a selection or participation equation is a binary model (see equation 4.12). The selection 
equation is used to determine the probability of household participation in AC services using all 
observations; AC service participants and non-AC service participants. In the second stage, the 
outcome functions are specified by two regime equations; regime 1 for AC service participants and 
regime 2 for non-participants. Outcome functions are illustrated below: 
Regime 1:   1i iiP iP iPy x if D = + =             (4.22a) 
Regime 2: 0i iiN iN iNy x if D = + =  (4.22b) 
Where iPy  and iNy  are the outcomes of interest (which are continuous variables), such as 
household income, farm income, household consumption, education expenses, and health 
affordability, for AC service participants and non-participants, respectively; ix  denotes a vector of 
explanatory variables influencing the outcome;   is a vector of the parameters estimated; and i  is a 
random disturbance term. 
The ESR model assumes that the error terms in the selection and outcome equations ( , ,iP iN   ) 





N  , respectively. 
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The covariance term between the error term in the selection and the outcome equation of 
participants in AC services ( )( ),i iPCov   are P and the covariance for non-participants 
( )( ),i iPCov   are N . If the error term in the selection equation is related to the error term in 
outcome equations, the expected values of iP and iN conditional on the sample selection are non-

























   = = − =
−
 (4.23b) 
Where ( ).  and ( ).  are the standard normal probability density function and the standard 
normal cumulative density function respectively; 
Pi Niand   are IMR calculated from using the 
selection equation. Where ( ) ( )Pi i iZ Z =   and ( ) ( )1Ni i iZ Z = − . If the estimated P  and N  
are statistically significant, it means that a household’s decision to participate in AC services are 
correlated with outcomes. Hence, there is the presence of endogenous switching or selection bias 
(Mojo et al., 2017).  
The ESR model addresses both observable and unobservable selection biases. A vector of 
explanatory variables ( )ix  in the outcome equation (equations 4.22a and 4.22b) capture observed 
characteristics which influence a household to participate in AC services. Unobserved factors are 
captured by an error term. If there is an endogenous switching or a selection bias ( )( ), 0i icorr    , 
the ESR model is able to mitigate these problems by adding IMR ( )iP iNand   and the covariance 
terms ( )P Nand    estimated using the selection equation, as additional explanatory variables 
in the outcome equation:  
1iP iP i P iP iP iy x if D   = + + =  (4.24a) 
1iN iN i N iN iN iy x if D   = + + =  (4.24b) 
Where IMR ( )iP iNand   capture the selection bias, which occurs from unobserved characteristics; 
iP iNand   are the error terms that have a normal distribution with zero means (Mojo et al., 2017). 
The selection and outcome equations are estimated simultaneously using the FIML method (Lokshin 
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& Sajaia, 2004). The FIML method provides consistent standard errors; therefore, the estimates are 
efficient. 
A vector of explanatory variables in the selection and outcome equations are allowed to overlap. 
However, the ESR model requires that at least one explanatory variable in a vector of explanatory 
variables in the selection equation is excluded from the outcome equation (Ma & Abdulai, 2016; 
Mojo et al, 2017; Shiferaw et al., 2014). The excluded variable is called a selection instrument 
variable. This requirement safeguards the ESR model from linearity problems. The valid selection 
instrument variable has to influence households’ decisions to participate in AC services but not 
influence outcomes (Ma & Abdulai, 2016). Following Ma and Abdulai (2016) and Mojo et al. (2017), 
our study employs two variables; the neighbour’s AC membership and distance to the nearest 
market or town as the selection instrument variable. Neighbour and relatives, who are AC 
membership, indicate social network. Social network is likely to have a positive influence on AC 
participation. However, it does not affect household incomes (Ito et al., 2012; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). 
Similarly, households living closer to town tend to have easier access to credit, input and output 
markets, and agricultural extension services, since the agents who provide those services are located 
in town (Mojo et al., 2017). Therefore, distance to town may affect household participation in AC 
services. Our study expects to find that both selection variables do not directly influence outcomes.  
When the ESR model is estimated, it yields the coefficients of correlation ( P  and N ).  P  is 
the coefficients of correlation between i  and iP  and N  is the coefficients of correlation 
between i  and iN  . Where P  equals  ( )P P     and N equals ( )N N    . If P or 
N  equals zero, it means that there is no selection bias. Therefore, consistent estimators can be 
obtained using OLS. While, P or N is statistically significant, indicating there is a selection bias 
from unobservable factors (Ma, 2016; Miranda & Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). The treatment effect 
estimation must take into account observable and unobservable factors.  
The signs of P  and N  have economic interpretations (Alene et al., 2008; Ma, 2016). When P
and N  are statistically significant with a different sign, it means that households participate in AC 
services on the basis of their comparative advantage. Households participating in AC services have 
above-average interested outcomes (e.g., income, consumption, and education status) from using AC 
services and those who do not participate in AC services have above-average interested outcomes 
from not using AC services. In contrast, if the signs of correlation coefficient are same, this means 
that AC service participants have above-average outcomes whether they use AC services or not, but 
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they are better off participating. While non-AC service participants have below-average outcomes in 
either choice but they are better off not participating. A positive P refers to a negative selection 
bias, indicating that households whose outcomes are below the average outcome are more likely to 
participate in AC services. In contrast, a negative P  implies positive selection bias. 
Endogenous Switching Probit Model 
Our study applies the ESP model to estimate the effects of AC service participation on school 
enrolment, the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, and health access 
improvements. These effects are binary in nature. The ESP model consists of two stages (Lokshin & 
Sajaia, 2011; Ma, 2016). Firstly, households decide to participate in AC services, as illustrated by 
equation (4.12). The outcome equations for AC service participants and non-participants are 
specified in equations (4.25a) and (4.25b.) The probit model is applied together with the 
participation equation to examine the probability of AC service participation and the outcome 
equations to investigate the relationship between an outcome variable and explanatory variables, 
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0iy  are the latent variables determining the observed binary outcomes 1iy for AC 
participants and 
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y  equals one if AC service participants and non-
participants send every school-aged child to school (for school enrolment outcome), and zero 
otherwise. The other outcomes, the adoption of farm technologies and practices and the 
improvement of household health access, are defined in the same way. 
i
x  is the vector of 
explanatory variables influencing an outcome variable;  is the vector of parameters; and i  is a 
random disturbance term. 
The ESP model assumes that the error terms, in the participation and outcome equations are jointly 













     (4.26) 
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Where 1  denotes the correlation between 1i  and  ; 0 denotes the correlation between 0i  
and  ; 10  denotes the correlation between 1i  and 0i . Since 1iy and 0iy cannot be observed 
simultaneously, the joint distribution of ( 1 0,i i  ) is not identified. Thus, 10  cannot be estimated. 
This study assumes that 10  equals one (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2011). 
The system of equations (equations 4.12, 4.25a, and 4.25b) is estimated simultaneously using the 
FIML method. The FIML method yields consistent standard errors for estimates (Lokshin & Sajaia, 
2011). In the ESP estimations, 1  and 0  are automatically generated and included in the outcome 
equations for both participants (equation 4.25a) and non-participants (equation 4.25b). This 
mitigates the selection bias arising from unobserved factors (Ma, 2016). 
4.2.3 Estimation Strategy 
Average Treatment Effects for Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
The ESR model allows us to obtain actual and counterfactual expected outcomes (Mojo et al., 2017). 
The actual expected outcomes for AC service participants and for non-participants are illustrated in 
equations (4.25a) and (4.25b), respectively. The counterfactual expected outcomes for AC service 
participants and non-participants are illustrated in equations (4.25c) and (4.25d), respectively. 
( )1iP i iP i P iPE y D x   = = +   (4.25a) 
( )0iN i iN i N iNE y D x   = = +  (4.25b) 
( )1iN i iN i N iPE y D x   = = +  (4.25c) 
( )0iP i iP i P iNE y D x   = = +  (4.25d) 
An ATT is the difference between the actual and counterfactual outcomes of AC service participants 
(the difference between equations 4.25a and 4.25c) are outlined below (Di Falco et al., 2011; Ma, 
2016):  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1iP i iN i
iP iN i P N iP
ATT E y D E y D
x      
= = − =
= − + −
 (4.26) 
An average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) is the difference between the counterfactual 
and actual outcomes of non-participants (the difference between equations 4.25d and 4.25b is 
shown below). 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0iP i iN i
iP iN i P N iN
ATU E y D E y D
x      
= = − =
= − + −
 (4.27) 
Average Treatment Effects for Endogenous Switching Probit Model 
The ESP model estimates can determine ATT and ATU. ATT is the mean of the treatment effect on 
the households who participate in AC services (TT) (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004). For example, the average 
effect of AC credit on farm technology adoption on treated (ATT) can be calculated by averaging TT 
over the AC credit participants. TT is the difference between the probability of farm technology 
adoption (choice of outcome) for AC credit participant i (actual probability) and the probability of 
farm technology adoption for AC credit participant i if the participant did not borrow money from 
ACs (counterfactual probability). ATT can be express as follows (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2011): 
( )
( ) ( )
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Where N1 and N0 denote the sample numbers for AC service participants and non-participants, 
respectively; ( )1Pr 1 1,iy D X x= = =  is the probability of participant i adopting farm technology 
(actual probability for AC service participants) and ( )0Pr 1 1,iy D X x= = =  is the probability of 
farm technology adoption for AC service participant i if the participant chose not to participate in AC 
services (a counterfactual probability for AC service participants). 2  is the cumulative function of a 
bivariate normal distribution. F is a cumulative function of the univariate normal distribution. 
ATU is the mean effect of the treatment effect on untreated (TU). TU is the expected effect of the 
treatment on households who did not participate in AC services. For example, the average effect of 
AC credit on farm technology adoption on untreated (ATU) can be calculated by averaging TU over 
non-AC credit participants. The effect of the AC credit on the untreated (TU) is the difference 
between the probability of farm technology adoption (outcome) for non-participant i if the 
participant borrowed AC credit (counterfactual probability) and the probability of farm technology 
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Where ( )1Pr 1 0,iy D X x= = =  is the probability of farm technology adoption for non-participant i 
if the participant chose to participate in AC services (counterfactual probability of non-participants) 
and ( )0Pr 1 0,iy D X x= = =  is the probability of farm technology adoption for non-participant i (a 
actual probability of non-participants). 
4.3 Data Collection and Methods 
4.3.1 Data Collection Method 
Our study used a structured questionnaire to survey rural households in the Nakhonratchasima 
province, in Northeast Thailand. The field survey was conducted between November 2017 and 
February 2018. Our study chose the Nakhonratchasima province as the study site because it has the 
highest number of farmers (259,648 farmers) and agricultural land areas (6.6 million rais) in Thailand 
(National Statistical Office, 2013). Furthermore, this province had the greatest number of AC 
members (with 305,627 members and 99 ACs as of December 2018) (Cooperative Promotion 
Department, 2019). 
The Nakhonratchasima province consists of 32 districts, 287 townships and 3,743 villages 
(Nakhonratchasima Provincial Governor’s Office, 2016). Most of the rural population in the Nakhon 
Ratchasima province work in the agricultural sector. The Nakhonratchasima province can be divided 
into six areas, based on the provincial development plan and policy (see Table 4.2). The groups are 
divided in terms of geography and development potential. Since the study is interested in AC effects, 
one district from each group, which has the greatest number of AC members in the group, was 
selected for the study. District selection is explained in the sampling method section. The selected 
districts have 29 active ACs in 2016 (see Table 4.2). All ACs provide credit, however, only nine ACs 
offer non-credit support services such as purchasing, marketing, processing, and agricultural 
extension services. The rest of the ACs provide some types of non-credit support services 
(Nakhonratchasima Provincial Cooperative Office, 2016). 
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Table 4.2  Number of Agricultural Cooperatives and Members in the Nakhonratchasima Province 
in 2016 by District 
 
Group District Number of Active ACs Number of AC Members 
1 
Muang Nakhon Ratchasima 6 3,695 
Sikhui 4 3,746 
Pakchong* 6 6,681 
Sungnon 2 4,352 
Chaloemphrakiat 4 1,516 
Khamthaieso 4 1,801 
2 
Chokchai 2 3,676 
Pakthongchai* 8 192,764 
Wongnamkhieo 5 798 
Khonburi 7 5,103 
Soensang 4 1,900 
3 
Phimai* 3 13,857 
Chumphuang 3 8,397 
Nondaeng 1 980 
Prathai 2 2,466 
Lumthamenchai 1 590 
Muang yang 3 965 
4 
Chakarat 2 5,431 
Nonsong* 8 6,583 
Huaithalaeng 3 1,783 
Nongbunnak 3 1,555 
Nonthai 2 4,832 
5 
Dankhunthot* 3 8,196 
Tepharak 0 0 
Phrathongkham 0 0 
Khamsakaesaeng 1 2,985 
6 
Buayai* 1 10,962 
Bualai 2 1,214 
Kaengsnamnang 2 1,749 
Sida 0 0 
Banluarm 2 1,246 
Khong 2 4,287 
Total 96 304,110 
Total Number of Selected Areas 
(6 districts) 
29 239,043 
Source: Nakhonratchasima Provincial Cooperative Office (2016) 




4.3.2 Questionnaire Design 
The household data was collected in 2017 using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was 
approved by the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee. The original questionnaire was written 
in English, translated into Thai and then back translated to ensure accuracy. The survey questionnaire 
collected information about household demographics and economic characteristics, as well as 
information about AC accessibility and AC services (credit and non-credit support services). 
The questionnaire consisted of four sections: (1) accessibility to ACs; (2) accessibility to AC credit and 
non-credit support services; (3) general farm information; (4) household demographic and economic 
characteristic. The first section was designed to capture AC accessibility and household perceptions 
of farm risk, AC performance, and expected AC benefits. This section measured farm risk in terms of 
three features: production risk, market risk, and financial risk. Respondents were asked to evaluate 
whether they faced risks and their risk levels. The scale ranged between ‘1’ strongly disagree to ‘5’ 
strongly agree. Strongly disagree indicated no risks while strongly agree indicated very high risks. 
Similarly, in terms of AC performance and benefits, respondents were asked to assess their 
interactions with ACs. The questions were related to their satisfaction with ACs and the effectiveness 
of AC support in the areas of credit and market access, income generation, technology adoption, and 
production improvement. The second section was designed to obtain information about AC services 
(credit and non-credit support services) and the characteristics of AC participants. The third section 
focused on agricultural activities and asked for specific information such as crop type, farm size, 
input use, yields, and the number of crops sold. The last section contained questions about 
respondents’ demographic and economic characteristics, such as income, expenditure, and 
household member welfare in terms of education and health status. 
4.3.3 Sampling Method 
The study aims to evaluate the effect of AC credit and non-credit support programs using the ESR 
model. Effect estimation requires a large amount of data and a sufficient sample size, both for the 
control and treatment groups, so that the results can be applied to a larger population (Heinrich, 
Maffioli, & Vazquez, 2010). In this study, AC members are a small minority, in terms of the overall 
population (19% of total rural households). Therefore, to obtain the necessary sample size for both 
groups, the quota sampling method was applied (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Quota sampling ensures 
that the sample size in each group is adequate for effect evaluation. It is also more convenient in 
terms of effort, costs, and time. Furthermore, it is necessary to employ this method when a sample is 
a minority group (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). 
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A two-stage stratified sampling technique was employed to select the rural household samples in 
order to obtain the best representatives. The first stage involves selecting one district from each 
group, by selecting the district which has the greatest number of AC members. Since the population 
for the study is rural households in the Nakhonratchasima province, Pakchong, Pakthongchai, Phimai, 
Nonsong, Dankhunthot, and Buayai were selected as study areas (see Table 4.2). Household selection 
from each district is covered in the second stage. The sample from each district was calculated using 
the disproportionate stratified random sampling method. 
4.3.4 Sample Size 
The household survey administered in Nakhonratchasima, the Northeast of Thailand. 
Nakhonratchasima has 926,370 households in 32 districts (Official Statistics Registration Systems, 






Where no is the sample size; 
2z  is the abscissa of the normal curve that cuts off an area at the tail; e  
is the desired level of precision; p is the estimated proportion of an attribute that is present in the 
population; and q  is 1- p . 
The level of confidence is determined to be 95%, where 𝑧=1.96 and e=0.05. p is assumed to be 0.5 
(equal to q  =0.5). Following the results obtained from the Cochran formula, the study used a sample 
size of 385 farm households. The study surveyed 600 respondents to obtain the required number of 
responses for analysis. The respondents were classified into two groups based on their AC 
membership status. The rural households who participate in ACs were referred to as the AC member 
group; others who did not participate in ACs were referred as the non-AC member group.  
To obtain the required number of samples for both the treatment and control groups, the quota 
sampling method was applied. This balances the sample size between both groups. Therefore, the 
study targeted 300 residents for both the treatment and control groups (see Figure 4.2).  Household 
samples were chosen from each district using disproportionate stratified random sampling. Since the 
sample size of Pak Chong was too large, the study used disproportionate stratified random sampling 
to ensure that the sample size for each district is sufficient to obtain the accurate estimate and 
compare among the districts (Ross, 2005). The sample sizes from Pakchong, Pakthongchai, Phimai, 
Nonsong, Dankhunthot, and Buayai were 160, 94, 110, 76, 100, and 60, respectively (see Table 4.3). 
By balancing the treatment group and control group, the sample size in both the treatment  and 
control group were equal, with 80 households from Pakchong, 47 households from Pakthongchai, 55 
from Phimai, 38 households from Nonsong, 50 households from Dankhunthot, and 30 from Buayai. 
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Table 4.3 Number of Households in the Nakhonratchasima Province in 2016 by Study Sites 
 
District Number of 
Households 













Pakchong 59,309 180 160 80 80 
Pakthongchai 29,811 90 94 47 47 
Phimai 36,113 109 110 55 55 
Nonsong 23,039 76 76 38 38 
Dankhunthod 31,924 97 100 50 50 
Buayai 17,765 54 60 30 30 
Total 197,961 600 600 300 300 




Figure 4.2 Proposed Framework for Sampling and Realization 
Source: Author’s calculation based on survey data 
  
Obtained Non-User Sample: 310 




Non- User: 393 
Marketing Service 
User: 265 
Non- User: 586 
Agricultural Extension Service 
User: 474 
Non- User: 377 
Targeted Member Sample:300 
Obtained: 560 
Targeted Non-member Sample:300 
Obtained: 291 
Not Using AC Services:  
Obtained: 19 
Using AC Services: 
Obtained: 541 
Targeted Total Sample: 600 Samples 
Obtained: 851 
Quota Sampling Method 
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Our study evaluates the effect of credit and non-credit support services provided by ACs on 
household welfare. Regarding the AC service type, the survey targeted 300 respondents for 
treatment (user) and control (non-user) groups. However, during the survey administration, it was 
difficult to obtain 300 AC-members who use marketing services. To obtain a sufficient number of 
respondents in each group, particularly the marketing service user group, the study collected 851 
rural households in the Nakhonratchasima province, in the Northeast of Thailand, using a structured 
survey questionnaire. The survey was administered in November 2017- February 2018.  Respondents 
were grouped into non-AC and AC members. Out of the 851 households who participated, 560 (66%) 
were AC members, while 291 (34%) were non-members (see Figure 4.2). In terms of the AC credit, 
458 respondents (59.46%) were AC members and borrowed credit from ACs in 2015, whereas, 393 
respondents (46.18%) were non-AC credit users including 310 non-AC member and 83 AC members 
who did not borrow  from ACs in 2015. In term of non-credit support services, 265 respondents 
(31.14%) were AC members and participated in AC marketing services. While 474 respondents 
(55.70%) were AC member participating in agriculture extension services (see Appendix C.1). 
4.4 Profiles of Sampled Households in the Survey 
This section describes the respondents’ characteristics based on AC participation. The sampled 
respondents’ characteristics include household head, household characteristics, and household 
perceptions of farm risks and expected benefits from AC participation. Frequency, mean and statistic 
tests were estimated to compare between the two groups of respondents. T-test is applied to 
compare the mean values of household characteristics of the two groups, AC and non-AC member 
groups. The Chi-square test is used to test the relationship between the non-metric household 
variables and AC participation. 
4.4.1 Individual Characteristics 
The respondents’ individual characteristics are presented in Table 4.4. Gender and farm types are 
significantly different at the 1% level. Age is significantly different at the 5% level across the two 
household groups (AC members and non-AC members). In addition, the mean distribution of AC and 
non-AC members is significantly related to marital status and orchard farm at the 10% level. 
However, the household heads’ educational level is not significant. 
Most of the respondents were female (64.28%). The percentage of females in AC and non-AC 
member groups was more than 50%. The statistical test shows that female or male respondents 
differ significantly across the two household groups. In terms of age, Table 4.4 shows that most of 
the respondents were between 46 and 65 years old. Over 20% of the household heads were aged 
between 46 and 55, while 32.6% were between 56 and 65 years old. A considerable proportion of 
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non-AC members (58.77%) and AC-members (64.10%) fell into the 46 - 65 year-old category. The 
average age of the respondents was 55 years old. Although the average age of non-AC members (56 
years old) and AC members (54 years old) was over 50 years, the statistical test indicates that the 
average age of non-AC members differs significantly from AC-members at the 5% level. There is a 
higher proportion of older respondents in the non-AC group (20.96%). 
Most respondents (98.47%) had attained some level of education, mostly at the primary level 
(72.15%). The distribution of education levels between non-AC and AC-member groups is not 
significantly different. Over 70% of the respondents in both groups graduated from primary school, 
while 23% had completed further schooling/education, below the bachelor’s degree level. The mean 
of educational years is not significantly different across the two groups (AC member and non-AC 
member groups). 
Crops in Nakhonratchasrima can be divided into three broad groups: paddy, cash crops, and 
orchards. Cash crops include cassava, corn, and sugarcane. Most of the respondents in both groups, 
(87.29% for non AC members and 69.64% for AC members) grew rice. Apart from rice, AC members 
grew fruit (8.59%), while non-AC members grew cash crops (13.04%). Our study finds that the 
distribution of paddy and cash crops for non-AC and AC member groups is significantly different at 
the 1% level.  
4.4.2 Household Characteristics 
Table 4.5 presents information about household population structure and economic status. The 
mean number of members, income earners, and children in household are not significantly different 
across the two groups. However, household wealth, measured by farm size, land ownership status, 
and household and farm income differs significantly across the two groups. 
Generally, households have four members, three working adults with one child (1-15 years old). Fifty-
three percent of the households had three to four members, followed by five to seven members 
(28%). The majority households (over 80%) had less than two children below 15 years old. The 
average number of income earners was three persons. The predominant number of income earners 
within a family was two to three persons (over 70%). These results indicate that younger members of 
the family (children below 15) may also work in order to earn money to attend school; they often 
leave school at the age of 15 to either help their parents or engage in full-time employment. In short, 
most family members are engaged in some form of work (full-time or otherwise). Income earners 











All Respondents  
(N=851) Statistical Test 
Count % of N1 Count % of N2 Count % of N   
Gender        
Female 170 58.42 377 67.32 547 64.28  
Male 121 41.58 183 32.68 304 35.72  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100  
2  = 6.609*** 
Age Group (years)        
Less than or equal to 25 2 0.69 0 0 2 0.24  
26-35 12 4.12 19 3.39 31 3.64  
36-45 45 15.46 105 18.75 150 17.63  
46-55  73 25.09 179 31.96 252 29.61  
56-65  98 33.68 180 32.14 278 32.67  
Over 66  61 20.96 77 13.75 138 16.22  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 
2  = 14.646** 
Mean (S.E) 55.70 (0.70) 53.94 (0.44) 54.54 (0.37) t= 2.2422** 
Marital Status        
Single   20 6.87 17 3.04 37 4.35  
Married  241 82.82 478 85.36 719 84.49  
Widowed  19 6.53 40 7.14 59 6.93  
Divorced  11 3.78 25 4.46 36 4.23  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 
2  =6.947* 
Education Level        
No Education  4 1.37 9 1.61 13 1.53  
Primary School 206 70.79 408 72.86 614 72.15  
Middle School 30 10.31 45 8.04 75 8.81  
High School  29 9.97 66 11.79 95 11.16  
Vocational Training 9 3.09 18 3.21 27 3.17  
Bachelor’s Degree  13 4.47 13 2.32 26 3.06  
Postgraduate  0 0 1 0.18 1 0.12  
Total 291 100 560 100.0 851 100 
2  = 5.287 
Mean (S.E) (years) 6.44 (0.21) 6.36 (0.15) 6.36 (0.12) t=0.4672 
Farm Type (Choose more than one)       
Paddy 254 87.29 390 69.64 644 75.68 2  = 32.38*** 
Cash-Crop 17 5.84 73 13.04 90 10.58 2  = 75*** 
Orchard 25 8.59 29 5.18 54 6.35 2  = 3.75* 
Others 4 1.38 10 1.79 14 1.65 2  = 0.446 

















Count % of N1 Count % of N2 Count % of N 
Household Size (Members)       
1-2  50 17.18 93 16.61 143 16.8  
3-4  157 53.95 298 53.21 455 53.47  
5-7  82 28.18 158 28.21 240 28.2  
8 and more  2 0.69 11 1.96 13 1.53  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 2 = 0.552 
Mean (S.E) 3.88  (0.08) 3.91  (0.06) 3.90  (0.05) t = -0.320 
Income Earner (Members)       
1  27 9.28 57 10.18 84 9.87  
2-3  208 71.48 406 72.5 612 71.92  
4 or More  56 19.24 97 17.32 153 17.98  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 99.77 2 =0.749 
Mean (S.E) 2.64  (0.06) 2.53  (0.04)  2.57  (0.04) t=1.524 
Children (Members)        
No Children  154 52.92 276 49.29 430 50.53  
1  91 31.27 178 31.79 269 31.61  
2-3  45 15.46 98 17.5 143 16.8  
4 or More  1 0.34 8 1.43 9 1.06  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 2 =0.373 
Mean (S.E) 0.65  (0.05) 0.72  (0.04)  0.71 (0.03) t=-1.552 
Farm Size (ha)        
Less than 0.96  57 19.59 41 7.32 98 11.52  
0.96 to less than 1.6  42 14.43 53 9.46 95 11.16  
1.6 to less than 6.4 166 57.04 342 61.07 508 59.69  
6.4 to less than 22.4  26 8.93 118 21.07 144 16.92  
22.4 or More 0 0 6 1.07 6 0.71  
Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 2 = 0.000 
Mean (S.E) 2.87  (0.18) 4.56  (0.19)  3.98  (0.14) t=-5.7491*** 
Land Holding Status        
Owned Land 206 71.03 340 61.04 546 64.46  
Leased Land 3 1.03 4 0.72 7 0.83  
Rental Land 73 25.17 179 32.14 252 29.75  
State Land 8 2.76 34 6.1 42 4.96 2 =10.599** 
Irrigation Access 117 40.21 252 45.00 369 43.36 2 = 1.792 
Technologies Access 118 40.55 266 47.50 384 45.12 2 = 3.736** 
Credit Demand 143 49.14 493 88.04 636 74.74 2 = 153.426*** 
Credit Access 139 96.53 489 99.19 628 98.59 2 = 5.665** 















Count % of N1 Count % of N2 Count % of N 
Household Income (Thai baht)       
  Inc_Pr (<20,000) 9 3.09 3 0.54 12 1.41  
  Inc_UPr (20,001 to 100,000)  82 28.18 118 21.07 200 23.5  
  Inc_NPr (100,001 to 500,000)  169 58.08 372 66.43 541 63.57  
  Inc_Ri (> 500,000)  31 10.65 67 11.96 98 11.52  
  Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 2 =15.389** 
  Mean (S.E) 264,995  (23,188) 311,827  (21,712) 295,813 (16,350) t=-1.359 
Farm Income (Thai baht)        
  Inc_Pr (<20,000) 128 43.99 123 21.96 251 29.49  
  Inc_UPr (20,001 to 100,000)  107 36.77 223 39.82 330 38.78  
  Inc_NPr (100,001 to 500,000)  56 19.24 214 38.21 270 31.73  
  Total 291 100 560 100 851 100 2 =53.667*** 
  Mean (S.E) 114,277  (21,027) 183,241  (21,518)  159,658  (15,913) t=-2.060** 
Note: 1. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
2. Farm size is grouped following the Thailand Agriculture Census. 
3. 1 hectare equals 6.25 rai. 
The average respondent’s farm size was 3.98 ha. A significant proportion of respondents (60%) hold 
more than 1.6 but less than 6.4 ha. The AC members’ farm size significantly differs from non-AC 
members at the 1% level. AC members have farms of greater size than non-AC members. The 
average farm size of the AC member group was around 4.5 ha, while non-AC members had 2.87 ha. 
Over 60% of the total respondents owned land and 40% had access to irrigation and adopted farm 
production technologies.  
Land ownership and technology access are significantly different between AC and non-AC member 
groups at the 5% level. The number of AC members who own land (around 61%) is less than non-AC 
members holding land (around 71%). The number of AC members accessing technology (47.50%) is 
more than non-AC members (40.55%). 
Regarding credit, approximately 75% of the respondents attempt to access loans. Among the 
respondents requiring credit, approximately 99% of households with credit demand were able to 
access loans. The high level of credit access can be attributed to Thailand’s official fiscal policy. The 
Thai government continuously enhances credit accessibility for Thai citizens, particularly for those 
unable to access formal credit sources (Microfinance Services Ltd, 2013). Credit demand and credit 
access differ significantly between AC and non-AC member groups. The findings indicate that 
households want to participate in ACs because they wish to access credit. Over 80% of AC members 
wished to borrow money (see Table 4.5) and they strongly believed that ACs could increase their 
credit access and supports them in spending loans for income generation activities at a high level, 
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4.26 and 3.89, respectively (see Table 4.7). Moreover, the number of AC members accessing credit 
(99.19%) is more than non-AC members (96.53%). This suggests that both AC and non-AC members 
do not experience liquidity constraints. 
Average household annual income equates to 295,813 baht, of which 54% is earned from farm 
activities with the remainder of income coming from other sources. Total household income in the 
study includes income from farm work, off-farm employment, and other income sources such as 
transfer payments and government subsidies such as subsistence allowance for the elderly and 
farmers (e.g. the spending 1,000 Baht Per rai project and the harvest subsidy project). Most of the 
households (63.57%) earned annual income between 100,000 and 500,000 baht. However, regarding 
farm income, almost 30% of the respondents were classified as poor since their income fell below 
the poverty line. Around 39% of the respondent were vulnerable to falling back into poverty. The 
survey data shows that off-farm work and other income is essential for rural households. Comparing 
AC and non-AC member groups, the greatest portion of AC members (66.43%) and non-AC members 
(58.08%) have annual household incomes between 100,001 and 500,000 baht. However, the 
statistical results reveal that AC members’ household income is significantly different from non-AC 
members at the 5% level. The percentage of AC members who are in the poor and the near-poor 
group is smaller than those of non-AC members. Similarly, farm incomes between these two groups 
are significantly different at the 1% level. Most non-AC members were classified as poor (43.99%), 
while most of the AC members fell into the near-poor (39.82%) and not-poor (38.21%) categories. 
4.4.3 Household Perceptions of Risks and AC Benefits  
Table 4.6 shows the household perceptions of agricultural risk. The mean score of agricultural risks 
was 2.60, a mid-level. The average household perceptions of agricultural risk differs significantly 
across AC and non-AC member groups at the 1% level. Non-AC members have a lower level of 
agricultural risk (2.53) than AC members (2.64). The main difference occurs within financial risk. The 
financial risk of both AC and non-AC members differs significantly at the 1% level. AC members 
confront a higher level of financial risk than non-AC members. This is because most households 
participate in ACs because they need help in credit access. Similarly, the farm production risk is 
significantly different across two groups at the 10% level. Non-AC members face higher levels of farm 
production risk than AC members. Interestingly, the market risk is not statistically different between 
the two groups, indicating that both confront a similar level of market risk. 
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Mean Mean Mean Diff S.E. t statistic 
Production Risks 3.03 2.93 2.97 0.09 0.06 1.6983* 
Market Risks 2.25 2.30 2.28 -0.05 0.06 -0.8939 
Financial Risks 2.30 2.69 2.56 -0.39 0.07 -5.2619*** 
Total Agriculture Risk 2.53 2.64 2.60 -0.11 0.04 -2.8295*** 
Note:  Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
In this study, household perception includes AC performance and expectations about potential 
benefits. AC performance is measured in terms of AC satisfaction and effectiveness. AC benefits 
include credit, marketing, and agricultural extension services. Table 4.7 discloses that the 
respondents are satisfied with AC management and their effectiveness in the high level, with a range 
between 3.88 and 4.27. While the level of AC member perceptions of AC effectiveness is higher than 
non-members, AC satisfaction is not significantly different (Table 4.7). 
Moreover, members believe that ACs assist them with credit, input, and output markets access, using 
loans to generate income, and support technology adoption. On a whole, respondents think that AC 
participation increases their credit access and supports them in spending loans for income 
generation activities at a high level, with mean scores of 4.16 and 3.83, respectively. These 
perceptions of credit benefits differ considerably across the two groups. AC members strongly 
believe that they benefit from credit access and income generation. Similarly, on average, the 
average scores of input and output marketing benefit perceptions were 3.90 and 3.91, respectively. 
In short, AC members strongly believe that ACs improve their input and output market accessibility, 
more than non-AC members, at the 5% level. These results indicate a strong relationship between 
household benefits of AC credit and marketing services and a family’s decision to participate. 
However, there is no difference in the two groups in relation to information access. In terms of 
agricultural extension services, respondents believe that ACs can assist them with improving their 
production and technology adoption in the middle level, with average scores of 3.19 and 2.95, 
respectively. Likewise, in terms of production improvements, the average level of benefits does not 
differ across the two groups (AC and non-AC member groups). However, AC members’ technology 
adoption benefit is higher than non-AC members at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.7 Household Perceptions of AC Performance 
 






All Respondents  
(N=850)   
N/A 
(% of N1) 
Yes 
(% of N1) 
Mean 
N/A 
(% of N2) 
Yes 
(% of N2) 
Mean 
N/A 
(% of N) 
Yes 
(% of N) 
Mean Diff S.E. t-Statistic 
Perceptions of AC Performance           
Satisfaction 73 218 4.19 1 559 4.30 74 777 4.27 -0.11 0.07 -1.5637 
 (25.09%) (74.91%)  (0.18%) (100%)  (8.71%) (91.41%)     
Effectiveness 58 233 3.75 19 541 3.93 77 774 3.88 -0.18 0.08  -2.3134** 
 (19.93%) (80.07%)  (3.40%) (96.78%)  (9.06%) (91.06%)     
Credit Benefits             
Credit Access 30 261 3.95 1 559 4.26 31 820 4.16 -0.31 0.07 -4.5311*** 
 (10.31%) (89.69%)  (0.18%) (100%)  (3.65%) (96.47%)     
Income Generation 54 237 3.70 5 555 3.89 59 792 3.83 -0.19 0.08  -2.2421** 
 (18.56%) (81.44%)  (0.89%) (99.28%)  (6.94%) (93.18%)     
Marketing Benefits             
Input Market Access 70 221 3.71 40 520 3.98 110 741 3.90 -0.27 0.08  -3.1527** 
 (24.05%) (75.95%)  (7.16%) (93.02%)  (12.94%) (87.18%)     
Output Market Access 71 220 3.77 69 491 3.97 140 711 3.91 -0.20 0.09 -2.3206** 
 (24.40%) (75.60%)  (12.34%) (87.84%)  (16.47%) (83.65%)     
Information Access 56 235 3.39 3 557 3.40 59 792 3.40 -0.01 0.10 -0.0507 
 (19.24%) (80.76%)  (0.54%) (99.64%)  (6.94%) (93.18%)     
Agricultural Extension Benefits            
Production Improvement 55 236 3.22 9 551 3.18 64 787 3.19 0.04 0.09 0.4240 
 (18.90%) (81.10%)  (1.61%) (98.57%)  (7.53%) (92.59%)     
Technology Adoption 52 239 3.08 10 550 2.89 62 789 2.95 0.19 0.11  1.8095* 
 (17.87%) (82.13%)  (1.79%) (98.39%)  (7.29%) (92.82%)     
Note:  Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data.
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4.4.4 Household Participation in AC Services  
Table 4.8 shows that ACs contribute to household welfare through AC credit, agricultural extension 
services, and funeral services. The survey results show 458 of AC members (81.79%) borrowed 
money from ACs and 474 of AC members (84.64%) joined agricultural extension services. They 
received help and support from the funeral fund (83.39% of AC members). They pay premiums life 
insurance that can be used when a family member dies. Moreover, the funeral fund can be used as 
loan collateral. However, few AC members trade to ACs. There are 44.46% of AC members who 
purchase farm inputs from ACs. Likewise, only 17.86% sell their farm products to ACs.  
AC borrowers are able to borrow money from ACs through group or individual lending. The survey 
results show 50.34% of the borrowers borrowed as a group (co-guarantors) rather than as an 
individual (see Table 4.9). Others used their land or home as collateral (53.29% of the total number 
of AC borrowers). Most AC loans were used for farm production (98.69%). They were often short-
term loans (91.27%) with an interest rate of 8.16%. Interestingly, 323 of AC borrowers (70.52%) were 
also able to access loans from other credit sources. This result shows that ACs are complimentary 
credit sources for households since some of AC borrowers have multiple forms of credit – from BAAC, 
the village fund, and ACs. 
Table 4.9 shows that 249 of AC members (44.46%) purchased farm inputs via ACs, and 100 (17.86%) 
sold their farm products to ACs. Most AC input participants purchased fertilizers (90.36%), pesticides 
or agrochemicals (38.15%), as well as seeds and saplings (36.95%). The most popular payment 
method was credit (57.43%). In terms of output marketing participants, 55% of output marketing 
participants sold their farm outputs to ACs, while 45% of those sold their farm products to a variety 
of sources; both ACs and other market channels (individual selling, dealer, and state agency). Most 
AC output marketing participants (87%) received AC sale revenue on time. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
To summarize, the chapter provides the empirical model specifications and data that were used to 
answer the research objectives of the thesis. Three empirical models were discussed in this chapter. 
First, the probit model was performed to identify which determinants influence households to 
participate in AC membership. Second, among AC members, the Heckman selection model was 
specified to identify determinants of participation in AC services in terms of participation decision 
and participation level. The model is expected to provide consistent estimators for the determinants 
of AC members’ decision to participate in AC services and level of participation under the selection 
bias. Finally, the ESR model was conducted for AC effect evaluation. The ESR also provides 
determinants of AC service participation and household welfare. The ESR model is expected to 
128 
 
achieve consistent estimators under the selection bias arising from both observed and unobserved 
factors. 
The data used for the analysis is primary data collected through a structured questionnaire. The 
survey was administered to rural households in the Nakhonratchasima province, in Northeast 
Thailand. Nakhonratchasima was categorized into six area groups following the provincial 
development plan and policy. The rural household samples were selected using a two-stage stratified 
sampling technique. The first stage was the selection of districts. Our study selected a district which 
has the largest number of AC members in a group. The second stage involved selecting the 
households from each district. The sample size of each district was calculated using the 
disproportionate stratified random sampling method. The survey yielded a total of 851 useable 
questionnaires. 
Table 4.8 AC Members’ Participation in AC Services 
 
AC Membership Non-Participation Participation 
Total 
  Number % Number % 
AC Services      
Credit 102 18.21 458 81.79 560 
Input Marketing Services 311 55.54 249 44.46 560 
Output Marketing Services 460 82.14 100 17.86 560 
Agricultural Extension Services 86 15.36 474 84.64 560 
AC Social Services      
    Services for Education Support 543 96.96 17 3.04 560 
Services for Health Support 557 99.46 3 0.54 560 
Funeral Fund 93 16.61 467 83.39 560 










Number % Number % 
AC Credit Participation (N=458)      
Other Loans 135 29.48 323 70.52 458 
Purpose      
Farm Activities   452 98.69  
Non-Farm Activities   6 1.31  
Duration      
Short-Term Loans  418 91.27  
Mid-Term Loans  20 4.37  
Long-Term Loans  20 4.37  
Collateral Requirement (Choose more than 
one) 20 4.37 438 95.63 458 
Mortgage Property (i.e., House, Land) 206 46.71 235 53.29 441 
Chattels Mortgage 440 99.77 1 0.23 441 
Co-Guarantors 219 49.66 222 50.34 441 
Deposits 439 99.55 2 0.45 441 
Loan Amount (Mean(S.E.))   149,690 (165,154)  
Interest Rate (%/year)     8.16 (0.93)   
AC Input Marketing Service Participation (N=249)         
Purchasing from Other Suppliers 98 39.36 151 60.64 249 
Input Types      
Seeds and Saplings 157 63.05 92 36.95 249 
Fertilizers 24 9.64 225 90.36 249 
Pesticides or Agro Chemicals 154 61.85 95 38.15 249 
Others (Fuel) 188 75.50 61 24.50 249 
Payment Method      
By Cash   72 28.92 249 
On Credit   143 57.43 249 
Part Cash and Credit   34 13.65 249 
Input Expenses (Thai baht) (Mean(S.E.))     22,110  (29,117)  
AC Output Marketing Service Participation  (N=100)         
Selling Products to Other Markets 55 55.00 45 45.00 100 
Receiving Delayed Payments 87 87.00 13 13.00 100 
Sale Amount (tons)   239.40 57.38  
AC Sale Share (Mean(S.E.))   0.67 (0.42)  
      








Determinants of Households Participation in AC Credit and non-
Credit Support Services 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the models for participation in AC membership, AC 
credit, and non-credit support services. It uses primary data collected from rural households in the 
Nakhonratchasima province, in the Northeast of Thailand. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
Section 5.1 presents the empirical model and results of diagnostic tests to obtain consistent and 
efficient coefficients in the Heckman selection model. Section 5.2 discusses the results of the AC 
participation models. Section 5.3 summarizes the results.  
5.1 Model Specification 
5.1.1 Empirical Model 
Our study explores the determinants of participation in AC and AC services, taking the selection bias 
into account. Our study examines both participation and levels of participation in AC services. Our 
study applies the probit model to identify participation factors in AC membership and agricultural 
extension services. Factors influencing households to participate in AC credit and AC marketing 
services are identified using the Heckman selection model. 
The Heckman selection model consists of two stages; the participation or selection process and the 
outcome process. First, household probability of participation in ACs and AC services is estimated. 
The household probability to participate in AC and AC services is given by equation (5.1).  
*











=     (5.1) 
Where Di is a binary outcome, Di=1 indicates that households decide to participate in AC and AC 
services, and Di=0 if households do not. Explanatory variables (Zi) are observable factors which 
influence the utility. δ is a vector of parameters. The error term (εi) captures unobservable factors 
affecting utility but are not included in the explanatory variables. The error term is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a zero mean.  
The second stage analyses the level of participation in AC credit and marketing services. The level of 
participation is measured by loan size, input expenditure, and the quantity of farm products sold 
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through ACs. Participation level is estimated using information provided by households who 
participate in the first stage. Participation levels for AC services are expressed by equation (5.2): 
i i iy x = +  , Given iD equals one    (5.2) 
Where xi is a vector of explanatory variables determining participation levels in AC services (yi), and 
(μ) is an error term. The error terms (ε, μ) are bivariate, normally distributed with zero means. If both 
error terms are correlated, the expected value of μ conditional on the sample selection are non-zero 
which is denoted by E(μǀε) = γε. The level of AC service participation (yi) is observed only when the 
household participates in AC services (Di=1).  
Our study applies the probit model (equation 5.1) to estimate the probability of participation in ACs 
and AC agricultural extension services. Regarding AC services, the Heckman selection model is used 
to examine the determinants influencing participation. Our study considers three AC services; credit, 
input and output marketing services. Thus, there are three Heckman selection models in our study. 
The Heckman selection model for each AC service consists of a participation equation (equation 5.1) 
and a participation level equation (equation 5.2). The dependent variable (yi) in the participation 
level equation for AC credit is loan amount. The dependent variable for AC input marketing service is 
input expenses through ACs and for output marketing service is farm product quantity sold to ACs. 
These systems of equations can be estimated using the Heckman two-stage approach. 
All dependent and explanatory variables used in the participation model for AC membership, AC 
credit, AC input marketing service, AC output marketing services, and AC agricultural extension 
services are described in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 provides names, descriptions, and the study’s 
hypotheses. 
Prior studies on AC participation report that participation in ACs and AC services is determined by 
several individual and household characteristics. For example, the age and education of individuals 
can have a positive and negative impact on participation since they imply risk preferences and 
different levels of understanding about AC benefits (Alene et al., 2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ferto & 
Szabo, 2002, Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Muthyalu, 2013). 
Among farm types, rice growers are less likely to join AC services, particularly input and marketing 
services, since they have more government support. Similarly, fruit and vegetable growers are less 
likely to participate in ACs. This may be because orchards are not common in Nakhonratchasima 
province, thus none of the ACs support orchard operations. However, farmers engaged in cash crops 
tend to join ACs since these are the primary crops grown in this province. 
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In terms of household characteristics, farm size may have a positive impact on AC participation, 
especially in terms of middle-class farmers (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). This 
finding indicates that very small or large farmers do not tend to participate in ACs. ACs are not 
interested in working with small farmers because they increase AC costs. They have various interests 
and their production is small therefore increase in the number of small farm members increases AC’s 
operation cost (Bernard & Spielman, 2009). In contrast, large farmers are wealthy and, as a result of 
their production quantity, have greater bargaining power. They are more likely to benefit from selling 
their produce individually and thus unlikely to join ACs (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). In terms of 
participation levels, farm size should have a positive impact on loan size, farm input expense, and 
sale amount via ACs since farm size refers to production scale. The larger the farm is, the greater the 
financial capital and input quantity farmers require to invest in farm production. Similarly, farmers 
with large productions have higher volumes of farm products to sell.  
In this study, the income variable is used to assess the level of poor households. Income level is 
grouped into four groups. Firstly, the poor group (Inc_Pr) covers those households which have 
income lower than 20,000 baht/year. Households in the first group are poor since their income is 
lower than the international poverty line (US$ 1.90 per day or 56 baht/day). Secondly, the near poor 
group (Inc_UPr) refers to households which have income levels between 20,001 and 100,000 
baht/year. Households in the near poor group are vulnerable to falling back into poverty and their 
income is lower than Thailand’s minimum wage (300 baht/day or USD 9.68). The third group 
(Inc_NPr) covers households which earn between 100,001 and 500,000 baht/year. The last group, 
the rich (Inc_Ri), covers those households whose income is over 500,000 baht/year. Our study uses 
the wealthy group as a reference dummy. Income level is hypothesized to positively impact AC 
participation. A poor household may have a higher probability of joining an AC and AC services since 
the aim of these cooperatives is to assist lower income households to access credit and markets. 
Thus the income level variable can be used to monitor the effective implementation of ACs. 
Risks or uncertainties are critical factors which influence agricultural production. Rural households 
confront various risks such as climatic uncertainty, unstable input and output prices, market changes, 
and innovations in production technologies. These difficulties or production and sale risks, and lack 
of funds significantly influence farmers’ decisions to participate in ACs and AC services (Hoken, 2016; 
Hoken & Su, 2015; Ito et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2011). Our study examines agricultural risks. Based 
on Aditto's (2011) analysis of farm risk factors in Thailand, our study classifies agricultural risks into 
three sources, farm production risks (Prod_Risk), market risks (Mkt_Risk), and financial risks 
(Fin_Risk). Risks are measured using numerical and self-evaluated variables. Households were asked 
to rate the risk levels in terms of their farm operations. The self-evaluated risk indicators are 
measured using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1=no risk to 5= extremely high risk. 
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Table 5.1 Determinants of Participation in ACs and AC Services 
 

























Household Head Characteristics         
Age_Yr Age of Household Head (Years) + +/- - - + +/- + +/- 
Sex Gender of Household Head (1=Male,0=Female) +/- +/-      +/- 
Edu_Yr Education Level of Household Head (Years) + +/- + -  +/- + + 
Paddy 1 if Household Grows s Rice, 0 Otherwise  - -  -  -   
Cash_Crop 1 if Household Grows a Cash Crop, 0 Otherwise. Cash Crops include Sugar Cane, 
Cassava, or Corn. 
+ +  +  +   
Orchard 1 if Household Grows Orchard, 0 Otherwise. Orchard in our Study include Fruit 
and Vegetables.  
- -  -  -   
Household Characteristics 
Inc_Earner Number of Income Earners (Persons) +/-        
Farm_Mem Number of Household Members Working on Farm (Persons)  + +/- - - +  + 
Farm_Si Size of Agricultural Land (Rais) +/- + + + +/- +/- + +/- 
Farm_Sq Size of Farm Squared - -  -  -   
Land 1 if Household Owns Land, 0 Otherwise        + 
Farm_Ass 1 if Household Owns Productive Assets, 0 Otherwise. Productive Assets include 
Farm Tools and Farm Machinery.  
 + +      
Household Annual Income Level          
Inc_Pr 1 if Household Income is Below 20,000 baht/year, 0 Otherwise. Thai poverty Line 
is Income Below 20,000 baht/year. 
+        
Inc_UPr 1 if Household Income is Between 20,000 baht and 100,000 baht/year, 0 
Otherwise.  
+        
Inc_NPr 1 if Household Income is Between 100,000 baht and 500,000 baht/year, 0 
Otherwise 
+        
Inc_Ri 1 if Household Income is over 500,000 baht baht/year, 0 Otherwise (Reference 
Dummy) 
        
Farm_Inc Household Annual Income Gained from Farm Work (baht/year)     +    
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Table 5.1     Determinants of Participation in ACs and AC Services (cont.) 
 
Variable Description Hypothesis for Participation in AC 





















FarInc_PU 1 if Household Farm Income is Below 100,000 baht/year, 0 Otherwise. This 
Indicates that the Poor and Vulnerable Households may Fall Back into Poverty 
+     -   
Commer Agricultural Commercialization (Ratio of Sale to Yield)      +   
Off_Farm 1 if Household Member Works in Off-farm Activities, 0 Otherwise        + 
Cre_Use 1 if Household Accesses Credit, 0 Otherwise +     +  + 
Oth_loan Loan Amount Borrowed from Other Lenders Except ACs (Baht)  +       
Ext_Acc 1 if Household Accesses Agricultural Extension Services, 0 Otherwise + +       
Irr_Acc 1 if Household Accesses Irrigation, 0 Otherwise    +    + 
Tech_Acc 1 if Household Adapts Technology in Farm Production, 0 Otherwise    +     
Household Perceptions of Risks and AC Benefits (Scale from 1 to 5) 
        
Pro_Risk Farm Production Risks including Weather, Pests, Infertile Soil, Late Delivery of 
Supplies, and Lack of Labour 
+       + 
Mkt_Risk Market Risks including Competing Growers, Changes in Consumer Preferences, 
Low Product Quality, Loss the Market, Failure to Access Market Information 
+   +  +   
Fin_Risk Financial Risks including Insufficient Cash to Meet Expected Obligations, 
Increased Input Costs and Interest Rates, Excessive Borrowing, and Failure to 
Fulfil Business Agreements 
+ + - +  +/-   
Sat Satisfaction with AC Management +       + 
Eff AC Effectiveness  +       + 
Cre_Be Credit Benefit Obtained from ACs including Credit Access and Income Generation 
Support 
+        
CreAcc_Be ACs Increase Credit Access  +       
IncGen_Be ACs Support Borrowers to Spend Loans for Income Generating Activities  +       
Inp_Acc ACs Facilitate Households to Access Farm Inputs with Fair Price and Standard 
Service 




Table 5.1     Determinants of Participation in ACs and AC Services (cont.) 
 
Variable Description Hypothesis for Participation in AC 





















Out_Acc ACs Facilitate Households to Access Product Markets with Fair Price and Standard 
Service 
+     +   
Ext_Be Benefits Obtained from Participating in AC Agricultural Extension Service include 
Improvements in Farm Production and Introducing New Farm Technologies 
+        
Prod_Be ACs Assist Households to Improve Farm Production        + 
Tech_Be ACs are Effective in Introducing New Farm Technologies        + 
Inf_Acc ACs Increase Households’ Access to Market Information  +     +  + 
 
AC Attributes 
        
AC_Share Number of AC Shares Owned by Household (baht)  +  +  +   
ACdis Distance from House to AC Centre (Kilometres)    -  -   
ACdur_Sh Borrowing Short-term Loan (1 if Loan Duration is les than  12 Months, 0 
Otherwise) (Reference Dummy) 
        
ACdur_Med Borrowing Mid-term Loan (1 if Loan Duration is between 12 Months and 36 
Months, 0 Otherwise)  
 +       
ACdur_Long Borrowing Long-term loan (1 if Loan Duration is over 36 Months, 0 Otherwise)  +       
Coll_Prop 1 if Household uses Assets, Land or House as Collateral when Borrowing Credit 
from ACs, 0 Otherwise 
 +       
ACInp_Cre 1 if Household Purchases Inputs on Credit from AC, 0 Otherwise    +     
AC_P The Average Price Offered by ACs (baht/kg.)      +   




Table 5.1     Determinants of Participation in ACs and AC Services (cont.) 
 
Variable Description Hypothesis for Participation in AC 





















Geographic and Related Factors         
Districts          
Dist_N 1 if Household Resides in the Northern Districts of Nakhon Ratchasrima (Phimai, 
Buayai, Nonsong Districts), 0 Otherwise 
+ Y  Y  Y  Y 
Dist_C 1 if Household Resides in Dankhuntod District, 0 Otherwise (Reference Dummy)  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Dist_S 1 if Household Resides in the Southern Districts of Nakhon Ratchasrima 
(Pakchong and Pakthongchai Districts), 0 Otherwise 
- Y  Y    Y 
Dis_Town Distance from House to the Nearest Town (Kilometers)  -       
AC_Rela 1 if Household’s Relatives are AC Members, 0 Otherwise +        
AC_Vill 1 if There is a AC in Household’s Residing Village, 0 Otherwise +   +  +  + 
Com_Att 1 if Household was Sought a Neighbour’s Opinion when Making the Decision 
Regarding AC Participation, 0 Otherwise 
 +  +     
 
Dependent Variable 
AC_Mem 1 if Household is AC member, 0 Otherwise  Y        
AC_Cre 1 if Household Participates in AC Credit, 0 Otherwise   Y       
ACcre_No Amount of AC Credit Borrowed by Household (Baht) (Log Form)  Y       
AC_Inp 1 if Household Participates in AC Input Marketing Service, 0 Otherwise    Y     
ACInp_Ex Input Expense via AC Input Marketing Service. Inputs include Seeds, Saplings, 
Fertilizer, and Pesticides (Baht) (Log Form) 
   Y     
AC_Mkt 1 if Household Participates in AC Output Marketing Services, 0 Otherwise      Y   
AC_Sale Number of Farm Products Sold through ACs (Kilogram)(Log Form)      Y   
AC_Ext 1 if Household Participates in AC Agricultural Extension Services, 0 Otherwise        Y 
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Farm production risks directly influence farm profitability, quantity and quality of farm production 
(Aditto, 2011). In this study, production risks consist of adverse weather, pests, infertile soil, the late 
delivery of supplies, and a lack of labour (see Table 5.1). Production risks are hypothesized to have a 
positive relationship with AC participation. Farmers who confront high production difficulties have 
greater motivation to participate in ACs because they require support that these groups provide. 
Therefore, households with higher production risks are more likely to participate in ACs since they 
wish to improve their farm production. 
Marketing risks measure market volatility, in terms of both input and output markets. They also 
include risks related to competing growers, changes in consumer preferences, low product quality, 
loss of markets, and a failure to access market information. In this study, marketing risks directly 
affect participation in input and output markets and impact upon farm profitability (Aditto, 2011). 
Marketing risks are hypothesized to have a positive relationship with input and output markets since 
ACs provide their members with improved farm inputs, stable sales, and market information (Zheng 
et al., 2011). Therefore, the higher market uncertainty farmers face, the greater probability they will 
trade via ACs. 
Lastly, financial risks measure the uncertainty of household income, changes in farm production 
costs, as well as cash flow insufficiency for farm production and household spending. In this study, 
financial risk indicators are risks of insufficient cash to meet expected obligations, increased input 
costs and interest rates, excessive borrowing, and failure to fulfil business agreements. Financial risks 
are hypothesized to have a positive relationship with participation in AC and AC services. Farmers 
who confront high financial risks tend to use AC credit services. However, financial risks have a 
negative relationship with loan size. While households with higher financial risks tend to borrow 
credit from AC, they are considered high risk borrowers. In short, loan size tends to decrease in 
tandem with increases in financial risks. Financial risks have a positive effect on farm input purchases 
from ACs since they tend to cost less and households can pay by credit (Zheng et al, 2011). Financial 
risks can both positively and negatively influence selling farm products through ACs. Selling via ACs 
can increase sellers’ bargaining power but do not receive payment for their goods immediately. Thus 
farmers who have high levels of financial risks may prefer to sell their goods themselves to ensure 
immediate payment (Zheng et al, 2011). 
Household perceptions of AC performances reflect their AC experiences. Households gain experience 
engaging with AC services and listening to other members’ experiences (Hoken, 2016; Ito et al., 2012; 
Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Mensah et al., 2012). In our study, household perceptions of AC performance 
include both households and neighbours’ experiences. Household perception of AC performance is 
measured both in terms of satisfaction (Sat) and effectiveness (Eff) of AC management (Mensah et 
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al., 2012). Our study also includes neighbour’s attitudes to AC participation (Com_Att) and relatives 
as AC members (AC_Rela). These indicators are used to measure the effect of social networks on AC 
participation (Hoken, 2016; Ito et al., 2012; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Mensah et al., 2012). 
Expected benefits are directly related to participation in AC services since households evaluate the 
costs and benefits of participation before they join (Fischer & Qaim, 2012, 2014; Mensah et al., 
2012). Expected benefits include advantages from participation in credit, marketing, and agricultural 
extension services. Credit benefit measures whether ACs assist respondents in accessing credit 
(CreAcc_Be) and whether ACs support borrowers in spending loans for income generating activities 
(IncGen_Be). Benefit of marketing services measures whether ACs support respondents to access 
inputs (Inp_Acc) and outputs (Out_Acc) at reasonable prices and good services. There are three 
benefits of participation in agricultural extension services; improvements in farm production 
(Prod_Be), the introduction of new technologies (Tech_Be), and access to current market 
information (Inf_Acc). 
All factors related to household perception are self-evaluated indicators using a five-point Likert scale 
(except for the AC relative variable which is a dummy variable). Households were asked which scale 
they agreed with. The scale ranged from 1=disagree to 5= strongly agree. All variables in household 
perception are expected to positively influence household participation in ACs and AC services. 
Households choose to participate in AC services if they believe that they will obtain certain benefits. 
All factors related to household perceptions (risk and AC benefit expectation variables) are assessed 
for validity and reliability. Validity was assessed in a pilot survey. The pilot survey result shows that 
the questions about household perceptions of risks and expected benefits of ACs are effective in 
terms of wording and the sequence of questions. The consistency and reliability of each factor are 
evaluated using a Cronbach’s Alpha test. The results show that the Cronbach’s Alpha values of all 
risks and AC benefit variables exceed 0.6, indicating that these variables are reliable (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2013) (see Appendix A.1). 
In this study, participation is defined in terms of the decision to participate and the level of 
participation. To determine the participation level in AC credit, input, and output marketing services, 
AC service attributes are included as explanatory variables in the participation level equation 
(equation 5.2) of the Heckman selection model. For credit service, credit characteristics directly 
determine loan size. The credit rationing theory argues that the credit market is characterised by 
information asymmetry, and the loan amount granted is influenced by both the borrower and lender 
(Zeller, 1994). In this study, credit attributes are collateral types, number of AC shares, and loan 
duration. These are adapted from prior studies (Atieno, 2001; Khoi et al., 2013; Menkhoff & 
Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). These variables are known to positively affect loan size (Khoi et al., 2013; 
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Ololade & Olagunju, 2013). Collateral availability has a positive impact on loan size (Fongthong & 
Suriya, 2014a; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Ololade & Olagunju, 2013). Based on the AC credit 
rules, borrowing requires one of three types of collateral; a guarantor, assets, or AC shares. Our 
study asserts that providing assets or AC shares as collateral increases the size of the loan granted by 
ACs. The loan amount is determined by loan duration since this is correlated with risks, terms and 
conditions in a loan contract (Khoi et al, 2013). 
Participation levels in input and output marketing services are related to their attributes (costs and 
benefits received from participation). Based on prior studies (Alene et al., 2008; Chagwiza et al., 
2016; Mensah et al., 2012; Muthyalu, 2013; Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005), distance to ACs 
negatively affects participation in AC marketing services since AC distance reflects travel costs. 
Moreover, the number of AC shares has positive associations with input expenditure and sale 
quantities via ACs marketing (Muthyalu, 2013). To capture attributes of Thai AC marketing services, 
purchasing method is included as an explanatory variable for the AC input marketing service model. 
Farm input purchase by credit indicates a benefit of AC input marketing services; therefore, purchase 
by credit may positively influence input expenses via ACs. For AC output marketing services, 
attributes include farm product price received by ACs and selling to other market channels. Output 
prices offered by ACs positively influence the amount of farm products sold to ACs, since high output 
prices motivate farmers to sell to ACs (Zheng et al., 2011). Conversely, selling to other market 
channels decreases the quantity of products sold to ACs. 
Geographical factors help to account for differences among villages. Like Abebaw and Haile (2013), 
Ma and Abdulai (2016), Mojo et al. (2017), and Verhofstadt and Maertens' (2014), in this study, 
geographical factors are districts, distance to town, and the presence of ACs in the village. Districts 
are used to control for geographical difference, which directly affect agricultural production. In this 
study, districts are grouped into three zones following the geography; the northern districts, central 
districts, and southern districts. The northern districts consist of Phimai, Buayai, and Nonsong 
districts. The main geography of these districts is a river plain, which is suitable for agriculture. 
Dankhuntod district covers the central area of Nakhonratchasrima. This area is suitable for 
agriculture as well, since it is highland. The Pakchong and Pakthongchai districts are considered 
southern districts, as they have mountainous geography. The district variable is a dummy variable. 
The Dankhuntod district is the reference dummy. The households in the southern districts are 
hypothesized to be negatively related to AC participation. Because of mountainous areas, it is 
difficult to access ACs. Households in the northern and central districts (reference dummy) may not 
exhibit any differences in the probability of AC participation since households in both areas work in 
the agricultural sector. 
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AC villages and distance to town are related to AC participation since they measure access to ACs and 
AC services. The presence of ACs in a particular village motivates households to join ACs and AC 
services because they can easily access facilities. However, households residing close to markets or 
towns are less likely to participate in ACs since they can access other credit providers and alternative 
marketing channels (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). 
5.1.2 Estimations Diagnosis 
This section reports results for model specification test to obtain consistent and efficient coefficients 
in the Heckman selection model. Firstly, we address the distribution of the dependent variables in 
the participation level equation (equation 5.2). Secondly, the Rivers and Vuong (1988) approach is 
applied to address the endogeneity problems in the participation equation (equation 5.1). Exclusion 
restrictions for the Heckman selection model are tested to obtain consistent coefficients and avoid 
collinearity. Finally, heteroskedasticity tests are performed to check for the consistency and 
robustness of the coefficients. 
Dependent Variables 
Loan size, farm input expenses, and sale amount used in equation (5.2) are given in logarithmic 
forms. Their distributions are very right-skewed (see Appendix A.2) because the three variables range 
from greater than zero to infinity; therefore, they are transformed into the logarithmic form. The 
logarithmic form of the dependent variables leads to the normal distribution of error terms in the 
model. In the Heckman selection model, the error terms are normally distributed. Therefore, to meet 
the assumption of the Heckman selection model, the dependent variables in equation (5.2) are 
transformed into logarithmic form. Besides, log transformation provides an economic interpretation. 
If log transformation is applied to both sides of the equation, the coefficient meaning indicates 
elasticity. 
Endogeneity Problem in the Participation Equation 
Our study addresses endogeneity problems in the participation equation (equation 5.1) for the AC 
member and AC credit model. Access to credit and agricultural extension services might be 
potentially endogenous variables in the participation equation for AC membership, since both 
variables may be jointly determined with AC participation (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Ma & Abdulai, 
2016). Similarly, regarding AC credit model, loan amount (granted by other lenders) may be an 
endogenous variable in AC credit participation (Khoi, 2012). To obtain consistent estimates, the 
endogeneity problem is treated before applying the Heckman selection model. Our study applies 
Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) model to estimate the probit model with endogenous variables. Our study 
uses a member of another organization as an instrumental variable (IV). A member of another 
organizations is a valid IV since it strongly and significantly influences EEVs (credit accessibility and 
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access to agricultural extension services), however, it is not significant in terms of AC membership 
(see Appendix A.3.1).Similarly, being a member of other credit organizations is a valid IV for AC credit 
participation (see Appendix A.3.3). 
The results of Rivers and Vuong model report that the estimated coefficients of the residuals for 
accessibility to credit and agricultural extension services are not significantly different from zero. This 
result indicates the absence of endogeneity problems in the participation equation of AC 
membership (see Appendix A.3.2). This implies that credit access and access to agricultural extension 
services are exogenous variables in the participation equation (AC membership). Regarding AC credit 
participation, the estimated results show that the coefficients of residuals for other loans is not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that other loans is not an endogenous variable in the 
participation equation for AC credit (see Appendix A.3.4). 
Exclusion Restrictions and Model Identification 
The Heckman selection model requires restrictions on exclusion to obtain consistent coefficients and 
avoid collinearity between IMR and the regressors (Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007; Ma & 
Abdulai, 2016; Mojo et al., 2017; Wossen et al., 2017). Collinearity problems cause larger standard 
errors. This problem can be corrected using exclusion restrictions similar to an IV. Applying a valid 
exclusion restriction decreases multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and the correlation 
between error terms. This leads to model identification and efficient estimates (Bushway et al., 
2007). 
Exclusion restrictions require that at least one explanatory variable, which is called a selection IV, 
influences the decision to participation (equation 5.1) but not influence the participation level 
(equation 5.2). A selection IV is included in the participation equation, but excluded from the level 
participation equation. Our study uses household perceptions of AC performance and AC benefit 
expectations as a selection IV in the Heckman selection model. For the AC credit model, neighbour’s 
attitude (Comm_Att) is used as a selection IV. We used expected benefits on input access (Inp_Acc) 
and output access (Out_Acc) as the selection IVs for AC input and output marketing service model, 
respectively. These selection IVs are valid because they satisfy the exclusion restrictions. Neighbour’s 
attitude significantly affects a household’s decisions to participate in AC credit at the 5% level but 
does not affect the loan size approved by ACs (see Appendix A.4). Similarly, expected benefit on 
input access is significant in terms of participation in AC input marketing at the 1% level (see 
Appendix A.5). An expected benefit on output access has significant impact on participation in AC 
output marketing service at the 1% level (see Appendix A.6). However, both selection IVs are not 
significant in terms of participation levels (farm input expenses and sale quantity through ACs). 
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Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity test is performed to check the consistency and robustness of the coefficients. As a 
result of censored data in the second stage of the Heckman selection model, the model may provide 
a smaller variance than the true population variance (Bushway et al., 2007). The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test results show that all equations have heteroskedasticity problems at the 
1% level, except the model for AC input marketing services (see Appendix A.7). Therefore, to correct 
the standard errors, the equations are estimated using robust variance. 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
Our study applies the probit model (equation 5.1) to estimate household participation in ACs. Our 
study uses the Heckman selection model to examine the determinants that influence participation 
levels in three AC services; credit, input and output marketing services. The Heckman selection 
model for each AC service consists of the participation equation (equation 5.1) and the participation 
level equation (equation 5.2). The dependent variable (yi) in the participation level equation for AC 
credit is loan amount. The dependent variable for AC input marketing service is input expenses 
through ACs, while for output marketing service it is farm product quantity sold to ACs. These 
systems of equations are estimated using the Heckman two-stage approach.  
5.2.1 Determinants of Participation in ACs 
Table 5.2 presents the probit model results. Here, the AC membership variable was regressed on 
household head and household characteristics, household perceptions of risk and AC performance, 
and geographical factors. The specification test results of the probit model for AC membership are 
presented at the bottom of Table 5.2. The Wald χ2 (χ2 (29) = 209.75) is significant at a 99% confidence 
level, indicating that explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
Pseudo R-square (R2= 0.417) suggests that the model can explain a variation in AC participation. The 
Pseudo R-square is between 0.2 and 0.4 and represents an excellent fit (McFadden, 1977). More 
specifically, the model has a 82.79% prediction success, indicating that the covariates provide good 
estimates. The Hosmer-Lemeshow GOF test result (HL test) shows that the selected covariates fit the 







Table 5.2 Determinants of Participation in AC Membership and Marginal Effects 
 
Variables 
AC Membership Participation 
Variables 









Individual Characteristics  Household Perceptions  
Age_Yr 0.007 0.001 Pro_Risk -0.576*** -0.126 
 (0.008)   (0.108)  
Edu_Yr -0.020 -0.004 Mkt_Risk -0.015 -0.003 
 (0.025)   (0.105)  
Sex -0.318**  -0.069 Fin_Risk 0.271*** 0.059 
 (0.147)   (0.093)  
Paddy -0.714*** -0.156 Sat 0.232** 0.051 
 (0.241)   (0.117)  
Orchard -0.267 -0.058 Eff -0.082 -0.018 
 (0.290)   (0.092)  
Cash_Crop 0.645*** 0.141 Cre_Be 0.204*** 0.045 
 (0.221)   (0.057)  
Household Characteristics 
 
Ext_Be -0.038 -0.008 
Inc_Pr 0.025 0.005  (0.042)  
 (0.717)  Inp_Acc -0.076 -0.017 
Inc_UPr 0.183 0.040  (0.115)  
 (0.287)  Out_Acc -0.078 -0.017 
Inc_NPr 0.310 0.068  (0.109)  
 (0.243)  Inf_Acc 0.229*** 0.050 
Farm_Mem -0.043 -0.009  (0.077)  
 (0.081)  
Geograhical and related Factors 
Farm_Si 0.015** 0.003 Dist_N 0.841*** 0.184 
 (0.007)   (0.202)  
Farm_Sq -6.94e-05** -0.00002 Dist_S 0.134 0.029 
 (3.09e-05)   (0.219)  
Land -0.272 -0.059 AC_Rela 1.328*** 0.290 
 (0.266)   (0.214)  
Cre_Use 0.956*** 0.209 AC_Vill 0.987*** 0.216 
 (0.165)   (0.236)  
Ext_Acc 0.620*** 0.135    
 (0.162)     
Constant -3.083***     
  (0.863)         
Observations  616    
Wald Chi2(29) 209.75***    
Pseudo R2  0.417    
Predicted Probability 82.79%    
Chi2 of HL 6.97    






Probability of participation in ACs is significantly influenced by crop type, credit use, access to 
agricultural extension services, farm production risks, financial risks, household perceptions of access 
to credit and market information provided by ACs,  AC relatives, the northern districts of 
Nakhonratchasrima, and AC location at the 1% level (see Table 5.2). Moreover, household heads’ 
gender, farm size, and household’s satisfaction of AC management significantly influence the 
likelihood of participation at the 5% level (see Table 5.2). Our findings on the effect of gender are 
consistent with Mojo et al. (2015b, 2017) and Bernard et al.’s (2008) studies which show that females 
are more likely to participate in ACs than males. Moreover, crop type has a strong influence on AC 
participation. Cash crop farmers have 14% higher probability of participation in AC membership 
compared to farmers who do not grow a cash crop. This result reflects the fact that cash crops are 
one of major features of Nakhonratchasima. As there are many farmers growing cash crops, ACs 
provide facilities to support those farmers and ultimately increase their membership numbers (Zheng 
et al., 2011). Paddy farmers are less likely to participate in ACs. Paddy farmers usually obtain support 
from the Thai government. The government provides aids in the form of money and agricultural 
inputs. For example, the government offers a debt moratorium project and rice pledging scheme to 
assist farmers who face high debt and the decline in rice prices (Strategic Studies Center, 2017; 
Suasuwan, 2014). The government establishes the agricultural commodity bank such as organic 
fertilizer and rice seed banks to improve farmers’ access to farm inputs (Cooperative Promotion 
Department, 2017). These banks enable farmers to borrow to buy fertilizers and seeds for their farm 
production. Further, the government provides farm production development programs to improve 
rice farm production. For example, the government encourages paddy farmers to use high quality 
seeds of jasmine rice. The government partially subsidises the organic seed expenditures. This 
program reduces farmers’ seed cost, improves quality of yields and ultimately the increase in the rice 
price, which improves farmers’ farm income (Thai Farmers’ Library, 2019). Similarly, to resolve water 
scarcity for farming, the government assists farmers to access water resources with well provisions. 
This program encourages farmers to drill wells on their farms. Farmers who join the program pay 
2,500 bahts to build a well, while the government covers the rest of the expenditure of 17,800 bahts 
(Land Development Department, 2019). In sum, the government has provided several programs to 
support paddy farmers to solve their problems including decline in rice prices, high production costs, 
and lack of access to water. The subsidies provided by the government cover partial expenditures of 
the farmers. Therefore, this encourages rice farmers to participate in the government programs 
rather than become AC members. 
Regarding household characteristics, farm size results support the idea of the middle-class effect 
discussed by Bernard and Spielmen (2009) and Mojo et al. (2015b). Medium-sized farmers are more 
likely to join ACs compared to those who have small and large farms. The probability of AC 
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participation increases with the number of farms that a farmer has, up to a certain level. This result 
indicates that mid-sized farmers obtain the benefits of ACs more than small and large sized farmers. 
Benefits tend to increase with household transactions via ACs (Bernard & Spielmen, 2009; Mojo et 
al., 2015b). Farm size positively relates to input use and production capacity (Bernard & Spielmen, 
2009; Muthyalu, 2013). Small-sized farmers are less likely to participate in ACs because AC 
participation is less beneficial for them. Small producers use less amount of agricultural input and 
yield small amount of farm products. If they participate in AC marketing services, the benefits 
obtained from AC might be less than transaction costs (Fischer & Qaim, 2014). Therefore, the small 
sized farmers are less likely to become members. On the other hand, farmers with a larger farm 
benefit more from buying and selling products to ACs. However, AC benefits will reduce for farmers 
with large farms since they have greater bargaining power and gain greater benefits by selling their 
own products. In sum, smaller and larger farmers participate less in ACs.  
Credit use increases the probability of AC participation. Farmers using credit are more likely to join 
ACs than non-credit users by 20.9 %. This finding indicates that farmers participate in ACs when they 
face liquidity constraints and need to borrow money (see Table 5.2). Similarly, access to agricultural 
extension services positively affects AC participation. This result implies that farmers accessing 
agricultural extension services tend to participate in ACs. One possible explanation is that they 
perform better by following ACs’ standards. 
In terms of household risks and perceptions of AC benefits, the results show that production risks 
significantly and negatively influence household participation in AC membership at the 1% level (see 
Table 5.2). This result suggests that the greater the farm production risk, the less likely a risky 
household is to participate in ACs. This result contradicts our hypothesis. This implies that production 
risk decreases farmer’s incentives to participate in ACs; farmers may not believe that ACs are able to 
reduce farm production difficulties or improve their production. This is consistent with evidence that 
expected benefits of AC agricultural extension services do not significantly affect AC participation 
(see Table 5.2). In contrast, household financial risk, perceptions of credit benefits and market 
information have significant and positive effects on AC members at the 1% level. Similarly, AC 
satisfaction significantly and positively influences on AC members at the 5% level. These results 
suggest that farmers with higher financial risks, satisfaction with AC management, or who believe 
that ACs will help them access credit and market information, are more likely to join ACs as they 
would like to obtain loans. These findings are consistent with previous studies which show that credit 
access is the main reason Thai households participate in ACs (Chiengkul, 2015). 
AC Relatives strongly influence household participation in ACs. Households with relatives or 
neighbours who are AC members have a 29% higher probability of joining ACs. This result suggests 
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that social network is a dominant factor influencing household decisions to participate in ACs. Living 
in a village which has an AC, and in the northern districts of Nakhonratchasrima have positive 
impacts on households’ decision to participate in ACs. The AC village variable reflects travel costs 
associated with AC membership. The probability that the households will participate in ACs is 
increased by 22% if they live in a village that has an AC. Furthermore, households in the northern 
districts (Buayai, Nonsong, and Phimai) are more likely to participate in ACs than those in the 
Dankhuntod district (reference dummy) by 18% (see Table 5.2). This is because ACs in the northern 
districts have higher probability to support farmers, particularly rice farmers. ACs in the northern 
areas participate in rice network, which is a strong and successful network (Siamturakij Publishing 
Corporation, 2013). This AC cooperation succeed in improving farmers’ rice production and 
enhancing output market accessibility. 
5.2.2 AC Credit Determinants 
One of the study objectives is to explore who is granted and denied AC credit. The samples used in 
the analysis are AC members who require credit since farmers will borrow money if they face 
liquidity constraints. Moreover, only AC members can apply for credit. 
The Heckman selection model results show that the coefficient of IMR (λ) is not significant (see Table 
5.3). This finding indicates that the error terms in the credit participation equation and the loan size 
equation are not related, implying the absence of a selection bias. Moreover, the Wald test for both 
the participation equation and loan size equation (χ2 = 150.77) rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% 
level; thus, the coefficients of the variables can explain the loan size granted by ACs.  
Determinants of AC Credit Participation 
Table 5.3 shows the Heckman selection model results of determinants of AC members’ decisions to 
participate in AC credit services. The results show that the probability of participation in AC credit is 
positively influenced by farm size, distance to the nearest market, and neighbour’s attitude towards 
AC credit participation. In contrast, it is negatively affected by household-head education and farm 
asset ownership. The findings show that household-head education is negatively significant in terms 
of a household’s decision to borrow from ACs at the 5% level, indicating that household-heads with 
higher educational attainment are less likely to borrow money from ACs. The result is consistent with 
Fongthong and Suriya (2014), Khoi et al. (2013), Sebopetji and Belete (2009), Duy et al. (2012), and 
Zeller's (1994) findings, which suggest that less-educated individuals are more likely to borrow from 
informal credit sources.  
Effects of farm asset ownership and farm size suggest that ACs are the important credit sources for 
poor households, consistent with Tetteh Anang et al. (2015) and Nguyen’s (2007) findings. Farm 
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asset ownership has a negative significant relationship with AC credit participation at the 5% level. 
Our results show that households who have less farm capital have a higher probability of accessing 
AC credit than those who have farm capital (by 4.6%) (see Table 5.3). This figure implies that ACs are 
the main credit source for poor farmers who cannot access formal loans. Household capital 
endowments are important factors for accessing formal credit (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Farmers 
who hold small endowments are evaluated by lenders as being poor and not creditworthy; thus, poor 
farmers are less likely to access loans from formal lenders (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). They are, 




Table 5.3 Determinants of AC Credit Participation using the Heckman Two-Step Method 
 











Individual Characteristics   
Age_Yr -0.013 -0.001 lgAge 0.219  
 (0.010)   (0.246)  
Edu_Yr -0.059** -0.006 lgEdu 0.210*  
 (0.029)   (0.110)  
Paddy  
 Paddy 0.041 4.13 
    (0.107)  
Orchard   Orchard 0.105 11.07 
    (0.192)  
Cash_Crop   Cash_Crop 0.266** 27.25 
    (0.116)  
Household Characteristics   
Farm_Mem 0.044 0.0046 lgFarm_Mem 0.056  
 (0.119)   (0.100)  
Farm_Si 0.018** 0.0018 lgFarm_Size 0.156***  
 (0.008)  
 (0.052)  
Farm_Sq -9.66e-05** -0.00001  
 
 
 (3.92e-05)  
  
 
Farm_Ass -0.487** -0.0455  
 
 
 (0.229)  
  
 
Oth_loan -4.86e-07 -5.07e-08  
 
 
 (4.07e-07)   
 
 
Ext_Acc 0.443* 0.0579  
 
 







Pro_Risk -0.010 -0.0009 Pro_Risk -0.018 -1.76 
 (0.129)   (0.050)  
Mkt_Risk 0.096 0.010 Mkt_Risk -0.045 -4.38 
 (0.146)   (0.054)  
Fin_Risk -0.056 -0.05886 Fin_Risk -0.095** -7.35 
 (0.110)   (0.044)  
CreAcc_Be -0.147 -0.0153    
 (0.141)  
  
 
IncGen_Be 0.139 0.01447    
 (0.109)  
  
 
AC Credit Attributes   
 
  lgAC_Share 0.143***  
 
   (0.032)  
 
  ACdur_Med 0.643*** 79.68 
 
   (0.181)  
   ACdur_Long 0.699*** 100.57 
    (0.190)  
   Coll_Prop 0.401*** 43.76 
    (0.087)  
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Table 5.3    Determinants of AC Credit Participation using the Heckman Two-Step 
Method (cont.) 
 











Geographical Factors     
Dis_Town 0.041*** 0.004    
 (0.012)  
  
 
Dist_N -0.180 -0.019 Dist_N 0.423*** 54.50 
 (0.241)   (0.114)  
Dist_S 0.354 0.033 Dist_S 0.336*** 40.64 
 (0.303)   (0.112)  
Comm_Att (IV) 0.163** 0.017    
 (0.073)  
  
 
Constant 1.128  
 8.132***  
  (1.059)     (1.090)   
Lambda   -0.479   
Rho   -0.619   
Sigma   0.774   
Observation  461   
Wald chi2  
 150.77***   
Note:  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Comm_Att is used as a selection IV for this model. 
Although ACs offer credit to poor households, borrowers must show that they are able to repay their 
loans. The findings are confirmed by the effect of farm size. The probability of participating in AC 
credit increases with greater farm size but decreases at a certain level. Farmers who have small farms 
cannot access AC credit due to their inability to repay their loans. Farmers who have larger farms will 
not borrow loans from ACs since they can access formal loans with lower interest rates, such as BAAC 
loans. Middle-class farmers are more likely to borrow loans from ACs rather than those with small or 
large farms. However, the magnitude effect of farm size is very small. The probability of access to AC 
credit increases by 0.18% for each additional rai of farm (see Table 5.3).  
Furthermore, distance to town significantly and positively influences the probability of AC credit 
participation at the 1% level, indicating that households are more likely to participate in AC credit 
when they live far from town. Households living far from town face difficulties in accessing formal 
credit facilities. In addition, a neighbour’s attitude to AC participation has a significant and positive 
association with AC credit participation at the 5% level. This result suggests that households who 
obtain information about ACs from neighbours tend to borrow credit from ACs. This finding shows 
the role of social capital in sharing AC information to potential participants. 
Determinants of AC Loan Size  
Regarding loan size, the second step of the Heckman selection model results confirm that loan size is 
significantly determined by household characteristics, AC credit attributes, and geographical factors 
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(see Table 5.3). Cash crop farming has a significant and positive influence on loan size granted by ACs 
at the 5% level, indicating that farmers growing cash crops borrow bigger amounts of loans than 
those who do not grow cash crops (27.25%). Furthermore, loan amounts significantly increase with 
farm size at the 1% level, consistent with Duong and Izumida (2002), Coleman (2006), Khoi et al. 
(2013), Nguyen (2007), and Duy et al.'s (2012) findings. If farm size increases by 1% percent, loan size 
will increase by 15.6%. Farmers with larger farm need more financial capital to invest in production. 
Therefore farmers with larger farms will borrow larger loans compared to those with smaller farms.  
In terms of farm risks, loan size is significantly affected by financial risk at the 5% level. This finding 
suggests that loan sizes are lower for farmers who confront higher financial risks. A 1% increase in 
financial risk will likely decrease the loan size approved by ACs (by 7.35%) (see Table 5.3). However, 
farm production and market risks do not impact upon AC loan size. 
Interestingly, the findings show that AC credit attributes strongly dominate loan size at the 1% level. 
AC share, loan duration, and using property as collateral have positive effects on loan size. Besides 
co-guaranteed collateral, AC shares and property are used as collateral to borrow loans from ACs. 
Therefore, the more AC shares and property members use as collateral, the greater the loan size 
borrowers receive. Loan duration has a great impact on AC loan amount; larger loan amounts are 
equated with longer loan repayment periods. The result shows that households borrowing 
intermediate or long term loans will receive a greater loan amount than those borrowing short-term 
loans by 79.68% and 100.57%, respectively. This is in line with Khoi et al.’s (2013) study, where the 
size of informal credit was found to have a positve relationship with an increase in loan duration.  
Regarding location, the findings show that district are significantly correlated to loan amount at the 
1% level. ACs in different districts provide different loan amounts for their members. Households in 
the northern and southern districts of Nakhonratchasrima receive greater loan amounts than those 
borrowing from the Dankhuntod AC (reference ACs). This finding relates to limited financial capital 
which varies between ACs. Thus different ACs will provide different loan amounts. 
5.2.3 Determinants of Input Marketing Services 
Our study investigates AC members’ decisions to purchase farm inputs through ACs. The samples 
include only AC members, since only households who are members can purchase farm inputs 
through them. Participation in AC input marketing services is defined in terms of the decision to 
participate and the purchase of various inputs. In our study, input use is measured by input 
expenditure. Input expenses include the cost of seeds, saplings, fertilizer, and pesticides. 
To address the selection bias, we use the Heckman model to estimate the determinants of 
participation in AC input marketing services. Table 5.4 presents the determinants of household 
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participation in AC input marketing services and the determinants of farm input expenditures. The 
Wald test for the participation equation and the input expenditure equation (χ2 = 130.59) rejects the 
null hypothesis at the 1% level; thus, the coefficients of the variables can explain input expenses. The 
coefficient of IMR (λ) is not significant, indicating that error terms in the participation equation and 
the input expense equation are not related. This implies the absence of a selection bias. 
Determinants of Participation in AC Input Marketing Services  
The findings show that members’ decisions to purchase farm inputs through ACs are significantly 
influenced by farm size, perceived benefits, and district at the 1% level. Cash crop farming, 
technology accessibility, and residing in villages with ACs is significant at the 5% level (see Table 5.4).  
As expected, the effect of farm size on participation in AC input marketing services is positively 
significant, a finding consistent with previous studies (Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Muthyalu 2013). Farm 
size relates to household wealth and farm production scale. An increase in farm size by one rai raises 
AC members’ probabilities of joining AC input marketing services by 0.7%. However, this will decline 
when farm size reaches a certain level. This findings confirm the middle-class effect; mid-sized 
farmers have the greatest probability of accessing AC marketing services (Fischer & Qaim, 2012).  
Further, the probability of purchasing farm inputs from ACs significantly increases with household 
attitude; this relates to whether ACs help farmers to access input markets or not. If farmers are in a 
stronger position, believe that ACs will assist them to access materials of good quality at reasonable 
prices and support them with purchasing modern inputs, they have a 6.8% greater probability of 
buying farm inputs from ACs. This result indicates that experience and information received play vital 
roles in a household’s decision to participate in AC services. 
AC location is an important factor which impacts on household participation in input marketing 
services. AC members in the Dankhuntod district, a based dummy variable, are more likely to 
purchase inputs through ACs than those in northern (Phimai, Buayai, Nonsong districts) and southern 
districts (Pakchong and Pakthongchai districts) by 32.1% and 20.8%, respectively.  
Regarding significant factors at the 5% level, participation in AC input marketing services declines 
with cash crop farming. Cash crop farmers have a 17.2% less likelihood to access AC input marketing 
service than other farmers (see Table 5.4). On the other hand, farmers accessing farm technologies 
and residing in an AC village have 17.9% and 14.5% higher likelihoods of purchasing farm inputs from 
ACs, respectively. ACs provide advanced technologies and inputs to households for farm production 
improvement. In short, households can access new technologies by purchasing them through ACs. 
Residing in a village with an AC reflects the distance to ACs and travel costs. Since distance to ACs 
incurs transaction costs, it reduces farm returns (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Therefore, 
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households living in the same village with ACs tend to buy farm input from them. The result is 
consistent with prior studies (Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Muthyalu, 2013). This finding may explain why 
farmers living close to ACs have better access to them and are more likely to use their services. In 
contrast, farmers who face greater difficulties accessing ACs may expect less benefits from them and 
thus are less likely to participate. 
Determinants of AC Farm Input Expenditure  
AC input expenditure is influenced by farm size, farm income, production risk, and payment method 
(see Table 5.4). As expected, farm size and farm income have significantly positive effects on AC 
input expenditure at the 1% level. If farm size increases by 1%, farmers are more likely spend more 
buying inputs from AC (46.2%) (see Table 5.4). This result is in line with results presented by 
Muthyalu (2013) who find that a proportionate change in farm size will likely increase levels of AC 
input and output marketing services. Similarly, the positive coefficient of farm income suggests that 
richer households tend to purchase higher input amounts. The coefficient of farm income is 
consistent with Winter-Nelson and Temu’s (2005) study.  
Farm production risk has a significant and negative effect on AC Input use, while payment method 
has a significant and positive effect at the 5% level. AC members spend 13.84% less on farm inputs if 
they have higher farm production risks. Besides, the percentage of input expenses increases 
dramatically with input purchasing on credit. Farmers who buy inputs from ACs on credit tend to 
spend more than those who do not use credit (by 31.65%). Survey evidence shows that 71% of 
members purchase farm inputs from ACs because they can buy using credit. This finding reflects the 
important role of trade credit in supporting farmers’ access to farm inputs.  
5.2.4 Determinants of Output Marketing Services 
Our study analyses members’ decisions to sell farm products through ACs. The samples used in the 
analysis exclude AC members whose farms are self-sufficient since these samples do not need to 
select a market channel to sell their farm products. Our study considers participation decision and 
sale quantity. To account for the selection bias, determinants of output marketing participation are 
estimated using the Heckman selection model. 
The Wald test for the participation equation and the sale quantity equation (χ2 = 158.01) rejects the 
null hypothesis at the 1% level (see Table 5.5). This suggests that the coefficients of these variables 
can explain the farm product quantity sold to AC. The coefficient of IMR (λ) is not significant. This 
result indicates that error terms in the participation equation and the sale quantity equation are not 




Table 5.4 Determinants of AC Input Marketing Participation using the Heckman Two-Step Method 
 












Individual Characteristics     
Age_Yr 0.003 0.001 lgAge -0.174  
 (0.007)   (0.287)  
Edu_Yr 0.033 0.013    
 (0.020)     
Paddy -0.111 -0.044    
 (0.178)     
Cash_Crop -0.445** -0.172    
 (0.189)     
Orchard -0.455 -0.165    
 (0.306)     
 
Household Characteristics     
Farm_Si 0.017*** 0.007 lgFarm_Size 0.462***  
 (0.005)   (0.132)  
Farm_Sq -5.68e-05** -0.00002    
 (2.64e-05)     
Farm_Mem -0.030 -0.012 lgFarm_Mem 0.051  
 (0.070)   (0.151)  
Farm_Inc -1.18e-07 -4.59e-08 lgFarm_Inc 0.211***  
 (1.30e-07)   (0.078)  
Irr_Acc -0.292 -0.113    
 (0.199)     
Tech_Acc 0.462** 0.179    
 (0.197)     
 
Household Perceptions     
Pro_Risk -0.041 -0.016 Pro_Risk -0.149** -13.84 
 (0.081)   (0.073)  
Mkt_Risk 0.080 0.031 Mkt_Risk 0.110 11.63 
 (0.086)   (0.075)  
Fin_Risk -0.09 -0.036 Fin_Risk 0.001 0.14 
 (0.072)   (0.064)  
Inp_Acc (IV) 0.175*** 0.068 Inp_Acc   
 (0.066)     
AC Attributes      
   lgAC_Share 0.069  
    (0.042)  
   ACInp_Cre 0.275** 31.65 
    (0.132)  
   ACdis 0.008 0.81 
    (0.006)  
 
Geographical and Related Factors   
Dist_N -0.851*** -0.321 Dist_N -0.137 -12.80 
 (0.190)   (0.192)  
Dist_S -0.557*** -0.208 Dist_S 0.246 27.89 
 (0.182)   (0.161)  
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Table 5.4 Determinants of AC Input Marketing Participation using the Heckman 
Two-Step Method (cont.) 
 











AC_Vill 0.368** 0.145    
 (0.173)     
Comm_Att 0.085* 0.033    
 (0.044)     
Constant -0.966   5.522***  
  (0.660)     (1.276)   
lambda    -0.120  
Rho     -0.150  
Sigma    0.805  
Observation    503  
Wald chi2       130.59***   
Note:  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Inp_Acc is used as a selection IV for this model. 
Determinants of Participation in AC Output Marketing Services 
Our study suggests that the decision to sell farm products to ACs is positively influenced by paddy 
farm, farm size, AC benefits related to output market accessibility, and the southern districts. It is 
negatively affected by financial risk and distance to ACs. The positive relationship between rice 
farming and the probability of selling products to ACs suggests that rice farmers are more likely to 
participate in AC output marketing services than farmers who do not grow rice (by 10.6%) since rice 
network among ACs is successful in rice market enhancement (Siamturakij Publishing Corporation, 
2013) (see Table 5.5). 
The effect of farm size on the probability of participating in AC output marketing services reflects the 
middle-class effect. This result is consistent with Fischer and Qaim (2012, 2014), Mensah et al. 
(2012), and Zhang et al.'s (2017) findings. Farm size is positive and significantly impacts upon 
participation in AC output marketing services at the 5% level. If the household farm size increases by 
one rai, the household will have a 0.4% higher probability of participating in AC output marketing 
services. This effect will decline at a certain level of farm size. This result confirms that mid-sized 
farmers have the greatest probability of accessing AC output marketing services (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012). Farmers who hold less farmland may not prefer to sell to ACs due to high transaction costs. 
Big farm farmers who produce large quantities of farm products gain greater benefits from selling 




Table 5.5  Determinants of AC Output Marketing Participation using the Heckman Two-Step 
Method 
 














    
Age_Yr 0.006 0.001 lgAge -0.036  
 (0.008)   (0.664)  
Edu_Yr 0.022 0.006 lgEdu 0.172  
 (0.025)   (0.267)  
Paddy 0.456** 0.106 Paddy -0.227 -20.31 
 (0.224)   (0.323)  
Cash_Crop 0.166 0.042 Cash_Crop -0.180 -16.47 
 (0.245)   (0.366)  
Orchard 0.227 0.063 Orchard -1.324*** -73.39 
 (0.346)   (0.411)  
 
Household Characteristics 
    
Farm_Mem 0.103 0.026    
 (0.086)     
Farm_Si 0.017** 0.004 lgFarm_Size 0.825***  
 (0.006)   (0.140)  
Farm_Sq -7.04e-05** -0.00002    
 (3.54e-05)     
Commer -0.443 -0.112 Commer 1.924*** 584.83 
 (0.426)   (0.712)  
Cre_Use 0.360 0.079    
 (0.233)     
FarInc_PU -0.010 -0.003    
 (0.215)     
 
Household Perceptions 
    
Pro_Risk -0.063 -0.016 Pro_Risk -0.079 -7.60 
 (0.096)   (0.119)  
Mkt_Risk -0.095 -0.024 Mkt_Risk -0.177 -16.22 
 (0.105)   (0.139)  
Fin_Risk -0.189** -0.048 Fin_Risk 0.122 12.98 
 (0.089)   (0.117)  
Out_Acc (IV) 0.366*** 0.093    
 (0.092)     
Inf_Acc -0.016 -0.004    
 (0.069)     
AC Attributes      
   lgAC_Share 0.076  
    (0.071)  
   AC_P -0.164***  
    (0.051)  
   ACpay_n 0.183  
    (0.304)  
   ACothsale -0.427**  
    (0.194)  
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Table 5.5     Determinants of AC Output Marketing Participation using the 
Heckman Two-Step Method (cont.) 
 














    
Dist_N 0.047 0.012 Dist_N 0.426 53.11 
 (0.230)   (0.378)  
Dist_S 0.760*** 0.216 Dist_S 0.399 49.03 
 (0.224)   (0.396)  
ACdis_n -0.018** -0.005    
 (0.007)     
Constant -2.780***   5.366*  
  (0.969)     (3.176)   
Lambda    0.092  
Rho    0.106  
Sigma    0.869  
Observation    460  
Wald chi2       158.01***   
Note:  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Out_Acc is used as a selection IV for this model.  
Household perceptions of access to output market has the strongest impact on a household’s 
decisions to sell its products through AC channels. Farmers selling their products to ACs believe that 
they will receive higher sale prices, compared to non-participants. In contrast, the financial risk is 
significant and has a negative impact on selling farm products to ACs at the 5% level. This result 
suggests that households with higher financial risks have a 4.8% less probability of participating in AC 
output markets (see Table 5.5). This result is expected because farmers who have liquidity 
constraints want to receive money instantly; if they sell their products to ACs they will not receive 
payment until a later date. 
In terms of geographical factors, the results indicate that members of ACs who live close to ACs in 
the south of Nakhonratchasrima (Pakchong and Pakthongchai AC) are more likely to sell their 
products to ACs. Districts in the South of Nakhonratchasima are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level while AC distance is significant and negative at the 5% level. This finding is consistent 
with prior studies (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Muthyalu, 2013). The probability of participation in AC 
output marketing services decreases with distance from farm to ACs because of transaction costs. 
The further away the farmers live, the greater the transaction costs they incur and the less profit 
they make.  
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Determinants of AC Sale Quantity 
AC farm product quantity is determined by orchard farm, farm size, ratio of sale to yields (Commer), 
output price offered by ACs, and selling through alternative channels (see Table 5.5). The findings 
show that orchard farming has a significantly negative effect on sale amount to ACs at the 1% level. 
This implies that the amount of farm products sold to ACs is less for orchard farmers since ACs in the 
study do not buy vegetables and fruits from members. 
Farm size and the portion of sales are positive and significantly impact the sale amount through ACs 
at the 1% level. If farm size increases by 1%, participants in AC output marketing services will sell 
more outputs to ACs (82.5%). Similarly, if the ratio of sale on yields increases by 1%, farm sales to ACs 
increase 5 times (584.83%). These results support the view that the more households trade through 
ACs, the greater the benefits they gain (Fischer & Qaim, 2014). 
Interestingly, the level of marketing participation depends on AC service attributes. The percentage 
of sales to ACs significantly deceases with selling to other channels and output prices offered by ACs 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Farmers selling their product to both ACs and other channels 
sell less products (quantity wise) to ACs compared to farmers who sell only to ACs. The effect of 
selling to other channels implies that when farmers have many market channels, they tend to sell 
less products to ACs. This finding suggests that ACs are not their first choice. The relationship 
between the quantity of products sold to ACs and the price received from ACs is negative. When the 
price of a farm product increases in the market, ACs have to offer higher prices to induce members 
to sell their products to them. However, most Thai ACs are small and their funds are limited, thus 
they are unable to purchase all of their members’ farm products (Thuvachote, 2007). When faced 
with higher output prices, ACs, which have limited financial resources, purchase less farm products.  
5.2.5 Determinants of Participation in AC Agricultural Extension Services 
Table 5.6 presents the estimated results of participating in AC agricultural extension services, which 
are regressed on individual and household characteristics, household perceptions of risk, AC 
performance, and geographical factors. The specification test results show that the model for 
participation in AC agricultural extension services fits the data well. The Wald 
2  (χ2 (18) = 88.01) is 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level, indicating that the explanatory variables are jointly 
statistically significant. Moreover, the Pseudo R-square (R2= 0.1929) indicates that the covariates in 
the model provide good estimates. The model exhibits 80% success in correct prediction. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test result indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected (χ2 (8) = 0.862), 
suggesting that the selected covariates fit the data well.  
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The estimated results of the probit model show that participation in AC agricultural extension 
services is related to household characteristics (land ownership, irrigation accessibility and off-farm 
work), household perceptions of production risk and AC satisfaction, the district, and whether the 
village has an AC. The coefficient of land ownership is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that land-holding households are more likely to participate in AC agricultural extension 
services (8.4% more) than landless households (see Table 5.6). This finding is expected because 
farmers holding land gain benefits from adopting technologies and farm practices offered through 
agricultural extension services. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Atsan et al., 2009; 
Elias et al., 2013). 
In addition to land ownership, paid employment outside the farm is significant and positively 
influences the probability of joining AC agricultural extension services at the 5% level. This finding is 
consistent with Ma’s (2016) work. Households who have employment elsewhere are more likely to 
participate in such services since off-farm work increases household income. Increased income 
enables households to buy equipment, apply for updated farm technologies or practices offered 
through agricultural extension services. 
However, access to irrigation has a significantly negative effect on participation in AC agricultural 
extension services at the 1% level. Farmers who access irrigation systems are 9.2% less likely to 
participate in these services than non-irrigation users. Farm production efficiency depends on access 
to irrigation. Farmers with irrigation systems are in a good position in terms of farm production; thus, 
they may be not interested in farm improvements when compared with farms that have no 
irrigation. This finding contradicts Egziabher et al.'s (2011) work. They find that access to irrigation 
does not have a significant impact on participation in agricultural extension services in Ethiopia. 
Based on the household perceptions of agricultural risk and AC performance, the findings show that 
household production risk and AC satisfaction are positive and significantly impact on participation in 
AC agricultural extension services at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These results indicate that 
households with higher production risks and satisfaction with AC performance are more likely to 
participate in agricultural extension services. This finding suggests that household experiences of AC 
operations are important factors in a household’s decision to join agricultural extension services. 
In terms of geographical factors, residing in a village with an AC is significant and positively increases 
the probability of using the services at the 5% level. This outcome is consistent with previous studies 
(Egziabher et al., 2011). Households living close to ACs find it easier to access farm support services 
and have lower travel costs than those living further away. Moreover, farmers living in the northern 
districts have a 9.3% lower probability of joining AC agricultural extension services than those living 
in the Dankhuntod district (see Table 5.6). This is because the northern districts have less farmers 
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who are interested in using improved technologies and farm practices in their production (79.77%) 
than those in Dankhuntod district (82.48%).  
Table 5.6  Determinants of Participation in AC Agricultural Extension Services and Marginal Effects 
 












Individual Characteristics  Household Perceptions  
Age_Yr -0.0002 -0.00004 Pro_Risk 0.382*** 0.069 
 (0.008)   (0.096)  
Edu_Yr -0.02 -0.004 Sat 0.232** 0.042 
 (0.021)   (0.106)  
Sex -0.271* -0.049 Eff -0.066 -0.012 
 (0.163)   (0.085)  
 
Household Characteristics  Prod_Be 0.022 0.004 
Farm_Mem 0.149* 0.027  (0.070)  
 (0.083)  Tech_Be -0.124 -0.023 
Farm_Si -0.0009 -0.0002  (0.079)  
 (0.002)  Inf_Acc 0.223*** 0.040 
Land 0.463** 0.084  (0.066)  
 (0.216)  Geographical Factors  
Irr_Acc -0.509*** -0.092 Dist_N -0.514** -0.093 
 (0.155)   (0.204)  
Off_Farm 0.399** 0.072 Dist_S 0.015 0.003 
 (0.163)   (0.225)  
Cre_use 0.328* 0.060 AC_Vill 0.483** 0.088 
 (0.197)   (0.227)  
Constant -1.765**     
  (0.743)         
Observations  528    
Wald chi2(18)  88.01***    
Pseudo R2  0.1929    
Predicted Probability 79.92%    
Chi2 of HL  0.862       




5.3 Chapter Summary 
Our study investigates the determinants of household participation in AC and AC services; credit and 
non-credit support services in Thailand. To address the selection bias, our study has applied the 
Heckman selection model. The estimated results indicate that ACs play a significant role in assisting 
middle-class households to access credit facilities and markets where they can sell their produce. 
Farm risks, and perceptions of benefits obtained from AC services, have significant effects on a 
household’s decision to participate in AC services. Moreover, AC service attributes significantly 
determine AC service participation levels. 
Our findings confirm that the decision to become a AC member is strongly influenced (at the 1% 
level) by the following factors; crop type, credit use, access to agricultural extension services, farm 
production risk, financial risk, household perceptions of access to credit and market information 
provided by ACs, AC relatives, the northern districts of Nakhonratchasima, and AC location (proximity 
to the farmer). These statistical factors suggest that social networks and location play a significant 
role in motivating households to join ACs. Households who have relatives or neighbours who are AC 
members receive information about AC performance and benefits; thus, they are more likely to 
participate in ACs. This finding implies that current AC members are important resources as they 
share AC information with potential customers. In addition, households residing in an AC village and 
in northern districts are more likely to be AC members; the presence of an AC in a village means that 
households have easy access. Moreover, the results indicate that AC members often confront 
liquidity constraints and have high expectations that ACs can support them in obtaining credit. 
Middle-class farmers who face low production risks and can access agricultural extension services are 
more likely to join ACs. In sum, households decide to participate in ACs because they need credit. 
Determinants which influence AC credit participation include education, farm size, farm asset 
ownership, access to agricultural extension services, distance to the nearest market, and neighbours’ 
attitudes to ACs. ACs play a significant role in the rural credit market since they function as 
complimentary credit lenders for households who are unable able to borrow from formal 
institutions. The findings indicate that households who do not own farm assets are more likely to 
borrow money from ACs. These farmers cannot access formal credit due to low asset ownership. 
However, they can borrow money from ACs, since other members act as guarantors. The results 
show that households who participate in AC credit services are overwhelmingly middle-class, 
indicating that the lower-tier poor still confront difficulties accessing credit. In terms of participation 
levels, loan amounts are significantly determined by AC credit attributes such as AC shares, loan 
duration, and property as collateral. Households who have higher AC share values and provide 
property as collateral are more likely to obtain larger loans. 
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Members’ decisions to use marketing services are significantly influenced by a household’s 
perception of the benefits that will be gained from their participation, as well as farm size and 
geographical factors. Households who use marketing services believe that ACs can assist them to 
acquire quality inputs at reasonable prices and provide them with reasonable prices for farm 
products. Mid-sized farmers have the greatest access to AC marketing services since the probability 
of AC marketing participation increases with farm size but decreases with farm size squared. 
Moreover, the decision to trade via ACs is associated with travel costs. Participation in input 
marketing services is positively related to living in an AC village, meaning that farmers who live in an 
AC village are more likely to buy farm inputs from them due to lower travel costs. In contrast, AC 
output marketing participation is negatively influenced by distance to ACs. Regarding participation 
levels in AC marketing services, input expenditure and product quantity sold through ACs is 
determined by household characteristics such as farm size, family income, and AC marketing 
attributes (such as buying inputs on credit and AC output prices).  
Lastly, a household’s decision to participate in AC agricultural extension services are significantly 
determined by its characteristics, perception of ACs and location. Households which own land and 
work in off-farm activities have a higher probability of joining AC agricultural extension services. 
These households earn additional income which means that they can afford new technologies; in 
turn, they benefit financially from the adoption of such technologies. In contrast, farmers who have 
access to irrigation systems are less likely to join AC agricultural extension services since they have 
less incentives to improve their production. In terms of household perceptions, households with 
higher production risks and satisfaction tend to participate in AC agricultural extension services 
because they believe that ACs can increase their efficiency. The presence of ACs in a village motivates 
households to join agricultural extension services because of easy accessibility.  
The results show that AC credit and marketing services play an important role in assisting the middle-
class households. This finding indicates that the poor still face credit access constraints, even in terms 
of ACs. To improve AC participation rates, especially for the very poor, ACs should provide training 
services. High production risk is a significant obstacle for farmers wanting to join ACs. In addition, 
households who access AC credit facilities tend to have higher financial risks. To reduce production 
and financial risks, ACs should extend training services, both in agricultural and off-farm activities, to 
develop members’ skills. Courses could include on-farm product processing to add value to 
members’ products and ones which focus on income generation. These skills are essential to increase 
farmers’ capabilities in mitigating farm risk and increase their AC participation opportunities. 
The results also show that distance to ACs is significant in terms of member participation. ACs should 
consider reducing farmers’ transaction costs as this would encourage members to use their 
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marketing services. Household participation in AC marketing services decreases in tandem with 
distance. Developing an AC network may reduce transportation costs and increase the group’s 
bargaining power. Both vertical and horizontal networks should be promoted. A vertical network, 
with other stakeholders in the supply chain, may reduce transportation costs for AC members. For 
example, contracts with input wholesalers would potentially lead to lower input prices and 
transportation costs. Since wholesalers may have several distributors in the cities, AC members 
should be able to pick up inputs from the closest distributor. Likewise, a horizontal network would 





Effects of Agricultural Cooperative Services on Household Welfare 
This chapter evaluates the effects of participation in AC credit and non-credit support services on 
rural household economic and social welfare. To address the selection bias arising from observed and 
unobserved factors, this study employs ESR and ESP models to assess household welfare using survey 
data. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the empirical models used to evaluate 
the AC effect. Section 6.2 provides the results of exclusion restriction test. Section 6.3 discusses the 
effects of participation in AC credit and non-credit support services on both household economic and 
social welfare. Section 6.4 summarizes the empirical findings. 
6.1 Empirical Model 
This chapter evaluates the effects of AC service participation on participants (a treated group) and 
non-participants (an untreated or control group). AC services include credit, marketing services, and 
agricultural extension services. This study employs 2017 survey data. For AC credit, the treated group 
includes households who borrowed money from ACs in the year 2015 (458 respondents), while, the 
control group covers households who did not use AC credit services in the same year (393 
respondents). This study considers effects on household economic and social welfare for the year 
2016 including household and farm income, consumption, educational expenditure, and health 
access. If households borrowed money from ACs in 2015, they will invest their loans in income 
generating activities. The yields of investment may not be evident until the following year (2016), 
therefore, we concentrate on AC loans established in the year 2015. 
The treated and control groups in AC marketing services and agricultural extension services are 
defined in similar ways. If households participated in non-credit support services in the year 2016, 
they will be included in the treated group (273 respondents for the AC marketing service model and 
474 respondents for the AC agricultural extension service model), otherwise they are included in the 
control group (578 respondents for the AC marketing service model and 377 respondents for the AC 
agricultural extension service model). For AC marketing and agricultural extension services, the study 
considers the effects of participation in non-credit support services which happen in the year 2016. If 
households traded individually or via ACs in 2016, they will receive farm income in 2016.   
Households self-select to participate in AC services; thus, unobservable characteristics (that is, 
households’ farm abilities and risk preferences) are likely to correlate with households’ decisions to 
participate in AC services and their welfare, such as household and farm income, and consumption 
(Ma, 2016; Mojo et al., 2017; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). To mitigate the selection bias arising 
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from observed and unobserved factors, this study applies two models (the ESR and ESP models) to 
evaluate effects of AC service participation on a household economic and social welfare. 
This study considers two AC services: AC credit and non-credit support services, along with eight 
outcome indicators: household income, farm income3, household consumption, educational 
expenditure for children in the family, health affordability, school enrolment, adoption of improved 
farm technologies and practices, and health access improvement. While the first five indicators are 
continuous variables, the last three indicators are binary variables. The ESR model is applied to 
evaluate the effects of AC service participation on continuous outcome variables (the first five 
indicators), while the ESP model is used to assess the effects of AC service participation on binary 
outcome variables (the last three indicators). Therefore, this study consists of five ESR models for AC 
credit, five ESR models for non-credit support services, three ESP models for AC credit, and three ESP 
models for non-credit support services.  
The ESR model consists of two stages: the participation stage and the outcome stage. In the first 
stage, households decide whether to participate in AC services or not. This study uses the probit 
model (equation 6.1) to determine the probability of a household’s decision to participate in AC 
services. The second stage specifies the outcome equations for AC service participants (equation 6.2) 
and non-participants (equation 6.3). The ESR model is presented as: 
*












Regime 1:   1i iiP iP iPy x if D = + =    (6.2) 
Regime 2:   0i iiN iN iNy x if D = + =    (6.3) 
Where D is AC service participation; Di=1 if households decide to participate in AC services, and 0 
otherwise. iPy  and iNy  are continuous outcome indicators for AC service participants and non-
participants, respectively; Zi and Xi denote explanatory variables influencing a household’s decision to 
participate in AC services and household outcomes, respectively. Explanatory variables are individual 
characteristics (that is, age, education, crop type), household characteristics (such as number of 
household members, farm size, farm assets, landownership, credit use, and access to agricultural 
extension services), a household’s perceptions of risk (farm production, financial, and market risks), 
 
3 Annual farm income is calculated as the value of crop and livestock production, excluding non-marketed 
produce valued at market prices. 
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geographic and other related factors (that is, district, relatives in ACs, and ACs in village). εi, μiP, and 
μiN are the error terms in participation equation, outcome equation for participants, and outcome 
equation for non-participants. The error terms are assumed to have a normal distribution with a zero 
mean. 
The outcome indicators in the ESR model are in logarithm. The distribution of the outcome variables 
in the ESR model is right skewed since income and expenditures range from zero to infinity (see 
Appendix B.1). Transforming outcome variables into the logarithmic form provides many advantages 
for estimation. Firstly, the logarithmic form can reduce the effects of potential influential 
observations (Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). If data distribution has a right or left skew and there 
are some outliers in dependent or independent variables, a log transformation can decrease the 
influence of outlier observations. Moreover, the logarithmic form converts the error distribution in 
the model close to normal so that it is closer to normal distribution. To obtain consistent estimates, 
the ESR model requires that the distribution of error terms is normal. Therefore, a log transformation 
leads to normal distribution of error term and yields consistent estimates. It also benefits economic 
interpretation of the results, which can be directly interpreted in percentage terms.  
A log transformation with outcome indicators leads to problems for impact assessment when some 
outcomes equal zero. Selected households in the sample have no farm income and no affordability to 
access medical treatment. A log transformation will drop these households since log zero is 
undefined. This means that respondents with zero outcomes are excluded from the effect 
evaluation. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS) can solve the problem of non-positive values 
without distorting the standard error (Pence, 2006). The IHS is more appropriate than a log 
transformation since it provides a way to estimate effects without dropping non-positive outcome 
samples. Moreover, the value of IHS transformation equals the logarithmic value. The IHS has been 
used in many studies. For example, Pence (2006) investigates the effects of tax incentives on wealth. 
Chandra (2003) and Johnson, Kitamura, and Neal (2000) study the impact of the black-white gap on 
wages.  
The system of equations (equations 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) can be estimated simultaneously using the 
FIML method. Generally, an endogenous switching model can be fitted one equation at a time 
(participation and outcome equations) by either two step least squares or maximum likelihood 
estimation (Kimhi, 1999; Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004). However, both methods are inefficient and yield 
inconsistent standard errors. Alternatively, the endogenous switching model can be estimated 
simultaneously using FIML estimation. This method yields consistent standard errors. Our study uses 
the “movestay” command provided by STATA for the FIML method. The robust option is 
implemented to receive robust variance estimates.  
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According to Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), the coefficients of the ESR model can be employed to 
estimate an ATT and an ATU. ATT is the difference between the actual and counterfactual outcomes 
of households participating in AC services (equation 6.4). Similarly, ATU is the difference between the 
counterfactual and actual outcomes of non-participants (equation 6.5). 
( ) ( )1 1iP i iN iATT E y D E y D= = − =      (6.4) 
( ) ( )0 0iP i iN iATU E y D E y D= = − =     (6.5) 
Regarding binary outcomes, this study uses the ESP model to evaluate the effects of AC service 
participation on binary household welfare characteristics (that is, school enrolment, the adoption of 
improved farm technologies and practices, and health access improvement). Our study involves 
three effect indicators and two AC services; AC credit and non-credit support services. Hence there 
are six ESP models in our study. From here on, we discuss the ESP model in terms of the effect of 
participation in AC credit and non-credit support services on school enrolment rates. The ESP model 
is also used to examine the effect of AC service participation on the adoption of improved farm 
technologies and practices and also for health access improvement. These models function in the 
same way as the ESP model for school enrolment rates. 
The ESP model involves two stages. The first stage determines the probability of a household’s 
decision to participate in AC services using the probit model (equation 6.1). The second stage 
specifies the outcome equations for AC service participants (equation 6.6) and non-participants 
(equation 6.7). Since the effect indicators are binary variables, the second stage uses the probit 
model to examine the relationship between the effect and explanatory variables, conditional on the 










ii i i i if yy x with y if D 













ii i i i if yy x with y if D 







y  and *0iy  are the latent variables for 1iy  and 0 iy , respectively; 1iy  and 0 iy  are the 
observed effect variables for AC participants and non-participants. The observed effect variable is 
binary. 
1i
y which equals one if AC service participants send every school-aged child in their family to 
school, and zero otherwise. 
0 i
y equals one if non-AC service participants send every school-aged child 
in their family to school, and zero otherwise.  
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ESP model equations (equations 6.1, 6.6, and 6.7) are estimated simultaneously using the FIML 
method. The FIML method yields consistent standard errors (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2011). This study uses 
the “switch_probit” command with the robust option provided by STATA for the FIML method to 
obtain the consistent standard error and robust variance estimates.  
After estimating the ESP model, this study calculates ATT and ATU from the estimated coefficients of 
the ESP model. According to Lokshin and Sajaia (2011), ATT is the difference between the probability 
that AC service participants send every school-aged child in their family to school (an actual 
probability) and the probability of sending every school-aged child to school for the AC service 
participants if they do not participate in AC services (a counterfactual probability). ATU is the 
difference between the probability of sending every school-aged child to school for non-AC service 
participants if they participate in AC services (a counterfactual probability) and the probability that 
non-AC service participants send every school-aged child to school (an actual probability). ATT and 
ATU can be expressed as: 








ATT y D X x y D X x
N =
 = = = = − = = =     (6.8) 








ATU y D X x y D X x
N =
 = = = = − = = =   (6.9) 
Where ( )1Pr 1 1,iy D X x= = = is the probability that AC service participants send every school-
aged child to school (an actual probability for participants). ( )0Pr 1 1,iy D X x= = = is the 
probability of sending every school-aged child to school for AC service participants if participants do 
not participate in AC services (a counterfactual probability for participants). 
( )1Pr 1 0,iy D X x= = =  denotes the probability of sending every school-aged child to school for 
non-AC service participants if they participate in AC services (a counterfactual probability for non-
participants). ( )0Pr 1 0,iy D X x= = = denotes the probability that non-AC service participants send 
every school-aged child to school (an actual probability for non-participants). N1 and N0 are the 
sample numbers for AC service participants and non-participants, respectively; 2  is the 
cumulative function of a bivariate normal distribution; and F is a cumulative function of the 
univariate normal distribution. 
6.2 Tests for Exclusion Restriction 
For consistency, both ESR and ESP models require at least one explanatory (a selected IV) to be 
included in the participation equation (equation 6.1). The IV must not appear in the outcome 
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equations. This indicates that the selected IV significantly influences a household’s decision to 
participate in AC services but does not influence their welfare. Our study employs two selected IVs: 
AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) and the presence of AC in a household’s village (AC_Vill). Hoken 
and Su (2015), Ito et al. (2012), and Ma and Abdulai (2016) employ AC neighbour membership 
(AC_Rela) as IVs to estimate the probability of AC participation. AC neighbour membership reflects a 
household’s AC experience, as narrated by other people. All of these studies find that households 
who obtain information about ACs from others living close to them are more likely to participate in 
ACs. The last IV is the presence of a cooperative in a household’s village. Ma and Abdulai (2016) find 
that the presence of an AC in a farmer’s village in China significantly affects his/her decision to 
participate in ACs since he/she can easily access support. 
To check the validity of a selected IV, this study adds an IV as an explanatory variable in the 
participation and outcome equations in the ESR model. The study applies the probit model to the 
participation equations (equation 6.1) and the OLS regression in the outcome equations (equations 
6.2 using the entire sample). Both equations are separately estimated. The study includes two AC 
services (credit and marketing services) and five continuous outcomes; thus, there are 10 ESR models 
used to test the validity of the selected IV. The results show that AC neighbour membership 
(AC_Rela) is statistically significant in AC credit participation at the 1% level, but not significant in 
household consumption and educational expenses (see Appendices B.4 and B.5). This result indicates 
that AC neighbour membership is a valid IV for the AC credit model with effects on consumption and 
educational expense. The presence of an AC in a village (AC_Vill) is valid as the selected IV for the AC 
credit model in terms of effects on household and farm income, and health affordability. The 
presence of an AC in a farmer’s village (AC_Vill) significantly influences a household participation in 
AC credit services at the 1% level but does not influence those outcomes (see Appendices B.2, B.3, 
and B.6). 
AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) is a valid IV for the AC marketing service model with effects on 
household income and consumption. AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) significantly affects a 
household’s decision to participate in AC marketing services at the 1% level but does not affect 
household income and consumption expenditure (see Appendices B.2 and B.4). The presence of an 
AC in a farmer’s village (AC_Vill) is a valid selected IV for the AC marketing service model with effects 
on farm income, education expense, and health affordability models. The presence of an AC in a 
village (AC_Vill) significantly influences household participation in AC marketing services at the 1% 
level, but does not affect farm income, educational expenses, and health affordability (see 
Appendices B.3, B.5, and B.6) 
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For the ESP models, the study adds an IV as an explanatory variable in the participation and outcome 
equations and then estimates them separately to test the validity of selected IVs. The study applies 
the probit model for both participation (equation 6.1) and outcome equations (equation 6.6 using 
the entire sample). Our study involves three effect indicators (school enrolment, adoption of 
improved farm technologies and practices, and improvement of health access) and two AC services 
(credit and non-credit support services). Our study tests the validity of the selected IVs for all six ESP 
models. 
AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) is a valid IV for the AC credit model on the effects on school 
enrolment, adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, and the improvement of health 
access. AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) significantly influences a household’s decision to 
participate in AC credit at the 1% level, but does not influence school enrolment, the adoption of 
improved farm technologies and practices, and  improved health access (see Appendices B.7 to B.9). 
In terms of non-credit support service model, AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) is a valid IV for 
the AC marketing service model with health access improvement effect (see Appendix B.9). Similarly, 
AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) is significant in terms of  participation in agricultural extension 
services at the 1% level, but not for the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices (see 
Appendix B.8).The presence of an AC in a farmer’s village (AC_Vill) is a valid IV for the AC marketing 
service model with effect on school enrolment. The presence of an AC in a farmer’s village (AC_Vill) is 
statistically significant on a household decision to trade with ACs at the 1% level, but not significant 
on school enrolment (see Appendix B.7). 
6.3 Result and Discussion  
This section discusses the estimated results of the ESR and ESP models and the effects of AC service 
participation. As discussed in section 4.2.2, both ESR and ESP models consist of participation and 
outcome equations. These equations are estimated simultaneously using FIML estimation. In short, 
the ESR and ESP models provide the estimated result for determinants of household participation in 
AC services and household welfare. This section discusses the determinants of household 
participation in AC services; credit, marketing, and agricultural extension services, the determinants 
of household welfare, and average treatment effects for both participants and non-participants in AC 
services.  
6.3.1 Determinants of Household Participation in Agricultural Cooperative Services 
Determinants of a household’s decision to participate in AC services are estimated using the ESR and 
ESP models. Since this section considers factors affecting a household’s decision to participate in AC 
services, the sample includes both groups (participants and non- AC participants – a total of 850 
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respondents). The estimated results of both models are similar with the results of determinants of 
AC members’ decisions to participate in AC services (see Chapter 5). Chapter 5 focuses on AC 
members’ decisions to participate in AC services, thus, the sample only includes AC members. To 
avoid repetition, this section discusses the determinants which are strongly correlated with AC 
service participation. 
Determinants of Household Participation in AC Credit  
The estimated coefficients of the participation equation on why households choose to 
participate/not participate in AC credit are reported in the first column of Tables 6.1 - 6.9. The 
participation variable in AC credit is regressed on individual characteristics, household factors, 
household perceptions of farm risks, geographical factors, and an IV. The Wald χ2 is statistic 
significantly at the 99% confidence level, indicating that explanatory variables are jointly statistically 
significant. 
The probability of participation in AC credit is statistically and significantly influenced by farm size, 
access to agricultural extension services, financial risk, distance to the nearest market, relatives being 
an AC member, the presence of an AC in village, and neighbours’ attitude on ACs at the 1% level. In 
addition, age, crop type, land ownership, and the northern districts of Nakhon Ratchasima (Phimai, 
Buayai, Nonsong districts) are significant at the 5% level. All factors which are significant at 1% level 
have positive impacts on AC credit participation. The findings show that households who have larger 
farms, higher financial risk, and access to agricultural extension services are more likely to participate 
in AC credit. The effect of farm size on AC credit participation supports the findings of previous 
studies (Duong & Izumida, 2002; Duy et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2007; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Farm size 
reflects farm production scale. Households with larger farms (land size) need more capital to invest 
in farm production than those with smaller land holdings. Therefore, an increase in farm size by one 
rai raises the probability of borrowing loan from ACs (Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). However, the 
probability of AC credit participation will decrease when farm size reaches a certain level: mid-sized 
farmers have the maximum probability of borrowing money from ACs (see Table 6.9). This is because 
small farmers are not seen as creditworthy, thus they are often unable to access AC credit. Larger 
farmers can access formal credit so they tend to borrow money from formal lenders such as the 
BAAC due to lower interest rates. 
Similarly, access to agricultural extension services positively affects a household’s decision to 
participate in AC credit, indicating that households who access agricultural extension services are 
more likely to borrow money from ACs. As they can access improved farm technologies and 
practices, they are more likely to borrow loans to invest in farm technologies, eventually improving 
their production levels (Girma & Abebaw, 2015; Tetteh Anang et al., 2015). Moreover, the findings 
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show that financial risk has a positive impact on AC credit participation, suggesting that the more 
financial risk households confront, the higher their probability of participation in AC credit. This 
finding supports Fongthong and Suriya (2014) and Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn's (2011) studies, 
which report that Thai housheolds with lower incomes or higher financial risk tend to borrow loans 
from village funds or ACs rather than the BAAC. 
Household participation in AC credit is dominated by AC relative membership (AC_Rela) and 
neighbour’s attitude to ACs (Comm_Att). AC relatives and neighbour’s attitude significantly and 
positively influence the probability of AC credit participation at the 1% level (see Tables 6.1 -6.9). 
These results reflect the role of social networks in encouraging households to participate in AC credit. 
Social networks are important in terms of sharing information or experiences between current AC 
service participants and potential participants. The survey data shows that around 91% of the AC 
participants obtain information about ACs and AC services from other people. They use this 
information to determine whether to participate in AC services. Therefore, households who have AC 
relatives and obtain information from them are more likely to borrow credit from ACs. This result is 
similar to Ito et al. (2012) and Ma and Abdulai’s (2016) studies on AC participation in China.  
Lastly, distance to town and AC located in village positively influences AC credit participation. 
Distance to town refers to the accessibility of formal credit services (Khoi, 2012). Households who 
live far away from town have difficulty accessing formal credit services (Duy et al., 2012; Nguyen, 
2007). Therefore, the further a household lives from formal credit services, the more likely that they 
will borrow from an AC. The result is consistent with Abebaw and Haile (2013), Mojo et al. (2017), 
and Wossen et al.'s (2017) studies. Similarly, the presence of an AC in a village has a positive 
influence on AC credit participation. This result indicates that households living in the same village as 
an AC(s) are more likely to borrow from them since they easily access AC services. This result is in line 
with Abebaw and Haile (2013) and Mojo et al.'s (2017) studies. 
Determinants of Household Participation in Non-AC Credit Support Services 
This study divides non-credit AC support services into marketing services and agricultural extension 
services. The ESR and ESP model results for the determinants of a household’s decision to participate 
in AC marketing and agricultural extension services are reported in the fourth column of Tables 6.1-
6.9. The Wald χ2 is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, indicating that the explanatory 
variables are jointly statistically significant. 
The estimated results of participation in AC marketing services show that farm size, credit use, access 
to agricultural extension services, relatives being AC members, neighbours’ attitude to ACs, the 
presence of an AC in a village, and districts in the South of Nakhonratchasima are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (see Tables 6.1 -6.9). All significant factors have positive effects on AC 
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marketing participation, except for the southern districts of Nakhonratchasima. As expected, farm 
size has a significant and positive effect on participation in AC marketing services, consistent with 
Bernard and Spielman (2009), Fischer and Qaim (2012,2014), Ma and Abdulai (2016), Mensah et al. 
(2012), Muthyalu (2013), and Zhang et al.’s (2017) studies. Farm size relates to farm production 
capacity. The larger the farm (land size), the greater amount of input farmers need in order to 
produce the maximum yield. Farmers with larger farms are more likely to purchase farm inputs and 
sell outputs to AC marketing services. However, the probability of AC marketing service participation 
decreases at a certain farm size. These findings confirm that middle class households have the 
greatest probability of participation in AC marketing services. Small farmers may not have enough 
produce to trade with ACs thus limits the benefits from participating. In contrast, larger farmers may 
obtain higher profits when they individually trade because their bargaining power increases. Hence, 
larger farmers are more likely to sell their own produce. 
Credit use and access to agricultural extension services significantly and positively influence AC 
marketing participation at the 1% level. This finding suggests that households who access credit and 
agricultural extension services are more likely to buy farm inputs and sell their products to AC 
markets. The effects of credit use and access to agricultural extension services on AC marketing 
participation are consistent with Fischer and Qaim (2012) and Alene et al.’s (2008) studies. One 
explanation is that ACs in the study area provide credit, either in the form of cash or credit for input 
purchases. When households obtain credit from ACs, they are more likely to buy farm inputs from 
them. ACs require good quality products to sell to the market. Households who access agricultural 
extension services must meet AC standards, thus they have a higher probability of selling their farm 
products to ACs. 
In addition to household characteristics, AC marketing participation is influenced by a household’s 
social networks and AC location. These findings show that probability of participating in AC 
marketing is positively connected to AC relative membership (AC_Rela) and neighbours’ attitudes to 
ACs (Comm_Att). These variables reflect the crucial effects of neighbours’ experiences of ACs. This 
result is consistent with Fischer and Qaim (2012; 2014) and Mensah et al.'s (2012) studies. Our 
finding indicates that household neighbours are an important source of information. AC location is 
another important factor which positively affects AC marketing participation. This finding is 
consistent with Alene et al. (2008), Chagwiza et al. (2016), Fischer and Qaim (2012), Muthyalu (2013), 
and Winter-Nelson and Temu’s (2005) results. AC location refers to the distance from farm to ACs, or 
transaction costs (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Households living in an AC village can easily access 
markets, thus they are more likely to purchase inputs and sell their products to ACs. Households in 
the southern districts, Pakchong and Pakthongchai, are less likely to trade with ACs compared to the 
Dankhuntod district (reference dummy). This is because Pakchong and Pakthongchai districts are 
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mountainous, thus, transaction costs are higher than the Dankhuntod district which is flat (see Tables 
6.1 -6.9). 
The estimated results of the probit model for AC agricultural extension services show that the 
probability of participation is significantly influenced by cash crops, credit use, financial risk, AC 
relatives, the presence of an AC in the village, and the northern districts of Nakhonratchasima at the 
1% level (see Table 6.7). Age, gender, paddy farming, and orchard farming significantly influence a 
household’s probability of participation in AC agricultural extension services at the 5% level. For 
household characteristics, the results show that households with an elderly female head are more 
likely to participate in AC agricultural extension services. However, the probability of participation in 
these services drops at a certain level of age. This finding is similar with Atsan et al. (2009), Egziabher 
et al. (2011), and Wossen et al.'s (2017) results, who all argue that the elderly are less likely to join 
agricultural extension services since it is difficult for them to adopt new technologies. 
The probability of participation in AC agricultural extension services reduces with paddy and orchard 
farms but increases with cash crop farms. Orchard farming is not common in the chosen study areas, 
thus none of the ACs provide agricultural extension services to support orchard production. Rice 
farmers are less likely to participate in AC agricultural extension services since they are the largest 
group and they tend to use traditional methods (69% of respondents use traditional methods). They 
are not interested in implementing new technologies and practices; hence they are less likely to 
participate in AC agricultural extension services.  
Households with higher financial risk and access to credit are more likely to participate in AC 
agricultural extension services. This result is similar to Wossen et al. (2017), Tiwari et al. (2008) and 
Ma’s (2016) studies. Our result indicates that households who do not face liquidity constraints are 
more likely to join AC agricultural extension services, because they can afford to pay for them. 
Our result shows that social network (AC relative membership) is positively significant in terms of a 
household’s decisions to participate in AC agricultural extension services. This finding is consistent 
with prior studies (Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Egziabher et al., 2011; Elias et al., 2013; Tiwari et al., 
2008), which argue that current AC members share their experiences of using improved farm 
technologies/practices and extension services. Hence, households who have neighbours or relatives 
in ACs are more likely to participate in agricultural extension services. Households in the northern 
districts of Nakhonratchasima and those living in AC villages are more likely to participate in 





6.3.2 Effect of Agricultural Cooperative Services on Household Economic Welfare  
This section discusses the empirical results of the effects of AC credit and non-credit support service 
participation on household and farm incomes, and consumption. The ESR model results are reported 
in Tables 6.1-6.3. Each table contains two sets of results: one for AC credit participation and the 
other for AC marketing service participation. While the second and third columns outline the 
determinants of income and consumption for participants and non-participant in AC credit, the last 
two columns show the determinants of income and consumption for participants and non-
participants in AC marketing services. The results also present the ATT and the ATU. 
Effects of AC Services on Household and Farm Income  
This section discusses the income effects of participation in AC credit and non-credit support 
services. Among AC non-credit support services, input and output marketing services directly relate 
to household income; participation in AC marketing services is thus used as a treatment variable for 
evaluating the effects of AC non-credit support services on household income. The FIML estimates of 
the ESR models for household and farm income effects of participation in AC credit and AC marketing 
services are reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. 
Table 6.1 provides the estimated results of household income. It compares those who use AC credit 
services with those who do not (the second and third columns) and those who use AC marketing 
services with those who do not (the fifth and sixth columns). The Wald χ2 for both AC credit and 
marketing services is significant at the 99% confidence level, indicating that the explanatory variables 
are jointly statistically significant. Regarding the AC credit model, the coefficients of correlation (ρ) 
between the participation equation and household income functions for participants (ρPC) and non-
participant (ρNC) are negative, but not significantly different from zero. This result implies that the 





Table 6.1 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Household Income using 
the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) 
 
Variables AC Credit  AC Marketing  
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Household Income Participation 
(Y/N) 







lgAge -0.043 0.298* -0.228 0.277 0.358** 0.059   











Paddy -0.429** -0.334*** -0.311* -0.024 -0.216* -0.370***   
(0.173) (0.088) (0.170) (0.162) (0.111) (0.117)  
Orchard -0.225 0.248 0.401** -0.252 0.298 0.405**   
(0.245) (0.229) (0.189) (0.224) (0.269) (0.184)  
Cash_Crop 0.317* -0.010 0.008 0.012 0.037 -0.011   
(0.165) (0.093) (0.140) (0.146) (0.119) (0.102)  
 
Household Characteristics 
lgHHmem -0.220* 0.497*** 0.601*** -0.259** 0.324*** 0.609***   
(0.134) (0.076) (0.101) (0.127) (0.108) (0.081)  
Dep_Rat -0.115 3.97e-05 -0.123** 0.122* 0.008 -0.098*   
(0.081) (0.049) (0.052) (0.069) (0.049) (0.053)  
lgFarm_Si 0.232*** 0.471*** 0.316*** 0.418*** 0.505*** 0.286***   
(0.074) (0.045) (0.058) (0.066) (0.074) (0.055)  
Farm_Ass -0.174 0.007 -0.115 0.100 0.036 -0.154**   
(0.117) (0.070) (0.085) (0.106) (0.084) (0.069)  
Land -0.405** 0.091 -0.062 0.053 -0.034 -0.008   
(0.180) (0.090) (0.132) (0.160) (0.111) (0.107)  
Oth_Loan,  -1.87e-07 2.44e-07 7.75e-07*** 0.439*** -0.044 -0.028  
Cre_Use (3.04e-07) (2.13e-07) (1.74e-07) (0.130) (0.136) (0.090)  
Irr_Acc -0.119 0.083 0.170**  
  
  
(0.111) (0.064) (0.079)  
  
 
Commer 0.094 0.217 0.267*** -0.014 0.367* 0.277***   
(0.124) (0.186) (0.083) (0.099) (0.205) (0.076)  
Off_Farm 
   
0.054 0.219*** 0.416***      












Household Perceptions of Risk 
Pro_Risk -0.076 0.067 0.044 -0.039 0.081* 0.025   
(0.072) (0.041) (0.051) (0.068) (0.044) (0.048)  
Mkt_Risk -0.014 0.006 -0.185*** 0.111 -0.014 -0.094*   
(0.077) (0.044) (0.068) (0.070) (0.054) (0.052)  
Fin_Risk 0.233*** -0.162*** -0.291*** 0.043 -0.164*** -0.238***   









Table 6.1     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Household Income 
using the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) (cont.) 
 
Variables AC Credit AC Marketing  
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Household Income Participation 
(Y/N) 






Geographic and Related Factors 
lgDis 0.292***       
 (0.056)       
Dist_N 0.309**   -0.226*    
 (0.145)   (0.120)    
Dist_S -0.171   -0.335***    
 (0.150)   (0.123)    
AC_Rela 0.941***   0.597***    





















Constant -2.428* 9.176*** 12.350*** -4.670*** 8.887*** 10.63***   

































308.62***   180.60***  
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in given brackets 
3. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
For the AC marketing model, both correlation coefficients (ρPM, ρNM) have the same sign; however, 
only the correlation coefficient for non-participants (ρNM) is significant (see Table 6.1). This result 
indicates the presence of a selection bias arising from unobservable factors in the AC marketing 
model (Lokshin & Sajaia, 2004). The finding suggests that observable and unobservable factors 
influence a household’s decision to trade through ACs and ultimately their incomes. The negative 
and significant correlation coefficient for the non-participant group (ρNM) suggests a positive 
selection bias, indicating that households who obtain a higher household income (than the average 
income) are not as likely to participate in AC marketing services. In contrast, the insignificant 
correlation coefficient for participants indicates that households who participate in AC marketing 
services do not have a similar income to the average income.  
Furthermore, the Wald test for joint independence of the three equations is not statistically 
significant (χ2= 0.253) for the AC credit model; however, it is significant at the 5% level for AC 
marketing services (χ2= 5.620). This result indicates that the error term of selection and income 
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equations are related; therefore, participation and household income equations for the AC marketing 
service model are statistically and significantly jointly determined. Ignoring the selection bias in the 
AC marketing model will lead to biased results. Using the ESR model for AC marketing services will 
mitigate the selection bias. 
Regarding household income effect, the ESR results are mostly consistent between the AC credit and 
the AC marketing service models. This finding shows that participants and non-participants’ 
household incomes are significantly influenced by age, crop type, number of household members, 
farm size, commercialization level, off-farm work, and financial and market risks (see Table 6.1). 
Regarding individual characteristics, age has a significant and positive effect on household income for 
AC credit participants at the 10% level and AC marketing services at the 5% level, but not for non-
participants. This result indicates that older participants in AC services obtain higher household 
incomes. This is probably because they have more farm production experience, thus they can earn 
relatively more (Jena et al., 2012). This result is in the line with Jena et al.’s (2012) study, which 
concludes that younger household heads earn less per capita income than older household heads. 
However, our findings contradict Ma and Abdulai’s (2016) study which concludes that older non AC 
participants have higher household incomes. 
In terms of crop type, our results indicate that paddy farms are negatively significant in terms of 
household income for both participants and non-participants in AC credit and AC marketing service 
models. This result indicates that rice farmers earn less than other farmers whether they participate 
in AC services or not (see Table 6.1). The survey data reveals that the difference in household 
incomes between rice farmers and other farmers is the result of differences in farm income. The t-
test result indicates that rice farmers earn significantly less farm income than other farmers at the 
1% level (t-value = 4.8330) (see Appendix C.3). While the average rice farmer’s income is 89,249 baht 
per year, other farmers earn 378,710 baht. This could be the result of drought and reductions in the 
price of rice in the crop year 2015/16; during this period farmers had lower rice yields and less 
income (Office of Agricultural Economics, 2016). Those who do not use AC credit or marketing 
services and who grow orchards including vegetables and fruits have higher incomes than those who 
grow other crops because of the high fruits and vegetables prices.  
As expected, the coefficients of number of members in family and farm size are positive and 
significantly different from zero, for both participants and non-participants, in every model. 
Household size refers to the number of members who earn income, while farm size refers to 
production scale. Larger households who have more land have higher household incomes. This 
finding is contrary to Jena et al. (2012) and Ma and Abdulai’s (2016) results. They study the effects of 
AC membership on per capita household income and find that larger household size decreases per 
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capita household income as more family members do not increase their farm yields or their net 
return. Off-farm work has a positive and significant effect on whether farmers join AC marketing 
services or not. One explanation is that off-farm activities provide additional income for households 
(Jena et al., 2012). 
Regarding production and sale characteristics, ratio of sales to yields are positively significant in 
terms of household income for non-participants in AC credit and AC marketing models, at the 1% 
level. This result suggests that a higher sales ratio increases a household’s income. This finding is 
consistent with Jena et al.’s (2012) finding. Similarly, irrigation access positively influences non-
participants’ incomes for the AC credit model but not significantly for AC credit participants (see 
Table 6.1). 
In terms of household perceptions of agricultural risks, financial risk significantly and negatively 
influences household income at the 1% level, for both participant and non-participant, in AC credit 
and AC marketing models. This implies that increased financial risk reduces household income, 
whether the household chooses to participate in AC services or not. However, market risk has a 
statistically negative effect only on non-participants in the AC credit model at the 1% level and the AC 
marketing service model at the 10% level. This result indicates that non-participants will have higher 
household incomes when they have lower market risks. 
Regarding farm income, the significant Wald χ2 for both AC credit and marketing service models 
shows that the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 6.2). 
The Wald test for joint independence of the three equations for both models are statistically 
significant, at the 1% level for the AC credit model, and the 5% level for the AC marketing service 
model. This result confirms the joint significance of the error correlation coefficients of the 
participation and farm income equations. Both the AC credit and marketing models must account for 
the selection bias. 
For the AC credit model, the coefficients of correlation (ρ) between the participation equation and 
farm income functions for participants (ρPC) and non-participant (ρNC) are significantly different from 
zero, at the 1% level. This result indicates the presence of a selection bias. Unobserved factors 
influence a household’s decision to participate in AC credit services and ultimately impact on farm 
income. Both correlation coefficients (ρPC, ρNC) have the same sign, indicating that AC borrowers’ 
farm incomes are higher than average farm incomes regardless of AC credit participation; however, 
they are better off participating. In contrast, non-AC borrowers’ farm incomes are lower than 
average farm incomes, irrespective of AC credit participation; they are better off not participating 
(Alene & Manyong, 2007). 
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In the AC marketing service model, the coefficients of correlation between the participation equation 
and participants’ farm incomes are not significant, while the coefficients of correlation between the 
participation equation and non-participants’ farm incomes are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The negative correlation coefficients suggest that households whose farm incomes are higher than 
the average farm income are less likely to trade with ACs. 
Farm income is significantly influenced by crop type, farm size, other credit use, sales ratio, and 
financial risk (see Table 6.2). The coefficients of crop type show that rice farming has a positive and 
significant impact on participants’ farm incomes at the 1% level for AC credit and marketing service 
models. This result suggests that rice farmers who participate in AC services earn higher farm 
incomes than those who do not. On explanation could be that ACs in the Northeast of Thailand have 
strong networks and have succeeded in adding value to their products (Thuvachote, 2007). They 
produce better quality rice under their own premium brand which they sell at a higher price. This 
result suggests that ACs in our study areas succeed in improving rice farmers’ farm incomes, thus, 
participating in AC services in Nakhonratchasrima province is a good choice for rice farmers. In 
contrast, ACs in Nakhonratchasrima province is not successful in assisting cash crop farmers. Our 
results indicate that AC credit and marketing services cannot increase cash crop farmers’ farm 
incomes. The relationship between farm income and cash crop farming is significantly negative at the 
1% level for AC credit participants and at the 5% level for the AC marketing service participants. 
These results indicate that cash crop farmers who borrow credit and trade with ACs earn less farm 
income than those growing other crops. This difference in income could be attributed to drought in 
the crop year 2015/16 and diseases which affected their crops. In the crop year 2015/16, cash crop, 
particularly corn and sugar cane were poor quality and did not sell well thus farmers gain low price 
(Office of Agricultural Economics, 2016). For orchard farming, the results show that farm income 
significantly increases at the 5% level for AC marketing service participants and at the 1% level for 
non-participants. This finding suggests that orchard farmers earn higher farm incomes than other 
farmers, no matter which market channel they use to sell their products. One possible explanation is 
that the prices of fruits and vegetables are higher than rice and cash crop prices.   
The coefficients of farm size have a positive and significant effect on farm income for both 
participants and non-participants in AC credit and AC marketing models, at the 1% level. This result 
indicates that larger farms have significantly higher farm incomes, whether they participate in AC 
services or not. The relationship between farm size and farm income is contradictory to earlier 
studies which have found that larger farms have lower farm incomes due to lower levels of 
productivity. For example, Ma and Abdulai (2016) find that larger farms earn less due to the lower 
apple yields per mu (1 mu equals 1/15 hectare). 
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Table 6.2 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Farm Income using the 
Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) 
 
Variables 













Individual Characteristics      
lgAge -0.015 0.160 -0.964 0.167 0.229 -0.527 
 (0.283) (0.404) (0.704) (0.277) (0.451) (0.459) 
lgEdu -0.118 -0.041 -0.316 0.072   
 (0.125) (0.171) (0.339) (0.137)   
Paddy -0.385** 0.429*** -0.127 -0.150 0.583*** -0.350 
 (0.174) (0.161) (0.505) (0.154) (0.173) (0.418) 
Orchard -0.209 0.402 1.002* -0.214 0.699** 1.292*** 
 (0.243) (0.352) (0.587) (0.235) (0.297) (0.499) 
Cash_Crop 0.295* -0.629*** 0.275 -0.049 -0.457** 0.596 
 (0.168) (0.212) (0.487) (0.151) (0.232) (0.559) 
 
Household Characteristics 
     
lgFarm_Mem 0.060 0.179 -0.211 0.089 0.456** -0.176 
 (0.132) (0.181) (0.367) (0.127) (0.210) (0.269) 
lgFarm_Size 0.202*** 1.139*** 1.296*** 0.419*** 0.945*** 1.162*** 
 (0.072) (0.093) (0.342) (0.069) (0.139) (0.264) 
Land -0.410** -0.219 0.159    
 (0.176) (0.224) (0.455)    
Oth_Loan, 
Cre_Use 
-1.73e-07 -1.82e-07 2.05e-06*** 0.368*** 0.225 0.065 
 (2.94e-07) (1.79e-07) (7.68e-07) (0.132) (0.348) (0.255) 
Irr_Acc -0.160 -0.051 0.112 -0.263 0.030 0.022 
 (0.172) (0.217) (0.417) (0.184) (0.261) (0.333) 
Tech_Acc 0.016 0.290 -0.181 0.365** -0.075 -0.177 
 (0.167) (0.207) (0.416) (0.181) (0.256) (0.317) 
Ext_Acc 0.739***   0.386***   
 (0.121)   (0.120)   
Commer 0.039 9.267*** 3.928* -0.225 8.364*** 4.603* 
 (0.105) (0.601) (2.244) (0.146) (1.009) (2.407) 
 
Household Perceptions of Risk 
    
Pro_Risk -0.054 0.015 -0.273 -0.075 -0.030 -0.176 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.193) (0.067) (0.101) (0.146) 
Mkt_Risk -0.005 0.067 -0.060 0.107 0.168 -0.038 
 (0.077) (0.098) (0.219) (0.073) (0.143) (0.156) 
Fin_Risk 0.212*** -0.013 -0.421** 0.025 0.011 -0.361** 
 (0.061) (0.082) (0.177) (0.060) (0.118) (0.148) 
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Table 6.2     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Farm Income using the 
Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) (cont.) 
 
Variables 












Geographic and Related Factors 
lgDis 0.325***      
 (0.052)      
Dist_N 0.296** 0.324* -0.419 -0.206   
 (0.142) (0.186) (0.352) (0.140)   
Dist_S -0.128 -0.094 0.664* -0.292**   
 (0.150) (0.164) (0.379) (0.132)   
AC_Rela 1.024***   0.687***   
 (0.153)   (0.171)   
AC_Vill 0.515***   0.508***   
 (0.175)   (0.167)   
Commu 0.251***   0.191***   
 (0.031)   (0.032)   
Constant -3.015** -0.380 9.600** -4.063*** -0.081 7.119** 
  (1.328) (1.866) (3.988) (1.338) (2.187) (2.781) 



















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns.   10.95***     5.90**  
Observations   837  
 837 
Wald Chi2   680.33***  
 228.38*** 
 Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 
3. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
In addition to farm size, access to other credit sources has a positive effect on farm income for non-
participants in AC credit at the 1% level. Credit accessibility allows farmers to enhance their farm 
productions. This finding is consistent with Ma and Abdulai’s (2016) study. Sale ratio is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level with respect to farm income for both AC credit and marketing 
service participants. In short, households earn more farm income when the portion of sale on yields 
increases. In terms of household perceptions of risks, financial risks are negative and statistically 
significant for non-participants’ farm income, in both AC service models, at the 1% level. This finding 






Effects of AC Services on Household Consumption 
The estimated results for effects of participation in AC credit and AC marketing services on 
household consumption expenditure using the FIML approach are illustrated in Table 6.3. The second 
and third columns in Table 6.3 present the determinants of household consumption expenditure for 
the AC credit model, while the fifth and sixth columns show the determinants of household 
consumption expenditure for the AC marketing model. The ESR results show that the Wald χ2 for 
both AC credit and marketing services models are significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that 
the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant. 
The correlation coefficients (ρ) between the participation equation and the household consumption 
function for both AC credit and AC marketing models are not significantly different from zero. This 
result indicates that a household’s decision to participate in AC credit and AC marketing services and 
their consumption expenses are not influenced by unobservable factors. Therefore, there is no 
selection bias for both the AC credit and AC marketing models. Similarly, for the AC marketing service 
model, the Wald test result for joint independence of the three equations is not significant (χ2= 
0.86), confirming that the error terms of participation and household consumption equation are not 
related. However, the Wald test result for joint independence of the three equations for the AC 
credit model is significantly different from zero at the 10% level (χ2= 3.26). This result suggests that 
the error term of selection and household consumption equations are associated. Participation and 
household consumption equations for the AC credit model are statistically and significantly jointly 
determined. Therefore, using the ESR model for AC credit controls for the selection bias.  
The ESR results show that the determinants of household consumption for both the AC credit and AC 
marketing models are similar. Coefficients of age are significantly negative at the 1% level for non-
participants in AC credit and AC marketing services, and significant at the 5% for participants in AC 
marketing services (see Table 6.3). This result indicates that households with older household heads 
spend less in terms of consumption. These findings are in line with Jena et al.’s (2012) study, which 
finds that the per capita consumption of small-scale farmers in Ethiopia is negatively influenced by 
age and positively affected by age squared. 
Regarding household factors, the number of members in a family significantly and positively affects 
household consumption at the 1% level, for both participants and non-participants in the AC credit 
and marketing service models. This result suggest that household consumption increases for each 
additional household member (see Table 6.3). One possible explanation is that the relatively larger 
family have a higher number of labours. A family with more members may earn more income, thus 
they have more money to spend. In contrast, the dependency ratio has a significantly negative 
relationship with participants’ consumption in the AC credit model at the 5% level. This result 
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indicates that households who borrow from ACs tend to reduce household consumption when their 
dependency ratio increases. One possible explanation is that they confront liquidity constraints along 
with less income earning members, so they have less money to spend. This finding is consistent with 
Ahmed and Mesfin’s (2017) study which compares consumption expenditure between AC members 
and non-members in Ethiopia. The authors find that ACs are effective in improving household 
consumption for households who have fewer children. 
Land ownership is positively related to consumption expenses, but only for participants in AC 
marketing services. This finding is consistent with Ahmed and Mesfin’s (2017) result. AC marketing 
participants with larger pieces of land have higher consumption levels compared to those with 
smaller pieces of land. This finding indicates that AC marketing services are effective in improving 
welfare for AC participants with larger pieces of land. Off-farm work only positively influences 
consumption for participants in AC credit. This result indicates that household consumption 
expenditure is greater for households who borrow money from ACs and work in off-farm activities, 
than those who do not.  
In terms of geographic factors, residing in the southern district is positive and significant on 
consumption expenditures for AC credit participants at the 1% level. This result suggest that AC 
credit provisions can improve household welfare, but only in the southern areas of 
Nakhonratchasrima. One possible explanation is that the southern districts are tourist hotspots and 
thus farmers are able to sell their products at a higher price. Households located in the southern 
districts also have higher levels of consumption. However, AC credit does not influence participants’ 




Table 6.3 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Consumption 
Expenditure using the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) 
 














Individual Characteristics      
lgAge -0.158 -0.230 -0.586*** 0.131 -0.455** -0.521*** 
 (0.288) (0.146) (0.133) (0.300) (0.185) (0.095) 
lgEdu -0.180 0.131* 0.041 0.063   
 (0.126) (0.069) (0.072) (0.152)   
Paddy    -0.107 -0.158* -0.056 
    (0.154) (0.085) (0.068) 
Orchard    -0.164 0.151 -0.010 
    (0.228) (0.138) (0.090) 
Cash_Crop    -0.099 -0.061 0.077 
    (0.155) (0.108) (0.060) 
 
Household Characteristics 
     
lgHHmem -0.238* 0.450*** 0.583*** -0.195 0.299*** 0.558*** 
 (0.133) (0.066) (0.063) (0.131) (0.091) (0.052) 
Dep_Rat -0.093 -0.064** 0.016 0.093 0.032 -0.043 
 (0.077) (0.032) (0.033) (0.070) (0.047) (0.028) 
lgFarm_Size 0.348***   0.436*** 0.149* 0.054* 
 (0.069)   (0.068) (0.089) (0.031) 
Land -0.467**   0.011 0.291*** 0.104 
 (0.186)   (0.170) (0.106) (0.077) 
Farm_Ass -0.168      
 (0.114)      
Oth_loan, 
Cre_Use 
-8.46e-08 3.03e-07*** 5.60e-07*** 0.407*** 0.125 0.179*** 
 (2.78e-07) (9.14e-08) (1.25e-07) (0.132) (0.135) (0.054) 
Tech_Acc -0.127 -0.063 -0.085*    
 (0.104) (0.049) (0.048)    
Ext_Acc 0.800***   0.398***   
 (0.117)   (0.119)   
Commer    -0.209   
    (0.203)   
Off_Farm 0.122 0.111** 0.055 0.099 0.099 0.080 
 (0.119) (0.056) (0.055) (0.122) (0.062) (0.050) 
 
Household Perceptions of Risk 
    
Pro_Risk -0.109   -0.134*   
 (0.071)   (0.072)   
Mkt_Risk -0.001   0.116*   
 (0.075)   (0.069)   
Fin_Risk 0.231***   0.025   
 (0.060)   (0.057)   
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Table 6.3     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Consumption 
Expenditure using the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) (cont.) 
 
Variables 













lgDis 0.373*** -0.019 -0.067** 0.074 -0.033 -0.063*** 
 (0.054) (0.031) (0.027) (0.054) (0.040) (0.022) 
Dist_N 0.077 -0.047 0.058 -0.251* -0.065 0.070 
 (0.131) (0.062) (0.056) (0.138) (0.126) (0.052) 
Dist_S -0.155 0.174*** 0.074 -0.355** 0.084 0.162*** 
 (0.144) (0.065) (0.062) (0.138) (0.096) (0.057) 
AC_Rela 0.939***   0.602***   
 (0.145)   (0.192)   
AC_Vill 0.617***   0.564***   
 (0.166)   (0.179)   
Comm_Att 0.249***   0.158***   
 (0.031)   (0.048)   
Constant -2.310* 11.49*** 12.83*** -3.581** 11.84*** 12.42*** 




















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns.   3.26*     0.86  
Observations   844   839 
Wald Chi2   127.91***   66.01***  
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 
3. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
Summary of Effects of AC Service Participation on Economic Welfare 
The effects of AC service participation on a household’s economic welfare are summarized in Table 
6.4. Table 6.4 provides estimates for the ATT and ATU by comparing the effects of AC credit and AC 
marketing service participation on household and farm incomes, and consumption. ATT presents the 
average effects gained from AC service participation among households who participate. ATU 
presents the average expected effects of AC service participation that would have happened if non-
participants choose to use AC services (counterfactual effect).  
The results suggest two important points. Firstly, AC credit and marketing services play important 
roles in improving household economic welfare. AC credit participation significantly improves 
household and farm incomes, and consumption for both treated (ATT) and untreated (ATU) groups at 
the 1% level. Regarding ATT, the results reveal that AC credit significantly increases household 
income (by 2.38%), farm income (by 12.48%), and consumption (by 2.31%) (see Table 6.4). The 
results of AC credit on income are inconsistent with Akerele and Akanni’s (2014) findings for Nigeria. 
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They conclude that cooperative credit fails to uplift farmers’ welfare since the cooperatives cannot 
encourage farmers to invest loans into farming. Regardless of the credit source, the income effect is 
in line with several studies on credit access (Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008), suggesting that credit 
has a positive impact on income. Moreover, the effects of ACs credit on consumption are consistent 
with Ahmed and Mesfin (2017) and Wossen et al.’s (2017) studies, who both report that Ethiopian 
and Nigerian ACs increase farm household consumption and that AC members’ consumption is 
higher than non-AC members. 
ACs are able to help those who have previously not had access to loans or never considered AC 
membership. If ACs expand credit to households who have not participated in AC credit previously, 
this may increase their economic welfare. The findings show that if households who have not 
previously borrowed money from ACs had done so, they would have had greater household income, 
farm income, and consumption by 1.06%, 5.43%, and 0.23%, respectively (ATU). If non-participating 
households borrowed from ACs, they would have had more money to invest in income generation 
activities. As a result, they would have earned more income and been able to consume more goods 
and services.  
AC marketing services play an important role in raising household and farm income but not 
household consumption. AC marketing services have significant and positive effects on household 
and farm income at the 1% level, for both treated and untreated groups. AC marketing services 
increase participants’ household income by 9.60% and farm income by 13.84% (ATT) (see Table 6.4). 
Similarly, in the untreated sample, non-participants’ household and farm incomes would increase by 
1.13% and 4.71%, respectively if they traded through AC marketing service (ATU). These results are in 
line with the findings of Calkins and Ngo, (2010) for Ghana, Fischer and Qaim (2012) for Ethiopia, 
Wollni and Zeller (2007) for Costa Rica, Bernard et al. (2008) and Ito et al. (2012) for China. AC 
marketing services increase AC members’ farm incomes as they provide low cost farm inputs and 
offer reasonable prices for farm products. Moreover, in Thailand, ACs allow members to purchase 
farm inputs using credit. AC members are able to obtain farm inputs in advance and pay later. 
Purchasing farm inputs on credit assists farmers facing liquidity constraints. However, AC marketing 
services do not impact household consumption. The effect on household consumption for AC 
marketing service participants is not significantly different from zero. This result indicates that 
household consumption does not change whether they trade with ACs or not. Similarly, non-





Table 6.4 Effects of AC Service Participation on Household Economic Welfare 
  
Outcomes AC Services Subsample 






  Actual Counterfactual 
Household Income 
Credit 
Participants 12.273 11.988 ATT = 0.285 17.971*** 2.38 
Non-Participants 11.977 12.104 ATU = 0.127 7.235*** 1.06 
   TH = 0.158   
Marketing 
Services 
Participants 12.342 11.261 ATT = 1.082 64.186*** 9.60 
Non-Participants 12.037 12.173 ATU = 0.136 10.503*** 1.13 
    TH = 0.946   
Farm Income 
Credit 
Participants 11.348 10.089 ATT = 1.259 19.416*** 12.48 
Non-Participants 9.959 10.500 ATU = 0.541 4.043*** 5.43 
   TH = 0.718   
Marketing 
Services 
Participants 11.640 10.225 ATT = 1.415 21.975*** 13.84 
Non-Participants 10.257 10.740 ATU = 0.483 7.060*** 4.71 




Participants 11.467 11.208 ATT = 0.258 34.731*** 2.31 
Non-Participants 11.353 11.380 ATU = 0.027 3.038*** 0.23 
   TH = 0.231   
Marketing 
Services 
Participants 11.435 11.442 ATT = -0.007 -0.743 -0.06 
Non-Participants 11.405 10.900 ATU = -0.504 -67.171*** -4.42 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data 





Transition heterogeneity (TH), which is the difference between ATT and ATU, is positive for three 
outcomes (household income, farm income, and consumption), indicating that the average effect of 
participation in AC credit and marketing services is greater for actual participants (ATT) compared to 
non-participants, if they had chosen to participate (ATU). This finding suggests that AC services are 
effective to improve economic welfare for the treated group. They meet the needs of their targeted 
group since actual participants obtain greater benefits from participation in AC credit and marketing 
services than non-participants. AC credit is less effective in improving household economic welfare 
than AC marketing services. ATT in AC credit model is less than AC marketing service model, 
indicating that trading through AC marketing channels provide households with economic benefits 
than borrowing AC credit. For instance, in the case of household income, ATT of AC credit 
participation (0.285) is smaller than the ATT of AC marketing service participation (1.082). The results 
for farm income and household consumption are interpreted similarly (see Table 6.4).  
6.3.3 Effect of Agricultural Cooperative Services on Household Social Welfare  
Effect of AC Services on Household Education 
The estimated results of participating in AC services on children’s education effects are reported in 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6. In this study, the effects of AC service participation on children’s education are 
measured using annual educational expenditure and school enrolment. The estimation of children’s 
education effect applies to the sub-sample of households who have school-aged children (between 6 
and15 years). While Table 6.5 reports the estimated results of participating in AC credit and 
marketing services on annual school expenditure for children, Table 6.6 reports the estimated results 
for school enrolment. The school enrolment variable is a dummy variable. School enrolment equals 
1, if all school-aged children in a household attend school, and 0 otherwise. 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show that the correlation coefficients (ρ) between the participation and outcome 
equations (educational expenditure for children and school enrolment) are not significantly different 
from zero, for both the AC credit and AC marketing models. This result indicates the absence of a 
selection bias arising from unobserved factors. Similarly, the Wald test results for joint independence 
of the three equations for the AC credit model (χ2= 0.22 for educational expense and χ2 = 0.49 for 
school enrolment) and the AC marketing service model (χ2 = 0.81 for educational expense and χ2 = 
0.59 for school enrolment) are not statistically significant.  This result suggests that the participation 
and education outcome equations for both AC service models are not jointly determined.  
All signs of the coefficients are as expected. Based on Table 6.5, educational expenditure for AC 
credit participants is positively influenced by a household head’s age and level of education. School 
expenditure for AC marketing service participants is only positively influenced by the number of 
household members. Among individual factors, the findings show that AC borrowers who are older 
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and have greater levels of education spend more on their children’s education than younger 
borrowers with lower levels of education. This finding is similar to Doan’s (2011), who argues that 
highly educated individuals who access AC credit spend more on monthly expenses for their 
children’s education. 
As expected, the number of household members has a positive and statistically significant effects on 
school expenditure for participants in AC marketing service model, at the 5% level. One possible 
reason is that the number of members in household reflects the number of income earners, thus, 
household expenditure for their children’s education increases with the number of household 
members.  
Regarding determinants of school enrolment effect, a household’s capability to support their school-
aged children to attend school is strongly determined by household members and the dependency 
ratio (see Table 6.6). The number of household members and the dependency ratio have significant 
and negative effects on school enrolment at the 1% level, for both participants and non-participants, 
in both AC service models. This result indicates that larger households with greater numbers of 
dependents are less able to send their children to school. Children in households with high 
dependency ratios are less likely to attend school compared to lower dependency ratio. One possible 
reason is they are often involved in house or agricultural works. Our survey data shows that most of 
the family members (66% of family members) work. This is consistent with Thailand Agricultural 
Census in 2013, which shows that 75% of members in agricultural families are involved in farm 
activities either full or part time (Chatarat et al., 2018). This implies that some school-aged children in 
high dependency ratio families must work as labourers to earn money for their family therefore they 











Table 6.5 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Educational Expenditure 
using the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) 
 
Variables 














Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.025 1.063** -0.170 0.301 -0.169 0.861* 
 (0.413) (0.417) (0.550) (0.387) (0.585) (0.515) 
lgEdu -0.207 0.746*** 0.078 -0.025 0.327 0.423* 
 (0.200) (0.195) (0.249) (0.264) (0.275) (0.254) 
Paddy -0.483**      
 (0.241)      
Orchard -0.870**      
 (0.377)      
Cash_Crop 0.029      
 (0.232)      
 
Household Characteristics 
    
lgHHmem 0.062 0.309 0.879*** -0.718** 0.571** 0.104 
 (0.256) (0.274) (0.263) (0.350) (0.288) (0.435) 
Dep_Rat -0.128 -0.004 0.165* 0.100 0.126 0.025 
 (0.110) (0.093) (0.087) (0.141) (0.114) (0.135) 
Oth_Loan, 
Cre_Use 
1.93e-07 2.27e-07 9.98e-07*** 0.157 0.331 0.428* 
(3.06e-07) (1.82e-07) (2.51e-07) (0.173) (0.298) (0.241) 
Land    0.007 0.509 0.270 
    (0.205) (0.322) (0.293) 
lgFarm_Size 0.269*** 0.095 -0.031 0.347** -0.015 0.385 
 (0.095) (0.118) (0.095) (0.157) (0.139) (0.270) 
Ext_Acc 0.706***   0.233   
 (0.184)   (0.322)   
 
Household Perceptions of Risk 
    
Pro_Risk -0.151   -0.303***   
 (0.112)   (0.075)   
Mkt_Risk -0.009   -0.023   
 (0.126)   (0.095)   
Fin_Risk 0.139   -0.100   
 (0.085)  
  (0.065)   
Geographic and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.218***      
 (0.079)      
Dist_N    -0.009   
    (0.224)   
Dist_S    -0.502*   
    (0.261)   
AC_Rela 0.788***   0.388   
 (0.211)   (0.856)   
AC_Vill 0.785***   0.509   
 (0.242)   (0.366)   
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Table 6.5     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Educational 
Expenditure using the Endogenous Switching Model (ESR) (cont.) 
 
Variables 













Commu 0.263***   0.083   
 (0.048)   (0.082)   
Constant -2.233 3.390* 8.904*** -1.138 7.926*** 4.513* 
 (1.975) (1.897) (2.597) (1.810) (2.709) (2.330) 
Sigma  1.234*** 1.175**  1.289 1.450 
  (0.072) (0.075)  (0.081) (0.511) 
Rho  0.084 0.076  0.195 0.944 
  (0.297) (0.191)  (0.264) (0.288) 
Wald Test of Indep. Eqns. 0.22 
  
0.81 
Observations   379   379 
Wald Chi2   22.55***   14.84** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 
















Table 6.6 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on School Enrolment using 
the Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) 
 
Variables 












     
Age_Yr 0.122** 0.029** 0.019 
 
0.024 0.025*** 




     
  (0.0005) 
     
Edu_Yr -0.020 0.025 -0.012 -0.021 0.065 -0.007 
  (0.023) (0.037) (0.040) (0.022) (0.050) (0.030) 
 
Household Characteristics 
    
Hhmem 0.037 -0.211*** -0.376*** -0.110** -0.349*** -0.253*** 
  (0.053) (0.073) (0.094) (0.053) (0.115) (0.060) 
Dep_Rat -0.004 -0.695*** -0.349** 0.053 -0.671*** -0.452** 
  (0.114) (0.166) (0.140) (0.106) (0.193) (0.178) 
FarmSi 0.013** 
  
0.016** -0.002 0.002 
  (0.006) 
  









Inc_PU -0.179 0.191 -0.103 
 
-0.300 0.114 




   
0.988** 0.185 
   




1.12e-07 3.33e-06 7.90e-07 0.214 0.196 0.027 










Household Perceptions of Risk 


























Geographic and Related Factors 
   
Dis_Town 0.024*** 
     
  (0.008) 
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Table 6.6     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on School Enrolment 
using the Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) (cont.) 
 
Variables 
AC Credit AC Marketing 
Participation 
(Y/N) 







AC_Rela 0.942***   0.964***   

















Constant -5.596*** 0.606 2.349** -1.024 1.021 1.299* 






















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns.  0.49  
 











Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 
3. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
Effect of AC Services on Improved Farm Skill Adoption 
Table 6.7 provides the estimated results of farm skill improvement for participating and non- 
participating households in terms of AC credit (the second and third columns) and AC agricultural 
extension services (the fifth and sixth columns). The Wald test for the AC credit model (χ2 = 227.54) 
and the AC agricultural extension service model (χ2 = 216.39) are statistically significantly at the 1% 
level, indicating that the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant. For the AC credit 
model, the coefficients of correlation (ρ) between the participation equation and the outcome 
functions (farm skill improvement) are negative, but they are not significantly different from zero. 
This result implies the absence of a selection bias for the AC credit model. Furthermore, the Wald 
test for joint independence of the three equations is not statistically significant (χ2= 0.98), suggesting 
that participation and outcome equations (farm skill improvement) are not jointly determined for the 
AC credit model.  
Regarding the AC agricultural extension services model, the correlation coefficients for participants 
and non-participants have the same positive sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level (see 
Table 6.7). The same positive sign suggests that while participants have an above average probability 
of adopting farm technologies and practices irrespective of participation in AC agricultural extension 
services, they are still better off participating. While non-participants have a below average 
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probability of adopting new technology regardless of participation, they are better off not 
participating (Alene & Manyong, 2007). Moreover, the Wald test for joint independence of the three 
equations is statistically significant at the 1% level (χ2= 10.09). This finding indicates that the decision 
to participate and farm skill improvement are influenced by unobserved factors. The selection bias 
occurs in the agricultural extension service model, therefore, the effect estimation of AC agricultural 
extension services on farm skill improvement must account for the selection bias using the ESR 
model. 
Table 6.7 reports that the probability of adopting improved farm technologies and practices for AC 
service participants is influenced by low quality farm products and household wealth. Firstly, the 
probability of the adoption for participants is significantly and positively influenced by low quality of 
farm products at the 1% level for both AC credit and agricultural extension service models. This result 
indicates that participants in AC credit and agricultural extension services who grow not good quality 
farm products and so they seek advice and technology to improve their crops. Households who 
access loans and farm technologies supported by ACs are able to afford farm technologies and 
improved inputs therefore they are more likely to apply improved farm technologies and inputs. This 
shows that ACs support farmers in adopting improved farm technologies and inputs by providing 
credit and agricultural extension services. 
The probability of participants adopting improved farm technologies and farm practices significantly 
increases with savings at the 5% and credit use at the 1% level for the AC agricultural extension 
service model, (see Table 6.7). This finding on credit use is in line with Ma (2016), Tiwari et al. (2008), 
and Wossen et al.’s (2017) findings, where credit accessibility assists households to unlock liquidity 
constraint which ultimately means they can invest in improved technologies. Similarly, savings 
provide liquidity; thus, households with savings are more likely to apply updated technologies and 
inputs. These results imply that households who have savings are more likely to invest in improved 
technologies and inputs to increase their production (Ma, 2016). 
Owning farm assets has a significantly negative effect on the probability of adopting improved farm 
technologies and practices at the 1% level, for both participants and non-participants in the AC 
agricultural extension service model. This result suggests that farmers who own agricultural tools (for 
example, a reaping hook, plough, sprayer, digger, or harrow) and machinery (a four-wheel tractor, 
hand tractor, trailer, tiller, or irrigation pump) are more likely to use traditional farming methods. This 
finding is consistent with Chatarat, Attavanich, Mahasuweerachai, Thampanichvong, and 
Chenphuengpawn (2019) and Ratanavararak et al.’s (2019) findings. Most of Thai farmers possess 
farm tools and machineries, however, they used traditional farming methods. For example, over 65% 
of agricultural household grows single crop (Chenphuengpawn, Chatarat, Attavanich, & Sangimnet, 
195 
 
2019). They use heavy agrochemicals, such as fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide, and barely apply 
modern farm technology and innovation to increase their production (Ratanavararak et al., 2019). 
The authors indicate that farmers’ decision to use the traditional method can be explained by three 
factors: farmers’ behaviour, technology access, and inefficient government policy (Chatarat et al., 
2019; Chenphuengpawn et al., 2019; Ratanavararak et al, 2019). Over 50% of labour in Thailand 
agricultural sector are elderly. The elderly farmers are risk averse with limited learning capability.  As 
a result, they do not have incentives to learn and adopt new farm knowledge and technologies. 
Secondly, small farmers, who are the majority of farmers in Thailand, cannot access modern 
technologies because it is costly. Lastly, the government policies do not encourage farmers to apply 
modern technologies. Thai government has focused on financial aid schemes such as crop price 
intervention and financial subsidy programs. These schemes can assist farmers in short-term but do 
not improve their agricultural production.  
Effect of AC Services on Household Health 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present the results of AC service participation on household health. This study 
measures health effect in terms of the affordability of medical treatment and improved healthcare 
access. While Table 6.8 shows the effects of AC credit and marketing participation on a household’s 
affordability in accessing health care facilities, Table6.9 shows the effects of AC credit and marketing 
participation on household improvement in health access. Health access improvement is a dummy 
variable. Household health access equals 1 if households have more ability to access medical 
treatment, 0 otherwise. 
Table 6.8 shows that only the correlation coefficients (ρ) for non-participants in AC marketing 
services is statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative correlation, which indicates a positive 
selection bias, suggests that households who have greater health affordability than the average level 
are less likely to participate in AC marketing services. The presence of a selection bias for the AC 
marketing model is confirmed by the Wald test results for joint independence of the three equations. 
The Wald test result (χ2= 9.06) is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the error 
terms of participation and health affordability equations in the AC marketing service model are 
related. Ignoring the selection bias in the model leads to biased results. Therefore, we must use the 
ESR model to evaluate the effects of AC marketing service to mitigate the selection bias. In terms of 
the AC credit model, the results indicate the absence of a selection bias since both correlation 
coefficients and the Wald test for joint independence of the three equations (χ2= 0.35) is not 





Table 6.7 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Adoption of Improved 
Farm Technologies and Practices using the Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) 
 
Variables 
AC Credit AC Agricultural Extension 
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Adoption of Improved 
Farm Skills Participation 
(Y/N) 








Individual Characteristics     
Age_Yr 0.084** -0.074 0.101** 0.079** -0.062 0.133*** 
 (0.036) (0.070) (0.050) (0.038) (0.072) (0.044) 
Age_Sq -0.0008** 0.0006 -0.0009* -0.0007** 0.0006 -0.001*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) 
Edu_Yr -0.023 0.0260 0.030 0.002 0.014 0.069** 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) 
Sex -0.149 -0.183 0.072 -0.249** -0.014 -0.126 
 (0.109) (0.163) (0.162) (0.107) (0.152) (0.155) 
Paddy -0.377**   -0.449***   
 (0.171)   (0.154)   
Orchard 0.015   -0.541***   
 (0.249)   (0.209)   
Cash_Crop 0.506***   0.434***   
 (0.161)   (0.152)   
 
Household Characteristics 
    
Farm_Mem 0.009 0.047 -0.161* 0.085 0.076 -0.097 
 (0.064) (0.084) (0.089) (0.055) (0.081) (0.097) 
Farm_Si 0.012** -0.0006 -0.005 0.001 -0.0002 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Farm_Sq -5.36e-05**   -1.17e-05   
 (2.73e-05)   (2.45e-05)   
Sav -0.234** 0.233 0.062 -0.026 0.330** -0.012 
 (0.103) (0.149) (0.156) (0.102) (0.141) (0.151) 
Farm_Ass -0.286**   -0.162 -0.568*** -0.471*** 
 (0.130)   (0.107) (0.164) (0.172) 
Land -0.308* 0.078 0.008 0.160 0.057 -0.049 
 (0.178) (0.231) (0.247) (0.178) (0.236) (0.223) 
Inc_PU -0.093 -0.248 0.154 -0.073 -0.341* 0.208 
 (0.128) (0.183) (0.186) (0.131) (0.183) (0.187) 
Off_Farm  -0.034 -0.183 0.138 -0.038 -0.160 
  (0.177) (0.182) (0.119) (0.174) (0.178) 
Oth_Loan,  -2.54e-07   0.977*** 0.963*** 0.405** 
Cre_Use (2.85e-07)   (0.120) (0.215) (0.166) 
Ext_Acc 0.782***      
 (0.148)      
 
Household Perceptions of Risk 
    
Pro_Risk -0.026   0.057   
 (0.070)   (0.068)   
Mkt_Risk -0.043   0.0001   
 (0.0748)   (0.068)   
Fin_Risk 0.171**   0.179***   
 (0.075)   (0.060)   
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Table 6.7     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Adoption of Improved 
Farm Technologies and Practices using Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) (cont.) 
 
Variables 
AC Credit AC Agricultural Extension 
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Adoption of Improved 
Farm Skills Participation 
(Y/N) 








Weather  0.021 -0.069  0.008 -0.081 
  (0.081) (0.094)  (0.085) (0.082) 
Pest  0.058 0.117  0.030 0.095 
  (0.067) (0.090)  (0.066) (0.080) 
Soil  0.065 0.129*  -0.019 0.261*** 
  (0.060) (0.072)  (0.061) (0.072) 
Irr_Acc  -0.056 -0.019  -0.043 0.056 
  (0.146) (0.163)  (0.141) (0.156) 
Qual  0.186*** -0.094  0.164*** -0.069 
  (0.064) (0.070)  (0.059) (0.067) 
 
Geographic Factors 
     
Dis_Town 0.020***      
 (0.005)      
Dist_N 0.402*** 0.278 -0.406** 0.418*** 0.181 -0.296 
 (0.135) (0.181) (0.204) (0.133) (0.183) (0.200) 
Dist_S -0.110 -0.100 -0.294 0.112 -0.225 -0.059 
 (0.142) (0.193) (0.214) (0.139) (0.180) (0.212) 
AC_Rela (IV) 1.067***   0.961***   
 (0.153)   (0.150)   
AC_Vill    0.794***   
    (0.149)   
Constant -3.429*** 1.922 -1.852 -4.389*** 1.051 -3.091** 



















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns.   0.98     10.09***  
Observations   850  
 850 
Wald Chi2   227.54***  
 216.39*** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 







Regarding health access improvement, the selection bias does not occur in the AC credit and 
marketing models. Table 6.9 shows that the correlation coefficients for both AC credit and marketing 
service models are not significant. Furthermore, the Wald test for joint independence of the three 
equations for the AC credit model (χ2= 1.48) and for the AC marketing service model (χ2= 0.49) are 
not statistically significant. These results suggest that unobserved factors do not influence a 
household’s decision to participate in AC credit and marketing services nor do they affect the 
outcome (health access improvement) for both participants and non-participants. 
Regarding determinants of health effect, household health affordability for AC service participants 
has a strong correlation with age, paddy farming, farm size, savings, land ownership, and financial 
risk (see Table 6.8). Based on individual characteristics, age significantly and positively influences 
household health affordability at the 1% level for the AC credit model, and at the 5% level for the AC 
marketing service model. This result implies that older AC participants have more ability to pay for 
healthcare when they need it. One possible reason is higher income and less consumption. According 
to section 6.3.2, among the AC credit and marketing service participants, the older participants 
obtain higher household income due to more experience in farm production and AC participation. In 
addition, households will spend less for food and children education when they get old.  
Paddy farming exhibits a significant and negative impact with household health affordability at the 
5% level for the AC credit model. This result implies that AC borrowers who are rice farmers are less 
able to afford healthcare compared to those who grow other crops. One possible reason is rice 
farmers earn less income than other farmers. The results of the T-test using survey data provides 
evidence that the average household income of rice farmers is significantly lower than those of other 
farmers at the 1% level (t=4.6590). On average, rice farmers earn around 227,500 baht a year, while 
other farmers earn approximately 508,343 baht a year (see Appendix C.2). 
Regarding household characteristics, coefficients of farm size are positively significant on health 
affordability for every household group at the 1% level. This result suggests that household 
affordability to health access increases with farm size (see Table 6.8). Farm size refers to farm 
production scale. The larger the farm, the more income a household earns: thus, their ability to pay 
for healthcare. For other wealth indicators, savings are positively significant for health affordability at 
the 5% level for AC credit model, but not significant for the AC marketing service model. However, 
financial risk is significant and negative for both participants and non-participants in the AC credit 
and marketing models at the 1% level. Similarly, land ownership significantly and negatively affects 
participants in AC credit at the 1% level, and AC marketing services at the 10% level. The effects of 
wealth may be explained by liquidity. Households with higher savings have more liquidity; thus they 
are more able to afford healthcare compared to those who are less wealth. Similarly, financial risk is 
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negatively related to health affordability, suggesting that households with higher financial risks are 
less able to afford healthcare because of high liquidity constraints. However, households which 
possess greater land/farm assets need to spend money on maintaining them, thus, they have less 
money left for healthcare. 
Health accessibility improvement for AC service participants is significantly determined by the 
household head’s education and land ownership at the 1% level (see Table 6.9). Household head’s 
education positively influences improved household access to health facilities for every household 
group. This result is consistent with Doan’s (2011) finding that Vietnamese households with greater 
education levels and credit access spend more on healthcare. For land ownership, the relationship 
between land ownership and health access improvement is in line with the effect of landholding on 
health affordability, which is a negative relationship.  
Summary of AC Service Participation on Household Social Welfare 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 present the estimates for the average treatment effects of AC service 
participation on household education and health outcomes. The results indicate four important 
points. Firstly, both AC credit and marketing services do not improve children’s education; 
educational expenditure or school enrolment (see Tables 6.10-6.11). In terms of educational 
expenditure, both AC credit and marketing services do not increase households’ educational 
expenditure for both treated (ATT) and untreated (ATU) groups (see Table 6.10). Regarding treated 
samples, the findings show that ATT is not statistically significant for the AC credit model, indicating 
that AC credit borrowers do not spend more on their children’s education. However, the ATT of AC 
marketing services is significantly negative at the 1% level, implying that households trading with ACs 
tend to spend less on their children by 18.13%. These results suggest that AC credit and trading with 
ACs do not lead to greater spending on children’s education. These findings reflect the fact that Thai 
schools are publicly funded. Children aged between 6 to 15 years can attend public schools at no cost 
(Constitution Drafting Commission, 2007). The government has established the free education to 
make it more accessible for Thai children and to reduce parents’ costs. This support covers tuition 
fees, textbooks, stationery, and uniforms (Ministry of Education Thailand, 2010). Due to government 
assistance, households do not spend much on their children’s education. Therefore, as the models 
show, educational expense does not differ among the households. The results are consistent with 
the findings of Coleman (1999) in Thailand and Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) in Pakistan, 
indicating that credit borrowing is not significant in terms of school expenses. Similarly, for untreated 
samples, both AC credit and marketing services have a significant and negative effects on household 
education expenditure at the 1% level. This result suggests that non-participants would have spent 
less for their children education if they had borrowed from AC credit (0.72%) and trade with ACs 
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(4.14%). These results indicate that AC services do not increase household educational expenditure 
for both participant and non-participants.  
Table 6.8 Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Health Affordability using 
the Endogenous Switching Regression Model (ESR) 
 
Variables 













Individual Characteristics       
lgAge -0.062 2.489*** 0.748 0.067 2.835** 1.406 
 (0.289) (0.921) (1.186) (0.282) (1.160) (1.004) 
lgEdu -0.115 0.594 -0.149 0.044 0.595 0.079 
 (0.127) (0.485) (0.561) (0.142) (0.672) (0.462) 
Paddy -0.464*** -1.036** -0.995 -0.118 -0.510 -1.102* 
 (0.171) (0.455) (0.828) (0.153) (0.534) (0.601) 
Orchard -0.269 -1.245 1.594 -0.201 -0.657 0.763 
 (0.239) (1.101) (1.042) (0.235) (1.381) (0.972) 
Cash_Crop 0.323* 0.144 -0.761 -0.026 -0.087 -0.253 
 (0.165) (0.601) (0.861) (0.146) (0.763) (0.576) 
 
Household Characteristics 
     
lgHHmem -0.230* 0.587 0.806 -0.202 0.164 1.153** 
 (0.133) (0.427) (0.585) (0.128) (0.586) (0.450) 
Dep_Rat -0.116 0.308 -0.612 0.113 0.121 -0.285 
 (0.081) (0.211) (0.377) (0.071) (0.270) (0.303) 
lgFarm_Size 0.231*** 1.865*** 1.50*** 0.415*** 1.844*** 1.30*** 
 (0.074) (0.265) (0.342) (0.071) (0.333) (0.285) 
Sav -0.084 0.707** 1.233** 0.224** 0.541 1.107*** 
 (0.113) (0.358) (0.511) (0.107) (0.480) (0.405) 
Farm_Ass -0.176 -0.457 -0.352 0.131 0.023 -0.893** 
 (0.117) (0.400) (0.567) (0.113) (0.488) (0.434) 
Land -0.391** -1.184*** -0.520 -0.047 -1.094* -0.908 
 (0.180) (0.401) (0.889) (0.167) (0.583) (0.597) 
Commer 0.081 0.866 1.191** -0.090 1.735 1.172** 
 (0.126) (1.222) (0.555) (0.135) (1.317) (0.508) 
Oth_Loan, 
Cre_Use 
-1.78e-07   0.406*** 0.448 -0.098 
 (2.97e-07)   (0.132) (0.698) (0.479) 
Ext_Acc 0.799***   0.392***   
 (0.123)   (0.118)   
 
Household Perceptions of Risk 
    
Pro_Risk -0.059 -0.081 -0.211 -0.086 0.030 -0.300 
 (0.075) (0.210) (0.346) (0.070) (0.271) (0.257) 
Mkt_Risk -0.010 0.027 -0.291 0.105 0.093 -0.348 
 (0.078) (0.287) (0.429) (0.074) (0.326) (0.353) 
Fin_Risk 0.225*** -0.744*** -1.108*** 0.014 -0.710*** -0.945*** 
 (0.063) (0.204) (0.311) (0.061) (0.246) (0.242) 
  
     
Table 6.8     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Health Affordability 





AC Credit AC Marketing Services 
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Health Affordability Participation 
(Y/N) 
Health Affordability 
Geographic Factors      
lgDis 0.292***      
 (0.056)      
Dist_N 0.353** 0.358 -0.458 -0.209 -0.247 0.125 
 (0.144) (0.516) (0.633) (0.133) (0.712) (0.515) 
Dist_S -0.167 -0.786 -0.450 -0.349*** -0.372 -0.672 
 (0.151) (0.497) (0.647) (0.134) (0.565) (0.550) 
AC_Rela 0.941***   0.699***   
 (0.150)   (0.163)   
AC_Vill 0.581***   0.526***   
 (0.177)   (0.159)   
Comm_Att 0.249***   0.196***   
 (0.033)   (0.033)   
Constant -2.329* -3.403 6.604 -3.581** -6.564 3.688 




















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns. (Chi2) 0.30    9.06*** 
Observations   839   839 
Wald Chi2     113.24***     79.85*** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 













Table 6.9  Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Health Access 
Improvement using the Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) 
 
Variables 
AC Credit AC Marketing Services 
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Health Access Improvement 
Participation 
(Y/N) 







Individual Characteristics      
Age_Yr -0.003 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Edu_Yr -0.030* 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.011 0.096*** 0.063*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
Paddy -0.459*** 0.396* 0.538* -0.092 0.352 0.566*** 
 (0.170) (0.223) (0.300) (0.154) (0.244) (0.215) 
Orchard -0.219 1.030*** 0.552** 0.032 0.169 0.236 
 (0.246) (0.323) (0.271) (0.172) (0.254) (0.210) 
Cash_Crop 0.482*** 0.215 0.223 -0.220 0.189 1.109*** 
 (0.168) (0.209) (0.256) (0.228) (0.436) (0.246) 
 
Household Characteristics 
     
HH_Mem -0.046 0.063 0.019 -0.039 0.011 0.083* 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.059) (0.034) (0.067) (0.048) 
Dep_Rat -0.145* 0.054 -0.109 0.090 0.086 -0.061 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.108) (0.071) (0.121) (0.096) 
Farm_Si 0.013** -0.006* 0.002 0.018*** -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Farm_Sq -5.77e-05**   -6.96e-05**   
 (2.70e-05)   (3.06e-05)   
Inc_PU  0.082 0.611***  0.068 0.406*** 
  (0.178) (0.165)  (0.230) (0.140) 
Farm_Ass -0.182   0.188   
 (0.121)   (0.136)   
Land -0.318* -0.545*** 0.053 -0.038   
 (0.173) (0.195) (0.249) (0.236)   
Oth_Loan, 
Cre_Use 
-8.34e-08 3.97e-07 -3.09e-07 0.386*** 0.392 0.010 
(2.93e-07) (5.97e-07) (5.47e-07) (0.127) (0.304) (0.249) 
Ext_Acc 0.745***   0.342*   
 (0.141)   (0.200)   
Commer    -0.065   
    (0.182)   
Household Perceptions of Risk     
Pro_Risk -0.056   -0.051   
 (0.098)   (0.153)   
Mkt_Risk -0.016   0.0991   
 (0.088)   (0.120)   
Fin_Risk 0.239***   0.012   
 (0.065)   (0.075)   
 
Geographic Factors 
     
Dis_Town 0.019*** 0.003 -0.017*       
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)       
Dist_N 0.416*** -0.212 -0.401* -0.170 -0.440 -0.145 
 (0.144) (0.210) (0.213) (0.133) (0.277) (0.172) 
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Table 6.9     Effects of AC Credit and AC Marketing Service Participation on Health Access 
Improvement using the Endogenous Switching Probit Model (ESP) (Cont.) 
 
Variables 
AC Credit AC Marketing Services 
Participation 
(Y/N) 
Health Access Improvement 
Participation 
(Y/N) 







Dist_S -0.187 -0.291 0.247 -0.332* -0.313 0.237 
 (0.156) (0.198) (0.191) (0.172) (0.246) (0.201) 
 (0.155)   (0.176)   
AC_Vill 0.597***   0.586***   
 (0.191)   (0.214)   
Comm_Att 0.259***   0.183***   
 (0.033)   (0.037)   
Constant -1.942*** -1.687*** -2.118*** -2.678*** -2.381** -2.604*** 



















Wald Test of Indep. Eqns. (Chi2) 1.48   0.49 
Observations   850   839 
Wald Chi2    252.28***     147.90***  
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are given in brackets 
3. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
Regarding the effect on school enrolment, AC credit and marketing services do not improve school 
enrolment rates. Table 6.11 reveals that AC credit and AC marketing participation have significantly 
negative effects on school enrolment for participants at the 1% level. This result indicates that 
households who join AC services are less likely to send all their school-aged children to school (ATT). 
This finding is consistent with Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel's (2010) study, who reports that 
agricultural credit participation in Malawi decreases school attendance rates. The authors explain 
that when households borrow credit, they are more involved in income generating activities. As a 
result, children are employed to work at home or on the farm. This situation is similar with our 
survey data, showing that young children (those under school age) engage in household or farm work 
and start to work full-time when they reach 15 years old. If households borrow more money, their 
school-aged children are more likely to work. Therefore, there is less probability of sending every 







Table 6.10  Effects of AC Service Participation on Household Social Welfare 
  
Outcomes AC Services Group 
Mean Outcome Average 
Treatment Effect 





Participants 9.813 9.844 ATT = -0.031 -1.142 -0.32 
Non-Participants 9.751 9.681 ATU = -0.070 -2.282** -0.72 
    TH = 0.039   
Marketing 
Services 
Participants 9.730 11.885 ATT = -2.154 -68.297*** -18.13 
Non-Participants 9.781 9.376 ATU = -0.405 -17.379*** -4.14 
     TH = -1.749   
Health Affordability 
Credit 
Participants 10.987 9.661 ATT = 1.326 20.501*** 13.72 
Non-Participants 9.785 10.052 ATU = 0.267 3.574*** 2.73 
    TH = 1.059   
Marketing 
Services 
Participants 11.437 8.031 ATT = 3.406 49.767*** 42.41 
Non-Participants 9.946 9.530 ATU = -0.416 -8.188*** -4.18 
     TH = 3.822   
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 








Table 6.11  Effects of AC Service Participation on Household Social Welfare  
 
School Enrolment Average Treatment Effect T-Value 
Credit 
ATT = -0.064 -7.709*** 
ATU = -0.094 -11.027*** 
 TH = 0.03  
Marketing Services 
ATT = -0.115 -10.010*** 
ATU = 0.073 8.432*** 
 TH = -0.188  
Adoption of Improved Farm Skill Average Treatment Effect T-Value 
Credit ATT = 0.111 12.770*** 
 ATU = 0.125 16.499*** 
 TH = -0.014  
Agricultural Extension Services ATT = -0.124 -17.914*** 
 ATU = -0.260 -20.154*** 
 TH = 0.136  
Health Access Improvement Average Treatment Effect T-Value 
Credit 
ATT = 0.110 17.363*** 
 ATU = -0.031 -4.619*** 
 TH = 0.141  
Marketing Services 
ATT = 0.042 5.906*** 
ATU = -0.096 -19.486*** 
 TH = 0.138  
Note:   1. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
 3. TH stands for transition heterogeneity 
Secondly, in terms of informal education for adults, AC credit plays an important role in the adoption 
of improved farm practices and technologies for both participants and non-participants (see Table 
6.11). AC credit participation significantly increases the adoption of improved farm technologies and 
skills for participants at the 1% level. This result indicates that households who borrow AC credit are 
more likely to implement improved farm technologies and practices (see Table 6.11). Similar results 
are obtained for non-participants in AC credit who would have been more likely to adopt updated 
farm technologies and practices if they had borrowed money from ACs (ATU).  
In contrast, participation in agricultural extension services offered by ACs does not improve a 
household’s adoption of farm technologies and practices. The result reveals that the probability of 
farm technology adoption significantly decreases with participation in AC agricultural extension 
services at the 1% level for both treated (ATT) and untreated (ATU) samples (see Table 6.11). These 
results suggest that ACs do not work well in farm production development. This may be explained by 
several reasons. Most farmers prefer to use traditional methods for farming because they confront 
high production costs and debts (Chanthakhananurak, Thaipakdee, & Seeniang, 2015; Chatarat et al., 
2018). Hence, they do not have enough capital to invest in new technologies and farm inputs. 
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Moreover, approximately 49% of the respondents are over 55 years of age and 34% of the 
respondents are over 60 years old. Since most of the households are elderly, they are reluctant to 
learn new farming methods. Finally, AC agricultural extension projects are frequently short term. 
Time constraints associated with AC projects obstruct efficient household implementation 
(Pleehachinda, 2003). These findings contradict Calkins and Ngo (2010), Francesconi and Ruben 
(2007), and Getnet and Anullo’s (2012) results, showing that AC agricultural extension services 
improve farmers’ production by motivating members to apply improved seed and use updated farm 
implements.  
Thirdly, both AC credit and marketing participation have positive effects on the improvement of 
household health access. In this study, health effect is measured using health affordability and access 
to health treatment when households are sick. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that both AC credit and 
marketing services enhance a household’s health affordability and access to health treatments. The 
results show that an increase in health affordability for AC credit and marketing service participants 
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This result suggests that households who borrow 
AC credit and trade with ACs have greater access health facilities by 13.72% and 42.41%, respectively 
(see Table 6.10). In short, participation in AC credit and marketing services increase household and 
farm incomes; eventually, participants have a greater capacity to afford health treatment. 
ACs should extend their credit to non-AC members in order to improve their household health 
affordability. Non-participants’ health affordability would significantly increase (by 2.73% at the 1% 
level) if they had borrowed from ACs (see Table 6.10). However, AC marketing services cannot 
improve health affordability for households who do not participate. AC marketing services have a 
significant and negative effect on non-participants’ health affordability at the 1% level, suggesting 
that non-participants would have had been even less likely to afford medical treatment (by 4.18%) if 
they had traded with ACs.  
In terms of health access, AC credit and marketing services have a significantly positive effect on 
households’ health access at the 1% level.   This result implies that households who borrow money 
and trade with ACs are more likely to improve their accessibility to medical treatment (see Table 
6.11). The findings are consistent with Setboonsarng and Parpiev's (2008) study, which concludes 
that microcredit access in Pakistan significantly increases the probability of participants seeking 
medical treatment and households’ funds to pay for medical treatment. For untreated respondents, 
both AC credit and marketing service significantly decrease households’ access medical treatment, at 
the 1% level. This finding indicates that households who do not join AC services would have had less 
probability of medical access if they had participated in AC services. This implies that health access 
for non-participants will not improve if they participate in AC credit and marketing services.  
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Finally, the TH of health outcomes are positive for both the AC credit and marketing service models 
(see Table 6.10 for TH of health affordability and Table 6.11 for TH of health access improvement). 
These results indicate that actual participants would have obtained health benefits more than the 
non-participants in AC credit and marketing services. However, the TH of AC credit is negative for the 
implementation of improved farm technologies and practices (see Table 6.11). The AC credit 
participants would have gained less benefit from AC credit borrowing than non-participants if they 
had participated. This finding suggests that AC credit will work more effectively in increasing the 
adoption of improved technologies and practices, if they extend credit to non-members.  
6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter evaluates the effects of participation in AC credit and non-credit support services on 
household welfare using cross sectional data from 2017. The effects of AC service participation on 
household welfare are evaluated using two models (ESR and ESP) to control for selection bias. The 
results of both models can be condensed into four points. The selection bias is present in the effects 
of AC credit participation on farm income and household consumption, indicating that there are 
unobservable factors influencing a household’s decision to participate in AC credit and outcomes: 
farm income and consumption. Similarly, the effects of AC marketing service participation on 
household income, farm income, and health affordability incur a selection bias, suggesting that a 
household’s decision to participate in AC marketing services and outcomes (household income, farm 
income, and health affordability) are influenced by unobserved factors. The selection bias also takes 
place in the effect of AC agricultural extension service participation on the adoption of improved 
farm technologies and practices. The ESR and ESP models are used to mitigate the selection bias 
arising from observed and unobserved factors.  
AC credit and AC marketing services play important roles in improving household economic welfare. 
AC credit exhibits significant positive effects on household and farm income, and household 
consumption for both participants and non-participants. Households who access AC credit have more 
money to invest in income generation activities; as a result, they will earn more income and are able 
to consume more goods and services. Regarding AC marketing services, participation in these 
services increases household and farm income but not consumption. Trading using AC marketing 
services increases household and farm income for participants, and would have a similar effect for 
non-participants if they chose to use these services. 
Interestingly, AC credit and marketing services do not improve children’s education in terms of 
educational expenses and school enrolment rates. Since the Thai government subsidises compulsory 
education for children aged 6 to 15, educational spending is minimal and differs very little between 
households. Moreover, borrowing AC credit decreases the probability of sending every school-aged 
208 
 
children to school. More borrowing in AC credit makes parents more involve in income generation so 
children tend to work to help their parents. 
Only AC credit considerably increases the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, 
which indicates the role of AC credit in farm production development. However, using AC agricultural 
extension services does not improve farm production since it cannot encourage participants to adopt 
improved farm technologies and practices. Under health effects, households’ health affordability and 
health access improve when they borrow money from, or trade with, ACs. Households have more 
income when they participate in AC credit and marketing services, thus, they have money to access 
medical treatment when they are sick. 
The TH for household income, farm income, consumption, and health affordability are positive for 
both AC credit and marketing service models. These results provide evidence that ACs offer services 
to the right customers since the current participants obtain higher benefits than non-participants if 
they had chosen to participate. However, the TH of the adoption of improved farm technologies and 
practices is negative for the AC credit model. The negative TH indicates that the effect of AC credit 
would have been higher for non-participants if they had chosen to borrow money. This finding means 
that if non-participating households had chosen to borrow AC loan, they would have been more 
likely to invest in the improved farm technologies and practices than the actual participants. This 
finding indicates that ACs can increase their effectiveness in farm production development by 
extending credit to non-member households.  
Effect comparison between AC credit and marketing services indicates that AC credit is less effective 
in improving household economic welfare than AC marketing services. Similarly, AC marketing 
services are more effective in improving social welfare in terms of household health affordability and 






This chapter summarizes the study’s findings. Section 7.1 refreshes the background of the research, 
as well as the questions, objectives and methodology. Section 7.2 presents the study’s major 
findings. While section 7.3 discusses the implications of the study’s findings, section 7.4 provides the 
limitations and directions for future research. 
7.1 Reseach Background and Methodology 
Thailand faces significant challenges regarding poverty. Although the national poverty rate has 
reduced substantially over the last three decades, from 67% in 1986 to 7.1% in 2015, more than 6.7 
million Thais remain vulnerable to falling back into poverty (World Bank, 2018). Most of the poor live 
in rural areas (Lewis et al., 2013). Rural households remain impoverished while confronting 
constraints such as limited access to resources, low educational outcomes, insufficient financial 
capital and inability to access financial and product markets (Mojo et al., 2017).  
Credit and non-credit support services (marketing and agricultural extension services) play a crucial 
role in assisting Thai rural households to escape poverty. Credit access allows households to unlock 
liquidity constraints to enable greater investment in economic activities and smooth their 
consumption (Reed, 2011). Non-credit support services assist farm households to improve their 
productivity and access input and output markets by reducing transaction costs, raising bargaining 
power, and obtaining market information (Ma, 2016). As a result, rural populations are able to 
improve their productivity, asset formation, and income. Increase in income would enhance the 
poor’s opportunities to attain improved nutrition and access essential services. 
Even though Thai ACs provide credit and non-credit support programs for rural households, poverty 
statistics for this group remains high. One possible cause impeding AC’s effectiveness in improving 
rural households’ welfare is low participation rates. Another possible reason is that AC members do 
not use integrated services available to them. Strong member participation in AC services is a crucial 
factor affecting their performances and members’ benefits (Ruete, 2014; Williams, 2007). If there is 
low member participation or trade, ACs will not have sufficient capital to survive and thus their 
ability to help will be curtailed. Low member participation in Thai ACs should be critically analysed to 
make them more effective in alleviating poverty. 
Our study examines how ACs help Thai rural households to improve their welfare. It investigates how 
ACs can improve their services in order to meet members’ needs and increase their effectiveness in 
210 
 
household welfare enhancement. There are four research objectives in this study: (i) to review ACs’ 
role in improving Thai rural household welfare; (ii) to investigate the determinants of rural 
households’ participations in AC credit and non-credit support services; (iii) to evaluate the effects of 
AC credit provisions on Thai rural households’ economic and social welfare; and (iv) to examine the 
effects of AC non-credit support programs on Thai rural households’ economic and social welfare. 
The data for our study was collected from rural households in the Nakhonratchasima province, in the 
Northeast of Thailand, using a structured questionnaire. Nakhonratchasima was selected as the study 
area since it had the greatest number of AC members in Thailand: 305,627 members and 99 ACs as of 
December 2018 (Cooperative Promotion Department, 2019). Nakhonratchasima is divided into six 
areas based on the provincial development plan and policy. The study used a two-stage stratified 
sampling technique to select the rural household sample and obtain the best representatives from 
the study population. The first stage involved selecting one district from each group that had the 
greatest number of AC members. Pakchong, Pakthongchai, Phimai, Nonsung, Dankhunthot, and 
Buayai were selected as the study areas. In the second stage, households were selected from each 
district. The sample from each district was calculated using the disproportionate stratified random 
sampling method. In total 851 households were interviewed, of which 560 (66%) were AC members, 
and 291 (34%) were non-AC members. 
Our study applied the probit model to estimate the probability of AC credit and agricultural extension 
service participation. Regarding AC services, the Heckman selection model was used to examine the 
determinants influencing AC service participation and participation level. Our study considered three 
AC services: credit, input and output marketing services. Thus, there were three Heckman selection 
models used in our study. The Heckman selection model for each AC service consisted of both a 
participation equation and participation level equation. These systems of equations were estimated 
using the Heckman two-stage approach. To obtain consistent coefficients, our study used 
household’s expected benefits from AC services as a selection instrument variable in the Heckman 
selection model. This variable was chosen because it affects a household’s decision to participate in 
AC services, but it does not affect their level of participation. 
To answer research objectives three and four, our study applied the ESR and the ESP to evaluate the 
effects of AC service participation on households’ economic and social welfare. As the ESR model is 
suitable for continuous outcomes, we used it to evaluate the AC effect on household income, farm 
income, household consumption, educational expense, and health affordability. In contrast, the ESP 
model is only capable of dealing with binaries and thus was used to determine outcomes for school 
enrolment, adoption of improved farm technologies and practices, and health access improvement. 
Both models used the FIML method to estimate participation and outcome equations 
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simultaneously. For consistency, our study used AC neighbour membership (AC_Rela) and the 
presence of AC in a household’s village (AC_Vill) as instrument variables in the ESR and ESP models. 
These variables influence a household’s decision to participate in AC services, but they do not affect 
their welfare. 
The sampled households (see section 4.4) in our study are representative of Thailand rural household 
in general. According to Thailand National Survey data, most of Thai farmers are elderly. At the 
country level, 46% of Thai farmers are older than 55 years old (The agricultural census, 2013). The 
national survey data is consistent with our survey data, which showed that 50% of our sampled 
households are over 55 years old. A significant proportion of farmers have attended primary 
education (64% of all Thai farmers and 72% of our sampled households). The majority of farmers 
owned agricultural land less than 40 rais (around 87% of all Thai farmers and 83% of our sampled 
households). The average farmers’ farm size at the country level is about 20 rais and for our sampled 
households it is about 25 rais. Most farmers owned land (65% of all Thai farmers and 70% of our 
sampled respondents). Over 60% of Thai farmers and our sampled respondents grow rice. Moreover, 
around 42% of Thai farmers and 43% of our sampled respondents can access to water resources for 
farm production. Although, the survey of this study covers only one province, the surveyed data is 
reflective of the national survey. The Nakhonratchasima province is Thailand’s largest agricultural 
land areas. Significantly, the total area of farmland in this province is 6.6 million rais (National 
Statistic Office, 2013). Since the Nakhonratchasima province shares borders with the Central and 
Eastern parts of Thailand, agricultural land of this province is diverse (Siamwalla et al., 1990; 
Netayarak, 1998). With a variety of geographical landscapes (river plains, highlands, and 
mountainous areas), farmers in the Nakhonratchasima province grow a wide variety of crops 
including the primary crops similar to famers in other provinces of Thailand. In addition, our 
demographic results reflect the national survey demographic data, thus the results of this study can 
be generalised at country level. 
7.2 Major Findings  
Our study provides detailed information about how ACs can increase their membership numbers and 
utilization of their service. ACs can use these findings to improve their services provision, which in 
turn will improve household welfare. The current study examines two issues. Firstly, which factors 
influence a household’s decision to participate in AC and AC services? Secondly, how do AC services 
impact household welfare? The findings are summarized below. 
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7.2.1 Determinants of AC Service Participation  
Our study examines factors relating to household participation in AC and AC services in Thailand. The 
probit model results confirm prior studies’ findings (see Bernard et al., 2008; Bernard & Spielmen, 
2009; Ito et al., 2012; Mojo et al., 2017), which indicate that the probability of participation in ACs is 
influenced by household characteristics, household perceptions of agricultural risks, perception of AC 
benefits, and geographical factors. First, crop type has a strong and positive influence on AC 
participation. Cash crop farmers have a higher probability of becoming AC members compared to 
farmers who do not grow cash crops. In contrast, paddy farmers are less likely to participate in ACs. 
Farm size results reveal that medium-sized farmers are more likely to join ACs compared to those 
who have small or large farms. Moreover, credit use and access to agricultural extension services 
increase the probability of AC participation. Farmers using credit are more likely to join ACs, 
indicating that farmers participate in AC when they face liquidity constraints and need to borrow 
money to invest in farm production (Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Wossen et al., 2017). Farmers who access 
to agricultural extension services are more likely to participate in ACs. One possible explanation is 
that they perform better by following ACs’ quality standards. This finding is consistent with Abebaw 
and Haile (2013) and Ma and Abdulai’s (2016) results. 
The household risk and perceptions of AC benefit results reveal that households choose to 
participate in AC because they need credit. Our findings indicate that farmers with higher financial 
risks, satisfaction with AC management, or who believe that ACs will assist them to access credit and 
market information, are more likely to join ACs since they want to obtain loans and buy farm inputs 
on credit (Zheng et al., 2011). However, production risks decrease farmers’ motivations to participate 
in ACs. Farmers may not believe that ACs can reduce farm production difficulties or improve their 
production levels. The results show that farmers with higher farm production risks are less likely to 
participate in ACs. This result is consistent with Ferto and Szabo (2002) and Zhang et al’ s (2017) 
findings which reveal that farmers with low quality products are less likely to participate in ACs since 
their products do not meet the required standards. Moreover, relatives have the greatest impact on 
AC participation, which is in line with Ito et al. (2012), Ma and Abdulai (2016), and Mensah et al.’ s 
(2012) findings. This result suggests that social network is a dominant factor influencing a 
household’s decision to participate in ACs. 
The probability of participation in AC credit is positively influenced by the following factors; farm size, 
access to agricultural extension services, distance to the nearest market, and neighbour’s attitude 
toward AC credit participation. In contrast, it is negatively affected by household-head education and 
farm asset ownership. The findings show that household-heads with higher educational attainment 
are less likely to borrow money from ACs. This result is consistent with previous studies, which 
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suggest that less-educated individuals are more likely to borrow from informal credit sources (see for 
example, Duy et al., 2012; Fongthong & Suriya, 2014; Khoi et al., 2013; Sebopetji & Belete, 2009; 
Zeller, 1994). ACs are important credit sources for poorer households who cannot access formal 
loans. Households who have less farm capital have a higher probability of AC credit accessibility. 
Although ACs are the main credit sources for low-income households, they cannot help the poor 
access credit. ACs will only offer credit to poor households if they can demonstrate that they are able 
to repay their loans. These findings are confirmed by the positive relationship between farm size and 
the probability of participation in AC credit services, which is in line with Khoi et al. (2013) and 
Nguyen’s (2007) work. In addition, middle-class farmers have the greatest probability of borrowing 
money from ACs. Social networks play an important role in AC credit participation in terms of sharing 
AC information. Prior research has indicated that households who obtain information about ACs from 
relatives or neighbours are more likely to participate in AC credit (Duy et al., 2012; Khoi et al., 2013).   
Regarding loan size, our study found that farmers growing cash crops are more likely to borrow 
money compared to those growing other crops. Farmers with larger farms will borrow greater 
amounts of money compared to farmers with smaller farms, since they need more financial capital to 
invest in production. This finding is consistent with Coleman (2006), Duong and Izumida (2002), Duy 
et al. (2012), Khoi et al. (2013), and Nguyen's  (2007) findings. In terms of farm risks, farmers who 
confront higher financial risks are given smaller loans. Farm production and market risks do not 
impact AC loan size. Interestingly, our results show that AC credit attributes strongly dominate loan 
size. AC share, loan duration, and using property as collateral have positive effects on loan size, 
which is consistent with previous studies (for example, see Khoi et al., 2013, Ololade & Olagunju, 
2013). Our findings show that ACs in different districts grant members different loan amounts 
depending on their available funding. 
Our findings on factors which affect household participation in AC input marketing services are 
consistent with prior studies (See Alene et al., 2008; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Muthyalu, 2013; Winter-
Nelson & Temu, 2005). Member decisions to purchase farm inputs through ACs are significantly 
influenced by farm size, perception of benefits, and district, technology accessibility, and residing in 
the same village with ACs. Mid-sized farmers are the most likely to access AC marketing services. 
Further, experience and information of AC input marketing benefits play important roles in a 
household’s decision to purchase inputs from ACs. Farmers who have stronger belief that ACs will 
assist them to access good quality inputs at reasonable prices are more likely to purchase farm inputs 
from ACs. Farmers accessing farm technologies and residing in a village with an AC have a higher 
likelihood of purchasing farm inputs from ACs. This finding indicates that ACs provide advanced 
technologies and inputs to households for farm production improvement. Households living in the 
area where an AC is located tend to buy farm input from AC since it does not cost them extra money 
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to travel to AC market (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). In terms of input expenditure, our results 
show that AC members’ input expenses are significantly correlated with farm size, farm income, 
production risk, and payment method. As expected, farm size and farm income have positive effects 
on AC input expense. AC members who confront high farm production risks spend less on farm 
inputs. Moreover, AC input expenses increases considerably with input purchase on credit.   
Household probability of selling farm products to ACs is positively influenced by paddy farm, farm 
size, AC output market benefits, and the southern districts. It is negatively affected by financial risks 
and distance to ACs. Rice farmers with larger farms are more likely to participate in AC output 
marketing services than farmers who do not grow rice. The highest probability of selling farm 
products to ACs is the middle-sized farmers. This result is the same as Fischer and Qaim (2012, 2014), 
Mensah et al. (2012), and Zhang et al.'s (2017) findings. Household perceptions of output market 
access has the strongest impact on selling their products to AC. In contrast, households with higher 
financial risks are less likely to sell to AC output markets. As the distance from farm to ACs increases, 
the probability of participation decreases due to travel costs. The further away farmers live, the 
greater the transaction costs they incur and the less profit they make (Chagwiza et al., 2016; 
Muthyalu, 2013). In terms of farm product amount sold to ACs, it is influenced by orchard farm, farm 
size, ratio of sale to yields, AC output price, and selling through alternative channels. Members sell 
less fruits and vegetables to ACs compared to other crops. There are no specific ACs that deal with 
fruits and vegetables in the area, since the Nakhonratchasima province is not suited to growing fruits 
and vegetables. Farm size and the portion of sales are positive and significantly impact the farm 
product amount sold to ACs. These results support the view that the more households trade through 
ACs, the greater the benefits they gain (Fischer & Qaim, 2014). Interestingly, the level of marketing 
participation significantly deceases with output price offered by ACs. When output market prices are 
higher, ACs which have limited financial resources purchase less farm products.  
Participation in AC agricultural extension services is significantly related to household characteristics 
(land ownership, irrigation accessibility, and off-farm work), household perceptions of production 
risks and AC satisfaction, the district, and AC location. Households who own land and are employed 
off the farm are more likely to participate in AC agricultural extension services. Farmers holding land 
gain benefits from adopting technologies and farm practices associated with agricultural extension 
services (Atsan et al., 2009; Elias et al., 2013). Off-farm work provides an additional income source 
for the household. Increased income enables households to purchase equipment and apply for 
updated farm technologies or practices offered through agricultural extension services (Ma, 2016). 
However, farmers who have access to irrigation systems are less likely to participate in these services 
compared to those who do not. Farmers who access irrigation systems do not lack of water for farm 
production; thus, they may be not interested in farm improvements when compared to farms with 
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no irrigation systems. This finding contradicts Egziabher et al.'s (2011) work. Their result shows that 
access to irrigation does not have a significant impact on participation in agricultural extension 
services in Ethiopia because the participants and non-participants are not significantly different in 
irrigation access. Moreover, our results suggest that household experiences of AC operations are 
important factors in a household’s decision to join agricultural extension services. Households who 
have higher production risks and who are satisfied with AC performance are more likely to 
participate in agricultural extension services. Households who live close to ACs find it easier to access 
farm support services and have lower travel costs than those who live further away (Egziabher et al., 
2011). 
7.2.2 Effects of Agricultural Cooperative Services on Household Welfare 
Our study evaluates the effects of AC service participation on household economic and social 
welfare. Regarding economic welfare, all AC services play important roles in improving household 
economic welfare. AC credit participation significantly improves household and farm incomes, and 
consumption for both treated (ATT) and untreated (ATU) groups. Participation in AC marketing 
services play an important role in raising household and farm incomes but not household 
consumption. AC marketing services increase AC members’ farm income as they provide low cost 
farm inputs and offer reasonable prices for farm products (Bernard et al., 2008; Calkins & Ngo, 2010; 
Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). Moreover, ACs allow members to 
purchase farm inputs on credit. This allows farmers to unlock liquidity constraints for their 
productions. In contrast, members’ consumption does not increase whether they trade with ACs or 
not. 
The effects of AC credit participation on household and farm incomes are less than those of AC 
marketing services. This result indicates that trading through AC marketing channels provides 
households with greater economic benefits than what they receive through borrowing AC credit. In 
terms of transition heterogeneity, the average effect of participation in AC services is greater for 
actual participants (ATT) compared to non-participants, had they chosen to participate (ATU). This 
finding suggests that ACs are meeting the needs of their target group since actual participants obtain 
greater benefits from participation in AC credit and marketing services than non-participants.   
Social effect covers education and health effects. Effects of AC service participation on educational 
outcomes can be summarised in two points. Firstly, participation in AC credit and marketing services 
do not raise children’s education rates, educational expenditure and school enrolment. This finding is 
not surprising given that Thai schools are publicly funded. Secondly, in terms of informal education 
for adults, only AC credit increases the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices for 
participants. In contrast, participation in agricultural extension services does not improve 
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participants’ adoption of improved farm technologies and practices. This result shows that ACs are 
not effective in farm production development. One possible explanation is most farmers confront 
high production costs and levels of debts, so they often prefer to use traditional methods of farming 
(Chanthakhananurak et al., 2015). Moreover, most household head are older with low levels of 
education. It is difficult for them to learn new knowledge. Finally, agricultural extension projects tend 
to be short term or temporary. The nature of these projects means that households cannot 
effectively implement them (Pleehachinda, 2003). 
Both AC credit and marketing services enhance a household’s health affordability and health 
treatment accessibility. Participation in AC credit and marketing services increase household and 
farm incomes; eventually, participants have a greater capability to afford health treatment. This 
result is consistent with Nghiem et al.' s (2007) finding, which suggest that ACs directly improve 
household income and  increase in income encourages households to spend more on health care. 
However, both AC credit and marketing service do not improve medical treatment accessibility for 
non-AC participants (if they had chosen to participate in AC services). This finding indicates that non-
AC participants made the right decision not to borrow credit or trade through ACs as they would not 
have obtained any benefits. The transition heterogeneity (TH) of health outcomes are positive for 
both AC credit and marketing service participation. Actual participants obtain more health benefits 
than non-participants from AC credit and marketing services. These results indicate that ACs are 
effective in improving targeted households’ health status in terms of health affordability and 
healthcare access. 
7.3 Implications 
The findings have several implications for academics and AC practitioners.  
7.3.1 Academic Implications  
Our results provide evidence to support the presence of selection bias in AC services participation. 
Our study used the ESR and ESP models to control selection bias. The ESR model results indicate the 
presence of a selection bias in the AC credit model in terms of the effects on farm income and 
household consumption. Similarly, a selection bias is also present in the AC marketing service model 
and impacts on household income, farm income, and health affordability. A selection bias is also 
evident in the AC agricultural extension service model and relates to the adoption of improved farm 
technologies and practices. These results suggest that there are unobservable factors, which 
influence a household’s decision to participate in AC services and their outcomes (household and 
farm income, consumption, health affordability, and farm technology and practice adoption). Thus, 
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scholars evaluating AC effects on household welfare should consider unobservable factors to ensure 
an unbiased result. 
The Heckman selection model results clearly identify the influence of household perceptions of 
agricultural risks and AC expected benefits on participation in AC credit and non-credit support 
services. Financial risks have a positive effect on AC participation, while production risks have a 
negative effect. These findings support previous studies which argue that production and sale 
difficulties, as well as fund scarcity, affect households’ decision to participate (Hoken, 2016; Hoken & 
Su, 2015; Ito et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2011). Furthermore, our study found that AC performance and 
households’ belief in expected benefits highly influence households’ decisions to participate in ACs 
and AC services. Our study provides empirical knowledge related to household’s decision to 
participate in credit and non-credit support services that other researchers can use to examine 
determinants of household participation in ACs and their services. Our study suggests that further 
research in this field should include household perceptions of agricultural risks and AC expected 
benefits in the model. 
7.3.2 Policy Implications 
Our findings provide the evidence, not only of the factors, which influence household participating in 
ACs and AC services, but also the effective of AC implementation. The findings indicate that several 
factors affect households’ decisions to participate in AC credit and non-credit support services. Our 
empirical results also reveal that ACs improve household economics and social welfare (household 
and farm income, consumption, health access, and adoption of improved farm technologies and 
practices). Therefore, these findings have different implications for different groups (households, ACs 
and the government).  
Household Recommendations 
Improving AC and AC service participation should start from the household themselves. They should 
reduce the agricultural risks since households’ agricultural risks significantly influence their decisions 
to participate in ACs and AC services. Our finding shows that high production risks are a significant 
obstacle for farmers who wish to join ACs. This may be because farmers do not believe that ACs are 
able to reduce farm production difficulties or improve their production levels, hence farmers with 
high production risk have no incentive to participate in ACs. Furthermore, high production risks cause 
low quality products, that is, products do not meet AC standards (Ferto & Szabo, 2002; Zhang et al., 
2017). In short, household with high production risks are less likely to participate in ACs.  In addition 
to production risks, households who have higher financial risks have higher demands for credit. 
However, they are risky customers and often granted lower credit amounts. Moreover, they are less 
likely to sell their products to ACs because of liquidity constraints.  
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However, it is difficult for farmers, particularly small farmers, to reduce their agricultural risks by 
themselves. They need support from the government and ACs. One practical way that households 
can reduce their agricultural risks and improve their agricultural production capacity is participating 
in agricultural development projects launched by the Thai government. In 2016, the Thai government 
launched 15 major projects to improve farmers’ production levels across the country. Their 
objectives are to reduce production costs, to improve agricultural production, and to enhance 
market access. The government projects include a collaborative farming project, a learning center for 
agricultural production improvement, an agricultural commodity bank, and a debt repayment 
suspension project. The first two projects can decrease agricultural risks in a short period of time. 
These projects aim to effectively solve common farming problems and increase farmers’ bargaining 
power using an area-based approach. These projects operate in every province across country. They 
bring together farmers whose farms are in the same area/province. Farmers who live in the same 
village confront similar constraints such as soil fertility, water scarcity, weather uncertainty, and 
agricultural pests. These projects not only improve agricultural production capacity but also enable 
the creation of agricultural networks. The government generates a network, which covers the 
relevant stakeholders in supply chain such as input suppliers, farmers, and output users. The network 
supports project participants from the start of the production process right through to market 
access; the aim is to reduce production costs and enhance marketing accessibility. The last two 
projects can reduce household financial risks. The Thai government established the agricultural input 
bank and debt repayment suspension projects to help farmers reduce their debts. The agricultural 
commodity bank provides farm inputs such as seed and fertilizers in advance, thus it assists farmers 
to access farm inputs. This implies that even if the farmers confront financial constraints, they can 
access the necessary resources to ensure they have a crop/crops to grow. The debt repayment 
suspension project assists indebted farmers to become debt free. The project specialist designs 
reimbursement and business plans for indebted farmers. Therefore, participating in these 
government projects will enable households to reduce their agricultural production, market, and 
financial risks. 
However, these projects have not been entirely successful in reaching the targeted households. 
Households are not interested in joining the government projects because these projects do not 
meet their needs (Poapongsakorn et al., 2015). The government lacks updated information on 
farmers’ problems and constraints. In short, they do not understand the real causes of farmer 
poverty (Poapongsakorn et al., 2015). Many of the government schemes have been designed using a 
top-down approach without surveying the target participants’, therefore they do not meet the 
farmers’ needs. Furthermore, in the past, the government has focused on financial assistance 
schemes, such as loans with low interest rate, rice pledging schemes, and financial aid for farmers 
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(Poapongsakorn et al., 2015). These schemes only improve farmers’ well-being in the short-term. 
Financial aid programs do not improve farmers’ production and risk management abilities. Therefore, 
they are not effective in the long-term. As a result of the top-down nature of these programs, 
farmers prefer financial aid schemes to those of production development because they obtain 
money without any effort. In short, most Thai farmers wish to participate in the financial assistance 
schemes. Lastly, the projects are complicated for farmers. In order to participate in these projects 
farmers must complete a variety of tasks, which can be quite challenging for some. For example, 
participants must analyse their problems, design production and business plans, identify inputs and 
technologies, and record income and expenditure. This means that only farmers with farm 
management skills can participate in such programs. Therefore, most Thai farmers are not able to 
participate. One way to increase participation rates in these projects is to include ACs.  
Agricultural Cooperative Recommendations 
ACs should encourage farmers to participate in government projects, which result in farmers’ 
agricultural risk reduction. ACs should act as farmers’ counsellors. ACs should transfer government 
project information to farmers and encourage them to participate. They should assist and educate 
the farmers in choosing the most appropriate and profitable projects. It is difficult for farmers to 
understand the terms and conditions of the projects, since many of them are old and have low levels 
of education. Furthermore, these projects are new to them. They are hesitant as to whether the 
projects will succeed or not. AC officers can provide members with project information and suggest 
which projects are suitable for their specific problems. However, encouraging members to 
participate in government projects will only succeed if AC officers have a clear understanding of the 
aims and benefits of each projects.   
Although linking up with government projects does not provide direct benefits to ACs, participation 
in these projects help households to improve their production capacities and reduce agricultural 
risks. ACs also gain indirect advantages, such as resolving AC fund scarcity and increasing ACs’ 
potential members. If ACs are able to train their members through government projects, then they 
will not spend their limited budgets generating training courses. Farm production development 
projects have financial backing from the Thai government. Moreover, the government projects can 
efficiently solve farmers’ problems since they are supervised, monitored, and followed up by farm 
specialists. Farmers participating in these projects can gain knowledge and learn skills which will 
enable them to overcome their own production problems. Moreover, farmers who graduate from 
government projects will become good AC members. When AC members graduate from government 
projects, they have higher levels of farm education, production and risk management. They will 
become potential customers who are ready to do business with ACs. 
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To improve poor households’ welfare, ACs should offer their services to poor households but only if 
they meet certain criteria. Our findings show that middle-class households are the main beneficiaries 
of ACs credit and market accessibility services. This indicates that the poor still experience barriers to 
access AC credit and non-credit support services. Poor households tend to have small scale 
production and less productive assets; thus, they have lower demands for credit. Although they have 
high credit demands, particularly for business expansion, they are less likely to be granted loans. 
They present too great a risk because they have low production capacities and would have difficulties 
to repay the loans (Duy et al., 2012; Li et al., 2011a). These findings confirm previous studies which 
reveal that the poor cannot generate enough income due to lack of capital (Bernard & Spielman , 
2009; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Wollni & Zeller, 2007). Therefore, improving 
farmers’ production capacities should be the first priority; this should be a pre-requisite for accessing 
AC services. In practice, ACs should only allow farmers to become members once they have 
completed training on production capacity development. One AC condition could be asking the 
farmers to participate in government projects. Participating in government projects enable the poor 
to access resources for farm production. These projects provide credit for cash and farm inputs, farm 
technology and machines, and output markets for selling their production. Moreover, participants 
are supervised by farm specialists to solve their agricultural problems and design farm production 
and business plans. Training in these projects can help participants improve their production 
capacities and farm skills, and eventually increase their income. Therefore, these conditions can 
protect ACs from losses when they extend their services to the poor. 
The results show that information sharing is a crucial component to encourage households to 
participate in ACs. Households who receive information about ACs from their relatives or neighbours 
are more likely to participate in ACs. Our survey result indicates that most non-AC members have 
limited information about AC functions and benefits. If ACs wish to increase their participation rates 
or expand their customer base, they must increase their marketing efforts and provide information 
about their successes and expected benefits to farmers. There are several ways information can be 
transmitted. For example, ACs should develop and update their websites. Website should contain AC 
information, updated market information, and agricultural knowledge. ACs should present the 
information in simple formats such as infographics and videos to attract targeted customers who 
have low levels of education. If ACs have limited funds to generate website or individuals cannot 
access the internet, ACs should provide information about their performance directly to the villages, 
using posters and seminars. 
Travel costs are associated with a lack of participation in AC marketing services. Households who live 
close to ACs are more likely to trade with ACs due to low travel costs and easy accessibility. ACs 
should consider reducing farmers’ travel costs as this would encourage members to use their 
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marketing services. Developing an AC network may reduce production and transportation costs and 
increase the group’s bargaining power. ACs should promote both horizontal and vertical networks. A 
horizontal network of ACs (for example, rice ACs, rubber ACs, and cassava ACs) would reduce 
production costs, increase bargaining power, and improve production (Dardak, 2015). Our study 
finds that the rice cooperative network is a crucial network in increasing members’ incomes. The 
strong collaboration among rice ACs increase bargaining power with input suppliers and output 
users. For example, a rice cooperative network can help all members in the network to develop their 
rice quality; in short, they will increase their product value. Collaboration among ACs (through an AC 
network) can reduce members’ cost of production and provide members with a higher price for their 
farm products, which ultimately leads to higher incomes (Patrawart & Sriurai, 2010).  
Likewise, a vertical network, with other stakeholders in the supply chain, can reduce production costs 
and market volatility (Dardak, 2015; Zhong, Zhang, Jia, & Bilman, 2018). ACs should contract with 
input wholesalers for fertilizers, seeds, and agrichemical supplies. Input contracts would potentially 
lead to lower input prices and transportation costs. Since wholesalers may have several distributors 
in the cities, AC members should be able to pick up inputs from the closest distributor. Besides, input 
contracts can decrease the risk of input price fluctuations. Similarly, to increase output market 
accessibility and control output market fluctuations, AC networks should engage in forward contracts 
to sell products with their product users such as factories, hotels, supermarkets, and other ACs. A 
vertical network is an effective tool for managing market risks as ACs can determine the price and 
amount of inputs and products that their members need (Ma, 2016). However, AC network creation 
needs support from the national federation and provincial cooperatives.  
ACs can improve their members’ economic welfare and increase service participation rates through 
redesigning their service policies. Our results show that AC service characteristics influence 
participation levels. AC shares, loan duration, and using property as collateral, have positive effects 
on loan, while purchasing on credit highly influences households to purchase inputs from ACs. These 
results suggest that AC innovation plays an important role in motivating members to use AC services. 
To increase participation levels, ACs should redesign their lending and trading policies to make them 
more flexible and suitable for household needs. Based on our study results, small farmers who 
borrow money may not be able to repay the entire loan and interest by maturity date. Agricultural 
production is characterised by uncertainty (natural and market risks); farmers may obtain less yield 
and/or income than they are expected. If they have to pay back their entire loans and interest, they 
may need to borrow money from informal lenders. As a result, they are become more indebted and 
trapped in a cycle of debt. Since AC’s primary aim is to improve household economic welfare, they 
should assist households with access to credit services that do not trap them into a debt cycle. ACs 
should offer flexible repayments schemes to encourage borrowers to pay back their loans. For 
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example, ACs should allow borrowers to pay back the loan in small amounts and save some money 
for next planting season. This lending policy assist borrowers to unlock liquidity constraints and to 
escape the debt cycle. Moreover, ACs should motivate borrowers to repay their loans. Loan 
refinancing with lower interest rates may be used for good borrowers. 
To increase marketing service participation, ACs should provide innovative ways of marketing their 
members’ products. To increase input purchases, the government should support ACs to buy farm 
inputs on credit from the agricultural input bank or private companies under the government 
projects. Most rural households consist of small farmers who lack financial capital and farm assets. 
They lack access to credit services. At present, ACs allow members to purchase farm input on credit. 
However, this service is limited due to AC fund scarcity. If ACs can obtain trade credit agreements 
with input producers, then this would enable them to pass on these savings to their members. 
However, trade credit agreements need government support. The government already has 
agreements with input suppliers for their agricultural projects thus the government could help ACs to 
access input producers.  
Trade among cooperatives should be promoted to increase AC sales. The Cooperative Promotion 
Department should encourage cooperatives to do business together. Trade refers to both trade 
within ACs and with other cooperatives. In practice, ACs should form contracts with other ACs and 
cooperatives. For example, rice ACs should sell their products to other ACs which grow other crops. 
Agricultural cooperatives are able to sell their products to consumer cooperatives, service 
cooperatives, and credit union. These ACs and cooperatives can buy rice cheaper and sell it to their 
members.Trade among cooperatives can increase AC sale volumes. When ACs have greater sales, 
they can buy more products from their own members. 
The results of AC effects show that AC credit and marketing service are important for improving 
household income. Our study found that AC marketing services are more effective in increasing 
income than AC credit. Since ACs confront fund limitations, it is difficult to increase the numbers of 
individuals borrowing credit. It is for this reason that ACs should concentrate on improving the 
effectiveness of marketing services. In the context of trade liberalization, ACs compete with 
agribusiness enterprises. To increase their competitiveness, ACs should create business partnerships 
with private company. These partnerships may help ACs extend output markets and improve their 
products through the transfer of farm knowledge and technology. ACs may find partners through 
attending the Commerce Chamber project established by the government. Working with the 
Commerce Chamber can improve AC management and output marketing services. They can provide 
ACs with advice about how to add value to their products.  
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The ESP model result shows that ACs have failed to improve members’ farm production level. 
Participation in AC agricultural extension services cannot improve farm production since they cannot 
encourage participants to implement improved farm technologies and practices. One possible 
explanation is that members lack financial capital to afford new farm technologies. To overcome 
members’ financial capital scarcity, ACs should create training services to develop their members’ 
production skills which increase their income. Income generating skill training should involve both 
on-farm and off-farm activities which focus on income generation. Courses could include on-farm 
product processing to add value to products. These skills are essential to increase farmers’ 
capabilities and increase their income. When farmers have more income, they can afford new 
technologies; in turn, they benefit financially from the adoption of such technologies. 
Government Recommendations 
The findings of this study provide some recommendations to improve the AC participation rate and 
efficiency. The government policies significantly influence functionality of ACs. The success or failure 
of ACs relies on the government support. The government can increase the number of members 
participating by improving farmers’ education about ACs. The findings show that households’ 
perception of the expected benefits obtained from ACs and information access positively influence 
farmers to participate in ACs and AC services. This implies that farmers gaining knowledge, 
information, and experience in AC are likely to become AC members and use their services. 
Therefore, appropriate policies to improve (or access) AC knowledge to targeted participants is 
necessary to increase AC membership. The government can use a host of channels to transmit the 
information, for example advertising through village meeting, local state offices, radio, internet, and 
social media. Furthermore, the government should update the information on ACs to ensure farmers 
have access and understand the information. The information content should consist of the AC 
concept and objectives, function, benefits and costs of participating in ACs, and successful 
performance of ACs.  
A lack of credit access is a barrier for farmers to invest in agricultural technologies. Our study results 
indicate that credit use positively influence households’ decision to join in agricultural extension 
services provided by ACs and the effect of AC credit on adoption of improved farm technologies and 
practice is positive. These results suggest that households who access credit exhibit a higher 
probability to participate in the agricultural extension services and apply the updated technologies in 
their farming. To increase the effectiveness of AC agricultural extension services, the government 
should promote the role of ACs as training institutions. The training institution aims are to improve 
and train farming methods and increase technology adoption. The government should provide 
technological and financial support to the training institutions. ACs should work together with the 
provincial agricultural extension department to research and develop suitable farming technologies 
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and methods for farmers. ACs have information about farmers’ agricultural production, finance and 
various constraints. The research collaboration between state organizations and ACs enables the 
agricultural extension department officers to understand the root cause of problems and obtain 
current information about local farmers. As a result, the agricultural extension department officers 
are able to identify solutions based on farmers’ problems and needs and generate business plans 
appropriate for the farmers. To ensure that farmers obtain financial capital, the government should 
offer credit for farming investment with low interest rate to farmers through ACs. Moreover, ACs can 
involve private companies as partnerships in the enhancing the capacity of the training institutions. 
The partnerships will share capital, technology, and skill with ACs. Because of the expertise in 
research and development of private companies, the training institutions enhance their ability to 
develop new technologies and enable farmers to access new farming technologies. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, our study focused on multiple agricultural cooperatives. 
This included ACs with different characteristics; for example, ACs for rice versus cash crop farmers, 
small versus large ACs, success versus failure ACs, and those which have networks and those without. 
These characteristics influence AC success to generate benefits for members (Verhofstadt & 
Maertens, 2014). However, the study results do not capture the effects across different ACs (the 
heterogeneous impact). For example, our study does not compare the effects of ACs for rice farmers 
with cash crop growers, the effects of small ACs versus large ACs, or the effects of ACs with good 
horizontal and vertical networks versus those without established network. It is important to 
understand what type of ACs succeed in improving household welfare. Future studies could examine 
the effects of ACs on household welfare by considering the heterogeneous nature of ACs.  
Our study estimated the effects of AC services on household welfare using the ESR and ESP models. 
The ATE results reveal the magnitude of effects of AC service use on household welfare. However, 
the results cannot explain how ATE varies with household characteristics (the heterogeneous 
treatment effect). The heterogeneous treatment effects reveal who are most likely to obtain benefits 
from using AC services. Heterogeneous treatment effect analysis is important because it enables ACs 
to improve their service effectiveness; ACs can apply the heterogeneous effect results to identify the 
right customers. The heterogeneous treatment effect evaluation is a tool for improving AC 
effectiveness.  
Finally, our AC effect results for children’s education capture enrolment and schooling expenditures 
for primary and middle education, both of which are compulsory. Since the Thai government 
subsidies compulsory education, the schooling expenditures and enrolment ratio between AC 
members and non-AC members does not differ greatly. In short, our results show that AC service 
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participation does not improve children’s education. Future studies might consider whether AC 
participation impacts on enrolment rates for higher education: in short, whether parents pay for 
their children to attend high school or university. As higher education is optional, the Thai 
government does not offer subsidies. Unlike primary school, which is free, households must pay fees 
for high school and university. Therefore, it would be interesting to identify the effect of AC service 
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Appendix A: Determinants of AC Participation  







Pro_Risk 5 0.615 2.966 1.319 
Mkt_Risk 5 0.665 2.283 0.220 
Fin_Risk 4 0.795 2.557 0.446 
Cre_Be 2 0.757 3.985 0.045 
Mkt_Be 3 0.789 3.716 0.074 
Ext_Be 2 0.764 3.058 0.032 




A.2 Distribution of Participation Level and log Participation Level 




A.2.2 Distribution of AC Input Expenditure and Log of AC Input Expenditure 
  
 
















































































































A.3 Results of Endogeneity Problem for AC Participation and AC Credit 
Participation 




Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Cre_Use (EEV) AC_Mem  Ext_Acc (EEV) AC_Mem 
Coefficient R.S.E. Coefficient R.S.E. Coefficient R.S.E. Coefficient R.S.E. 
Age_Yr -0.015*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.008) 0.008 (0.005) 0.007 (0.008) 
Edu_Yr -0.070*** (0.017) -0.019 (0.025) 0.034** (0.016) -0.019 (0.025) 
Sex   -0.320** (0.147) -0.218** (0.100) -0.320** (0.147) 
Mari     0.350*** (0.129)   
Paddy   -0.711*** (0.242) 0.212 (0.146) -0.711*** (0.242) 
Orchard   -0.276 (0.289) -0.405** (0.203) -0.276 (0.289) 
Cash_Crop   0.631*** (0.219) 0.306** (0.143) 0.631*** (0.219) 
Inc_Pr -1.597*** (0.497) 0.035 (0.717)   0.035 (0.717) 
Inc_UPr -0.192 (0.215) 0.171 (0.288)   0.171 (0.288) 
Inc_NPr -0.023 (0.188) 0.308 (0.243)   0.308 (0.243) 
Farm_Mem 0.016 (0.062) -0.046 (0.081)   -0.046 (0.081) 
Farm_Si 0.009*** (0.003) 0.016** (0.007) -0.003 (0.002) 0.016** (0.007) 
Farm_Sq   -7.04e-05** (3.10e-05)   -7.04e-05** (3.10e-05) 
Land -0.249 (0.178) -0.273 (0.269) 0.199 (0.156) -0.273 (0.269) 
Irr_Acc -0.316*** (0.104)       
Ext_Acc 0.412*** (0.111) 0.633*** (0.166)   0.633*** (0.166) 
Oth_Mem (IV) 0.980*** (0.122) -0.121 (0.207)  0.283** (0.124) -0.121 (0.207) 
Cre_Use   0.982*** (0.166) 0.421*** (0.117) 0.982*** (0.166) 
Pro_Risk 0.005 (0.064) -0.570*** (0.109) 0.074 (0.065) -0.570*** (0.109) 
Mkt_Risk 0.009 (0.075) -0.023 (0.106) -0.197*** (0.067) -0.023 (0.106) 
Fin_Risk 0.106* (0.060) 0.278*** (0.093) 0.086* (0.052) 0.278*** (0.093) 
Sat   0.241** (0.116)   0.241** (0.116) 
Eff   -0.084 (0.092)   -0.084 (0.092) 
Cre_be   0.205*** (0.057)   0.205*** (0.057) 
Ext_be   -0.038 (0.042)   -0.038 (0.042) 
Inp_Acc   -0.077 (0.115)   -0.077 (0.115) 
Out_Acc   -0.073 (0.109)   -0.073 (0.109) 
Inf_Acc   0.228*** (0.077)   0.228*** (0.077) 
Dis_Town 0.0123** (0.005)   -0.010** (0.004)   
Dist_N   0.833*** (0.203) 0.148 (0.129) 0.833*** (0.203) 
Dist_S   0.138 (0.220) 0.227* (0.133) 0.138 (0.220) 
AC_Rela   1.331*** (0.213)   1.331*** (0.213) 
AC_Vill   0.980*** (0.235)   0.980*** (0.235) 
Constant 0.660 (0.500) -3.071*** (0.867) -1.224** (0.484) -3.071*** (0.867) 
Observations 850  616  850  616  
Wald chi2 (30) 148.54***  207.73***  69.31***  207.73***  
Pseudo R2 0.184  0.418   0.0726  0.418  
Note: 1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
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Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
Cre_Use (EEV) AC_Mem  Ext_Acc (EEV) AC_Mem 
Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Age_Yr -0.005*** (0.002) 0.007 (0.009) 0.003* (0.002) 0.011 (0.009) 
Edu_Yr -0.020*** (0.005) -0.021 (0.029) 0.011** (0.005) -0.003 (0.028) 
Sex   -0.318** (0.147) -0.072** (0.034) -0.413** (0.161) 
Mari     0.120*** (0.045)   
Paddy   -0.715*** (0.240) 0.070 (0.046) -0.583** (0.270) 
Orchard   -0.269 (0.290) -0.147** (0.072) -0.468 (0.314) 
Cash_Crop   0.643*** (0.219) 0.098** (0.044) 0.758*** (0.242) 
Inc_Pr -0.496*** (0.121) 0.006 (0.747)   0.062 (0.716) 
Inc_UPr -0.047 (0.059) 0.179 (0.286)   0.178 (0.288) 
Inc_NPr 0.004 (0.049) 0.310 (0.242)   0.313 (0.240) 
Farm_Mem 0.008 (0.017) -0.043 (0.081)   -0.036 (0.081) 
FarmSi_Aft 0.002*** (0.0005) 0.016** (0.007) -0.0009 (0.0007) 0.014** (0.007) 
Farm_Sq -0.065 (0.042) -6.95e-05** (3.09e-05)   -7.02e-05** (3.11e-05) 
Land -0.086*** (0.028) -0.274 (0.270) 0.066 (0.055) -0.168 (0.268) 
Irr_Acc 0.113*** (0.033)       
Cre_Use   0.918* (0.550) 0.141*** (0.041) 1.160*** (0.226) 
Ext_Acc   0.625*** (0.184)   -0.646 (1.023) 
Oth_Mem (IV) 0.332*** (0.042)   0.103** (0.045)   
Pro_Risk 0.0007 (0.018) -0.575*** (0.109) 0.022 (0.021) -0.536*** (0.113) 
Mkt_Risk 0.0008 (0.020) -0.016 (0.106) -0.064*** (0.021) -0.100 (0.132) 
Fin_Risk 0.027* (0.016) 0.273*** (0.095) 0.027 (0.017) 0.317*** (0.098) 
Sat   0.233** (0.117)   0.235** (0.116) 
Eff   -0.082 (0.092)   -0.076 (0.092) 
Cre_be   0.204*** (0.057)   0.210*** (0.057) 
Ext_be   -0.038 (0.042)   -0.036 (0.042) 
Inp_Acc   -0.076 (0.115)   -0.089 (0.114) 
Out_Acc   -0.077 (0.109)   -0.069 (0.109) 
Inf_Acc   0.229*** (0.077)   0.229*** (0.078) 
Dis_Town 0.003*** (0.001)   -0.003** (0.001)   
Dist_N   0.841*** (0.203) 0.050 (0.041) 0.896*** (0.210) 
Dist_S   0.134 (0.219) 0.078* (0.043) 0.227 (0.238) 
AC_Rela   1.328*** (0.214)   1.325*** (0.214) 
AC_Vill   0.986*** (0.235)   0.985*** (0.236) 
Residual     0.041 (0.557)    1.303 (1.041) 
Constant 0.691*** (0.141) -3.049*** (0.945) 0.093 (0.161) -3.051*** (0.855) 
Observations 850  616  850  616  








Pseudo R2    0.417      0.420  
Note: 1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
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Oth_loan (EEV) AC Credit Participation (Y/N) 
Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Individual Characteristics 
Age_Yr 33.945 (566.343) -0.012 (0.011) 
Edu_Yr 6,607.506 (6,016.679) -0.062** (0.029) 
Household Characteristics    
Farm_Mem   0.004 (0.109) 
Farm_Si 601.953** (236.719) 0.017** (0.008) 
Farm_Sq   -0.00009** (0.00004) 
Farm_Ass -28,002.07 (26,526.93) -0.490* (0.252) 
Land -55,959.3 (57,886.6)   
Tot_Inc 0.005 (0.010)   
Ext_Acc 18,509.06 (12,641.54) 0.397* (0.203) 
Oth_loan   -4.42e-07 (3.94e-07) 
OthMem_Cre (IV) 45,546.94** (18,991.02) -0.256 (0.266) 
Household Perception    
Pro_Risk -2,507.277 (5,128.01) 0.021 (0.120) 
Mkt_Risk -621.513 (5,373.409) 0.083 (0.775) 
Fin_Risk 11,975.65** (5,859.392) -0.040 (0.096) 
CreAcc_Be   -0.152 (0.110) 
IncGen_Be   0.137 (0.091) 
Geographical and Related Factors   
Dis_Town -210.810 (577.903 ) 0.041*** (0.014) 
Dist_N   -0.212 (0.224) 
Dist_S   0.308 (0.276) 
Comm_Att   0.155** (.074) 
Constant -16,395.85 (44,444.04 ) 1.405 (1.028) 
Observations 492  Observations 487 
F(12, 479) 2.11**  Wald chi2 (18) 38.27*** 
    Pseudo R2 0.1765 
Note:  1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  









Oth_loan (EEV) AC Credit Participation (Y/N) 
  Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Individual Characteristics 
Age_Yr 33.95 (566.34) -0.013 (0.011) 









Farm_Ass -28,002 (26,526) -0.547* (0.283) 
Land -55,959 (57,886) 
  
Tot_Inc 0.005 (0.010) 
  









Pro_Risk -2,507 (5,128) -0.008 (0.118) 
Mkt_Risk -621.51 (5,373) 0.085 (0.109) 







Geographical and Related Factors 










Res(Oth_loan)     1.74e-06 (3.67e-06) 




F(12, 479) 2.11** 
 
Wald chi2 (18) 38.56*** 
    Pseudo R2 0.1733 
Note:  1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  












AC Loan size  
(log) 
Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient Coefficient R.S.E 
Individual Characteristics     
Age_Yr -0.013 (0.011) lgAge 0.122 (0.259) 
Edu_Yr -0.061** (0.030) lgEdu 0.157 (0.102) 
    Paddy 0.045 (0.100) 
    Orchard 0.086 (0.146) 
    Cash_Crop 0.289*** (0.110) 
Household Characteristics     
Farm_Mem 0.003 (0.106) lgFarm_Mem 0.080 (0.093) 
FarmSi_Aft 0.017** (0.008) lgFarm_Size 0.161*** (0.055) 
Farm_Sq -9.47e-05** (3.81e-05)    
Farm_Ass -0.506** (0.252)    
Oth_loan -4.94e-07 (4.04e-07)    
Ext_Acc 0.393* (0.204)    
Household Perception     
Pro_Risk -0.010 (0.118) Pro_Risk -0.007 (0.050) 
Mkt_Risk 0.093 (0.112) Mkt_Risk -0.035 (0.050) 
Fin_Risk -0.044 (0.096) Fin_Risk -0.103** (0.043) 
CreAcc_be -0.169 (0.111)    
IncGen_be 0.147 (0.091)    
AC Credit Attributes     
    lgAC_Share 0.141*** (0.037) 
   ACdur_Med 0.647*** (0.170) 
    ACdur_Long 0.708*** (0.140) 
    Coll_prop 0.397*** (0.090) 
Geographical and Related 
Factors 
    
Dis_Town 0.041*** (0.014)    
Dist_N -0.234 (0.232) Dist_N 0.424*** (0.112) 
Dist_S 0.317 (0.273) Dist_S 0.379*** (0.096) 
Comm_Att (IV) 0.153** (0.074) Comm_Att 0.015 (0.026) 
Constant 1.399 (1.019) Constant 8.412*** (1.130) 
Observations 487  Observations 422  
Wald chi2 37.96***  LR chi2 (17) 133.72***  
Pseudo R2 0.173         
Note:  1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Computed by the authors using 2017 survey data. 
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A.5 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for AC Input Marketing Model 
(Heckman Selection Model) 
Independent 
Variables 
AC Input Marketing  
Participation (Y/N) Independent 
Variables 
AC Input Expenditure  
(log) 
Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Individual Characteristics     
Age_Yr 0.003 (0.007) lgAge -0.197 (0.284) 
Edu_Yr 0.034* (0.020)    
Paddy -0.105 (0.181)    
Cash_Crop -0.507*** (0.191)    
Orchard -0.491 (0.318)    
Household Characteristics     
Farm_Si 0.016*** (0.005) lgFarm_Size 0.494*** (0.119) 
Farm_Sq -5.01e-05* (2.88e-05)    
Farm_Mem -0.051 (0.068) lgFarm_Mem 0.050 (0.149) 
Irr_Acc -0.331 (0.207)    
Tech_Acc 0.489** (0.202)    
FarmRev_Aft -1.28e-07 (1.32e-07) lgFarm_Inc 0.202*** (0.075) 
Household Perception     
Pro_Risk -0.051 (0.080) Pro_Risk -0.150** (0.072) 
Mkt_Risk 0.058 (0.086) Mkt_Risk 0.110 (0.074) 
Fin_Risk -0.077 (0.072) Fin_Risk -0.005 (0.063) 
Inp_Acc  (IV) 0.169*** (0.063) Inp_Acc 0.040 (0.061) 
AC Input Marketing Attributes     
    lgAC_Share 0.068 (0.042) 
    ACInp_cre 0.272** (0.129) 
Geographical and Related Factors     
Dist_N -0.891*** (0.186) Dist_N -0.189 (0.146) 
Dist_S -0.594*** (0.176) Dist_S 0.206 (0.145) 
AC_Vill 0.449** (0.176) ACdis 0.008 (0.006) 
Comm_Att 0.088** (0.043)    
Constant -0.762 (0.628) Constant 5.414*** (1.273) 
Observations 516  Observations 214  
Wald chi2 66.13***  LR chi2 (13) 121.08***  
Pseudo R2 0.106         
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  




A.6 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for AC Output Marketing Model 
(Heckman Selection Model) 
Independent 
Variables 
AC Output Marketing 
Participation  (Y/N) Independent 
Variables 
AC Sale Quantity  
(log) 
Coefficient R.S.E. Coefficient R.S.E. 
Individual Characteristics     
Age_Yr 0.006 (0.008) lgAge -0.127 (0.664) 
Edu_Yr 0.022 (0.024) lgEdu_Adj 0.196 (0.259) 
Paddy 0.456** (0.221) Paddy -0.201 (0.302) 
Cash_Crop 0.166 (0.216) Cash_Crop -0.087 (0.368) 
Orchard 0.227 (0.288) Orchard -1.334*** (0.416) 
Househol Characteristics     
Farm_Mem 0.103 (0.083)    
FarmSi_Aft 0.017** (0.007) lgFarm_Size 0.770*** (0.129) 
Farm_Sq -7.04e-05** (3.41e-05)    
Commer -0.443 (0.408) Commer 1.949*** (0.722) 
Cre_use 0.360 (0.232)    
FarInc_PU -0.010 (0.218)    
Household Perception     
Pro_Risk -0.063 (0.097) Pro_Risk -0.038 (0.120) 
Mkt_Risk -0.095 (0.099) Mkt_Risk -0.141 (0.142) 
Fin_Risk -0.189** (0.088) Fin_Risk 0.087 (0.113) 
Out_Acc 0.366*** (0.089) Out_Acc -0.052 (0.122) 
Inf_Acc -0.016 (0.064)    
Attributes of AC Output Marketing Service    
    lgAC_Share 0.072 (0.072) 
    AC_P -0.165*** (0.051) 
       
    AC_Pay 0.204 (0.311) 
       
    AC_Othsale -0.491** (0.195) 
Geographical and Related Factors 
Dist_N 0.047 (0.211) Dist_N 0.437 (0.388) 
Dist_S 0.760*** (0.222) Dist_S 0.401 (0.330) 
ACdis_n -0.018*** (0.007)    
Constant -2.780*** (0.952) Constant 6.050** (2.902) 
Observations 460  Observations 95  
Wald chi2 (19) 55.67***  LR chi2(17) 92.92***  
Pseudo R2 0.132         
Note:  1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  




A.7 Heteroskedasticity Test Results 
  
Participation Equation in AC and AC services  
(equation 5.1) 
















Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 101.91 151.65 7.73 48.01 50.39 42.27 12.9 50.37 
Reject/not reject H0 Reject at 1% Reject at 1% Not reject Reject at 1% Reject at 1% Reject at 1% Not reject Reject at 1% 
Note:  1. number in parentheses are the probability > chi2 for BP/CW test  





Appendix B: Effects of AC Service Participation 
B.1 Distribution of Household Welfare Indicators 






































































































































































































B.2 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Household Income Model 







Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.075 0.014 0.113 0.150 
 (0.288) (0.123) (0.284) (0.123) 
lgEdu_Adj -0.128  0.072  
 (0.127)  (0.141)  
Paddy -0.446** -0.322*** -0.129 -0.320*** 
 (0.174) (0.077) (0.153) (0.080) 
Orchard -0.249 0.323*** -0.189 0.397*** 
 (0.243) (0.116) (0.231) (0.149) 
Cash_Crop 0.319* 0.057 -0.037 0.056 
 (0.166) (0.072) (0.148) (0.073) 
Household Characteristics    
lgHHmem -0.220 0.571*** -0.181 0.516*** 
 (0.134) (0.062) (0.130) (0.064) 
Dep_Rat -0.114 -0.078** 0.097 -0.045 
 (0.081) (0.036) (0.071) (0.037) 
lgFarm_Size 0.229*** 0.414*** 0.411*** 0.432*** 
 (0.074) (0.033) (0.070) (0.038) 
Farm_Ass -0.170 -0.061 0.148 -0.078 
 (0.118) (0.055) (0.114) (0.053) 
Land -0.409** 0.055 -0.006 0.022 
 (0.180) (0.082) (0.166) (0.080) 
Off_Farm   0.066 0.366*** 
   (0.119) (0.064) 
Commer 0.094 0.250*** -0.174 0.234*** 
 (0.130) (0.071) (0.174) (0.070) 
Other Loan -1.73e-07 4.30e-07*** 0.383*** 0.087 
Cre_Use (2.96e-07) (1.63e-07) (0.130) (0.059) 
Ext_Acc 0.804***  0.376***  
 (0.122)  (0.122)  
Irr_Acc -0.116 0.101*   
 (0.111) (0.052)   
Household Perception    
Pro_Risk -0.076 0.057* -0.072 0.035 
 (0.072) (0.033) (0.068) (0.033) 
Mkt_Risk -0.015 -0.086** 0.113 -0.066* 
 (0.077) (0.036) (0.074) (0.039) 
Fin_Risk 0.236*** -0.211*** -0.001 -0.210*** 
 (0.062) (0.029) (0.062) (0.029) 
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B.2 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Household Income 
Model (cont.) 
   







Geographical and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.291***    
 (0.056)    
Dist_N 0.333**  -0.205  
 (0.144)  (0.132)  
Dist_S -0.162  -0.320**  
 (0.151)  (0.133)  
AC_Vill 0.607*** -0.045 0.584***   
  (0.175) (0.076) (0.156)   
AC_Rela 0.946***   0.656*** 0.101 
  (0.148)   (0.163) (0.070) 
Comm_Att 0.254***  0.186***  
 (0.032)  (0.032)  
Constant -2.254 10.72*** -3.658***  
  (1.383) (0.536) (1.416)   
Observations 839  839  
Wald chi2 258.79***  162.16***  
Pseudo R2 0.3158  0.1867  
F-test   37.23***   43.80*** 
Note: 1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 





B.3 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Farm Income Model 
  
Variables 







Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.030 -0.450 0.218 -0.219 
 (0.284) (0.418) (0.276) (0.333) 
lgEdu_Adj -0.143 -0.191 0.100 -0.082 
 (0.128) (0.193) (0.138) (0.356) 
Paddy -0.408** -0.026 -0.153 0.963*** 
 (0.175) (0.341) (0.155) (0.362) 
Orchard -0.214 0.881** -0.199 0.423 
 (0.243) (0.368) (0.238) (0.500) 
Cash_Crop 0.317* 0.444 -0.054 0.075 
 (0.167) (0.505) (0.150) (0.200) 
Household Characteristics    
lgFarm_Mem 0.073 0.102 0.087 1.279*** 
 (0.134) (0.198) (0.128) (0.221) 
lgFarm_Size 0.183*** 1.316*** 0.404***  
 (0.071) (0.239) (0.069)  
Land -0.420** 0.024   
 (0.180) (0.230)   
Oth_loan -1.77e-07 5.12e-07 0.374*** 0.309 
Cre_Use (3.03e-07) (4.17e-07) (0.129) (0.203) 
Ext_Acc 0.767***  0.367***  
 (0.121)  (0.120)  
Irr_Acc -0.175 0.099 -0.264 0.141 
 (0.175) (0.221) (0.183) (0.220) 
Tech_Acc 0.026 -0.151 0.363** -0.154 
 (0.171) (0.228) (0.179) (0.227) 
Commer 0.102 4.923** -0.178 4.930** 
 (0.128) (2.410) (0.164) (2.401) 
Household Perception    
Pro_Risk -0.059 -0.121 -0.079 -0.128 
 (0.071) (0.101) (0.067) (0.102) 
Mkt_Risk -0.003 0.031 0.108 0.037 
 (0.077) (0.118) (0.073) (0.119) 
Fin_Risk 0.208*** -0.176* 0.015 -0.175* 
 (0.061) (0.100) (0.060) (0.101) 
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Geographical and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.294***    
 (0.055)    
Dist_N 0.308** 0.066 -0.200  
 (0.143) (0.208) (0.132)  
Dist_S -0.136 0.247 -0.318**  
 (0.150) (0.228) (0.133)  
AC_Vill 0.594*** -0.518 0.586*** -0.541 
  (0.172) (0.357) (0.159) (0.361) 
AC_Rela 0.969***  0.632***  
 (0.147)  (0.163)  
Comm_Att 0.252***  0.186***  
 (0.031)  (0.031)  
Constant -2.788** 5.739** -4.208*** 4.532** 
  (1.347) (2.753) (1.354) (2.190) 
Observations 837  837  
Wald chi2 244.75***  168.75***  
Pseudo R2 0.3077  0.1862  
F-test   44.70***   57.51*** 
Note: 1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 





















Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.156 -0.454*** 0.153 -0.459*** 
 (0.288) (0.098) (0.286) (0.086) 
lgEdu -0.166 0.0863 0.099  
 (0.124) (0.050) (0.142)  
Paddy   -0.124 -0.087 
   (0.154) (0.053) 
Cash_Crop   -0.072 0.028 
   (0.153) (0.049) 
Orchard   -0.164 0.109 
   (0.233) (0.075) 
Household Characteristics    
lgHHmem -0.234* 0.498*** -0.185 0.486*** 
 (0.132) (0.046) (0.130) (0.045) 
Dep_Rat -0.093 -0.027 0.101 -0.019 
 (0.078) (0.024) (0.072) (0.024) 
lgFarm_Size 0.340***  0.429*** 0.054** 
 (0.066)  (0.068) (0.022) 
Farm_Ass -0.157    
 (0.116)    
Land -0.467***  -0.014 0.104* 
 (0.175)  (0.166) (0.062) 
Oth_loan -9.98e-08 4.15e-07*** 0.380*** 0.124*** 
,Cred_use (2.87e-07) (1.04e-07) (0.130) (0.042) 
Ext_Acc 0.811***  0.383***  
 (0.117)  (0.122)  
Tech_Acc -0.118 -0.050   
 (0.104) (0.035)   
Off_Farm 0.108 0.083** 0.076 0.102** 
 (0.119) (0.039) (0.118) (0.039) 
Commer   -0.181  
   (0.185)  
Household Perception of Risks    
Pro_Risk -0.092 0.038* -0.085 0.034 
 (0.070) (0.022) (0.068) (0.022) 
Mkt_Risk 0.009 -0.023 0.109 -0.023 
 (0.075) (0.025) (0.074) (0.024) 
Fin_Risk 0.232*** -0.008 0.009 -0.022 
 (0.061) (0.019) (0.061) (0.019) 
     
     
     
266 
 
B.4 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Household 











Geographical and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.369***  0.063  
 (0.053)  (0.053)  
Dist_N 0.087  -0.218  
 (0.130)  (0.134)  
Dist_S -0.166  -0.335**  
 (0.139)  (0.133)  
AC_Rela 0.946*** 0.047 0.630*** -0.027 
  (0.144) (0.041) (0.165) (0.043) 
AC_Vill 0.591***  0.599***  
 (0.166)  (0.155)  
Comm_Att 0.253***  0.179***  
 (0.031)  (0.031)  
Constant -2.420* 12.29*** -3.869*** 12.29*** 
  (1.373) (0.477) (1.437) (0.386) 
Observations 844 850 839 844 
Wald chi2 247.92***  159.85***  
Pseudo R2 0.2970  0.1863  
F-test   22.46***   20.36*** 
Note:  1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 















Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.024 0.393 0.286 0.386 
 (0.405) (0.367) (0.407) (0.374) 
lgEdu_Adj -0.208 0.417** -0.186 0.464*** 
 (0.196) (0.171) (0.205) (0.175) 
Paddy -0.496**    
 (0.238)    
Orchard -0.850**    
 (0.368)    
Cash_Crop 0.045    
 (0.227)    
Household Characteristics   
lgHHmem 0.066 0.576*** -0.747*** 0.578*** 
 (0.258) (0.191) (0.265) (0.191) 
Dep_Rat -0.131 0.053 0.032 0.061 
 (0.110) (0.066) (0.100) (0.067) 
lgFarm_Size 0.266*** 0.042 0.431*** 0.035 
 (0.095) (0.066) (0.089) (0.067) 
Oth_loan, 1.89e-07 5.55e-07*** 0.131 0.198 
Cre_use (3.03e-07) (2.12e-07) (0.183) (0.143) 
Ext_Acc 0.709***  0.438**  
 (0.185)  (0.188)  
Land    0.270 
    (0.206) 
Household Perception of Risks    
Pro_Risk -0.135  -0.288***  
 (0.103)  (0.105)  
Mkt_Risk -0.015  -0.009  
 (0.114)  (0.121)  
Fin_Risk 0.141*  -0.058  
 (0.083)  (0.087)  
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B.5 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Educational 











Geographical and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.215***    
 (0.078)    
Dist_N   -0.281  
   (0.184)  
Dist_S   -0.622***  
   (0.201)  
AC_Rela 0.780*** -0.188 0.928***   
  (0.206) (0.139) (0.236)   
AC_Vill 0.783***   0.638*** -0.086 
  (0.244)   (0.230) (0.171) 
Comm_Att 0.265***  0.162***  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  
Constant -2.261 6.538*** -1.887 5.985*** 
  (1.928) (1.712) (2.028) (1.722) 
Observations 379  379  
Wald chi2 117.06***  89.69***  
Pseudo R2 0.2748  0.2104  
F-test   4.78***   2.85** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 





B.6 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Health Affordability Model 
  
Variables 







Individual Characteristics    
lgAge -0.074 1.633** 0.064 1.628** 
 (0.287) (0.758) (0.282) (0.755) 
lgEdu -0.122 0.172 0.038 0.214 
 (0.127) (0.379) (0.141) (0.389) 
Paddy -0.469*** -0.969** -0.135 -0.735* 
 (0.171) (0.415) (0.154) (0.404) 
Orchard -0.279 0.348 -0.237 0.133 
 (0.237) (0.765) (0.232) (0.748) 
Cash_Crop 0.319* 0.020 -0.055 -0.048 
 (0.165) (0.440) (0.148) (0.413) 
Household Characteristics    
lgHHmem -0.229* 0.775** -0.179 0.775* 
 (0.134) (0.359) (0.127) (0.360) 
Dep_Rat -0.119 -0.146 0.097 -0.118 
 (0.081) (0.219) (0.071) (0.217) 
lgFarm_Size 0.230*** 1.710*** 0.405*** 1.768*** 
 (0.074) (0.216) (0.070) (0.216) 
Sav -0.082 0.941*** 0.222** 0.944*** 
 (0.113) (0.308) (0.107) (0.306) 
Farm_Ass -0.173 -0.571* 0.146 -0.561 
 (0.117) (0.343) (0.114) (0.345) 
Land -0.388** -0.850* -0.033 -0.724* 
 (0.180) (0.448) (0.167) (0.438) 
Oth_loan -1.83e-07  0.392*** 0.483 
, Cre_Use (2.94e-07)  (0.130) (0.375) 
Ext_Acc 0.800***  0.384***  
 (0.122)  (0.122)  
Commer 0.083 1.131** -0.140 1.051** 
 (0.129) (0.510) (0.170) (0.480) 
Household Perception of Risks    
Pro_Risk -0.060 -0.183 -0.097 -0.172 
 (0.075) (0.191) (0.069) (0.190) 
Mkt_Risk -0.012 -0.179 0.101 -0.191 
 (0.078) (0.255) (0.075) (0.256) 
Fin_Risk 0.227*** -0.824*** 0.016 -0.853*** 
 (0.063) (0.190) (0.063) (0.190) 
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Geographical and Related Factors   
lgDis 0.291***    
 (0.056)    
Dist_N 0.355** -0.041 -0.232*  
 (0.144) (0.400) (0.132)  
Dist_S -0.161 -0.790* -0.340**  
 (0.150) (0.412) (0.134)  
AC_Rela 0.934***  0.658***  
 (0.147)  (0.161)  
AC_Vill 0.596*** -0.326 0.555*** -0.341 
  (0.173) (0.465) (0.157) (0.464) 
Comm_Att 0.250***  0.199***  
 (0.033)  (0.033)  
Constant -2.268 1.680 -3.419*** 0.681 
  (1.388) (3.634) (1.409) (3.70) 
Observations 839  839  
Wald chi2 249.91***  158.65***  
Pseudo R2 0.3153  0.1903  
F-test   11.46***   12.02*** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 




B.7 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for School Enrolment Model 
Variables 









Individual Characteristics    
Age_Yr 0.124** 0.027***  0.026*** 
 (0.052) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Age_Sq -0.001**    
 (0.0005)    
Edu_Yr -0.020 0.018 -0.026 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) 
Household Characteristics    
Hhmem 0.035 -0.275*** -0.120** -0.259*** 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) 
Dep_Rat -0.0043 -0.561*** 0.068 -0.581*** 
 (0.114) (0.107) (0.099) (0.107) 
Farm_Si 0.014**  0.019*** -0.001 
 (0.006)  (0.006) (0.003) 
Farm_Sq -4.76e-05  -7.64e-05**  
 (2.94e-05)  (3.81e-05)  
Inc_PU -0.172 0.076  0.076 
 (0.200) (0.209)  (0.214) 
Oth_loan, 1.04e-07 1.58e-06 0.168 0.047 
Cre_use (2.65e-07) (1.13e-06) (0.180) (0.198) 
Ext_Acc 0.661***  0.408**  
 (0.179)  (0.186)  
Land    0.319 
    (0.237) 
Household Perception of Risks    
Pro_Risk -0.106  -0.262***  
 (0.099)  (0.100)  
Mkt_Risk -0.025  0.004  
 (0.111)  (0.119)  
Fin_Risk 0.107  -0.045  
 (0.082)  (0.086)  
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Geographical and Related Factors   
Dis_Town 0.024***    
 (0.008)    
Dist_N   -0.273  
   (0.181)  
Dist_S   -0.614***  
   (0.193)  
AC_Rela 0.906*** -0.307 0.911***   
  (0.205) (0.250) (0.251)   
AC_Vill 0.775***   0.645*** 0.017 
  (0.234)   (0.223) (0.230) 
Comm_Att 0.249***  0.152***  
 (0.045)  (0.046)  
Constant -5.536*** 1.492** -0.768 1.016 
  (1.513) (0.654) (0.634) (0.652) 
Observations 380 380 380 381 
Wald chi2 111.93*** 52.40*** 70.22*** 55.34*** 
Pseudo R2 0.2504 0.1770 0.1825 0.1683 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 





B.8 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Adoption of Improved Farm 
Technologies and Practice Model 
Variables 









Individual Characteristics    
Age_Yr 0.084** 0.051 0.087** 0.045 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Age_Sq -0.0008** -0.0004 -0.0008** -0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Edu_Yr -0.024 0.030* 0.005 0.039** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) 
Sex -0.162 -0.094 -0.248** -0.019 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) 
Paddy -0.418***  -0.357**  
 (0.161)  (0.161)  
Orchard -0.050  -0.484**  
 (0.231)  (0.232)  
Cash_Crop 0.491***  0.524***  
 (0.153)  (0.154)  
Household Characteristics    
Farm_Mem -0.0008 -0.048 0.105* -0.025 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063) 
Farm_Si 0.012** -0.002 0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Farm_Sq -5.30e-05**  -1.61e-05  
 (2.61e-05)  (2.63e-05)  
Sav -0.239** 0.123 -0.031 0.183* 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.107) 
Farm_Ass -0.228**  -0.164 -0.651*** 
 (0.110)  (0.108) (0.121) 
Land -0.291* -0.048 0.135 -0.072 
 (0.176) (0.165) (0.179) (0.168) 
Inc_PU -0.115 -0.093 -0.064 -0.061 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.132) (0.132) 
Oth_loan, -2.75e-07  0.984*** 0.243** 
Cre_use (2.99e-07)  (0.123) (0.124) 
Ext_Acc 0.730***    
 (0.117)    
Irr_Acc  -0.093  -0.075 
  (0.108)  (0.111) 
Off_Farm  -0.132 0.141 -0.132 
  (0.123) (0.122) (0.127) 
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B.8 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Adoption of Improved 
Farm Technologies and Practice Model (cont.) 
 
Variables 










Household Perception of Risks    
Pro_Risk -0.034  0.059  
 (0.069)  (0.069)  
Mkt_Risk -0.049  -0.031  
 (0.072)  (0.075)  
Fin_Risk 0.201***  0.153**  
 (0.058)  (0.064)  
Weath  -0.011  -0.022 
  (0.059)  (0.059) 
Pest  0.086  0.080 
  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Soil  0.086*  0.076* 
  (0.046)  (0.045) 
Qual  0.082*  0.079* 
  (0.044)  (0.045) 
Geographical and Related Factors   
Dis_Town 0.020***    
 (0.005)    
Dist_N 0.403*** -0.098 0.439*** -0.102 
 (0.134) (0.133) (0.135) (0.136) 
Dist_S -0.121 -0.247* 0.129 -0.291** 
 (0.141) (0.137) (0.140) (0.141) 
AC_Rela 1.097*** 0.076 1.035*** 0.052 
  (0.138) (0.131) (0.145) (0.137) 
AC_Vill   0.732***  
   (0.177)  
Constant -3.419*** -1.062 -4.695*** -0.753 
  (1.075) (1.070) (1.135) (1.118) 
Observations 850 850 850 850 
Wald chi2 232.87*** 37.18*** 212.38*** 69.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.043 0.268 0.082 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 






B.9 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Household Health 
Accessibility Model 









Individual Characteristics    
Age_Yr -0.223 0.006 0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
Edu_Yr -0.030* 0.071*** 0.011 0.022*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) 
Paddy -0.452*** 0.474*** -0.097 0.139*** 
 (0.167) (0.161) (0.151) (0.046) 
Orchard -0.199 0.800*** -0.222 0.271*** 
 (0.239) (0.199) (0.146) (0.069) 
Cash_Crop 0.480*** 0.206 0.027 0.063 
 (0.161) (0.140) (0.146) (0.042) 
Household Characteristics    
Hhmem -0.045 0.057 -0.038 0.014 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.010) 
Dep_Rat -0.141* -0.006 0.090 0.004 
 (0.080) (0.069) (0.070) (0.020) 
Farm_Si 0.012*** -0.003 0.018*** -0.0009** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.0005) 
Farm_Sq -5.58e-05**  -7.09e-05***  
 (2.56e-05)  (2.75e-05)  
Farm_Ass -0.179  0.189*  
 (0.115)  (0.112)  
Land -0.333* -0.391** -0.035  
 (0.173) (0.152) (0.166)  
Oth_loan, -9.47e-08 5.66e-12 0.385*** 0.021 
Cre_Use (2.90e-07) (2.71e-07) (0.128) (0.033) 
Ext_Acc 0.773***  0.356***  
 (0.120)  (0.120)  
Commer   -0.067  
   (0.131)  
Inc_PU  0.330***  0.091** 
  (0.120)  (0.036) 
Household Perception of Risks   
Pro_Risk -0.078  -0.058  
 (0.071)  (0.061)  
Mkt_Risk -0.011  0.109  
 (0.077)  (0.073)  
Fin_Risk 0.224***  0.005  
 (0.062)  (0.061)  
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B.9 Result of a Valid Instrumental Variable for Household 
Health Accessibility Model (cont.) 
 









Geographical and Related Factors   
Dis_Town 0.020*** -0.002   
 (0.005) (0.005)   
Dist_N 0.413** -0.279** -0.175 -0.083** 
 (0.142) (0.137) (0.131) (0.039 
Dist_S -0.183 -0.015 -0.335*** 0.012 
 (0.151) (0.133) (0.132) (0.036) 
AC_Rela 1.002*** 0.125 0.667*** 0.014 
  (0.147) (0.128) (0.161) (0.036) 
AC_Vill 0.570***  0.570***  
 (0.173)  (0.154)  
Comm_Att 0.255***  0.182***  
 (0.031)  (0.031)  
Constant -1.879*** -1.933*** -2.657*** -0.198 
  (0.591) (0.455) (0.600) (0.130) 
Observations 850 850 839 850 
Wald chi2 251.74***  147.32***  
Pseudo R2 0.3038  0.1745  
F-test   69.79***   7.68*** 
Note:   1. *, **, and *** Indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 2. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 




Appendix C: Distribution and Mean Difference Test of Samples 
C.1 Distribution of Users and Non-Users by AC service Type 
District 
Credit Marketing Services Agricultural Extension Services 
User Non-User User Non-User User Non-User 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Pakchong 108 23.58 43 10.94 43 16.23 108 18.43 104 21.94 47 12.47 
Pakthongchai 32 6.99 95 24.17 30 11.32 97 16.55 40 8.44 87 23.08 
Phimai 56 12.23 20 5.09 26 9.81 50 8.53 59 12.45 17 4.51 
Nonsong 79 17.25 83 21.12 59 22.26 103 17.58 83 17.51 79 20.95 
Dankhunthod 122 26.64 98 24.94 90 33.96 130 22.18 123 25.95 97 25.73 
Buayai 61 13.32 54 13.74 17 6.42 98 16.72 65 13.71 50 13.26 
Total 458 100.00 393 100.00 265 100.00 586 100.00 474 100.00 377 100.00 




C.2 Result of the Mean Difference Test of Household Income between 
Paddy and Non-Paddy Farmer Groups 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 207 508,343 59,695 858,855 390,653 626,034 
1 644 227,500 8,377 212,584 211,050 243,950 
combined 851 295,813 16,350 476,959 263,722 327,904 
diff   280,843 60,280   162,026 399,660 
diff = mean (0) – mean (1)              t =   4.6590 
Ho: diff = 0                                        Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 214.167 
 
 Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff! = 0                   Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000           Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000           Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
C.3 Result of the Mean difference Test of Farm Income between Paddy and 
Non-Paddy Farmer Groups 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 207 378,710 59,508 856,167 261,388 496,032 
1 644 89,249 6,780 172,050 759,36 102,562 
combined 851 159,658 15,913 464,202 128,426 190,891 
diff   289,461 59,893   171,397 407,524 
 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                          t =   4.8330 
Ho: diff = 0                                       Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 211.371 
 Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff! = 0                   Ha: diff > 0 



















Non AC-Member AC-Member All Respondents 
Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Paddy 254 39.44% 390 60.56% 644 100% 
Average Household Income (S.E) 208,174 (204961) 240,087 (216,739) 227,500 (212,584) 
Average Farm Income (S.E) 53,960 (116,502) 112,232 (196,873) 89,249 (172,049) 
Cash Crop 52 16.15% 270 83.85% 322 100% 
Average Household Income (S.E) 372,852 (364,226) 387,417 (457,335) 385,066 (443,147) 
Average Farm Income (S.E) 237,349 (261,131) 273,008 (446,501) 267,249 421,988 
Orchard 25 46.30% 29 53.70% 54 100% 
Average Household Income (S.E) 662,698 (1,077,415) 726,664 (1,646,148) 697,050 (1,399,388) 
Average Farm Income (S.E) 567,124 (1,046,501) 600,012 (1,667,058) 584,786 (1,401,567) 
Other Crops 4 28.57% 10 71.43% 14 100% 
Average Household Income (S.E) 145,346 (55,145) 212,630 (25,025) 193,406 (24,110) 
Average Farm Income (S.E) 69,046 (28,912) 57,690 (25,704) 60,935 (19,592) 
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Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire 
Survey questionnaire for farm households’ participating in credit and non-credit 
support services of Agricultural Cooperatives (ACs) 
Respondent’s location: Province: _______________ 
District: ________________   
Town: __________________ 
Village: _________________ 
Instructions: For each question with brackets provided, please tick your answer(s); otherwise, please 
follow the instructions given to answer the questions. Your participation is voluntary and your answers 
will be kept confidential. 
 
Section 1. Accessibility to agricultural cooperatives (ACs) 
(for All Respondents) 
1. Is there an agricultural cooperative (AC) in your village?  
a. Yes  [ ]    b. No  [ ] 
2. Are any of your neighbours, friends, or relatives member of AC(s)?  
a. Yes  [ ]    b. No  [ ] 
3. Have you or any of your household members worked as a local government official or agricultural 
cooperative official?  
a. Yes  [ ]    b. No  [ ] 
4. Are you or any of your household members a member of an AC? 
a. Yes (please go to Q6) [ ]    b. No (please go to Q5) [ ] 
5. What is the reason you choose not to be an AC members? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Local AC is not available [ ] 
b. Expected benefit is questionable [ ] 
c. Self-farming condition is lower than requirement of AC [ ] 
d. Used to the traditional farming methods [ ] 
e. Lack of AC understanding [ ] 
f. Lack of trust in AC management [ ] 
g. AC services do not meet your need [ ] 
h. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
6. What associations do you belong to beside ACs? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Credit group [        ] b. Marketing group [        ] 
c. Saving group [        ] d. Other types of cooperatives [        ] 
e. Community group (e.g., group of temple) [        ] f. Other(s), please specify: ___________ 






Number: [            ] 




 Below is a series of statements pertaining to your attitude and perception toward farm risks and ACs. 
Please tick how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on a scale of 1 to 




 (2) (3) 
Neutral 
 (4) (5) 
SA 
Respondent’s attitude toward farm risks  
7. Adverse weather condition such as drought, freezes, or 
excessive rainfall at harvest or planting means my farm 
yield or output levels will be lower than projected 
     
8. Insect pests and disease negatively affect my farm yield and 
output despite control measures employed 
     
9. Infertile soil negatively affect my farm yield and output       
10. Failure of equipment and machinery such as an irrigation 
pump means my farm yield and output levels will be lower 
than projected  
     
11. Mechanical failure, failure of technical processes, and not 
willing to adopt new technology negatively affect my farm 
yields and outputs 
     
12. Late delivery of supplies and services negatively affect my 
farm yields and outputs 
     
13. Lower sales and prices due to increased numbers of 
competing growers mean the price I received will be less 
than expected  
     
14. Changes in consumer preferences means the price I 
received will be less than expected  
     
15. If my products fail to meet the market standards or 
packaging requirements, the price I received will be less 
than expected  
     
16. I lose the market for my products due to a wholesale buyer 
or processor relocating or closing  
     
17. Failure to access market information (price and demand 
movement) means my sale and price I received will be less 
than expected 
     
18. Insufficient cash to meet expected obligations, generating 
lower than expected profits, and losing equity in the farm 
negatively affect my production  
     
19. Increased input cost and higher interest rates negatively 
affect my production  
     
20. Excessive borrowing, higher cash demand for family needs, 
and lack of adequate cash or credit reserves negatively 
affect my production  
     
21. Failure to fulfil business agreements and contracts often carry 
a high cost 
     
22. A lack of people management skills and poor 
communications events can be devastating to a farm 
     
Respondent’s attitude toward AC benefit and performance 
23. I am satisfied with the overall management of AC      
24. ACs make farm operations more profitable than other 
alternatives  
     
25. ACs  increase my access to credit      
26. ACs are effective in supporting borrowers to spend loans 
for income generating activities 
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27. ACs can facilitate my access to farm inputs with fair price 
and standard service (e.g., good quality inputs, adequate 
supply, and punctual delivery) 
     
28. ACs can facilitate my access to product markets with fair 
price and standard service (e.g., accurate measurement 
and punctual payment,) 
     
29. ACs assist me to improve my farm production      
30. ACs are effective in introducing new farm technologies      
31. ACs increase my access to market information      
32. My closest networks (parents, relatives, friends, etc.) are 
satisfied with  ACs services or alike  
     
33. My decision to participate in an AC depends on experiences 
of neighbours, friends, and relatives 
     
Next please proceed to Section 2 for AC clients and section 3 for non-AC clients 
 
Section 2 Accessibility to AC credit and non-credit support services  
(for AC members)  
34. How far is your residence to the AC that you are member of? (please specify): ____________ km. 
35. How many shares do you have in an AC? (please specify): ____________ baht 
36. How many years have you been an AC member? (please specify): ____________ years 
37. Which other services offered by the AC did you receive over the last 2 years? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Credit in term of cash [ ] b. Credit in term of noncash [ ] 
c. Savings and deposits [ ] d. Input supply/Purchasing service [ ] 
e. Marketing service [ ] f. Agricultural extension services [ ] 
g. Food processing service [ ] h. Farm insurance 
i. Other(s), please specify: ____________ 
38. How does an AC assist you to increase your household members’ education and health?           
(You may tick more than one) 
a. AC provides funds for education expenditure [       ] 
b. AC provides funds for medicine expenditure [       ] 
c. AC provides credit related to education  [       ] 
d. AC provides credit related to health [       ] 
e. AC provides the facilities on education for members (e.g., training centers) [       ] 
f. AC provides the facilities on health care for members (e.g., health centers) [       ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________ [       ] 
39. Did you borrow loans from any ACs in the year 2015?  
a. Yes (please go to Q41)              [  ] b. No (please go to Q40)          [         ] 
40. If No in Q39, why didn’t you borrow loans from ACs? (You may tick more than one)  
a. Have enough savings/earnings from other sources [       ] 
b. Lack of information [       ] 
c. Do not qualify for AC requirement [       ] 
d. Afraid of having a debt [       ] 
e. Too many required documents to submit [       ] 
f. Lack of collateral [       ] 
g. Interest rates were not affordable [       ] 
h. Uncertainty in repaying the financing/ Lack of ability to pay back the loan [       ] 
i. Incurred previous financing(s) or bad financing record [       ] 
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j. Credit application process takes too much time [       ] 
k. Other(s), please specify ________________  
Next go to Q49 
 
41. If Yes in Q39, what was the purpose of your loans? (You may tick more than one) 
Agricultural activities  
a. Expenditure for farm inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, pesticides)  [ ] 
b. Farm investment (e.g. preparing land and water source [ ] 
c. Purchase of farm assets (e.g. farm machine, land)                                                                                                                                                                              [ ] 
d. Expenditure for operation or running business (e.g., employees and utilities) [ ] 
e. Expenditure for sale and product processing (e.g., information cost, 
transportation cost, and cost for food processing) 
[ ] 
f. Livestock raising [ ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
Non-agricultural activities  
a. Small investment/trade  [ ] 
b. Pay for children’s education [ ] 
c. Purchasing durable assets (e.g. TV, car) [ ] 
d. Housing (e.g. repair, construction) [ ] 
e. Emergency (e.g. medical, hospitalisation) [ ] 
f. Paying off other debts [ ] 
g. Consumption [ ] 
h. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
42. What was the total loan amount borrowed from the AC in 2015? (please specify): ________baht 
43. What was the duration of your AC loans in 2015? (please specify): ____________ months 
44. What was the loan interest rate charged by the AC in 2015? (please specify): _____ percent/year 
45. Does your loan(s) require collateral(s)?  
a. Yes (please go to Q46)              [ ] b. No (please go to Q47)      [ ] 
46. If Yes in Q45, what kind of collateral(s) was required? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Mortgage property (e.g. house, land) [ ] 
b. Chattels mortgage (e.g. vehicles, farm equipment) [ ] 
c. Promissory note [ ] 
d. Co-signer/co-guarantor [ ] 
e. Deposits [ ] 
f. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
47. Did you borrow from other financial institution(s) in 2015?  
a. Yes (please go to Q48)                  [       ]  b. No (please go to Q49)               [       ] 
48. What was the amount of additional loan borrowed from other sources in 2015? (please specify): 
_____baht 
49. Did you buy farm inputs, particularly seeds, sapling, fertilizers, agro chemical and pesticides 
from an AC in year 2016? 
a. Yes  (please go to Q51) [       ] b. No (please go to Q50) [       ] 
50. If No in Q49, what are your reasons for not buying farm materials from an AC? (You may tick 
more than one)  
a. Inadequate supply  [       ] b. High price [       ] 
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c. Late delivery [       ] d. Absence of buying on credit [       ] 
e. Inappropriate time for instalment [       ] f. Poor material quality [       ] 
g. Did not meet my need [       ] h. Other(s), please specify: ____________ 
Next go to Q55 
51. If Yes in Q49, what farm inputs did you buy via an AC in year 2016? (You may fill more than one) 
Farm inputs Quantity (kg.) Cost (baht) 
a. Seeds and Sapling                     [     ] [     ] 
b. Fertilizers                                   [     ] [     ] 
c. Pesticides or agro chemical                                    [     ] [     ] 
d. Fuel for farm machines [     ] [     ] 
e. Farm materials [     ] [     ] 
f. Others (please specify):__________________ [     ] [     ] 
52. How did you pay for the farm inputs purchased via ACs? 
a. By cash            [        ] b. On credit        [        ] c. Part of cash and part of credit [        ] 
53. Did you buy farm inputs from other suppliers in 2016?  
a. Yes  (please go to Q54) [        ] b. No (please go to Q55) [      ] 
54. Which suppliers did you buy farm inputs from? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Dealers (retailer or wholesaler) [      ] b. Private company [      ] 
c. State agency [      ] d. Other(s), please specify: ___________ 
55. Did you sell your farm products via an AC in year 2016? 
a. Yes  (please go to Q57) [       ] b. No (please go to Q56) [      ] 
56. If No in Q55, what are your reasons for not selling products via an AC? (You may tick more than one) 
a. AC does not provide marketing service [       ] 
b. AC does not provide an accurate measurement [       ] 
c. AC does not provide a fair price [       ] 
d. AC requires high quality products [       ] 
e. AC does not deliver your farm products to markets [       ] 
f. AC limits number of time for a trade  [       ] 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
Next go to Q62 
 
57. If yes in Q55, how many kilograms of farm products did you sell via an AC in 2016? (please 
specify):_____ kg 
58. What was price received from selling products via an AC in 2016? (please specify):_____baht/kg 
59. Have you received delayed payment in selling your farm products via an AC?  
a. Yes   [      ] b. No  [      ] 
60. In 2016, did you sell your farm products via other marketing channels?  
a. Yes (please go to Q61)  [      ] b. No (please go to Q62) [      ] 
61. Which other marketing channels did you sell your farm products in 2016? (You may tick more 
than one) 
a. Individual selling [      ] b. Dealer (retailer or wholesaler) [      ] 
c. Supermarket [      ] d. Exporter [      ] 
e. Agriculture industry [      ] f. State agency [      ] 
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g. Agricultural future exchange [      ] h. Other(s), please specify: ____________ 
62. Did you participate in agricultural extension service provided by an AC in year 2016? 
a. Yes  (please proceed to section 3) [      ] b. No (please go to Q63) [      ] 
63. If No in Q62, what are your reasons for not joining agricultural extension services provided by 
AC? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Lack of information (e.g. place, time) [       ] b. Lack of continuous support [       ] 
c. Lack of facilities [       ] d. Lack of specialists [       ] 
e. Inconvenience time [       ] f. Knowledge is difficult to 
implement  
[       ] 
g. Inconvenience place (far from my 
place) 
[       ] h. Methodology of teaching is 
not effective 
[       ] 
i. Content of extension services did 
not meet my need 
[       ] j. Other(s), please specify: 
____________ 
Next please proceed to Section 3 
Section 3. General farm information 
 (for All Respondents)  
64. What is/are major crop(s) that you grow? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Paddy [       ] b. Rubber [       ] 
c. Sugarcane [       ] d. Cassava [       ] 
e. Maize/Corn [       ] f. Soybean [       ] 
g. Fruits [       ] h. Vegetables [       ] 
i. Flowers [       ] j. Oilseeds [       ] 
k. Other(s), please specify: ______________ 
65. How long have you been farming? (total working period includes this year) (please specify): 
____________  years  
66. The number of household members participating in farm activities is: ………………….. persons 
67. Do you or your household members participate in off-farm work? 
a. Yes   [       ] b. No  [       ] 
68. The area of your cultivated land in year 2016 is (please specify): ____________ hectares 
69. What is the status of your farmland ownership? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Owned my land [       ] b. Rental land [       ] 
c. Lease land [       ] d. Other(s), please specify: ___________ 
70. The area of cultivated land in year 2014 was (please specify): ______ hectares  
71. In 2016, what is the cost of your farm production including farm materials and equipment, soil 
maintenance, land rent, wage for non‐family labour, and transportation? (please specify): ______ baht 
72. What were the amount of farm inputs you use for the years 2014 and 2016? (please estimate): 
  2014 2016 
Seeds Quantity used (kg.)   
Expenditure (baht/ year)   
Fertilizers Quantity use (kg.)   
Expenditure (baht/ year)   
Pesticides/ Agro 
chemical 
Quantity use (kg.)   
Expenditure (baht/ year)   
Others (please 
specify):_____________ 
Quantity use (kg.)   
Expenditure (baht/ year)   
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Remark: if the unit of fertilizers is in a bag, please ask how much a bag weighs _________kg. 
73. What were your farm output and sale for the years 2014 and 2016? (please estimate): 
Year 2014 2016 
Yields (kg)   
Sale (kg)   
Product price (baht/kg)   
Margin price (baht/kg)   
Note: Margin price is product price minus cost of production (baht/kg) 
74. How far is your farm to the nearest market or township? (please specify): _________ km. 
75. Did you need to borrow money in year 2015? 
a. Yes (please go to Q76) [ ]    b. No (please go to Q80) [ ] 
76. Were you able to get the financing in year 2015? 
a. Yes (please go to Q77) [ ]    b. No (please go to Q80) [ ] 
77. If Yes in Q76, what was the total loan amount you were able to borrow in 2015? (please specify): _____baht 
78. Which source(s) of financing did you obtain your loan? (You may tick more than one)  
1. Formal sources  2. Informal sources  
a. Bank for Agriculture and agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC)                                         
[      ] a. Private money lender                                  
 
[ ] 
b. Commercial banks (e.g. Krung Thai Bank, 
Siam Commercial Bank)                                              
[      ] b. Middlemen                                                    [ ] 
c. Village funds                                                       [      ] c. Input supplier                                                [ ]
d. Agricultural cooperatives (ACs)                       [      ] d. Friends/neighbours                                                            [ ]
e. Farmer’s groups or saving groups                   [      ] e. Relatives                                                         [     ]
f. Other government agencies (e.g., 
Revolving loan fund for farmers and the 
poor)              
[      ] f. Other(s), please 
specify: ________                                                   
 
g. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
79. How far is it from your residence to the nearest credit source? (please specify): _______ km.  
80. Have you participated in agricultural extension services provided by any agents in 2016?  
a. Yes (please go to Q81)  [ ]    b. No (please go to Q82) [ ] 
81. How many time did you participate in agricultural extension services last year? (please specify): 
______ times 
The following questions ask you to compare changes of your household welfare on education and 
health for the years 2014 and 2016. If you think that in 2016, your household welfare has been 
significantly improved then it means “Extremely increased”, if you think that your household welfare 








82. Adoption of  new technologies and modern farm 
material in farming  
   
83. Level of farm knowledge (e.g., farm production and 
management)  
   
84. Accessibility to hospitals or health centres    
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Next please proceed to Section 4 
Section 4. Socioeconomic and production characteristics 
 (for All Respondents)  
 
85. What is your gender? 
a. Male [       ] b. Female [       ] 
86. Which age group do you belong to? 
a. Less than or equal to 25 years old [       ] 
b. 26-35 years old [       ] 
c. 36-45 years old [       ] 
d. 46-55 years old6 [       ] 
e. 56-65 years old [       ] 
f. Over 66 years old [       ] 
87. What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married [        ] b.  Married/ Living together [        ] 
c. Widowed [        ] d. Divorced/Separated [        ] 
88. What is your highest educational qualification?  
a. No education [        ] b. Primary school [        ] 
c. Middle school [        ] d. High school [        ] 
e. Vocational training [        ] f. Bachelor degree [        ] 
g. Postgraduate (Postgraduate 
Diploma, Masters or Ph.D. 
degree) 
[        ] h. Other(s), please specify: ________ 
89. How many people are there in your household? (please specify)  
For year 2014: ______ persons, for year 2016: ______ persons 
90. In 2016, what is the number of dependency in your household (over 64 years of age and under 
15 years of age)? _______ persons 
91. How many schooling children do you have in your household? (please specify) 
For year 2014: ______ persons, for year 2016: ______ persons 
92. The number of income earners in your household is: ____________ persons. 
93. What kind of household assets do you own? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Savings  [        ] b. Car or pick‐up [         ] 
c. Motorcycle [        ] d. Bicycle [         ] 
e. Telephone or mobile phone [        ] f. Household appliances (e.g. TV, radio)  [         ] 
g. Computer [        ] h. House [         ] 
i. Other(s), please specify: ____________  
94. What kind of production assets do you own? (You may tick more than one) 
a. Farmland  [         ] 
b. Livestock (e.g., cow, buffalo, pig, chicken, and duck) [         ] 
c. Agricultural tools (reaping hook, plough, sprayer, digger, harrow, etc.) [         ] 
d. Farm machinery (four‐wheel tractor, hand tractor, trailer, tiller, irrigation pump, etc.) [         ] 
e. rice mill/ warehouse [         ] 





95. How much was your annual household income? (please specify the estimated income)  
Income (baht/year) 2014 2016 
1. Total household income   
2. Net farm income including both cash and noncash   
3. Non‐farm income    
4. other incomes    
96. How much was your annual household expenditure? (please specify the estimated expenditure) 
Consumption (baht/year) 2014 2016 
1. Food expenditure (e.g. food, drink)   
2. Non‐food expenditure   
a. Health care expenditure   
b. Education expenditure   
c. Household appliance expenditure   











Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have further 
comments about credit card, please feel free to comment in the space provided below. Once again, we 
assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
